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SYNOPSIS 
An important problem in modern international law is the creation of a 
secure environment for the flow of private foreign investment This is because 
the economic development of Third Wodd countries requires foreign capital and 
skills, to enable them to develop their natural resources. This is especially true 
of the development of the economies of oil exporting countries, because such 
capital and skills can only be attracted if a secure investment climate is provided. 
Recently, a number of legal measures have been taken to ensure the 
legal security of foreign investment, by bilateral and multilateral agreements, by 
international conventions and organi;!:ations, and by legal guarantees provided 
by States requiring foreign capital and skills. 
The primary focus of this thesis is on the legal problems that arise in the 
case of disputes between capital-importing States and the providers of that 
capital. Specifically, the study is an enquiry into the law governing oil concession 
agreements and the permanent sovereignty of oil exporting States over their 
natural resources. 
One view has been that investment protection disputes should be made 
subject to the rules of international law, e.g. by choice of law clauses invoking 
international law or the general principles of law. However, most Third World 
countries believe that such disputes should be subject to local jurisdiction, at 
least as between capital importing States and foreign investors. This opinion h~ 
been supported by United Nations resolutions since 1952. 
This thesis concludes that the most applicable law to govern oil 
concession agreements is the law having the closest connection with the 
agreement, as no one law can be made compulsory in every case. Further, 
international law has recognized the sovereignty of a State and its right to 
nationalize natural resources in its territory, on condition that, for a public 
purpose, non-discrimination and compensation is paid according to whatever the 
international standard of compensation may be. 
iii 
Traditionally it has been considered unlawful for a State to nationalize 
foreign propeny; if this is done it must be accompanied by restitution in kind or 
if this is impossible, full payment of the value plus any losses sustained. This 
principle is known as the Hull rule; it is summarized by the formula that 
compensation must be "adequate, prompt and effective". On the other hand, 
Third World countries generally argue that nationalization is legal, providing 
"adequate" or "appropriate" compensation is paid. 
This thesis also examines these issues as they arise under Islamic 
Shari'ah. The thesis concludes that under the principle of Durura in Islamic 
Shari'ah, a State may nationalize its resources, when prompted by the necessity 
of ensuring the continued development of the State, and in the interests of its 
community. Thus the position under Islamic Shari' ah is thus not very different 
from the position under international law. 
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PART I - INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Aim of The Thesis 
1 
In past centuries there existed a relative self-sufficiency in the states of 
the world, with little need for economic transactions between them. Thus there 
were relatively few disputes and no impetus to establish a system of conflict of 
laws. However, as contact between states increased and expanded, trade created 
economic interdependency. The need arose to establish means of settling 
international disputes, including international commercial disputes. This need 
was particularly acute in relation to agreements to exploit the natural resources 
of another country - that is, concession agreements. The status and effect of these 
agreements is the focus of this thesis. 
Part I will outline the aim of this thesis, offer a definition of the various 
kinds of concession agreements, and outline the development of concession 
agreements, particularly where they are concerned with the relationship between 
oil exporting and oil importing countries. This will be followed by looking at the 
legal nature of oil concession agreements in various legal systems. 
In the second Part of this thesis I will look at issues involved in the 
choice of law and forum in governing contracts, and at what these issues imply 
for oil concession agreements in particular. I will then look at the issues involved 
in the choice of State law as the substantive law of a contract between a State 
and a national of another State. This discussion will include those cases where 
the choice of law is not specified, and will deal with the question whether 
principles of international law or general principles of law can be applied either 
as the proper law or to augment the proper law. These issues particularly arise 
between developing countries and capital exporting States. 
2 
Traditionally. capital exporting countries have argued for the need for the 
application of general principles of law or of international law, on the grounds 
that host States do not possess a legal system sufficiently sophisticated to deal 
with the complex legal questions that arise out of international transactions, and 
also that as it is possible for a State to alter its own laws during a contract, using 
only that State's law poses unacceptable risks to the foreign party. These risks, 
it is argued, can only be averted through the use of international law or general 
principles of law. 
By contrast, in resolving the problem of the applicable law the opinion 
of developing countries is likely to differ from those of the First World. To 
developing countries the most applicable law must be the national law of the 
state party. This conflict is seen repeatedly in disputes over oil concession 
agreements, where the failure of some international jurists to take into account 
the rights of developing countries has led since the 1950's to much discussion in 
the United Nations and other international forums. These rights were seen to 
evolve at the same time as the rise of OPEC, OAPEC and national oil 
companies, with the concomitant economic pressure they proved to be able to 
exert, and because of the solidarity of the Third World countries committed to 
re-formulating the rules of the international legal order. 
Part III of this thesis looks at the stabilization of oil 
concession agreements. This involves a discussion of the emerging recognition 
of the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as Third World 
countries struggle to regain control over their natural resources. This trend for 
national economic control is a characteristic of the world in the 20th century. 
But so is greater economic interdependence among nations, and the question is, 
how are the two to be reconciled? 
The question of oil concession agreements has had a high profile in the 
last twenty years, due to the numbers of unresolved conflicts which have had both 
national and international relevance. To oil producing countries, their extreme 
economic dependence on this resource has meant that oil has played a great role 
in domestic policy formulations. The oil producing countries demanded an 
increasing degree of control over their resources. By the end of 1951 they were 
3 
demanding 50% share of profits with the companies operating the concessions. 
Therefore, there was a trend to establish full ownership of petroleum enterprises, 
a trend made explicit by OPEC in 1968 when it emphasised the inalienable right 
of all States to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.1 
And, as we will see, their right to control their resources has been recognized 
both in treaties and in numerous United Nations resolutions. 
This thesis also makes special reference to the Islamic Shari'ah, the 
legal system of the Arabic nation, which is also the national law of a number of 
the most important oil producing States. Islamic Shari'ah is described as a 
comprehensive legal system which for more than one thousand years has been 
capable of dealing with foreign people and with conflicts that have arisen in 
dealings with them. An analysis of Islamic Shari'ah shows that it is substantially 
consistent with modern developments in international law. Accordingly, this 
thesis attempts to justify the position of oil exporting countries of the Third 
World, with particular reference to those which rely on the Islamic Shari'ah, in 
exerting increasing control over their natural resources. 
2. Structure of this Thesis 
To give effect to this general aim, the thesis has the following particular 
structure. 
In Chapter One I define oil concession agreements, referring to the 
nature of the agreement under different legal systems and the development of 
relationships between oil importing and oil exporting countries. 
In Chapter Two the implications of choice of law and forum on oil 
concession agreements will be analysed. 
In Chapter Three I will discuss the dispute settlement mechanisms in 
some oil exporting countries. 
1 OPEC General Information & Chronology (1986) 36. 
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In Chapter Four I will analyse the various limitations that may exist on 
choice of law and forum. The freedom of the parties to choose the proper law 
or forum is not absolute, since certain limitations on the parties' choice have 
been recognised by judicial decisions and international treaties. 
In Chapter Five I will look at the many laws applicable to oil concession 
agreements and the use of the notion of "the most real connection" as the basis 
of resolving the problem of choice of law. 
In Chapter Six I will discuss the development of the concept of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the implications of its 
acceptance. Then I will compare the international concept with the concept as 
it is understood in Islamic Shari'ah. 
In Chapter Seven I will discuss the issues related to fundamental change 
of circumstances as they pertain to the renegotiation of oil concession agreements 
and the effect of stabilization clauses, while in Chapter Eight I will discuss the 
issues related to fundamental change of circumstances and contract termination 
in Islamic Shari'ah. 
In Chapter Nine I will discuss the issue of expropriation of foreign-owned 
property, with special regard to oil concession agreements and the right of States 
to control their natural resources. 
In Chapter Ten I will discuss the problem of the payment of 
compensation and the varying standards that have been used in such cases. The 
conflict between the demands of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, 
which may pose intolerable demands on developing countries, and the Third 
World position of appropriate compensation will be discussed. 
Of course it is recognized that the various differences in the positions of 
capital-importing and capital-exporting countries, of industrialized and Third 
World countries, which are discussed here, are not simply legal or doctrinal 
differences. They relate to the cultural values, economic position and political 
history of the countries concerned. But those differences are often expressed, 
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and fought out, in legal terms, and the legal doctrines have thus been a vehicle 
for communication and accommodation, as well as change. For these reasons it 
is useful to study the various legal doctrines themselves, and this will be done 
here. 
3. The Nature of Concession Agreements 
The legal nature of concession agreements between the government of 
a state and an individual or a business association has been much discussed. The 
importance to the world economy of the concession system, especially where it 
involves the exploitation of oil and basic minerals, largely accounts for this 
interest. Concessions typically owned or at least partly owned by foreign 
nationals can be found in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and in other 
countries. Here I briefly discuss the definition and kinds of concession 
agreements. 
(a) Definition of "Concession" in General 
The term concession implies the granting of a franchise, license, patent, 
charter, monopoly or privilege to a national or foreign company by a state within 
an exclusive area of its land for a period of time. Thus the term is a broad one, 
as was indicated in German Government v. Reparations Commission (1924) where 
the Arbitral Tribunal, in attempting to interpret article 260 of the Treaty of 
Versailles, stated "the concept of the concession is very wide and varied; it may 
extend, according to t)le legislations and the doctrines concerned, from the grant 
of titles of nobility or of a burial ground, to that of certain public functions 
involving, for instance, the right to expropriate or the right to regulate".2 By 
contrast Gidel adopted this definition: 
A contract by which one or several persons are engaged to 
execute a work on the consideration of being remunerated for 
their effort and expenses, not by a sum of money paid directly 
to them by the administration after the completion of the work, 
2 Annual Digest of International Law Cases (1923-1924) 341. 
but by a receipt of a return levied for a more or less length~ 
period of time on the individuals who profit from the work .... 
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These definitions are rather variable, and it may not be possible to go 
further than Mosler, who defined a concession as "the grant to an individual of 
rights under municipal law which touch the public interest" and stated that 
beyond this term "concession" has no fixed legal meaning.4 Thus in the 
Arbitration between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Aramco of 1958, the 
Arbitrator stated: 
the legal nature of economic concessions is not the same in the 
case of public service concessions, or of pure public works 
concessions, or of concessions for the occupation of the public 
domain or the exploitation of State resources, or of port 
concessions, or of concessions of water works or of land, for 
instance in the colonies, or, lastly, of mining concessions. It does 
not seem possible to subsume all these various concessions under 
a common concept; This was recognised by the French Conseil 
d'Etat in its opinion of 19 and 26 December 1907 about various 
questions relating to mining concession.... Finally, the legal 
nature of the concession is not the same in the different systems 
of law.5 
(b) Different Kinds of Concession Agreements 
Concession agreements may take several forms, including economic 
concessions and political concessions. Economic concessions cover a variety of 
business enterprises, among the most important of which are oil concession 
agreements, especially in the Middle East, which contains the world's largest oil 
reserves. 
There are two main areas that typically become the subject of concession 
agreements. These are (i) public utilities and (ii) the exploitation of natural 
resources, although it is possible for most kinds of economic activity to be the 
3 Gidel, Des Effets de /'Annexion sur les Concessions (1904) 123, quoted by DP O'Connell, 
The Law of State Succession (1956) 106. 
4 H Mosler, Wirtschaftskonzessionen bei Anderung der Staatshoheit 79 (1948), quoted by T 
Huang, Some International & Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question. AJIL 5! (1957) 
291. 
5 Il.JI. 27 (1963) 157. See also DP O'Connell, !()6.. 7 & KS Carlston, Concession Agreements 
and Nationalization AJIL 52 (1958), 260 for other definitions. 
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subject of a concession agreement. Public utilities include cables, telegraphs, 
shipping, roads and air travel. Natural resources cover not only petroleum but 
also minerals, coal, timber, rubber and agricultural products.6 But as Huang 
points out 
In the more important concessions the principal grant may be 
supplemented by auxiliary rights, such as rights over land, right 
of eminent domain, exception from taxation and customs dues 
for a stipulated period, or for the duration of the concession, 
right to exploit mines together with the operation of railways, 
stations and other appurtenances.7 · 
But in addition to economic concessions, there can be political concessions 
agreements typically contained in a treaty, as was the case when China conceded 
the Chinese Eastern Railway to Russia, the Shantung Railway and the Port of 
Kiauchau to Germany, part of the Port of Tientsin to Belgium, and Weihaiwei 
to Britain.8 However such political concessions are now more or less obsolete, 
and will not be further discussed in this thesis. 
For present purposes a concession agreement can thus be defined as an 
economic development agreement which is bilateral in nature, i.e. it implies 
mutuality of obligation.9 This point was emphasized by Lord McNair as follows: 
These contracts are entered into for many purposes and bear 
many names. Amongst the purposes may be mentioned the 
development of oil or other mineral resources; the laying of 
pipe-lines for oil; the development of an uncultivated area for 
the purposes of agriculture or forestry and perhaps they are best 
described as "economic development agreements". They are 
often called "concessions", but the objection to this term is that 
it is apt to conceal the bilateral character of the transaction, and 
moreover it is often used, popularly, to denote the area in 
respect of which the agreement is made.10 
6 Huang, 292-3. 
7 Id, 293. 
8 Encyclopaedia Britannica, V1 (1958) 201. 
9 JN Hyde, Economic Development Agreement, Hague Recueil 15 (1%2 1) 105,267. 
10 Lord McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, BYIL 33 
(1957) 1. 
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Economic concession agreements are a unique type of contract between a State 
and a company. They are used to facilitate the use of private enterprise in the 
development of a State's resources where the State does not have sufficient 
resources · to do it alone. 
However, they are not necessarily ordinary agreements, ruled by the law 
of a State. Difficulties can therefore arise from their mixed nature, though 
Olmstead notes that "such agreements are limited in subject matter to the extent 
that the terms must not provide for performance inconsistent with international 
standards".n The relationship of the parties is seen as more an association "in 
which the equality of the parties is the rule" .12 It is common that recourse to 
arbitration in the event of conflict is included in such concession agreements. 
Relying on these kinds of arguments, foreign oil companies have often reiterated 
the view that oil concession agreements are not government contracts, but 
international agreements. According to this view the concession is therefore 
outside the jurisdiction of a State's regulatory powers. However, these assertions 
have not been supponed: by looking at French and other authorities, it can be 
shown that such concessions were considered a public service concession subject 
to the jurisdiction of the State.13 Moreover, the view that economic concession 
agreements are autonomous instruments of an international character has little 
apparent legal authority and very few cases have relied on that view, Texaco 
being the disputed exception. "The most fundamental problem is to locate 
sufficient authority in suppon of the view that the agreements are directly 
governed by international law" ,14 where one party is an individual or company. 
This view was expressed in the Anglo Iranian Oil Company Case, where the 
International Coun referred to an oil concession agreement as "nothing more 
than a concessionary contract" between a State and a foreign company.15 
II CJ Olmstead, Economic Development Agreements Part II, 49, California Law Review, 
(1961) 507. 
12 M Bourquin, Arbitration & Economic Development Agreements, The Business Lawyer 
15 (1960) 860. 
13 H Sultan, Legal Nature of Oil Concessions, Revue Egyplienne De Droil Inlernational 21 
(1965) 73. 
14 EJ Paassivirta, Parlicipalion of S1a1es in Imernalional Comraels and lhe Arbilral Settlemenl 
of Dispules (Cambridge, PhD thesis, 1988) 80. 
15 ICJ Repons (1952) 112. 
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Similarly, in the Letco Case where the tribunal decided that most appropriate law 
was the law of Liberia, the place of performance of the contract. 16 
(c) The Development of Relations Between Oil Producing and Importing 
Countries 
In the immediate post-war period, developed countries sought to be 
assured that their interests in the exploitation of foreign natural resources were 
protected. A mutual dependence of interests existed between oil companies and 
their home governments, at a time when developing countries were coming to 
rely increasingly on oil as an energy source. The role of the exporting countries 
was that of tax collector. "They were not in a position to participate in any 
decision regarding the operations of the oil industry within their national 
borders". 17 
By the early 1970s the position of oil producing countries changed to that 
of real oil exponers. Co-ordinated by the newly established Organization of 
Petroleum Exponing Countries (OPEC), they began to take increasing control 
over both the production and distribution of oil. This change of status was 
emphasised by the Arab oil embargo from October 1973 to March 1974. This 
change of status met with considerable hostility from western governments and 
the western press. This hostility led to the creation of the International Energy 
Agency after the Washington Energy Conference of 1974. The lEA was a 
powerful group of oil imponing countries, with an advisory committee of national 
and international companies belonging to lEA countries. 
OPEC was, however, successful in raising the price of oil in October 
1973, one day before the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exponing Countries 
(OAPEC) imposed an embargo on oil expons to the United States because of its 
suppon for Israel in its war with the Arabic nation. That embargo can be seen 
as an irnponant stage in the continuing differences between oil exporting and 
imponing countries. Imponing countries need to obtain cheaper oil to sustain 
and expand their own development, and foreign oil companies wish to continue 
16 ILM 26 (1987) 661. 
17 AA Attiga, Interdependence on the Oil Bridge, Risks and Opportunities, 1988,56-8. 
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their domination of oil resources in producing countries. Exporting countries 
need a price for oil which will sustain their desire for internal development and 
international sovereignty. This goal is supported, as we will discuss in Part III, 
Chapters 6 and 9 of this thesis, by international law and United Nations 
resolutions. 
4. The Legal Nature of Oil Concession Agreements 
In this section I will outline the legal nature of oil concessions in the 
different legal systems as follows: 
(a) Under civil law 
(b) Under common law 
(c) Under former Soviet law 
(d) Under Islamic Shari'ah (law) 
(a) Under Civil Law 
Under French law and in countries which adhere to the civil law a 
concession might be classified in two different ways: 
(1) as a contract under private Jaw dealing with commercial or industrial 
matters. 
(2) as a unilateral administrative act. 
Jeze stated that: 
... the fact of its having been solicited by the grantee does not 
suffice to turn it into a contract... the concession is an 
act-condition which subjects the concessionaire to an objective 
and impersonal legal regime, a fact which implies the existence 
of laws and regulations pursuant to which the concession is 
granted.18 
Despite this it is customary in French Jaw to consider that any concession 
is contractual in nature. There are three major types of concession: 
18 Quoted by the Saudi Arabia Govemment & Aramco Arbitration (1958) ILR 27 (1963) 159. 
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(I) A public service concession, which is sometimes considered to have a 
dual legal nature. As between the parties is a contract between the 
grantor and the concessionary; as against users, it is considered a public 
law regulation. 
(2) A pure public works concession, by which a concessionaire undertakes 
to build, maintain and manage public works and receive remuneration 
resulting from this exploitation. 
(3) A mining concession, including oil concessions. These are considered to 
be completely different from a public service concession and are defined 
as that "by which the public authority creates a perpetual ownership ... 
since the complete ownership of the mine reverts to the State at the end 
of the concession" .19 
The difference between a public service concession and an oil concession under 
civil law was indicated in the Arbitration between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and Aramco of 1958: 
Mining and oil concessions are not public service concessions 
because they do not include any provision in favour of users. To 
use the words of Planiol, the mine is not destined to public use 
and is exploited by the concessionaire in his own private interest. 
.. . The concessionaire en joys a near! y total freedom, and is 
neither bound by clauses concerning maximum tariffs for sales 
nor by prohibitions of preferential tariffs, which are the usual 
features of the cahiers des charges in public service concessions.20 
As Duez and Debeyre state: 
The concession of a mine should not be confused with the 
concession of a public service .... The exploiter of a mine does 
not administer a public service. His exploitation remains a 
private enterprise subject to the rules of private law to the extent 
that no express derogation is made thereto by the law ... with 
regard to new concessions granted under the law of 1919, the 
. State's control over the mining exploitation is accentuated while 
preserving its character of a private enterprise. The regime of 
19 Id, 160-1. 
20 Ibid. 
mines brings these private enterprises closer to public service, 
although the activity involved is not susceptible to be treated as 
a public service since no prestations are furnished to the public.21 
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In conclusion, it may be said that a mining concession in French law is 
an act sui generis, which cannot be completely assigned to any other category. It 
is an act which partakes of the nature of a unilateral act in that it depends on 
the authorization of the State and of that of a contract in that it requires an 
agreement of the respective wills of the State and of the concessionaire. 
(b) Under Common Law 
Common law consists of the body of non-statutory law applicable in 
England and in other countries where English law was received or adopted, 
comprising rules which have been recognized by the courts as always having 
existed from the earliest times or which have been developed through the course 
of judicial decision. 22 In English law, the general rules of the law of contract 
apply to concessionary agreements except where one party to the agreements is 
the Crown. A mining concession may be seen as a lease or as the creation of a 
profit a prendre.23 Whyatt C.J. discussed the distinction between a lease and a 
profit a prendre as follows: 
As is well known, it is frequently a matter of difficulty for a 
court to decide whether a particular instrument operates to 
create a lease or a profit a prendre. Each case must depend upon 
its own particular circumstances and the intention of the parties 
must be gathered from the· instruments as a whole. If the coun 
is of the opinion that the intention of the parties is to confer a 
right of exclusive possession, unattended by a simultaneous right 
in any other person, the coun construes the instrument as a 
lease, but if, on the other hand, the instrument merely confers 
a right to use another's land for the purpose of taking a "profit" 
from it, the land itself remaining in the possession and control 
of the owner, then it will be regarded as a profit a prendre. 
Applying these principles, as nearly as may be, to the appellants' 
concessions, it appears to me that the grant by the government 
21 Duez and Debeyre, Droit Administratif (1952) 606-611. Quoted by Henry Cattan, The Law 
of Oil Concessions in the Middle East & North Africa (1967) 81. 
22 E Sykes, The Employer, The Employee & The Law (1964) 7; A Harding, Social History of 
English Law (1966) 30; W Friedmann, Changing Functions of Contract in the Common 
Law, UniversityofToronto Law Journal IX (1951) 15,41. 
23 The Arbitration between Saudi Arabian Government & Aramco (1958) Il.R 27 (1963) 161. 
to the appellant was more analogous to a lease than to a profit 
a prendre since it gave the concessionaire an exclusive power to 
explore and exploit the petroleum existing in the strata in the 
concession area for a term of years and contained nothing 
whatever to suggest that any other person could lawfully exercise 
any similar power in relation to the strata.24 
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However, as a general rule of public policy a public authority cannot be 
prevented by an existing contract from acting in a way essential to its existence 
and for which was created. As the Transvaal Commission Report stated: 
No reasonable man can anticipate that a government can 
indefinitely fetter the legislation of the future, and indeed, in 
countries such as Great Britain, where opinion is tender to 
vested interests, modification without compensation has been 
made in the statutory powers and privileges of undertakings 
incorporated under parliamentary powers and relating to gas, 
water, electric light, public transport and other subjects with 
which the well-being of the community at large is closely bound 
up.25 
In United States law, the problem that arises out of the conflict between 
the needs of the State and the need to protect private contractual rights can be 
seen by comparing Lynch v United States (1934), where it was stated that. .. "its 
rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to 
contracts between private individuals ... ",26 and Nonnan v Baltimore & Ohio hC 
(1935) which stated: 
Contracts however expressed, cannot fetter the constitutional 
authority of the Congress. Contracts may create right or 
property, but when contracts deal with a subject matter which 
lies within the control of congress they have a congenital 
infirmity. Parties cannot remove that transaction from the reach 
of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about 
them.27 
24 NV De Bataafsche, Petroleum Maatschappij & others v. The War Damage Commission. 
(1956) ILR 23 (1956) 810. 
25 Transvaal Commission Report, Cmd. 623 (1901)8. 
26 [1934] 292 us 571. 
27 [1935]9 294 us 240. 
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In general the discussion in the United States is dominated by constitutional 
provisions which protect an individual's liberty and property.28 
(c) Under Former Soviet Law 
During the period 1922-1927 the Soviet Union granted concessions to 
foreigners who were treated as exempt from the prevailing legal order. 29 The 
view taken at the time was that: 
A concession implies an element of exemption from the general 
regime established by law. A concessionaire is granted rights 
with regard to the exploitation of the object of concession (in 
industries, concessions with regard to the industrial enterpriseJ 
which under general laws are not granted to a private business. 
The former Soviet Union had two kinds of "concession agreements", those with 
Comecon countries and those with members of non-Comecon countries. 
From 1971 joint equity ventures with members of Comecon were 
developed. These were restructured in 1986, when the emphasis changed from 
trade to forming joint enterprises, joint organisations and international 
associations. The creation of these entities were regulated by a decree of the 
USSR Council of Ministers, adopted on 13 January 1987. 
As far as countries outside Comecon were concerned, the Soviet Union 
passed legislation in September 1987 which made joint enterprises between 
capitalist countries and Soviet organisations into juridicial persons, formed on the 
basis of a contract between the parties. Under former Soviet law a juridicial 
person could possess, use and dispose of property in accordance with the purpose 
of its activities and of the property itself. It was protected in the same manner 
as the property of Soviet State organisations.31 
28 See further, S Toriguian, Legal Aspect of Oil Concessions in the Middle East (1972) 23. 
29 Huang, 291. 
30 Vladimir Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law, II, 68 Citing Karass, Concession, Magerovsky, 
Fundamentals of Soviet Law, 356, 358 (In Russian 2nd edn 1929), quoted by Huang, 291. 
31 WE Butler, Soviet Law (1988) 388-9. 
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(d) Under Islamic Shari'ah Law 
Islamic Shari'ah is of major importance because it is the basis of the law 
for all Muslim people in the world. Numerous Muslim States are oil producing 
countries so it is necessary to study the concept of concession in Islamic Shari'ah. 
Concessions were known in early Islamic nations. They were concessions 
to reclaim vacant land without an owner, or for the exploration and exploitation 
of minerals such as silver, gold, iron, lead and copper (classified as hidden 
mines); surface mines such as naphtha (oil), sulphur and water were also 
included.32 These are two terms for such concession agreements in Islamic 
Shari'ah, /qta and Ijarat. 
As to the first, /qta, Ibn Kudamah, the Hanbali school jurist (d 1223 
A.D.), defined a concession agreement as follows: 
Minerals are free, he who finds a mineral is entitled to take his 
need thereof by priority to others, after which he must go away 
to let others satisfy also their needs: he cannot appropriate the 
vein or mine or deposit except with and as a result of his 
appropriation of the grounds where such vein or mine or deposit 
is found: this appropriation may be through an Iqta' or a grant 
from the Imam or through occupancy and reclaiming it if it is a 
mawat (dead land), which has no owner ... No one is permitted 
to collect or dig out a mineral contained in the property of 
someone else because the ownership of the land comprises the 
owner of its apparent and hidden parts and layers. Uquid 
minerals in particular are, according to the prevalent opinion, 
always free and not liable to be appropriated by 'Iqta' or 
occupancy or by whoever owns the ground where they are found 
if they happen to be found in an owned property.33 
Thus, according to the prevailing opinion in the Hanbali School, liquid minerals 
whether apparent or hidden are not liable to private appropriation either through 
discovery and occupancy or through an 'Iqta' or grant by the Ruler. 
32 Land in Islamic Shari'ah is divided into two types: (1) A Mowat (dead land) which has 
no owner; (2) Living Land. 
33 Arbitration between Saudi Arabian Government & Aramco. Transcript of Arbitration 
proceedings II, 761. This transcript was not published, quoted by Cattan, 57. 
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Sheikh Mohammad Abuzahra stated in the Aramco arbitration of 1958 
that: 
As to its legality [the concession] is to be considered as corning 
within an Islamic legal institution known as 'lqta'al mawat 
(literally, allotting of undeveloped land) or as a grant of the right 
to take possession of minerals. It is well established that an 'lqta' 
for minerals which are under the ground is recognized by the 
Shari'ah. In such an 'lqta'; the leader of the Moslem Community 
(Imam) grants permission to one or more persons to explore a 
specified area and to take out whatever minerals he may 
discover .... It is established and accepted that whoever first takes 
possession of a buried mineral has the best claim to it. It is his 
property. He has the right to continue to take the mineral and 
no other person has a right to compete with him for it.34 
Another form of hire agreement similar to concession agreements was 
known as "Ijarat" or hire and lease agreements. "Ijarat" in Islamic Shari'ah is the 
sale of the use or benefit of a thing, and as such forms part of the law of sale.35 
In a contract for an Ijarat a rent or payment is specified to be paid in exchange 
for the use of the thing. There are two kinds of Ijarat contract, the first for a 
specified period, the second for a specified piece of work.36 
The law requires that both the rent for the thing hired, or the wages for 
the work performed, as well as the use and the object hired, must be well 
defined?7 Ennawawi from the Shafi'i school writes; "You cannot have a valid 
hire contract to remove the skin of an animal against its skin as payment for the 
services rendered, or promise a part of the flour as payment for services in a 
contract to grind wheat".38 
The "Majallah" - the Ottoman Civil Code- based on the Hanafi school 
of Islamic Shari'ah, dealt with "ljarat" in the following provisions. 
Art: 449: The subject matter of the contract of hire must be 
specified. Consequently, if one of two shops is let on hire, 
without the particular shop in question being specified, and the 
34 Id, 57- 8. 
35 Ibn Kudamah, AI Mughni, 5, 389-99 (Arabic Text). 
36 Id, 402. 
37 Le precis de droit d'Ibn Kudamah, Henri Laoust- 1950, quoted by Toriguian, 100. 
38 Minhaj el Talibin - van Der Berg, II, 151-2, quoted by Toriguian, 100. 
lessee being given an option as to which one he will take, such 
contract is invalid. 
Art: 450: The rent must be clearly ascertained. 
Art: 451: In a contract of hire, the advantage to be derived from 
the subject matter of the contract must be specified in such a 
manner as to avoid any possibility of dispute. 
Art: 454: In the case of hire of land, the period of hire must be 
stated; the purpose for which such land is to be used ... 
Art: 457: The advantage to be derived from the thing hired must 
be capable of enjoyment. Consequently, a contract of hire in 
respect to a runway animal is invalid. 
Art: 465: If the rent consists of merchandise, or things estimated 
by measure of capacity, or by measure of weight, or things 
estimated by enumeration and which closely resemble each 
other, such rent must be made known by stating both the 
amount and description thereof.39 
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In accordance with the Hanbali School,40 oil concession agreements are 
classified as a form of mining concession. Oil concession contracts can be made 
provided that they do not contradict the laws of the Shari 'ah. Generally they 
would not contradict them, as such concession agreements conform to two 
fundamental principles of the Muslim legal system. The first is the principle of 
the liberty of contract within the limits of divine law and the second is the 
principle of respect for contracts. Regarding the first principle, Ibn Tairniya 
stated: 
... men shall be pertnitted to make all the transactions they need, 
unless these transactions are forbidden by the Book or by the 
Sunnah ... 41 
The second basis for the rule, in Ibn Taimiya' s opinion, results from the 
fact that Islamic Shari'ah does not distinguish between a treaty, a contract of 
public or administrative law and a contract of civil or commercial law. All these 
39 CA Hooper. The Civil Law of Palesline & Transjordan, 1938, quoted by Toriguian, 101. 
40 The Hanbali School (780-855 AD) is one of four schools in Islamic Shari'ah. The Hanbali 
School like the other schools is dominated by the principles of the Holy Qur'an and the 
Sunnah, the tradition of the prophet Mohammad. It is the predominant school in Saudi 
Arabia and other countries. 
41 Arbitration between Saudi Arabia Government & Aramco (1958) ILR 27 (1963) 163. 
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types are viewed by Muslim Jurists as agreements or pacts which must be 
observed, since God is a witness to any contract entered into by individuals or by 
collectivities. Under Islamic Shari'ah, a valid contract is obligatory, in 
accordance with the principles of Islam and the law of God, as expressed in the 
Qur'an: "Be faithful to your pledge to God, when you enter into a pact."42 
42 Id, 164. 
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PART II - CHOICE OF LAW AND CHOICE OF FORUM AND 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR OIL CONCESSION AGREEMENTS 
CHAPTER2. 
CHOICE OF FOREIGN LAW AND FORUM 
1. Introduction 
Private international law or the conflict of laws deals with the rules 
relating to the effect of foreign law on the decision of a civil case. These rules 
are national in character and are adopted by the legislatures and courts of 
different states. 1 In cases which have a geographical connection with more than 
one country, it becomes necessary to decide which law is to apply in determining 
the case, and whether the forum or a foreign court should exercise jurisdiction? 
Thus, in the words of Castel: 
Conflict of laws is that branch of the law of each province or 
territory... which, in a case involving one or more legally relevant 
foreign elements connecting it with more than one legal unit, 
determines before the courts of what unit this case should be 
heard and by the law of what unit each relevant issue should be 
decided.3 
In Anglo-American systems, this branch of the laws is called "conflict of laws". 
In civil law countries such as France and other countries which follow the French 
system, it is called "private international law". 
The rules which make up the conflict of laws have developed from 
several sources, national and international. Some principles have been taken 
from public international law, and have in a few instances led to an overlap of 
public and private international law: these include sovereign and diplomatic 
immunity from suit. Where treaties have been entered into, uniform conflict of 
I JG Castel, Conflict of Laws (5th edn, 1984) 1-3. 
2 RH Graveson, The Conflict of Laws (7th edn, 1974) 3. 
3 Castel, 1-3. 
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Jaw rules are often incorporated. In addition, principles drawn from international 
and comparative jurisprudence and foreign judicial decisions are considered as 
sources in the conflicts of Jaw, which in that sense has an international aspect or 
tradition that distinguishes it from other areas of domestic law. 
Within any system it is likely that legislation will have formal priority as 
a source of conflicts of Jaw rules: where such legislation exists it must be applied 
by the courts of that jurisdiction. 4 In common law countries, legislation has been 
a very minor source of conflicts rules hitherto: this situation is however changing, 
especially since legislation may be necessary to give effect to international 
conventions, which are an increasingly important source of conflicts rules.5 
Despite this, judicial decisions have been far more important than legislation in 
the development of conflict of law or private international law in different legal 
systems. 6 And, unlike other areas of municipal law, writers have also been 
important in the development of conflicts of law principles. While judges tend 
to deal with immediate situations, writers have provided a major source for the 
development of the theoretical basis and structure of the conflict of laws. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the choice of the proper law 
by which the parties are to govern their contracts. This is important because oil 
concessions, whatever else they may be, are initially contracts, entered into under 
some national legal system. The principles by which it is decided what the 
governing law of an oil concession is may be of great significance, especially 
when questions of variation, renegotiation or cancellation arise.7 I will look at 
problems of choice of governing law in accordance with the different theories 
applied in different legal systems, and at the implications of these theories for 
the way in which the parties should choose the proper law in a particular case. 
In particular, I will discuss whether the parties are free to choose any law 
whatever to govern their contracts, or whether limitations on this choice may be 
imposed. Further, as there is a tendency to choose foreign law I will look at the 
reasons for this. Then I will examine cases where a choice of proper law has not 
4 AE Anton, Private International Law (2nd edn, 1990) 14. 
5 See EI Sykes & MC Pryles, Conflicts of Laws. Commentary and Materials (1988) 6. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See Chapter 5. 
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been expressly stated: the question is how the court should determine the 
applicable law, and in particular in what circumstances it should determine, in 
the case of oil concession agreements, that the proper law is a foreign law. 
Finally, I will discuss the importance of arbitration in the settling of disputes, 
and the significance of the arbitration agreements in the choice of law. In 
particular, examples of the choice of proper law for the arbitration of disputes 
in some concession agreements and petroleum laws will be given. 
2. The Notion of a Proper Law of Contract in Different Legal Systems 
In general the proper law is the system of law chosen by the parties to 
govern their contractual relationship. The proper law governs most but not 
necessarily all matters affecting a contract. 8 It has been stated that: 
the fact that one aspect of a contract is to be governed by the 
law of one country does not necessarily mean that that law is to 
be the proper law of the contract as a whole.9 
The questions whether the parties possess capacity, whether an agreement has 
been reached or whether the contract is formally valid are not necessarily 
governed by the same system of law. But the court will not split the contract in 
this sense readily or without good reason.10 Instead, "there is a primary system 
of law ... the proper law of the contract, which usually governs most matters 
affecting the formation and substance of the obligation". 11 
As to the determination of the proper law, there are two major theories, 
based on "the intention of the parties", and on "the most real connection" of the 
transaction with the legal system in question. 
8 Dicey & Morrison the Cor(lict of Laws (11th edn) 2 (1987) Ch 32, 1161; Cheshire, North 
& Fawcett, Private I nrernationa/ Law ( 1987) 44 7. 
9 Re United Railways of the Havana and Reg/a Warehouses (1960) Ch 52, 92. 
10 Kahler v. Midland Bank Ltd [1950] AC 24, 42 (Lord MacDermott). 
11 Cheshire, North & Fawcell, 448. 
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(1) The Theory of the "Intention of the Parties" 
Dicey's "subjective" theory states that the proper law is based on the 
intention of the parties. According to Dicey: 
The term proper law of a contract means the law, or the laws, 
by which the parties intended, or may fairly be presumed to have 
intended, the contract to be governed; or (in other words) the 
law or laws to which the parties intended or may fairly be 
presumed to have intended, to submit themselves.12 
Similarly Lord Atkin in R v.lnternational Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders 
A.G. 13 stated that: 
Their intention will be ascertained by the intention expressed in 
the contract, if any, which will be conclusive. 
According to this theory, where there is an express choice of law by the parties, 
that law which has been chosen has necessarily to be the proper law. And in fact 
most countries agree upon the adoption of the intention of the parties as a 
fundamental rule. 
In English law there are two theories ( 1) the intention of the parties and 
(2) the localisation of the contract. According to the former theory, the parties' 
intention is decisive. Judge Willes stated that: 
In such cases it is necessary to consider by what general law the 
parties intended that the transaction should be governed, or 
rather to what general law it is just to presume that they have 
submitted themselves in the matter.14 
12 Dicey, 7th edn, Rule 148, 717. However in the 11th edn and under Rule 180 Dicey & 
Morris stated: "The term 'proper law of a contract' means the system of law by which 
the parties intended the contract to be governed, or, where their intention is neither 
expressed nor to be inferred from the circumstances, the system of law with which the 
transaction has its closest and most real connection." Dicey & Morris (1987) ch 32, 1161. 
13 [1937] AC 500,529. 
14 Lloyd v. Guibert [1865] LR 1 QB 115, 120. 
Similarly, Lord Atkin stated: 
The legal principles which are to guide an English Coun on the 
question of the proper law of a contract are now well settled. 
It is the law which the parties intended to apply ... 15 
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However, there may be problems deciding what the intention of the parties was 
at the time of making the contract. It is simplistic to define by the laissez-jaire 
notion,16 the proper law as that system of law with reference to which the 
contract has in fact been made. 17 
An alternative view relies on the localisation of the contract. According 
to this theory, the proper law of a contract is the law of the 
most elements of the contract are most densely grouped. 
country in which 
Rather than a 
subjective interpretation of intention, it implies an objective interpretation, that 
while free to choose the connecting factors, "their intention is taken to be that 
the governing law shall be the law of the country in which the chosen factors 
show the contract to be localized".18 The implication is that they would not be 
allowed to select a governing law if it was in conflict with the natural locale of 
the contract. 
United States law in this area is confused. Some States have adopted 
the law of the place of constructing, some the law of the place of performance, 
and some the law intended by the parties. Federal couns have usually applied 
the law of the State or country intended by the parties.19 
In French law the effects of a contract and its validity are governed by 
the intention of the parties. Unless expressly stated the parties are seen to have 
contracted according to the laws of the place where the contract was made and, 
where they are the same nationality, they are seen to have contracted according 
15 R v.lnternational Trustee [1937]AC 500,529. See further Cheshire, North & Fawcett, 449. 
16 Ibid. 
17 ld, 455. 
18 Id, 450. 
19 EG Lorenzen, "Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws" Yale Law Journal 
30 (1920-1) 565. • 
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to their national law. 20 
In German law, the intention of the parties is the controlling rule, and 
where that intention is not expressed or unclear, courts use the place of 
performance to determine the law, unless they can be convinced some other law 
should be applied.Z1 
Italian law, strongly influenced by Mancini, states that "The substance 
and effect of obligations are deemed to be regulated by the law of the place in 
which the acts were done".22 Other European countries adopt the intention of 
the parties as the deciding factor, and most of them refer to the law of the place 
of contracting as the presumed intention.23 
The Bustamante Code is an attempt by Latin American countries to 
develop a conflict of laws code. It was ratified in 1928 by fifteen Latin American 
states, but with six countries expressing general reservations. It states that if 
there is no express law governing the contract, then, "the personal law common 
to the contracting parties shall be ftrst applied, and in the absence of such law 
there shall be applied that of the place where the contract was concluded. "24 
In Australia the choice of proper law will be in accordance with the 
forum's choice of law rule, which governs most substantive aspects of a contract. 
It does not, however, govern questions of form and illegality. It is generally held 
that the formalities of a contract are valid if they comply with the lex loci 
contractus, even though the contract is formally invalid under proper law. Also, 
contracts which involve acts considered illegal in a foreigu State will not be 
enforced.25 
By a provision of the 1889 Convention of Montevideo, South American 
States parties are bound by Article 33 which states that "the law of the place of 
20 ld, 567. 
21 Ibid. 
22 ld, 568. 
23 Ibid. 
24 AM Vickers, The Choice of Law Clause in Contracts Between Parties of Developing and 
Developed Nations, GA J Inti & Comp L, 11 (1981) 627. 
25 EI Sykes & MC Pryles, Australian Private International Law (3rd edn, 1991) 748. 
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performance governs ... all matters concerning contracts whatever their nature".26 
Under Japanese law, Article 7 of the Civil Code 1919 provides that the 
"will of the parties" is a determining factor effecting legal transactions and that 
if this is not clear "the law of the place where the transaction is entered into shall 
control". 27 However, there are different interpretations of this rule, and differing 
rules apply where the intention of parties are not clearly determined, as we will 
see later. 
(2) The Theory of the "Most Real Connection" 
The objective theory of Westlake contends that the proper law of a 
contract is that which has "the most real connection" with the contract. He 
stated: 
In these circumstances it may be said that the law by which to 
determine the intrinsic validity and effects of a contract will be 
selected in England on substantial considerations, the preference 
being given to the country with which the transaction has the 
most real connection, and not to the law of the place of contract 
as such.Z8 
There is considerable support for this theory in English law. Lord 
Simonds stated that the proper law is "the system of law by reference to which 
the contract was made or that with which the transaction has its closest and most 
real connexion".Z9 Similarly Denning U in Boissevain v. Wei/30 noted that the 
proper law of the contract .. 
depends not so much on the place where it is made, nor even on 
the intention of the parties or on the place where it is to be 
performed, but on the place with which it has the most 
substantial connection. 
26 Lorenzen, 570. 
27 Jd, 572. 
28 J Westlake, Private International Law (7th edn, 1925) 302. 
29 Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia [1951] AC 201, 219. 
30 [1949]1 KB 482, 490. 
.------------------· 
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(3) Evaluation of the Competing Theories 
Neither the "objective" nor the "subjective" theory are seen to be a 
complete explanation. As Graveson stated: 
... the answer is not that one is right and the other wrong, but 
that neither is a complete exposition of the matter.31 
On the other hand, many jurists now maintain that regardless of which theory 
was followed the applicable law would still be the same. 32 According to 
Cheshire: 
It must be confessed that in actual practice it will not make an 
iota of difference to the actual decision of a contested case 
which of them ... the objectivist or subjectivist.33 
Similarly, Morris stated that: 
... the court is likely to reach the same result whether it inquires 
what was the presumed intention of the parties or whether it 
inquires with what law the contract had the most substantial 
connection. 34 
3. Express Choice of Law and the Limitations upon It 
There are three possible situations where it is necessary to determine the 
proper law: 
(1) Where the parties have made an express choice of proper 
law to govern their contract, that law will be the proper law of 
the contract. 
(2) Where an express choice of the proper law is not made by 
the parties, the court will examine the terms of the contract and 
· 31 Graveson, 406. 
32 RK Ramzani, "Choice of Law Problems and International Oil Contracts: A Case Study" 
ICLQ 11 (1962) 505, 506. 
33 Cheshire, "The Significance of the Assunzione" BYIL 32 (1955) 126 and see Ramzani 16, 
34 JHC Morris, "The Proper Law of the Contract A Reply" ICLQ 3 (1950) 197. See also 
EJ Cohn, "The objectivist practice on the proper law of contract" ICLQ 6{1957) 373; FA 
Mann, "The. Proper Law of the Contract" ICLQ 3 (1950) 68. 
all facts surrounding it to determine whether there is an inferred 
choice of proper law by the parties. 
(3) In the absence of a choice of proper law, express or inferred, 
courts have tended to declare the proper law as that law "with 
which the transaction has the closest and most real connection" ,35 
in an attempt to fmd an objective approach to the determination 
of proper law. · 
It is proposed to deal with each of these in tum. 
(1) Express Choice of Proper Law 
(a) The Basis of Choice of Law 
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The determination of the proper law of the contract will not create any 
difficulty as long as the parties have expressed which legal system is to govern 
their contract. 36 Dicey and Morris state that: 
when the intention of the parties to a contract, as to the law 
governing the contract, is expressed in words, this expressed 
intention, in general, determines the proper law of the contract.37 
To the same effect the American Law Institute's Restatement Second, Conflict of 
Laws (1971) provides in ss187-8: 
187. (1) The law of the State chosen by the parties to govern 
their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the 
particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by 
an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue. 
(2) The law of the State chosen by the parties to govern their 
contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the 
particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved 
by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, 
unless either: 
35 Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia [1951] AC 201; Tomkinson v. First Pennsylvania 
Banking & Trust Co. [1961] AC 1007, 1068, 1081; Miller v. Whitworth Street Estates Ltd 
[1970] AC 583; Rossano v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. Ltd [1963]2 QB 352; Amin 
Rasheed Shipping Corp v. Kuwait Insurance Co. [1983] 3 WLR 241, 255; Compagnie 
v·Armement Maritime SA v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA [1971]AC 572. 
36 The first case to establish tbe rule expressly was Gienar v. Meyer [1796]2 HyBI 603. 
37 Dicey & Morris (1987) 1168-9. 
(a) the chosen State has no substantial 
relationship to the parties or the transaction and 
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' 
choice, or 
(b) application of the law of the chosen State would be 
contrary to a fundamental policy of a State which has a 
materially greater interest than the chosen State in the 
determination of the particular issue and which, under the 
rule of s188, would be the State of the applicable law in 
the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the 
reference is to the local law of the State of the chosen law. 
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The generally accepted view is thus that when the parties have expressed what 
law they intend to govern their contract "prima facie their intention will be 
effectuated by the court". 38 The basis of this principle is that parties are free to 
choose the governing law of their contract with respect to matters that lie within 
their contractual power. 39 In other words, the freedom of the parties to choose 
the proper law derives from the principle of freedom of contract. 40 
Vita Food Products Inc v. Unus Shipping Co. Lta"1 is the leading authority 
on the freedom of parties to choose the proper law to govern their contract. 
This case determined that parties are free to submit their contract to any foreign 
law. Goods were shipped in Newfoundland under bills of lading which contained 
a clause that the contract was to be governed by English law. These bills were 
provided for exemption from liability of damage due to the negligence of the 
shipowners servants. An action was brought against the shipowner in respect of 
damage to the goods, but the court held that by applying the intended English 
law, the shipowner was within the exceptions which exempted him from.liability. 
This acceptance of the choice of English law as the proper law was maintained 
38 Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian, etc Assurance Society Ltd [1938) AC 224, 
240 (Lord Wright). 
39 WM Reese,"Power of Parties to Choose the Law governing their Contract" ASIL 54 (1960) 
49; Dicey & Morris (1987) 1170; Cheshire, North & Fawcett, 451-2. Kahn-Freund stated 
that: "The rule of "autonomy" in the conflict of laws is like nature; you cannot drive it out 
even with a pitchfork", quoted by TMC Asser,"Choice of Law in Bills of Lading" JMLC 
5 (1974) 355. 
40 F Savigny, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (2nd edn, 1880) (trans Guthrie) ss369-70, 
quoted by A Thomson, "A Different Approach to Choice of Law in Contract" MLR 43 
(1980) 650. 
41 Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939]AC 277. 
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even though the contract has no apparent connection with England. Speaking 
for the House, Lord Wright accepted this "older, subjective view of the proper 
law", and said that "connection with English law is not as a matter of principle 
essential".42 
The principle of the parties' freedom to choose the proper law has been 
recognized in many countries, although in some cases with modifications. In 
England this principle has been recognized for about two centuries. 43 In civil law 
countries the principle is given a less liberal application: the parties' choice of 
law will be respected if the law chosen has some internal connection with the 
parties or the transaction. 44 In the United States the principle of party autonomy 
has been recognized. As Jackson stated: 
the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law 
which the parties intended to apply. 45 
As we have seen, the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws (1971) with some 
qualification provided for this principle.46 In the Soviet Union article 126 of the 
Soviet Merchant Shipping Code 1968 inter alia provides that "the parties may 
choose a law to regulate their contract rights and duties as long as the law 
chosen does not violate Soviet public order and does not lead to any change in 
the fundamental norms of the Merchant Shipping Code".47 
Thus both under civil law and common law countries the principle of the 
parties' freedom to choose the proper law governing their contract has been 
recognized. This principle is also generally reflected in international treaties, 
including the United Nations Convention on Contract for the International Sale 
42 [1939] AC 277,290. 
43 Cheshire, North & Fawcett, 451; Graveson, 6-8. 
44 E Rabel, 2 The Collflict of Laws, A Comparative Study (2nd edn, 1960) 359-431; M Wolff, 
Private international Law 2nd edn (1962) 413-28. 
45 Lauritzen v. Larsen 345 US 571, 589 [1953] quoted by Albert A Ehrenzweig, "Conttact in 
the Conflict of laws" Col LR 59 (1959) 984. 
46 For a criticism of this, see RA Sedler, "The Conttacts Provisions of the Restatement 
(Second). An Analysis and a Critique" Col LR 72 (1972) 279. 
47 WE Butler & JB Quigley, trans, The Merchant Shipping Code of the USSR (2nd edn, 
1968). 
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of Goods, Vienna, 1980,48 the Law of the Sea Treaty 1982,49 the Hague 
Convention on the Law applicable to International Sales of Goods, 1955, the 
Hague Convention on the Law applicable to Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods, 198550 and the draft Convention on the Law applicable to Agency 
1976, as well as the EEC draft Convention of 1972.51 Thus, Article 3(1) of the 
EEC Convention provides that: 
the choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable 
certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the 
case. 
Article 7 ( 1) of the Hague Convention on the Law applicable to Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (1985) provides: 
A contract of sale is governed by the law chosen by the parties. 
The parties' agreement on this choice must be express or be 
clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract and the 
conduct of the parties, viewed in their entirety. Such a choice 
may be limited to a part of the contract. 
Thus the freedom to choose the proper law has been recognized, with 
limitations in certain cases, in both national law and treaties. But the crucial 
question for the purposes of this thesis is what limitations can properly be 
imposed on this freedom, as a matter of national and international law. 
Developing countries may not have sufficient bargaining power in their 
relationship with developed countries to feel that unlimited freedom in the 
choice of law would be equitable. Further Vickers notes that: 
Allowing firms from developed nations to select from any 
available rule of law often results in choices that are the most 
economically feasible, but nevertheless are unacceptable to the 
developing world's socio-economic interests."52 
48 United Nations Document NCONF 97/18 (1980). 
49 See United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, article 293 (United Nations Document 
NCONF 62/122, 7 October 1982). 
50 C McLachlan, "The New Hague Sales Convention and the Limits of the Choice of Law 
Process" LQR 102 (1986) 591. 
51 AL Diamond, "Conflict of Laws in the EEC" Current Legal Problems 32 (1979) 158. 
52 Vickers, 620. 
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Without limitations preventing a choice of law to circumvent public 
policy, there would be little incentive for developing nations to have confidence 
that the contract would cater for their interests. Similarly, without the limitation 
that a law be bona fide and legal, the same inequalities in the bargaining position 
of States could lead to developing nations being forced into using a system of law 
without protection. 
In this chapter, I will discuss the limitations that may be imposed by 
national law on freedom of contract. In the next chapter, I will discuss the 
limitations which are permissible under the various treaties. 
(b) Tendency to Choose Foreign Law 
As we have seen the general principle, the starting point in this area, is 
that the parties have complete freedom to choose the proper law to govern their 
contract. Therefore, there is a tendency of parties to a contract to choose a 
foreign law to be applied in the case of a dispute between them. The parties 
may resort to a foreign law when they feel that the legal system of one or both 
of the contracting states is not detailed enough to deal with intricate technical 
problems which may arise, or they may choose a neutral law especially in cases 
where there is a "desire to ensure the elimination of the possibility of the State 
subsequently altering the terms of the contract through unilateral legislation or 
administrative act",53 or they may choose a law which they feel is more adequate 
for their case, for example where the municipal law of one or other of the States 
is considered to be insufficiently developed. 54 
In this case there is a tendency to choose a well-known or highly 
elaborate legal system of another state to govern the contract, even if there is no 
immediate connection with this contract. An important reason why a party to a 
contract has a tendency to choose a foreign law, is that in international trade 
disputes, the legal system particularly of an involved party may not be perceived 
53 D Suratgar, "Considerations Affecting Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts between. 
Governments and Foreign Nationals", Indian Journal of International Law 2 (1962) 293, 
299. 
54 Ibid. 
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as treating both parties fairly. 55 Therefore a legal system must be chosen which 
best suits each contract This, it is hoped, will prevent a national court showing 
a preference for domestic law and leading to a bias in favour of its nationals, and 
thus avoid international diplomatic intervention.56 
(2) Limitations on Choice of Law 
There are limitations on the freedom of parties to choose their governing 
law in certain cases. Lord Wright stated in the Vita Food case that the choice 
must be "bona fide and legal" and that there should be "no reason for avoiding 
the choice on the grounds of public policy". 57 The first part of this provision is 
interpreted to mean "that the parties cannot pretend to contract under one law 
in order to validate an agreement that clearly has its closest connection with 
another law"58 and which would be invalid under that law. Thus, where the 
express choice of the proper law by the parties is not bona fide and legal, or 
where it is contrary to public policy this choice will be ineffective, and the court 
will apply the proper law ascertained objectively, or, in certain cases, the law of 
the forum. 
This principle was applied in Golden Acres Ltd v. Queensland Estates Pty 
Ltd,59 where a Queensland estate agent company attempted to recover 
commission owing to it under a contract expressly providing that the contract was 
governed by the law of Hong Kong. The contract provided that "for all purposes 
arising under this agreement, the same shall be deemed to be entered into in the 
colony of Hong Kong". Judge Hoare refused to give effect to the choice of law 
because "the attempted selection of this law was for no other purpose . than to 
avoid the operation of the Queensland law", and that the choice of the Hong 
Kong law "was in the circumstances against public policy".60 Thus he applied 
Queensland law. 
55 ld, 300. 
56 ld, 290. 
57 [1939]AC 277,290. 
58 Cheshire, Nonh & Fawcett, 454. 
59 [1%9] QdR 378, 385. This decision affirmed on different grounds sub nom Freehold 
Land lnvesrments Ltd v. Queensland Estates l'ty Ltd [1970]123 CLR 418. See D St L. 
Kelly, "Reference, Choice, Restriction and Prohibition" JCLQ 26 (1977) 868. 
60 [1969] QdR 378, 385. 
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In Compagnie D'Armement Maritime SA v. Compagnie Tunisienne de 
Navigation SA,61 Lord Diplock stated: 
The English Courts will give effect to their choice unless it 
would be contrary to public policy to do so. 
The question is when it will be held to be contrary to public policy to choose 
another system of law. In Boissevain v. Weil Denning L.J. stated: 
I do not believe that parties are free to stipulate by what law the 
validity of their contract is to be determined. Their intention is 
only one of the factors to be taken into account 62 
As a general proposition one can state that, in selecting the proper law for a 
contract, the parties must prove that the purpose of the choice is for commercial 
or other valid reasons. It would be invalid if it were selected to evade the 
mandatory laws of the most closely connected legal system.63 
However, "there have been hardly any cases where an express choice of 
law has been denied effect"64 In the BHP Petroleum Pry. Ltd v. Oil Basins LtrfS 
the judge upheld the choice of law even though he recognised there was little 
connection between the contract and the State of New York, which was the 
chosen proper law of the contract, as he felt there was no attempt to avoid the 
fiscal and policy provisions of the legal systems more closely connected to the 
contract. 
There is much ambiguity in this area, and it is perhaps generally held 
that it is an indication of good faith that there is a connection between the 
agreement and law chosen though providing there is no attempt to avoid a more 
connected law an express choice can still be bona fide and legal. 66 
61 [1970]3 AllER 71-91. 
62 [1949]1 KB 482, 491. 
63 Boissevain v. Weil [1949] 1 KB 482, 490. See also JG McLeod, The Conflict of Laws 
(1983) 478. 
64 Sykes & Pry1es (1991) 598. 
65 [1985] VR 125. 
66 Cheshire, North & Fawcett, 454. 
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Another ground for limiting party autonomy in the choice of law relates 
to an indefinite or uncertain choice. It has been said that the parties cannot 
choose a "floating" proper law to govern their contract. "The proper law must 
exist and be identifiable at the time when the contract is made" .67 Therefore, it 
has been stated that a clause in a contract must not allow for the possibility of 
choosing between a range of alternative legal systems at some future time. 
In Dubai ElectriciryCo. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines,68 goods 
were shipped from Hamburg to Dubai by an Iranian state-owned ship. The bill 
of lading and all disputes arising shall "in the option of the carrier to be declared 
by him on the merchant's request be governed either by (1) Iranian law or (2) 
German law or (3) English law".69 The judge decided that this amounted to a 
floating law and that the proper law had to be built into the contract. He noted 
"It is I think clear and not disputed that this clause in the bill of lading is bad" 
and that a proper law should "be built into the fabric of the contract from the 
start and cannot float in an indeterminate way until finally determined at the 
option of the party."70 
However, it is possible that a certain proper law may be used in one 
event and another in another event. In Astro Venturoso Campania Naviera v. 
Hellenic Shipyards SA. The Mariannina,11 the bills of lading provided that "Any 
claim and or dispute arising under this bill of lading shall be referred to 
arbitration in London pursuant 
it is ruled by a competent 
unenforceable then any claim 
law ... "72 
to English arbitration law ... but if for any reason 
authority that the... arbitration provision is 
and/or dispute... shall be governed by Greek 
The judge noted that though the clause was unusual "There was no 
reason why there could not be good commercial sense in a fall-back provision of 
this kind".73 He concluded that the proper law was English law.74 
67 Cheshire, North & Fawcett, 455. 
68 [1984]2 Lloyd's Reports 380. 
69 Ibid. 
70 ld, 385. 
71 [1983]1 Lloyd's Report, 12 (CA.). 
72 lbid. 
73 ld, 13. 
74 Ibid. 
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As a general principle, and although there are differences of opinion, it 
would appear that authority establishes that the proper law must be decided, or 
be capable of being decided, on the same day as the contract is signed,75 and that 
subsequent behaviour of the parties is not to be considered in determining the 
proper law, except to the extent that the contract specifically so allows. 76 
Again the choice of law will be disregarded if it is seen as meaningless. 
This would occur for example if the legal system in question ceased to exist or 
if, as in the Compagnie D' Armement Maritime SA v. Compagnie Tunisienne de 
Navigation SA,71 the contract states something meaningless in practice. In this 
case, Clause 13 of the contract stated that: 
This contract shall be governed by the laws of the flag of the 
vessel carrying the goods. 
The House of Lords held that the choice of law clause was meaningless as the 
contract contemplated its completion by means of a number of ships under 
different flags. As it was impossible to decide from among the flags the proper 
law of the contract, that question had to be determined independently. 
Against this background, Reese outlines four limitations which are 
concerned with the matters that lie within the contractual power of the parties.78 
(1) The parties' power of choice is limited in the first place to 
multi-state contracts i.e. the "contracts which have significant 
contacts in two or more States". 
(2) "The choice of law will be denied effect if it is procured by 
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or mistake".79 
75 Rossano v. Manufacturer' sLife Insurance Co. [1963)2 QB 352, 362. 
76 James Miller and PartnersLtd. v. Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. [1970)AC 583, 
603-611. 
77 [1971) AC 572. 
78 WM Reese, "Contracts & the Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second" ICLQ 9 (1960) 
535 states: "A limitation upon the parties' power to choose the governing law will be 
. imposed only with respect to questions that lie beyond their contractual power. Such 
questions include issues of capacity, of formalities, as the Statute of Frauds, and of 
substantial validity (eg illegality and the need for consideration)." 
79 WM Reese, "Power of Parties to choose law Governing Their Contract" ASIL 54 (1960) 
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(3) It will be denied effect if "there is no reasonable basis for the 
parties' choice". 80 However, there is some discussion as to the 
kind of connection a contract should have with the chosen law. 
There is a tendency to support the opinion that the parties can 
only select a system "which has a substantial though not 
necessarily preponderant connection with the contract".81 In 
particular a system of law carmot be chosen to evade the 
application of an otherwise applicable law. 
(4) "Fulfilment of the parties' intentions is not the only value in 
contract law. Regard must also be had for States interests".82 
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An implication of the fourth limitation is that the forum will only deny 
effect to a choice of law provision in order to protect a fundamental policy of the 
State of the otherwise governing law. 83 The nationalization of a State's assets is 
a fundamental and substantial policy which would if these limitations were 
applied allow the State law to supersede the choice of the proper law of a 
contract. 
(3) Incorporation of Foreign Law 
Parties may choose by express selection to have their whole contract 
governed by the proper law of a State, or may choose to incorporate only part 
of that law into the contract. In the former case, the chosen law is seen as "a 
living and changing body of law",84 and any change in that law may affect the 
performance of the contract. In the later case, the incorporated part must 
become part of the terms of the contract, providing it can be determined to be 
valid and effective. This remains constant and carmot be effected by any change 
in the law from which it was incorporated. 
One must thus distinguish between the express selection of a proper law 
to govern the whole contract and the incorporation of a foreign law to govern a 
particular matter. As Cheshire and North state: 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
ld, 53. 
PE Nygh, Conflict of laws in Australia (1971) 341. 
Reese (1960) 53. 
ld, 54. 
Wolff, 424. ' 
It is imponant to distinguish carefully the express selection of 
the proper law from the quite different process of the 
incorporation in the contract of certain domestic provisions of 
a foreign law. There are two different courses open to the 
parties. They may, within the limits already discussed, select a 
given law as a whole to govern the contract or, having already 
created a contract that is valid according to the law to which it 
naturally belongs, they may incorporate therein the domestic and 
relevant rules of some other legal system, which thereupon 
become terms of the contract. This incorporation may be 
effected either by a verbatim transcription of the relevant 
provisions or by a general statement that the rights and liabilities 
shall in certain respects by subject to the chosen law. The latter 
is only a short-hand method of expressing the agreed terms. 
Thus the parties to an English contract for the sale of goods may 
expressly provide that their duties with regard to performance 
shall be regulated by the rules contained in the Swiss Code, 
whether a particular term incorporated in this manner is valid 
and effective is, of course, a matter for the proper law to 
determine. 85 
Regarding the effect of incorporation they assert ... 
It is well established that this right of incorporation may be 
free! y exercised. 86 
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Since the 1930's, oil concession agreements, incorporated international 
law and general principles of law, have been called on, in case where a failing of 
the primary law of the agreement may have occurred. An example, is the 
International Oil Consortium's Agreement with Iran (1954), Article 46, where the 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations in general were to be used 
should the "principles of law common to the nations" involved in the contract 
prove not to be in agreement. 
In the 1960s the following policy became part of the 1955 Libyan 
petroleum law and was incorporated into existing concessions on 20 January 
1966. It stated that in the absence of principles of law consistent with the law of 
Libya, general principles of law were to be used, including those applied by 
international tribunals. 
85 Cheshire's Private International Law (8th edn, 1970) 210. 
86 Ibid. 
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(4) Inferred Choice of Proper Law 
Where the proper law is not expressed by the parties, it is the duty of 
the court to see if a proper law can be inferred by looking at all the factors 
surrounding the contract. 87 The court will consider a variety of factors 
surrounding the contract. Perhaps the most significant factor is the presence of 
a choice of jurisdiction or arbitration clause referring to a particular country. 
Other factors have included the form of the documents made with respect to the 
transaction, 88 the style and terminology in which the contract is drafted, 89 the use 
of a particular language90 (through this is not generally an important factor),91 
the use of a "follow London" clause,92 the nature and location of the subject 
matter of the contract, 93 the currency in which payment is to be made, 94 the 
residence95 and occasionally the nationality, of the parties,96 a connection with a 
preceding transaction,97 or the fact that one of the parties is a government.98 In 
concession agreements, where one party is a government the system of law with 
which the transaction has its most substantial and real connection would almost 
inevitably be that of the state party. 
In early agreements between States and oil companies connected to the 
developing of the potential oil resources of a State, the applicable law was only 
stipulated in very general terms, such as a provision to interpret the clauses of 
the agreement "in good faith and in a spirit of goodwill" or "in accordance with 
the principles of mutual goodwill and good faith. "99 This could be interpreted 
as rejecting the application of the national law of the State party. A similar legal 
87 Dicey & Morris (1987) 1182; Cheshire (1970) 200. 
88 Chamberlain v. Napier [1880]15 Ch D 614; James Miller and Partners Ltd v. Whitworth 
Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd [1970] AC 583. 
89 Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co. Ltd [1891] 1 QB 79, 82; Amin Rasheed 
Shipping Corp v. Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50,460-1. 
90 The Leon XIII [1883]8PD 121;Chatenayv.BrazilianSubmarine Telegraph Co. Ltd (1891) 
1 QB 79. 
91 The Industrie [1894]58, 71; Coast Lines Ltd v. Huding and Veder Chartering NV [1972]2 
QB 34, 47-50. 
92 Armadora Occidental SA v. Horace Mann Insurance Co. [1977]1 WLR 1098. 
93 Lloyd v. Guibert [1865]LR 1 QB 115, 122-3. 
94 R v.International Trustee for the protection of Bondholders AG [1937]AC 500, 553; Sayers 
v.International Drilling Co. NV [1971]1 WLR 1176, 1183-6. 
95 Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais [1884]12 QBD 589. 
96 Re Missouri Steamship Co. [1889]42 Ch D 321, 328-9. 
97 The Freights Queen [1977]2 Lli>yds Rep 140; The Adriatic [1931]241, 247. 
98 R v.International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders AG [1937] AC 500, 531-57. 
99 See Chapter 5. 
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inference may arise from an arbitration clause embodied in an oil concession or 
other State contract. 100 
In Abu Dhabi v. Petroleum Development Ltd in 1951, the arbitrator 
considered that given that the contract had been made in Abu Dhabi and was to 
be wholly performed in that country " ... If any municipal system of law were 
applicable it would prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi..." However, there was not, 
in his opinion, " ... any settled body of legal principles applicable to the 
construction of modem commercial instruments".101 In Qatar v. International 
Marine Oil Company in 1953,102 the arbitrators noted that no law had been 
stipulated to govern the contract, and as in the previous case Islamic law was not 
seen to be sufficient to interpret the contract. There was a similar arbitration 
decision in the Saudi Arabia and Aramco Case in 1958.103 In all these cases the 
arbitration tribunal decided that general principles of law would be the law 
governing the concession agreements. 
That, contrary to the opinion of the arbitrators, Islamic Shari' ah was a 
developed and sophisticated legal system, will be further discussed in Chapter 
5. 
4. Implied Choice of Law and Foreign Law as the Proper Law 
(1) Ascertaining the Proper Law in the Absence of Express or Inferred Choice 
Ascertaining the proper law in the case of contract may be a complex 
matter, because of the many factors which may be connected to the case. These 
factors include where a contract is made, where it is to be performed, the place 
of domicile, nationality or business of the parties, the form in which the contract 
is drafted. But as Lord Atkin stated: 
100 H Cattan, The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa (1967) 91. 
101 ICLQ I (1952) 247, 261. 
102 ILR 20 (1953) 545. 
103 ILR 27 (1963) 163. 
... all these rules serve only to give prima facie indications of 
intention. They are all capable of being overcome by 
counter-indications, however difficult it may be in some cases to 
find such.104 
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In the absence of express or inferred choice of proper law of the contract by the 
parties, Lord Atkin stated: 
.. .If no intention be expressed the intention will be presumed by 
the court from the terms of the contract and the relevant 
surrounding circumstances ... 105 
The editors of Dicey and Morris set out three sub-rules of their present 
rule 180.106 Sub-rule 3 provides: 
When the intention of the parties to a contract with regard to 
the law governing it is not expressed and cannot be inferred 
from the circumstances, the contract is governed by the system 
of law with which the transaction has its closest and most real 
connection. 
But, as the leading Australian text, Sykes and Pryles, notes, the editors to Dicey 
and Morris preface these rules ... 
with the remark that the English Courts have adopted a flexible 
system for determining the proper law and they offer the 
sub-rules only as maxims by which the English Courts are in the 
. 'dedl07 roam gw . 
They go on to comment that: 
... reference to the parties' intention, except in the case of an 
express contractual stipulation of the proper law, is fast 
di . 108 sappeanng ... 
104 R v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders [1937) AC 500, 529. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Dicey & Morris (1987) 1190-1. 
107 EI Sykes & MC Pryles (1991) 660. 
108 EI Sykes & MC Pryles (1988) 694. 
The Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws provides that: 
(I) A coun, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a 
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law. 
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the 
choice of the applicable rule of law include: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested States and the 
relative interests of those States in the determination of 
the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of 
law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law 
to be applied. 
188. Law governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the 
Parties 
( 1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue 
in contract are determined by the local law of the State which, 
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship 
to the transaction and the parties under [these] principles ... 
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties 
the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles 
to determine the law applicable to an issue include: 
(a) the place of contracting, 
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract, 
(c) the place of performance, 
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and 
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business of the parties. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative 
importance with respect to the particular issue. 
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of 
performance are in the same State, the local law of this State 
will usually be applied, except as otherwise provided ... 
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In ascertaining the proper law the coun must take into consideration all 
the variables that may pertain to the case. These variables may include where 
.• 
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the contract was made, 109 where it is to be performed, no the nature of the legal 
personalities of the parties, lll the nationality of the parties, the domicile of the 
parties, their place of business, etc. No single factor is decisive but in each case 
the priorities of the connecting factors must be used to decide the proper law.n2 
In oil concession agreements the factors that have to do with place of 
contracting, performance, location of the subject matter and place of domicile of 
the parties indicate clearly that the State's law would prevail. Thus in Qatar and 
the International Marine Oil Company (1953), the arbitrator concluded that the 
law of Qatar was the appropriate law. 113 A similar decision was reached in 1958 
in Aramco v. Saudi Arabia. The award stated: 
The law in force in Saudi Arabia should also be applied to the 
content of the concession because this State is a party to the 
agreement, as grantor, and because it is generally admitted, in 
private international law, that a sovereign State is presumed, 
unless the contrary is proved, to have subjected its undertakings 
to its own legal system. This principle was mentioned by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in its Judgements of 
July 12, 1929 concerning the Serbian and Brazilian Loans ... "114 
(2) Presumption as to Proper Law 
In the past, certain presumptions, notably those favouring the place 
where the contract was made, the place where the contract was executed, or the 
law of flag relating to maritime transport, were used to determine the proper law 
to be applied to a case. ns Now such presumptions are considered to be "out of 
fashion and rejected".116 No longer can precedence be given tti any single factor 
as decisive. Rather, it is now considered that when there are a variety of 
circumstances to be considered in deciding on the proper law, the "former 
109 P & 0 Steam Navigalion Co. v. Shand [1865]3 Moo PC NS 272. 
llO Re Missouri Steamship Co. [1889] 42 Ch D 321, 341; James Miller & Partners Ltd v. 
Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd [1910] AC 583. 
Ill R v.International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders [1937] AC 500, 531; National 
Bank of Australasia Ltd v. Scottish Union & National Insurance Co. [1952] AC 493. 
112 Chesire, North & Fawcett, 448. 
113 ILR 20 (1953) 545. 
114 ILR 27 (1963) 167. 
115 R v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders [1937] AC 500, 529; Merwin 
Pastoral Co. Pty Ltd v. Moolpa Pastoral Co. Pty Ltd [1933]48 CLR 565, 576. 
ll6 Chitty on Contracts (1989) 2169. 
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presumptions are now no more than factors which the Courts will take into 
account simultaneously with all the other circumstances of the case". 117 
When there are many factors involved in deciding the proper law no one 
factor or presumption can override any other. This is illustrated by The 
Assunzione: 118 
When such a position arises all the relevant circumstances must 
be borne in mind, and the tribunal must fmd, if it can, how a 
just and reasonable person would have regarded the problem ... 
in the most convenient way and in accordance with business 
efficiency. 
Two important grounds here are, first, that the contract is to be carried out in 
the State in question (lex loci solutionis),119 and secondly, that that State is the 
grantor of the concession. 
However, whatever the general situation with respect of presumptions as 
to the proper law, traditional oil producing countries presume that oil concession 
agreements are governed by the "lex loci solutionis", the place of performance 
being within the territory of the State. In these cases it should be presumed that 
the national law will be the proper law for the parties' contract and should be 
the applicable law. 
(3) The Connection of the Transaction with a System of Law 
There is much controversy over whether the connection is to be with a 
system of law, or with a particular country, i.e. the country with which the 
transaction has the closest and most real connection. Earlier cases tended to 
require a connection with a country, 120 but the modern tendency is to adopt the 
connection with a system of law.121 The connection with either a country or a 
system of law should be based on the "transaction" contemplated by the contract: 
117 Nygh, 344. 
118 The Assunzione (1954) 176, 179 (Singleton U), quoted by Graveson, 431. 
119 Lord McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, BYIL 33 
(1957) 5. 
120 Boissevain v. Wei! [1949]1 KB 482,490. 
121 Bonytlwn v. Commonwealth of Australia [1951] AC 201-19; Chitty, 2081. 
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this means that the connection should be with what is to be done under the 
contract, rather than just with the technical form of the contract. This is used as 
a guide to determining whether the major connection is with a system of law or 
the law of the country. 122 In James Miller and Partners Ltd v. Whitworth Street 
Estates 123 the judges could not agree on the proper law of the contract and by a 
majority chose British law, although differing in their deftnition of the relevant 
connecting factors. Lord Reid and Wilberforce held that the tests of "system of 
Jaw" and "country" should be combined.124 But in Rossano v. Manufacturers Life 
Insurance Co/25 Judge McNair stated that "the correct formulation is the system 
of law and not the country with which the transaction has its closest and most 
real connexion". Here, although the case was most closely connected with Egypt, 
it was held that as it was most closely connected with Ontario law, this should be 
the proper law of the contract. 
A more recent case where a court determined by looking at the facts 
and circumstances a connection with a system of law was Amin Rasheed Shipping 
Corporation v. Kuwait Insurance Co. 126 Among the factors leading to the 
conclusion were that the contract was written in the English language and that 
the wording followed Lloyd's policy schedule. Further at the tim" the contract 
was written there was no Kuwaiti law of marine insurance. British law was seen 
to be the closest relevant system of law. 
This is an imponant issue for the purpose of concessions where the State 
concerned will invariably be the country most concerned, but where the legal 
system most concerned may be able to be manipulated. Common law states, 
for example, if the United States and United Kingdom have a contract between 
them and the contract is for the supply of oil to the United Kingdom from the 
United States, the United States' pon in that case is the place where the 
transaction is to be carried out and the lex loci so'"'ionis is United States law. 
Until recently the presumption was that United States law would apply. 
122 Coast Lines Ltd v. Hudig & Veder Chartering NV [1972]2 QB 34,46-50. 
123 [1970] AC 500, 531. 
124 Ibid. 
125 [1963]2 QB 352. 
126 [1984] AC 50. Article 4(1) of EEC Convention of 1972, provides that in tbe absence of 
a choice of the proper law by the parties, a contract is governed by the law of tbe country 
with which it is most closely connected. 
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However, this presumption has been rejected by recent cases which adopt the 
most real connection test, with the lex loci solutionis being just one factor to be 
weighed in the general circumstances of the case. 
The implications ~ on both sides. From the concession State's point 
of view, it controls the legal system of the country where the transaction is mostly 
to be carried out and is therefore better able to manipulate this legal system 
than the foreign contracting parties. The arbitrator may also be at a 
disadvantage because he may not be familiar with local law, and may wish to 
utilize a system of law which is seen to be "neutral" and with which he is familiar. 
Needless to say foreign parties will seek the application of a system of law other 
then that of the State party, and ideally a system with which they are familiar. 
Hence the varied pattern of the results in the arbitrations. 
5. The Choice of the Proper Law of Arbitration 
Arbitration has become an important neutral forum for the settling of 
disputes between States and foreign enterprises. The efficacy, confidentiality and 
expertise of arbitration have been used increasingly for world trade disputes and 
for oil disputes in particular, as we will see later. It is self-evident that the 
confidence of capital exporting nations increases with the assurance of a neutral 
forum for the arbitration of disputes, and there are indications that States are 
increasingly willing to submit to international arbitration. For the same reasons 
parties must have confidence in the law governing their arbitration. 
Third World countries now show greater acceptance of United Nations 
resolutions which provide for the mechanism of arbitration as an instrument in 
the settlement of disputes. In particular an increasing number of States adhere 
to the ICSID Convention. By 1987, 97 States had signed it and recent bilateral 
protection treaties suggest there is an increasing acceptance of international 
arbitration within the ICSID system.127 
In this regard, the Secretary General of the United Nations in his report 
127 EJ Paasivirta, Participation of States in International Contracts and the Arbitral Settlement 
of Dispules (Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 1988) 23-4. 
of 7 April 1983 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, stated: 
Arbitration is the prevalent mode for the settlement of the 
disputes that inevitably arise. Its function is to motivate the 
parties to reach an agreement among themselves in order to 
avoid the intervention of third parties and, eventually, to provide 
a neutral forum for settling and deciding disputes. Major 
petroleum producers have successfully insisted on the jurisdiction 
of their national courts. Similar policies are adhered to in most 
Latin American countries. In other countries, arbitration, either 
under the auspices of the international chamber of commerce 
(ICC) or the World Bank's International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is the rule.128 
(1) Methods of Expressing Choice 
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Usually an arbitration agreement is a clause included in a contract, and 
the proper law of the contract will often be the proper law of the arbitration 
included within it. Dicey and Morris state that: 
... the choice of the proper law of the contract, which includes 
the agreement to arbitrate, coincides with the choice of the law 
governing the arbitration proceedings. It cannot however be 
doubted that the courts would give effect to the choice of a law 
other than the proper law of the contract.129 
An arbitration agreement is a separate agreement to submit a particular 
dispute to arbitration, and it is at least theoretically possible for such an 
arbitration to have a different law from the proper law of the contract. On the 
other hand, if there is an express choice of arbitration law and it specifies the 
country of arbitration, this becomes an important factor which indicates that the 
place of arbitration is the proper law. If there is no express choice of law, it is 
to be inferred from terms and nature of the contract and the circumstances of 
the case.130 
128 E/C. 7/1983/5. 16 Para 47, quoted by Paasivirta, 23. 
129 Dicey & Morris (1980) 1128. 
130 MC Pry1es, Comparative Aspects of Prorogation and Arbiiilltion Agreements ICLQ 25 
(1976) 543. DR Thomas, Arbiiilltion Agreements as a Signpost of the Proper Law. 
Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quanerly (1984) 141. Mustill & Boyd, 
Commercial Arbitration Clauses (1982) 317; Sykes & Pry1es (1991) 141. 
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The major issue is the strength to be given to the designation of a place 
of arbitration but not an express law. On this issue, Dicey and Morris state that: 
Where the parties fail to choose the law governing the 
arbitration proceedings, those proceedings will almost certainly 
be governed by the law of the country in which the arbitration 
is held, on the ground that it is the country most closely 
connected with the proceedings.131 
Two pertinent cases are Tzortzis v. Monark Line AlB when the forum 
clause provided "an irresistible inference which overrides all other factors", 132 and 
Compagnie d' Armement Maritime SA v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA, 
when the House of Lords decided that though significant the designation of a 
place of arbitration was neither decisive nor irresistible.133 In this case the 
contract contained a clause providing for arbitration in London but all the other 
contracts were connected to France and Tunisia, which shared the same law. 
The House of Lords held that the proper law was French. Modem rulings 
indicate, however, that there is a strong tendency to infer that the proper law of 
arbitration is that of the country where the arbitration was designated. This can 
only be overridden by an express choice of law clause or by the amassing of 
other significant factors pointing to another legal system.134 
(2) Absence of express choice of law in arbitration clause 
When parties to a contract do not expressly state where and by what law 
their arbitration is to occur, the intention of the parties must be inferred from 
the agreement. In the Alsing Case, the Swiss arbitrator inferred that the law of 
the arbitration was Greek law. In 1920 the government of Greece and the 
Swedish Match Company and its associates concluded a concession agreement 
under Greek law containing two contracts, a loan contract with the Swedish 
Match Company, and a contract with Alsing for the exclusive supply of matches 
to the Greek government for a period of twenty years. The government by law 
had a monopoly in the manufacture, import and sales of matches in Greece. 
131 Dicey & Morris (1980) 1128. 
132 [1968]1 WLR 406,413 (CA). 
133 [1971] AC 512. See Sykes & Pry1es (1991) 142-7. Thomas 144. 
134 Sykes & Pry1es (1991) 142-7. 
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Both contracts were signed for the companies by the same agent, ratified for the 
government by the same decree law and published together in the government's 
Official Journal. Article I 0 provided: 
Any dispute or difference between the government and the 
company regarding the application, execution and interpretation 
of the present contract will be adjudged by two arbitrators, one 
of whom shall be appointed by the government and the other by 
the company. 
The arbitrators shall be appointed within fifteen days after the 
date on which one of the contracting parties shall have duly 
notified the other in writing of its desire to settle the dispute by 
arbitration. 
The arbitrators appointed, who may also be of foreign 
nationality, shall adjudge the dispute submitted to them 
irrevocably and without appeal; recourse to any other 
Jurisdiction and any other procedure is precluded. 
Should the arbitrators not reach agreement. They may, at the 
request of one of them, unanimously appoint, within twenty (20) 
days following such a request, a third party as umpire. In case 
of disagreement as to who the umpire is to be, he shall be the 
president of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, or, in default of the 
latter, the President of the supreme court of appeal of the 
Netherlands. The umpire's decision shall be irrevocable and 
final and the contracting parties shall submit to it without 
dispute. The umpire's decision shall be given within two months 
at the latest.135 
There was no express choice of law clause. In 1954 the parties had a dispute 
which led to arbitration. 
The umpire held that Greek law was the proper law of the arbitration, 
on the basis that: 
In [choosing a Swiss umpire] they did not agree that, at this 
stage of the arbitration proceedings, the law to be applied should 
be redetermined according to the rules followed by the Judge 
newly called upon to settle the dispute without appeal, and 
whose nationality was not yet certain. 136 
135 SM Schwebel "The Alsing Case 1920" ICLQ 8 (1959) 320, 326. 
136 ld., 326. 
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It may be worth noting that the arbitrator recorded the parties agreement that: 
given the interdependence and the common source of the 
systems of law in force in continental Europe, the question of 
the law to be applied is rather a question of principle without 
much practical significance.137 
In the course of his reasoning, the arbitrator referred to Swiss, French and 
German law, but this was stated to be merely .in order to fill gaps in Greek law 
or to test and illustrate his results by comparison. 
An imponant issue is to do with the strength of inference implied when 
the nationality of the arbitrator is decided. It is generally seen to infer that the 
law of the arbitration will be that of the law of the country of the arbitrators, 
though as already seen, not always. The presumption is seen to be at its 
strongest, when it refers to a local system of law which has developed an 
established scheme of administration and at its weakest in a one-off contract 
where the country is chosen for its neutrality P8 
(3) Choice of Arbitration Clauses in Oil Concession Agreements 
Oil concession agreements have frequently provided for arbitration as 
the mechanism of dispute settlement. The reason may be that the parties 
believed that arbitration procedures are more flexible and faster than normal 
judicial procedure. Arbitration may also give the parties more flexibility through 
their negotiations in accordance with the provisions of the agreements themselves 
as a basis for the solution of their differences. Consequently, arbitration tends 
to be adopted in preference to domestic courts. 
Arbitral clauses in oil concession agreements usually follow the same 
pattern. The parties to a dispute appoint the arbitrators, who in turn select an 
umpire. The arbitrators and the umpire must be impartial and experienced in 
legal matters. Where the parties or their arbitrators fail to select an umpire they 
137 ld. 327. 
138 DR Thomas, 148-9. 
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request a neutral international authority, such as the President of the 
International Coun of Justice, or the President of the Supreme Coun of a State, 
such as Switzerland or Sweden, or the Coun of Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, to do so.139 We will see examples from the oil 
concession agreements where the parties have expressed a choice of law and 
other examples where the parties have not expressed such a choice. 
(a) Oil Concession Agreements containing an Express Choice of Law 
Iran and the Pan American Oil Company in their concession agreement 
of 1958 provided in Article 38 that any dispute arising under their agreement was 
to be decided according to: 
The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, or 
alternatively, Swiss, Danish, Swedish or Brazilian law. 
The concession agreement of 17 May 1935 between Petroleum 
Development (Qatar) Ltd and the Ruler of Qatar provided: 
The Sheikh and the company declare that they base action upon 
this agreement on the basis of good faith and pure belief and 
upon the interpretation of this agreement in a manner consistent 
with reason. 
The offshore concession agreement of 5 July 1958 between the Kuwait 
Government and the Japanese-Arabian Oil Company provided: 
The parties base their relations with regard to this agreement on 
the principle of good will and good faith. Taking account of 
their different nationalities, this agreement shall be given effect 
and must be interpreted and applied in conformity with the 
principles of law common to Kuwait and Japan, and in the 
absence of such common principles, then in conformity with the 
principles of law normally recognized by civilized nations in 
139 See further, JF Lalive, Contracts between a State or a State Agency and a Foreign 
Company ICLQ 13 (1964) 991. Note that the terms "arbitrator", "umpire", "referee" etc 
are used without any very clear difference between them. The basic principles of 
impartiality etc would apply whatever the title. 
general, including those which have been applied by 
international tribunals. 
(b) Oil Concession Agreements lacking an Express Choice of Law 
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Article 31 of the oil concession agreement of 1933 between the Saudi Arabian 
Government and the Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco) provided: 
Any doubt, difference, or dispute shall arise between the 
government and the company concerning the interpretation or 
execution of this contract, or anything herein contained or in 
connection herewith or the rights and liabilities of the parties 
hereunder, it shall, failing any agreement to settle it in another 
way, be referred to two arbitrators ... 
This Article did not contain a choice of law clause. Instead it allowed the 
arbitrators to choose the applicable law. It provided: 
The decision of the arbitrators, or in the case of a difference of 
opinion between them, the decision of the referee, shall be final. 
The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed upon by 
the parties, and in default of agreement shall be the Hague, 
Holland. 
The arbitration agreement between the Saudi Arabian Government and 
Aramco of 23 February 1955 provided: 
The dispute being of a purely legal character, the flrst question 
to be decided by the arbitration tribunal is what law is to be 
applied to the relationship existing between the parties. 
The arbitration tribunal shall decide this dispute: 
(a) in accordance with the Saudi Arabian law as 
hereinafter defmed in so for as matters within the 
jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia are concerned. 
(b) in accordance with the law deemed by the arbitration 
tribunal to be applicable, in so for as matters beyond the 
jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia are concerned. 
Saudi Arabia law, as used herein, is the Muslim law: 
(a) as taught by the School of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hambal; 
(b) as applied in Saudi Arabia.140 
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The agreement between the Saudi Arabian government and the Trans 
Arabian Pipeline Company of 1366 AH (1947) for arbitration of disputes provided 
in Article 23: 
The decision of the arbitrators, or, in the case of a difference of 
opinion between them, the decision of the umpire, shall be fmal. 
The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed by the 
parties, and in default of agreement, shall be Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia. 
Again there was no express choice of law clause, and it was the responsibility of 
the arbitrators to determine the applicable law. 
The agreement between the Saudi Arabian government and the Japan 
Petroleum Trading Company Ltd, of 18 Jumada I, 1377 AH (10 December 1957) 
provided in Article 55 for arbitration of disputes. It did not express any choice 
of law, but allowed the arbitrators to apply the applicable law: 
... The decision of the arbitrators, or in the case of a difference 
of opinion between them, the decision of the majority shall be 
final, conclusive and binding upon both parties. The place of 
arbitration shall be Saudi Arabia or such other place as may be 
agreed upon by the parties ... 
However, article 47 provides that the rights of the company shall be exercised in 
a lawful manner subject to tl_Je law of the country and existing agreements. 
The agreement between the government of Saudi Arabia and Getty Oil 
Company of 22 Rabia 11, 1368 AH (20 February 1949) provided in article 45 for 
the arbitration of disputes in terms similar to article 55 of the Japan Petroleum 
Trading Company agreement. 
140 Saudi Arabian Government v.Ex-ArabianAmerican Oil Company (Aramco Arbirralion)ILR 
27 (1963) 1534. 
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Anicle 40 of the Iraq Petroleum Company (fPC) agreement of 14 March 
1925 as revised by further agreements of 29 March 1931 and 3 February 1952 
provided: 
... The decision of the arbitrators, or in the case of a difference 
of opinion between them the decision of the referee, shall be 
final. The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed 
by the parties, and in default of agreement shall be Baghdad. 
There was no express choice of law clause, with the arbitrators being required to 
determine the applicable law. 
(4) Choice of Arbitration Clauses in Petroleum Laws 
The petroleum laws of some countries in Africa and the Middle East 
provide for the settlement of dispute by party-selected arbitrators and a neutral 
referee. This practice may have been influenced by the French decree of 13 
November 1956 which gave authority to the French overseas territories to insert 
arbitration clauses in certain commercial arrangements, for example, with mining 
companies. 
In the case of Italy and in accordance with the Italian Code of Civil 
Procedure the 1951 Italian Petroleum Law calls for arbitration at a domestic 
level. 
Concerning Pakistan's petroleum production and mining concession rules 
a Judge of the Federal Court decides the controversy if two party-chosen 
arbitrators disagree. 
A similar provision for settling differences between the petroleum 
administration of the council of ministers and oil companies was made pursuant 
to the Turkish petroleum law of 7th March 1954.141 
141 See further, Suratgar, 290.1. 
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Anicle 45 of the Egyptian Law No 66 of 1953 on mines and quarries 
provides: 
For the purposes of arbitration in the cases specified in this law, 
a board shall be formed consisting of three members, one to be 
nominated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the 
second to be chosen by the lessee, and the third to be elected 
by the general assembly of the administrative court from 
amongst its members; this latter member shall preside over the 
board. The decisions of the arbitration board shall not be 
subject to any appeal. 
On 10 June 1955 the Libyan government issued the Libyan Petroleum 
Law. This was amended many times. This amendment, together with the other 
amendments introduced by the Libyan law of 1965, was incorporated in the 
existing Libyan concessions on 20 January 1966. Anicle 28(7) was the final form 
of the article which allowed for arbitration of disputes. It provides: 
This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in 
accordance with, the principles of law of Libya common to the 
principles of international law and in the absence of such 
common principles then by and in accordance with the general 
principles of law, including such of those principles as may have 
been applied by international tribunals. 14 
Anicle 4 of the Venezuelan Law of Hydrocarbons of 13 October 1955 
provides: 
Any doubts · and controversies of whatever nature that many 
ensue because of this concession and which cannot be amicably 
settled, shall be decided upon by the competent courts of 
Venezuela, and in accordance with its laws, and for no reason 
nor for any cause shall they give rise to foreign claims.143 
Anicle 14 of the Petroleum Law of Iran of July 1957 provided: 
Any differences arising between the national Iranian Oil 
Company and other parties, if not resolved through a machinery 
142 Article 28(7) of the Second Schedule to the Libyan Petroleum Law No. 25 of 1955. 
Middle East Law Review, I No.6 September 1958,286. See ILR 53 297, 302-3,389,393-8. 
143 See further, S Toriguian, Legal Aspect of Oil Concessions in the Middle East (1972) 77,78. 
for amicable settlement which shall be laid down in the 
agreement, shall be referred to conciliation and arbitration, the 
rules relating to which shall also be determined as considered 
appropriate in each agreement. 144 
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Article 50 of the Saudi Arabian Mining Code of 1382 AH (1963) which 
was amended in form but not substance in article 55 1392 AH (1972) provided 
for the establishment of an independent board for the appeal of disputes arising 
from its application as follows: 
There shall be established pursuant to this code an independent 
board for the appeal of disputes arising from the application of 
this code, consisting of not less than three and not more than 
five members to be chosen, regardless of nationality, from 
eminent and highly reputable jurists and judges experienced in 
international law and in problems relating to leases. 
The members of the board shall not be called to account civilly 
or criminally except in accordance with rules to be prescribed by 
a special law. A decision shall be issued by the Council of 
Ministers for the formation of the board, setting forth the rules 
of pleading before it. The board shall be provided with an 
adequate number of technical and administrative personnel. 
(6) Choice of Law: Conclusion 
The principle of permanent sovereignty dictates that a State should 
maintain control over its resources. This puts resource-rich states in direct 
conflict with capital exporting states, who are interested to gain and remain in 
control of those resources. This conflict of interest can be seen in the differing 
views on the choice of law rules. 
It is clearly in the interest of oil producing countries to have their 
contract governed by municipal law. By contrast capital exporting countries 
choose international law or general principles of law as the governing law, to 
avoid the application of municipal law. 
144 ld, 88. 
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This conflict is seen to be resolved in juristic opinion, by allowing parties 
the freedom to choose the law of the contract This principle has been applied 
to most oil concession agreements from the middle of this century. 
However, because of the urgent need of Third World countries for 
revenue, they are often compelled to accept the choice of law of capital exporting 
States. This may be disguised, when the municipal legal system is described as 
not specialized or adequate enough to cover the contract, but in fact the choice 
of another legal system is motivated by a decision to avoid the municipal system 
of the other party. 
There is a strong tendency to choose arbitration as the method of 
dispute resolution, as the inherent conflict of the choice of law can be seen to be 
arbitrated by a neutral arbitrator. Though not always satisfactory the use of an 
"umpire" in arbitration is the only way at present to resolve this conflict. 
7. Choice of Forum and its Relation to Choice of Law 
Judicial jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court 
to make a valid decision binding on the party or parties 
concerned in any matter properly brought before it.145 
When the parties' contract stipulates that the courts of a specified foreign country 
have exclusive jurisdiction over their contract in case there arises any disputes 
between them, they intend to exclude the jurisdiction of other foreign courts. 
Thus a choice of forum intends ... 
to grant jurisdiction to the courts of a certain country or place 
to the exclusion of other courts that might be equally or more 
competent to take jurisdiction. It contemplates that the latter 
courts will defer to the parties choice in the event that one PBfll 
later reneges by bringing suit in such a non-chosen tribunal. 1 
145 Graveson, 94. See also DA Johnston, "Admiralty. International Commercial Transactions 
- Choice of Forum Clauses presumed valid" NYUJILP 6 (1973) 367. 
146 M Friedman, "The Validity and Efficacy of Choice Of Law Clauses in International 
Contracts" 5 Liberian LJ 71 (1969) 71-72, quoted by IM Farquharson, "Choice of Forum 
Clauses. A Brief Survey of Anglo-American Law" International Lawyer 8 (1974) 85-6. 
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The choice of forum implies two concepts, that, of prorogation, which denotes 
the acceptance by the parties of the particular jurisdiction, and derogation, which 
infers that the parties do not want action to be pursued within other 
jurisdictions.147 It is the later notion which has caused the most concern as it 
could encroach on the rights of a State with an interest in the case. 
There are differences between States in the freedom given to parties to 
chose their own forums, but it cannot be denied that there is a trend towards 
accepting the rights of parties to such a choice, provided at least that such a 
choice is considered reasonable. An important justification for this trend is that 
it provides a secure and predictable environment in which international trade can 
occur. Much the same considerations apply within a federal system in terms of 
interstate transactions.148 
The validity of a choice of forum clause as a grant of jurisdiction has 
been recognized in international law. The courts of most countries recognize the 
validity and effect of a party's choice of forum as conferring jurisdiction without 
the need for any other link with the forum: 149 the same is true of the various 
international conventions on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments, with 
exceptions relating to certain matters only.150 
A non-selected forum may be denied jurisdiction unless "the other State 
would be a substantially less convenient place for the trial of the action than this 
State". 151 Secondly, a forum selection clause may be denied "if the plaintiff 
cannot secure effective relief in the other state ... " 152 This could happen if the 
court is not empowered to hear this type of action, or if it lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over the claim.153 The third reason is when it can be shown it "was 
obtained by mis-representation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other 
14 7 Farquharson, 86. 
148 M Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in lntemationill and Interstate Commercial 
Agreements, University of Illinois Law Review I (1982) 156. 
149 A Lenhoff, "The Parties' Choice of a Forum Prorogation Agreement" Rutgers Law Review 
15 (1961) 414,419, Farquharson, 86. 
!50 LO Lagerman, "Choice of Forum Clauses in International Contracts. What is Unjust and 
Unreasonable?" International Lawyer 12 (1978) 794. 
151 Lagerman, 781. 
152 Model Choice of Forum Act ss3(2). 
153 Lagerman, 783. 
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unconscionable means". 154 Finally, it would be denied if it were found to be 
unreasonable, if "it would for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable to 
enforce the agreement",m such as when a State by applying its laws would violate 
the public policy of the foreign State's law. 156 
8. Choice of Forum in Different Legal Systems 
(1) The United States 
The current American position can be said to have evolved from the 
gradual erosion of the common law approach where most courts would refuse to 
accept an agreement that was in derogation of the exercise of its jurisdiction. In 
other words, while accepting jurisdiction based solely on a choice of forum 
clause, the courts "did not let the fact that they were not the chosen forum deter 
them from hearing the case"/57 unless a case was considered to be exceptional. 
In Mittenthal v. Mascagni 158 a Massachusetts court ruled that the parties' choice. 
of forum would be upheld although both parties to the contract where foreigners. 
In Gitler v. Russian Co.159 the choice of forum clause was agreed on after the 
cause of action arose. 160 This contract which could be seen as a partial 
settlement agreement, included a provision that the plaintiff promise not to 
pursue a remedy in enforcement of a judgement except in the courts of Russia. 161 
The court maintained that the parties could agree "not to submit to the courts a 
particular pending controversy" .162 
On the other hand, objections to a choice of forum clause were proposed 
by Chief Justice Shaw in Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Insurance Co.163 These were 
!54 Model Choice of Forum Act ss3(4). 
!55 Id, Act ss 3{5). 
156 Lagerman, 787. 
157 WM Reese, "The Supreme Court Supports Enforcement of Choice of Forum Clauses" 
International Lawyer 7 (1973) 534; WM Reese, "The Contractual Forum Situation in the 
United States" AJCL 13 (1974) 187. 
!58 66 NE 425 (Mass 1903). 
159 108 NYS 793 (1903). 
160 See IT Gilbert, "Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts" 
Kentucky Law Journal 65 (1976) 13. 
161 Ibid 
162 108 NYS 794. 
163 72 Mass 174 (1856). 
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based on the idea that choice would be inconvenient to the parties, could 
threaten the perception of a court's relative competence and partiality, and was 
an attempt to oust courts of their statutory jurisdiction.164 On these grounds, the 
forum selection agreement was held unenforceable. This view became 
entrenched in American courts and although challenged by commentators was 
not seriously questioned until 1949. 
In that year Judge Learned Hand made the first important statement 
undermining this approach, noting that: "in truth, I do not believe that, today at 
least, there is an absolute taboo against such contracts at all. In the words of 
the Restatement of Contracts ss558 (1932), they are invalid only when 
unreasonable ... "165 This "reasonableness" test was applied in 1955 in the case of 
Wm. H. Muller and Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd.166 In this case Muller 
shipped goods on a Swedish American ship. The Agreement stipulated that the 
Swedish Court was to have exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes. Muller 
claimed that the Carriage Of Goods by Sea Act made the choice of forum 
invalid.167 The court ruled that the choice of a Swedish Court did not lessen a 
carrier's liability:168 
The parties by agreement cannot oust a court of jurisdiction 
otherwise obtaining; notwithstanding the agreement the court has 
jurisdiction. But if in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction, by 
a preliminary ruling the court fmds that the agreement is not 
unreasonable in the setting of the particular case, it may 
properly decline jurisdiction and relegate a litigant to the forum 
to which he assented. 169 
Five factors were listed as needing to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of the forum limitation provision. Those limitations were: 
1. Ownership of the ship and place of construction (when 
the ship was lost at sea). 
2. The nationality and residence of the crew members. 
164 JM Reilly, "Enforceability of 'Choice of Forum' Clauses" California Western Law Review 
8 (1972) 326. 
165 Krengerv. PennsYlvania RR. 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d cir. 1949), quoted by Gilbert, 13-14. 
166 224 F 2d 806 (2d Cir, 1955). 
167 46 USC ssl300-15,ss1303(8) (1970). 
168 224 F 2d 806, 807. 
169 ' ld, 808. 
3. Whether the chosen court will apply the same measure 
of damages as the instant forum. 
4. Whether the chosen forum's limitation proceedings are 
more restrictive and 
5. The potential for fair anci just adjudication of the case in 
the chosen forum. 170 
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In 1965, in Central Contracting Co. v. CE Youngdahl and Co,171 the 
reasonableness test was applied with the result that the choice of forum clause 
was upheld. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "such an agreement is 
unreasonable only where its enforcement would under all the circumstances 
existing at the time of litigation, seriously impair the plaintiff's ability to pursue 
his cause of action ... " 172 
Again in 1966 Central Contracting Co v. Maryland Casualty Co. 173 the 
Youngdahl case was relied on and the choice of forum clause was upheld on the 
grounds that no unreasonableness could be found. 174 The court considered that 
the most pertinent elements were the "distance from the plaintiff's home office" 
and "the complementary choice of law provision" .175 Hawaii, 176 Minnesota, m 
New York178 and Washington179 have adopted the reasoning of Muller and 
Youngdahl. 
As I will discuss in the next chapter on limitations on choice of law and 
forum, the Model Choice of Forum Act was approved in 1968 by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Law in the United States. 
Courts were allowed greater discretion as to whether to uphold the choice of 
forum clause. 
170 Ibid. See Gilbert, 15; Reilly, 327. Muller was not the first case to enforce a 
forum-selection clause, but it aroused interest in re-evaluating the traditional view about 
such clauses: see Gruson, 144-5. 
171 209 A 2d 810 (1965). 
172 Id, 816. 
173 367 F 2d 341 (3d Cir, 1966). 
174 Id, 344-5. 
175 Ibid. See Gilbert, 17-19; JR Keys, "New Freedom in the Negotiation of International 
Contrac!S. The Supreme Court upholds Forum Selection Clauses" Law and Policy in 
International Business 5 (1973) 705. 
176 Hawaii Credit Card Corp v. Continental Credit Card Corp 290 F Supp 848 (D Hawaii) 
(1968). 
177 Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convey Inc 294 F Supp 1132 (D Minn, 1968). 
178 National Equip Rental, Ltd v. Sanders 271 F Supp 756 (EDNY, 1967). 
179 General Elec Co. v. City, of Tacoma 250 F Supp 125 CW D Wash, 1966). See Reilly, 329. 
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(2) England 
English law has been based upon the concept of "party autonomy". Its 
civil law jurisdiction started with the principle that the parties choice of forum 
should, subject to a few exceptions, always be given effect.180 However, in a 
desire to guard the rights of the judiciary, the ouster rule was developed. This 
rule asserted that "the jurisdiction of an English Court could not be ousted by 
agreement between the parties".181 But a court could decide not to exercise its 
jurisdiction.182 This gave the greatest possible effect to the intention of the 
contracting parties, while protecting the rights of the State. But there were 
limitations to this right where the intention were not "bona fide and legal", or 
where there was some "reason for avoiding the choice on the grounds of public 
policy."'83 
Modern English law has continued this tradition. It distinguishes 
between the clauses that commit parties to the exclusive jurisdiction of foreign 
courts and those providing for non-exclusive jurisdiction.184 The courts recognize 
choice of forum clauses in both domestic and international jurisdiction "subject 
only to certain public policy considerations usually under the idea of 
administration of justice." ... 185 The position in English law is that if the parties 
accept the jurisdiction of the English courts by contract (notwithstanding the 
complete absence of any connections between the forum and the case) the courts 
will give effect to that choice. But if by the same kind of clause a forum outside 
England is selected the foreign proceedings may be, in certain circumstances, set 
aside or stayed. 
180 Farquh3Illon, 88. 
181 A Aballi, Comparative Developments in the Law of Choice of Forum, NYUJILP I (1968) 
192-93, quoted by Farquh3Illon, 89. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Lord Wright, Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus SfUpping Co. [1939]AC 277. In spite of the 
fact that this expression involves only the proper law, it states the principle of party 
autonomy, which encompasses forum-selection clauses. See Farquh3Illon, 90. 
184 L Collins, "Choice of Forum and the Exercise of Judicial Discretion - the Resolution of 
an Anglo-American Conflict" ICLQ 22 (1973) 332, 333. See also C Noles, "Enforcement 
of Forum Selection Agreements in Contracts Between Unequal Parties" GA Jlntl &Comp 
L 11 (1981) 703. 
185 Farquh3Illon, 93. 
62 
In all cases the English couns have the discretion to decide the case, but 
they will usually uphold the choice of forum clause, in the case at least of a 
defendant on whom service of process outside English jurisdiction is required, by 
refusing jurisdiction. Thus if there is a submission to a foreign coun, a plaintiff, 
to be allowed to continue a case in England, must make "a strong case" why this 
should be done. One of the most vital issues here is whether all the evidence is 
in England. 
If the coun selected is a foreign coun but the plaintiff applies to the . 
English coun, the defendant may apply to have the case stayed.186 In recent 
years, there has been some controversy over forum non conveniens, which have 
shifted the onus to the defendant to prove that the action should be stayed.187 
In MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd 1977188 four Scotsmen injured in industrial 
accidents were advised to sue in England rather than Scotland, as it was felt they 
would obtain a more favourable ruling in England. The defendants applied for 
a stay, which was refused. Lord Diplock stated: 
In order to justify a stay the defendant must show more than 
that it is warranted by the scales of convenience being weighted 
in his favour. 
In The Abidin Daver in 1984,189 a Cuban vessel collided with a Turkish 
vessel in Turkish waters. The owners began action in Istanbul, the Cuban owners 
in the English Admiralty Coun. The Turkish owners were granted a stay of the 
English action. Basing their deCision on the doctrine of forum non conveniens the 
House of Lords ruled that the Turkish coun was the natural and more 
appropriate forum, unless the plaintiff could prove he would be deprived of 
personal or judicial advantage legitimately. 
The problem that has arisen out of this is how a coun is to interpret 
"legitimate personal or judicial advantage". In 1986 Lord Goff, listed this as one 
of several factors to be considered in deciding on a stay of proceedings; other 
186 Collins, 332. See also Graveson, 117. 
187 For further detail see JG Collier, Coriflict of Laws (1987) 78. 
188 [1978] AC 795. 
189 [1984] AC 398. 
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factors were that a stay would be granted only if the other court was appropriate 
to the trial, that the onus was on the defendant to show that the other forum is 
clearly appropriate, and that the court must look at with what action there was 
the closest and most real connection. 190 
(3) Latin America 
The position in the countries of Latin America varies. In Guatemala, for 
example, Article 14 of the Civil and Commercial Procedure Law provides that 
irrespective of any agreement to the contrary, the plaintiff may always bring 
action at the domicile of the defendant. By contrast Article 237 of the 
Panamanian Judiciary Code states that "express prorogation by contract 
determines the exclusive competence of the court chosen by the parties".191 
Mexico and Cuba accept that the court chosen by the parties in a contract is 
primarily competent and that alternative rules of competency should be applied 
only when the court has. not been chosen, while in Argentina preference is given 
to the place of performance designated by the parties. But there appears to be 
a trend away from upholding choice of national forum clauses. 
In Brazil, where the courts usually uphold exclusive jurisdiction clauses, 
statutory restrictions are applied to cases involving Brazilian real estate, which 
must be brought before Brazilian courts, and labour matters, which have courts 
designated by statute. But In a 1962 decision of the courts of Guanabara, Rio 
de Janeiro it was ruled that the jurisdiction of Brazilian courts was a matter of 
public policy and could not be waived.192 
In Argentina, the trend away from upholding choice of forum clauses can 
be seen in the changed opinion in Compte Y Cia v. Ybarra Y Cia (1936) where 
"the opinion concluded that Argentinian sovereignty and the protection of its 
jurisdiction required that exclusive jurisdiction clauses be disregarded in the 
international sphere. "193 In that case the contract had stipulated the Courts of 
190 [1986)3 WLR, 971. 
191 MA Schwind, "Derogation Clauses in Latin-American Law" AJCL 13 (1964) 168. 
192 Id, 168-70. 
193 Decision of 16 November 1936, quoted by Schwind, 171. 
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Seville in Spain as the exclusive forum, but the Procurator General argued that 
the prior case Ia w could be changed. 
On the other hand the Latin American Convention on Private 
International Law of 1928 (the Bustamante Code) recognized the principle of 
choice of forum. 194 Article 318 of the Bustamante Code provides that lawsuits 
should be brought to the judge to whom the parties have submitted, provided 
that at least one of the parties is a citizen or domiciliary of the State of the 
forum and that local law does not forbid the submission. This code was relied 
on in Holzmann v. Gainsborg in 1950 between Chile and Bolivia. 195 
(4) Europe 
(a) French Law 
The principle of choice of Forum is fundamental in French law196 and 
there is no limitation to it, whether a dispute is contractual, in personam or in 
rem, or whether covering real or personal propeny. 197 Under Article 14 and 15 
of the Civil ' ,,de, the privileges extended to French nationals are not upheld if 
there is an explicit agreement that jurisdiction be in a foreign court: however if 
this agreement is not expressly stated there is no presumption of waiver.198 
(b) German Law 
German law allows a choice of forum to parties in dispute by express or 
applied agreement. 199 Only in certain situations covered by the Code of Civil 
Procedure limiting party autonomy is this choice not valid. The most important 
of these limitations is under s40 of the Code which provides that "no contractual 
change of competence is allowed as to non-pecuniary claims and those pecuniary 
194 Lagerman, 794. 
195 Holzmann v. Gainsborg [1950]47 Revista de Derecho, Jurisprudenciay Ciencias Sociales 
11.1 509 quoted by Schwind, 172. 
196 Lenhoff, 414-40. 
197 ld, 442. 
198 Ibid. 
199 A Drobnig, American German Private international Law (1972) 323 quoted by Noles, 703. 
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claims which fall under an exclusive competence".200 Because of this, the 
principle of choice of forum does not operate in relation to non-pecuniary family 
law claims, or in matters which are exclusive to the jurisdiction of German 
couns.201 
(c) Other European Countries 
The principle of choice of forum is accepted in most European countries, 
although subject to a range of qualifications. However in Spain, Ponugal and 
Hungary no effect is given to choice of forum clauses, showing a strong tendency 
to protect local citizens by guaranteeing a local forum. In Italy, forum selection 
clauses stipulating a coun other than the Italian couns will generally not be 
enforced unless the agreement is in writing and involves alien or an alien and a 
non-resident non-domiciled citizen, and has to do with pecuniary matters.202 On 
the other hand, Italy shows a bias towards prorogation clauses: unless the action 
relates to immovable propeny outside Italy, a prorogation clause is a sufficient 
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. 203 As well, parties may choose to designate 
that their place of domicile is Italy. Such a designation in the contract will be 
accepted. 
Austria, Belgium, Greece and Switzerland tend to uphold the choice of 
forum unless it involves a matter of public policy or involves immovables within 
the state, while the Scandinavian countries take the choice of forum provision for 
granted. 204 
9. The Principle of Choice of Forum in International Agreements 
This principle is reflected in the Draft Convention on the Jurisdiction of 
the Selected Forum in the Case of International Sales of Goods prepared by the 
Hague Conference in 1956, which expressly recognizes the validity of forum 
200 Pryles, 569. 
201 Ibid. 
202 JM Perillo, "Selected Forum Agreements in Western Europe" AJCL 13 (1964) 163, 165. 
203 Ibid. 
2(}4 Ibid. 
66 
selection clauses. 205 The Hague Conference on Private International Law 
approved the 1964 Hague Convention, based on this Draft This Convention 
treats forum provisions as presumptively valid both in prerogative and derogative 
senses, so that no coun other than the selected one would have the right to hear 
action covered by the agreement except in specifically defmed situations. 206 
Anicle 2 provides that: 
This Convention shall apply to agreements on the choice of 
coun concluded in civil or commercial matters in situations 
having an international character ... 
Article 3 provides that: 
This Convention shall apply whatever the nationality of the 
parties. 207 
The EEC Convention of 27 September 1968, on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgements is also relevant. Article 17 
provides: 
If by an agreement in writing or a verbal agreement confirmed 
in writing when at least one of the parties is domiciled in the 
territory of a contracting State, the parties have designated a 
court or the courts of a contracting State as competent to settle 
disputes ... only the des~ated court or the courts of that State 
shall have jurisdiction. 8 
The Bustamante Code in 1928 provides in Article 318 that law-suits in 
civil and commercial matters shall be brought in the first instance before the 
judge "to whom the litigants expressly or impliedly submit themselves ... ".209 But 
Pryles states that "the Bustamante Code does not seem to have had a great 
effect. There is some doubt about the extent of its operation and Article 318 
205 Lagerman, 794. 
206 Gilben, 29. 
207 The text of the Hague Convention is found in AJCL 13 (1964) 629. 
208 See generally Pryles, 573. 
209 Ibid. 
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expressly permits the invocation of local law to deny effect to prorogation 
agreements. "210 
10. Conclusion 
There is, despite certain exceptions, a trend towards upholding choice of 
forum clauses in the trading nations of the developed countries. By contrast, the 
developing countries are more likely to seek to protect national interests by 
imposing limits on such clauses, or refusing to recognize their effect. Thus there 
are likely to be areas of conflict between developing and developed countries. 
Thus Third World countries may attempt to protect themselves by 
stipulating national forums for the settlement of certain classes of disputes. For 
example, the tendency in the countries of Latin America is not particularly 
favourable to supporting choice of forum clauses in international contracts. zn 
The reason for this may be the perceived weaker bargaining position in contract 
formation of parties from Third World countries, particularly when faced with 
multi-national corporations.Z12 
11. Conflict of Laws in Islamic Shari'ah Law 
Conflicts of law in Islamic Shari'ah usually concern questions relating to 
domicile, marriage, divorce, succession, wills, contracts etc, of non-Muslims and 
foreigners resident in Muslim territory.213 The private international law of Islam 
is a part of "Figh" jurisprudence. Foreign relations ·in Islamic Shari'ah are 
regulated by special laws, which derive their "authority not from any foreign 
source, but from the sovereign will of the Muslim State itself'.214 However in 
practice the rules reflect great tolerance of choice of other laws.215 
210 Ibid. 
211 Schwind, 173. Gilben, 24. 
212 Noles, 705. 
213 AK Pavithran, Public International Law, Western and Eastern (1965) 669. 
214 Ibid. 
215 A Msallam, Private international Law (1966) 157 (Arabic text). 
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It is not possible within the scope of this thesis to discuss 
comprehensively conflicts of laws as recognized in Islamic Shari' ah. I will 
however outline some of the basic conflicts principles. 
(1) The Position of Foreigners in Islamic Jurisprudence 
Islamic jurisprudence distinguishes between a native of an Islamic State 
and a foreigner by dividing the world into two separate parts: Dar a/Islam, the 
Islamic world, ruled by Muslims, and Dar al Harb, the rest of the world, ruled by 
non-Muslims. It allows that providing they are not at war there is no restriction 
on commercial and political relations between them. Following a war and after 
peace agreements are signed, it is possible to resume relations. The term used 
to describe the people of Dar a/ Harb would change from "the warriors" to "the 
peaceful ones. "216 
The citizens of countries known as Dar a/Islam are of two categories: 
the first are Muslims, the second non-Muslims who are permanent residents of 
a Muslim country. The second group are referred to as "Dhimmis": they are 
granted the benefit of Islamic nationality and are not considered to be foreigners. 
It is not possible for a Muslim of any nationality to be considered a foreigner in 
Dar a/Islam, even if he comes from a country ruled by non-Muslims. So the 
term foreigner is restricted to refer to those non-Muslims living in Dar al Harb. 
Should a foreigner enter Dar a/Islam he will be granted safety, providing 
he initiates communication with the Muslims or "Dhimmis". He is referred to as 
"Musta'min" or a seeker of safety. Should a Musta'min marry a "Dhimmis", the 
marriage confers "Dhimmis" status on the "Musta'min" either male or female. 
Thus marriage confers nationality on a "Musta'min". Further a "Musta'min" will 
acquire "Dhimmis" status if he lives in Dar a/Islam for a long time. The length 
of time is unspecified but tends to be less than that required by more recent 
nationalization laws. In any event a Musta'min will enjoy the same care and 
treatment in· government and law as Muslim citizens?17 
216 Id, liD. 
217 Id, Ill. 
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(2) The Meaning and Consequences of "Dhimmis" Status 
The term Dhimmis was given by Muslims to the followers of the 
religions it considered to be the revealed religions, i.e. persons of Christian or 
Jewish faith, the so called "ahl al-kitab" (people of the book). 
According to the jurists a contract between a Muslim and a Dhimmis 
was called a Dhimma. This contract conferred a protected person status on the 
Dhimmis. It gave him the right to stay in Islamic territory, security for his 
person and his belongings, freedom of religious practice and defence against an 
enemy. In the Hanbali school it was also stipulated that a Dhimmis must not 
speak ill of the Islamic religion and should not be involved in any action 
detrimental to believers!" There is also an obligation to obey all rules of 
Islamic Shari' ah which do not contradict their faith. 219 
(3) Islamic Jurisprudence and Positive Laws 
Prior to the development of a comparable jurisprudence in feudal 
Europe, the Arabian nation had a legal system which depended on Islamic 
jurisprudence. Islamic jurisprudence is not only a religious jurisprudence but 
also the jurisprudence of a State. It covers the relationship between Muslims 
and non-Muslims having the same nationality or citizenship, and is therefore a 
legislative jurisprudence for everyone. It is not possible for the positive laws 
and the religion it depends on to be considered in the same category. As these 
are not equivalent it is impossible to have laws conflicting on the base of "Ia 
notion rattachee".21i> Since Islamic jurisprudence does not rule on "Ia notion 
rattachee", this will have an effect in conflicts between other positive laws and 
legislation. 
However, the Islamic State has long had relations with foreigners. 
Islamic jurisprudence organized these relations not after "Ia notion rattachee", 
which means that relations with foreigners be governed by a certain law, but 
directly after the positive rules mentioned in Islamic jurisprudence under 
218 M Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (1960) (1955) 176. 
219 Msallam, 156. 
220 Ibid. 
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headings such as the non-Muslims' special rules, the difference between Dar a/ 
Islam and Dar a/ Harb, marriage with non-Muslims, and rules regulating relations 
between Dhimmis and Musta' mins.u1 In those rules there is a recognition of the 
rules of "Dhimmis", as long as those rules do not contradict Islamic Shari'ah. 
(4) Jurisdiction over non-Muslims 
The Islamic Shari' ah was originally a code concerned with territorial 
matters, and not -- as has been mistakenly inferred in Europe •• a personal code 
ruled by the principles of subjective law. In principle Dhimmis were considered 
to be under the jurisdiction of their own religious leaders. The Muslim Judge 
(qadi) has jurisdiction over a dispute between two Dhimmis. However, opinion 
was divided over cases where the two Dhimmis were brought before a Muslim 
Judge. The Hanbali School held the view that the judge was to try the case, 
whereas the Maliki school and the Shafi'i school saw the judge as having a 
choice. 222 On this issue the Holy Qur' an says: 
... If they do come to thee, either judge between them [the 
Dhimmis] or decline to interfere.}23 
and further: 
.. .Judge between them [the Dhimmis] bt what God hath 
revealed, and follow not their vain desires... 4 
In either civil or criminal case the Muslim judge had to apply Islamic Shari'ah 
for "Islam must dominate and not be dominated".225 The Holy Qur'an says "But 
who, for a people whose faith is assured, can give better judgment than God",226 
and also: " ... And never will God grant to the unbelievers a way [to triumph] over 
the Believers ... m 
221 Ibid. 
222 M Khadduri & HJ Liebesny, Law in the Middle East I (1955) 337. 
223 The Holy Qur'an Sura V. verse 45. 
224 The Holy Qur'an Sura V verse 51. 
225 Khadduri & Liebesny, 337. 
226 The Holy Qur'an Sura V verse 53. 
227 The Holy Qur'an Sura IV verse 141. 
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According to the Malikis school, the choice of law in a case involving 
two Dhimmis, should be the national law of the parties to the dispute, even if the 
judge be Muslim. However, should this national law contradict Islamic Shari' ah 
it would have to be rejected for reasons of public order. The concept of public 
order in Islamic Shari'ah is essentially a religious one, for it involves a people 
who relate everything to God and who have established their law on the basis of 
their faith. 
One may take as an example a situation where a judge had to decide 
between two Dhimmis on the sale of wine or pork, (both of which are prohibited 
in Islamic Shari'ah). They, according to the Malikis school, an Islamic Judge 
would either have to decline judging the case or apply the appropriate rules of 
the Islamic Shari' ah. On the other hand the judge would be obliged to enforce 
the contract concluded among Dhimmis unless its provision infringed upon the 
precepts of Islamic Shari'ah. This principle applies to all contracts between 
Dhimmis.22B 
228 Sahnun a! Mudawana al-Kubra, vol XI, 42, vol XIII, 56, vol XN, 32, 74, quoted by 
Khadduri & Liebesny, 338, 339-40. 
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CHAPTER3 
DISPUTE SETILEMENT MECHANISMS IN THE 
ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
AND SOME MEMBER STATES 
1. Background 
In a move to ensure control over the supply of oil, the League of Arab 
states formed an Oil Exports Committee in 1951. A growing sense of national 
identity moved Arabic countries to emphasise their aspirations for a single Arab 
nation, and encouraged them to devise a united policy to protect and control 
their oil. In 1954, a Petroleum Department was set up within the League of 
Arab States as a permanent regulatory body. In 1957 the Economic Council of 
the Arab League established a Petroleum Congress in Cairo. However, they 
"were aware that such an association could only be effective if it included Arab 
as well as non-Arab large exporters of petroleum". In 1959 they invited 
Venezuela and Iran as observers to the Petroleum Congress. From this time 
there has been an increased co-operation among the oil producing countries, 
which have extended their contact with each other, based on principles of 
co-operation and the co-ordination of policies.' The result of this co-operation 
has been the establishment of several petroleum organizations: OPEC in 1960, 
OAPEC in 1968, and the African Petroleum Producer's Association CAPPA) in 
1987. OPEC and OAPEC have provision in their constitutions for settling the 
disputes of members, as we will see later, but APPA has no similar provision in 
its Constitution. 2 
(a) The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
Between 10 and 14 September 1960 the representatives of the 
Governments of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela met in Baghdad. 
I MA Ajomo, "An Appraisal of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC)" Texas International Law Journa/13 (1977) 12, 14. 
2 APPA Constitution of 1987. APPA members are Algeria, Gabon, Libya, & Nigeria. This 
information was provided by Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. 
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Here OPEC was established as a permanent inter-governmental organization 
based in Vienna Later other petroleum exporting countries joined as full 
members: Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962), Libya (1962), United Arab Emirates 
(1974), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973), Gabon (1975). OPEC 
now has thirteen members. 3 
Article (2) of the OPEC Statute states its aim as follows: 
A. The principal aim of the organization shall be the 
co-ordination and unification of the petroleum policies of 
member countries and the determination of the best means for 
safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively. 
B. The organization shall devise ways and means of ensuring 
the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view 
to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations. 
C. Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests of the 
producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady 
income to the producing countries: an efficient, economic and 
regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair 
return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum 
industry. 
OPEC has made many recommendations and resolutions, particularly 
dealing with the major problems facing the member countries, the world 
economy, and the confrontations between nations concerned with oil. The 
guiding principle of OPEC has been to encourage the national development of 
member nations and to allow them to exercise control over their own resources 
and economies.4 Highlights of its activity have been as follows: 
( 1) On 15-21 January 1961 the Caracas Conference adopted a resolution for a 
comprehensive study on the economics of investment in the oil industry by 
concession-holding companies. It also emphasized the restoration of prices to 
levels which members considered justified and appropriate. 
3 Abu Dhabi's membership (1967) was transferred to the United Arab Plnirates after the 
formation of the United Arab Emirates which included Abu Dhabi in 1974. See MA 
Ajomo 14-15. 
4 !d., 26. See GG Kaplan, "International Economic Organization, Oil and Money" Harvard 
International Law Journal!? (1976) 203. 
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(2) On 24-31 December 1963 in Riyadh, the 5th Conference resolved to 
establish a three-member OPEC Negotiation Committee (Iran, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia) with the oil companies on royalty payments and marketing expenses; to 
compile a code of uniform petroleum laws and to initiate studies on the 
establishment of an Inter-OPEC High Court for the settlement of disputes 
relating to petroleum matters, and to prepare a project to set up an Inter-OPEC 
Commission to examine crude oil prices on a regular basis. 
(3) On 5-6 October 1967 in Taif (Saudi Arabia) A consultative meeting of Five 
member countries decided to enter into negotiations with the oil companies to 
eliminate the allowances stipulated in the royalty agreements. 
(4) On 6-10 November 1967 in Djakarta, A meeting of representatives of the 
National Oil Companies of OPEC member countries authorized the OPEC 
Secretariat to commission a study on the co-ordination of policies of national oil 
companies (NOCs) in the international market. 
(5) On 24-25 June 1968 in Vienna, the 16th OPEC conference adopted a 
"Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries". The 
Statement emphasized, inter alia, that member governments should endeavour 
to explore for and develop their hydrocarbon resources directly; acquire 
reasonable participation in the ownership of the concession-holding companies, 
participate in choosing the acreage to be relinquished, and base the assessment 
of the companies' income, taxes and any payments to the State on a posted or 
tax reference price for those hydrocarbons produced under contract. It also 
emphasized the inalienable right of all countries to exercise permanent 
sovereignty over their natural resources. 
(6) On 9-12 December 1970 in Caracas, the 21st OPEC Conference resolved 
that all member countries were to adopt a set of objectives namely, to establish 
55 per cent as the minimum rate of taxation on the net income of oil companies; 
to eliminate disparities in posted or tax reference prices of crude oils on the basis 
of the highest posted price applicable in member countries, taking into 
consideration differences in gravity and geographic location; to establish a 
uniform general increase in the posted or tax reference prices in all member 
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countries to reflect ·general improvement in the conditions of International 
petroleum markets, to adopt a new system for the adjustment of gravity 
differential of posted or tax reference prices; and to eliminate completely the 
allowances granted to oil companies as from the beginning of 1971. This 
resolution achieved something of a revolution in the global oil situation, giving 
the oil producing countries considerably more power in creating a stable high 
price for crude oil. This was gained at the expense of foreign oil companies. 5 
(7) On 4-6 March 1975 in Algeria, the Conference of Sovereigns and Heads of 
State of OPEC member countries adopted a "Solemn Declaration" which 
emphasized inter alia, mutual respect for the sovereignty and equality of all 
member nations of the international community in accordance with the UN 
Charter, and reaffirmed the sovereignty and the inalienable right of all countries 
to the ownership, exploitation and pricing of their natural resources. 6 
(b) The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) 
On 9 January 1968 the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC) was established by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya, and 
was based in Kuwait. Eventually all the Arab producing countries (United Arab 
Emirates, Bahrain, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Qatar, Egypt and Tunisia) joined the 
organization.7 Article 2 of the agreement emphasized the organization's major· 
goals as follows: 
to promote co-operation and close ties between the member 
countries in economic activities related to the oil industry, to 
determine ways of safeguarding their legitimate interests - both 
individual and collective in the oil industry, to unite their efforts, 
so as to ensure the flow of oil to consumer markets on equitable 
and reasonable terms, and to create a favourable climate for the 
investment of capital and expertise in their petroleum industries. 
5 Ajomo, 27-8. 
6 OPEC Official Resolutions and Press Releases, 1960-1983. See also OPEC General 
Information and Chronology (1986) 25. 
7 For further information, M Tetreault, The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries: History, Policies, and Prospects (1981). 
The central objective of this anicle is: 
(a) To take adequate measures to ensure the co-ordination of 
the petroleum economic policies of members. 
(b) To take measures to ensure the harmonization of the legal 
systems in the member countries to the extent required for the 
organization to carry out its activity. · 
(c) To help members to exchange information and expertise, 
and to provide opportunities for the citizens of member nations 
to be trained and employed by member nations where the 
opportunities exist. 
(d) To actively encourage, co-operation among members to 
work towards solutions to problems facing them in the petroleum 
industry. 
(e) To utilize members' resources and to combine their 
potential abilities to create joint ventures in the various phases 
of the petroleum industry. Such ventures may be undertaken, by 
all members or those interested in such projects. 
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OAPEC was established as a result of the growing Arab nationalist 
movement and the desire of member nations to exercise their right to control 
their natural resources for the interests of their nations and their national 
income. Many projects have been initiated by OAPEC. These have included: 
(1) Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Company 
(AMPTC) 6 May 1972 
(2) Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Company 
(ASRY) 8 December 1973 
(3) Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation 
(APICORP) 14 September 1974 
(4) Arab Petroleum Services Company (APSC) 23 
November 1975 
(5) Arab Petroleum Training Institute (APT!) 1979 
(6) Arab Engineering Company (AREC) 22 March 1981.8 
8 OAPEC, Secretary General's Twelfth Annual Report (1405 AH, 1985 AD) 126. 
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OAPEC's member nations have subsequently considered many related issues, 
such as pricing production levels and production methods. It is also concerned 
with the relations between States within the Arab nation. On a practical level 
it provides for technical conferences and seminars where non-OAPEC States are 
invited to attend. Further, it liaises with other countries in the world on behalf 
of members, especially in connection with energy and development problems.9 
2. Judicial Tribunals in OPEC/OAPEC Countries 
(a) The OPEC High Court 
At OPEC's Fifth Conference held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, between 24 
and 31 December 1963, a resolution was passed to establish an Inter-OPEC High 
Court. Resolution v. 41(2) states: 
(1) that the Secretary General shall invite a number of experts 
from member countries and, if necessary, from other countries, 
to work on the compilation of a code of uniform petroleum laws, 
and that a comprehensive report in this connection shall be 
submitted for consideration to member countries; and 
(2) that the Secretary General shall forthwith initiate studies for 
the establishment of an inter-OPEC High Court for the 
settlement of all disputes and differences relating to petroleum 
matters, except for member countries whose legal system does 
not allow them to participate in the establishment of such a 
court, and prepare a project thereon for submission to member 
countries; and that, further, the statutes of the said High Court 
shall be so conceived as to allow the court to act both in an 
advisory and in a judicial capacity. 10 
The jurisdiction of this court was to extend over "all disputes and 
differences relating to oil matters". It was to be the administrative court of the 
Organization and to provide jurisdiction on international controversies that were 
9 Article (3) of the OAPEC Agreement provided that 
The provisions of this agreement are not deemed to affect the rights and 
obligations of members in respect of their agreement with the 
Organization of Petroleum and Exporting Countries. The parties to this 
agreement are to be bound by the ratified resolutions of OPEC and shall 
be bound by them even though they are not members of OPEC. 
I 0 OPEC Resolution v 41. 
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related to oil. Funher it was to cover controversies over the interpretation, 
application and termination of oil concession agreements between OPEC 
member governments and oil companies or enterprises.11 Despite this resolution 
the Inter-OPEC High Court did not come into existence. This left OPEC 
without a formal method of settling disputes by arbitration or judicial 
settlement.12 This deficiency encouraged members of OPEC to convene the 
OPEC Conference. The Conference was to be the supreme authority of the 
organization. It would consist of delegated representatives of all members of 
OPEC. It would discuss problems and attempt to fmd solutions.13 The writer 
contacted the legal department of OPEC in Vierma in connection with this thesis 
and was informed that the conferences have dealt with a number of disputes 
between members of OPEC, notably between Iran and Iraq over oil production 
quota. With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war however this ceased to be an 
issue.14 
(b) The OAPEC Judicial Tribunal 
Article 21 of the OAPEC Constitution provided for the establishment of 
a Judicial Tribunal, by way of a Protocol to be agreed upon by member 
countries. The Judicial Tribunal's Protocol was signed in Kuwait on 9 May 1978, 
and came into effect in April 1980. Because of the tight cormection between the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction, and the organisation's activities (with its emergent 
companies), the Tribunal is considered as OAPEC's judicial arm, as indicated by 
the Organization's Agreement and the Judicial Tribunal Protocol. The OAPEC 
Judicial Tribunal is the fitst inter-Arab judicial system. 
The foundation of the Tribunal was the begirming of a new trend 
confirmed when the Arabian Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) established a 
special Tribunal for treating the disputes between the members. Its Statute was 
promulgated in Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates) on 21 Rajah 1401 AH 
corresponding to 25 May 1981. These developments may sustain the idea of 
11 M Mughraby, Permanent Sovereignty over Oil Resources (1966) 129. 
12 Ajomo, 17. 
13 Anicles 10, 11 of the OPEC Statute. 
14 This information was provided by Mr Muhammad Baghdadi from the Legal Department 
of OPEC in Vienna (May 1989). ' 
79 
establishing an Arab Court of Justice with general jurisdiction. The Arab 
League's Committees are now studying a draft Statute for such a Court.15 
Article 22 of the OAPEC Agreement provides that "the judges of the 
Tribunal shall be chosen from persons whose impartiality is not in doubt and 
who fulfil the necessary conditions for holding the highest legal positions in their 
countries, or are jurists of international repute ... " 
OAPEC and its members with their emergent companies have standing 
before the Judicial Tribunal. Oil companies operating in an OAPEC member 
territory may also enjoy the same right, whether they belong to the OAPEC 
members or are foreign companies, if the member and the company have agreed 
to refer their future or current disputes to the Judicial Tribunal. Article 24(C) 
of the Protocol permits other parties to bring cases before the Tribunal, and also 
provides that the Judicial Tribunal may review any cases classified by the 
OAPEC Council as within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 
The Judicial Tribunal differs from most other international courts in that 
the right to initiate proceedings can be exercised by states, international 
organizations, international public companies having a commercial aspect, and 
national or international private companies. The Judicial Tribunal's jurisdiction 
arises under Article 23 of the OAPEC Agreement, and Articles 24, 25, 26, 27 of 
the Judicial Tribunal Protocol.16 The Tribunal's jurisdiction consists of: 
(l) obligatory jurisdiction 
(2) optional jurisdiction 
(3) consultative jurisdiction. 
(1) The Tribunal's Obligatory Jurisdiction 
According to Article 23(1) of the OAPEC Agreement, and Article 24(1) 
of the Judicial Tribunal's Protocol, the Tribunal is entitled to deal with the 
following disputes: 
15 OAPEC Judicial Tribunal Report (1985) 8. 
16 See further Appendix I. 
(a) disputes concerning the interpretation and application of 
the Agreement, and the execution of its obligations. The 
countries members, the organization and its companies are all 
admitted as parties in these disputes. 
(b) disputes between two members or more in the oil 
industry, on condition that the dispute must not involve the 
sovereignty of any country member involved in the disputes. 
(c) disputes determined by the Council to be within the 
Tribunal's Jurisdiction, subject to the same provision as in clause 
(b) above. 
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Subject to these restrictions the Tribunal may deal with any one of these disputes 
provided that one party wishes to proceed: it does not need the approbation of 
the other party. Article 7 4(2) of the Tribunal's procedural rules states that if the 
accused - after being duly warned that an action is taken against it - does not 
appear before the Tribunal or fails to carry out any later step in the proceedings, 
the accuser may proceed to claim judgment in absentia, and the Tribunal must 
continue with the proceeding. 
(2) The Tribunal's Optional Jurisdiction 
Article 23(2) of the OAPEC Agreement and Article 24(2) of the Judicial 
Tribunal's Protocol define the disputes which can be treated by the Tribunal 
after an agreement between the parties. These are: 
(a) Disputes between any country member and the oil companies 
working in its territory. 
(b) Disputes between a country member and an oil company 
belonging to another member. 
(c) Disputes between two members or more, except for that 
mentioned in article 23( 1 ). 
The Tribunal cannot treat those cases unless the disputing parties agree 
previously to be judged by the Tribunal. This text is considered as a basis for 
the countries members and their companies and foreign companies working in 
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their territories to agree to insen provisions in their future agreements, selecting 
the Tribunal to arbitrate disputes under those agreements, when the parties do 
not agree to refer such disputes to the national law of the country member. 
(3) The Tribunal's Consultative Jurisdiction 
The Tribunal may give a consultation in respect of cases duly referred 
to it by the Organization's Council of Ministers. According to Article 77 of the 
Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, the Council has a wide power to refer to the 
Tribunal a panicular case or class of cases, or to allow a member or an 
emergent company or institution to claim for a consultation from the Tribunal in 
a cenain case. 
3. The Rules of Law applied by the Judicial Tribunal Since Its Foundation 
According to Anicle 26 of the Judicial Tribunal's Protocol, the Tribunal 
gives judgment by reference to the Protocol, the Islamic Shari'ah, and 
international law. In these matters it applies: 
(a) the Organization's Agreement and any international 
conventions which bind the parties to the dispute; 
(b) international custom accepted as binding; 
(c) the general principles of law applied in international 
society; 
(d) the general principles in the member countries' laws. 
In addition ... 
(e) The Coun's judgments and the trends of the great jurists 
in the public law in the member countries may be drawn on as 
required. 
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Disputes dealt with by the Tribunal according to its optional jurisdiction may be 
judged according to the law which the Tribunal believes should be applied to 
settle the case. 17 
4. Cases before the Tribunal since its Foundation 
Two cases have been brought before the Tribunal. 
(a) Iraqi Republic v. Syrian Arab Republic (1982) 
The Iraqi Republic requested to proceed against the Syrian Arab 
Republic about "the cessation of crude oil transportation across Syrian territory", 
relying on the Tribunal's jurisdiction under Article 24(2)(C) of the Judicial 
Tribunal's Protocol, and to Article 15 of the Complementary Agreement between 
the Governments of Iraq and Syria. This Complementary Agreement of 26 
November 1981 provided for the transportation of Iraqi crude oil across Syrian 
territory and for oil to be supplied to Syria for its local consumption.18 
The writer contacted the Secretary of the Judicial Tribunal of OAPEC 
in connection with this thesis and was advised that the case is still pending.19 
(b) Sea Arab Company for Oil Transponation v. Government of the People's 
Democratic Algerian Republic (1983) 
On 27 August 1983, the Sea Arab Company for Oil Transportation 
requested to proceed against the Government of the People's Democratic 
Algerian Republic, because "the accused party did not keep to its fmancial 
obligations towards the accuser company, due by the agreement of the company 
establishing and its statute, and by the decisions of its General Assembly". 20 
17 The OAPEC Statute of 1968. See also the Judicial Tribunal of OAPEC Protocol of 1978. 
18 OAPEC Judicial Tribunal Reports 1985, 1986, 1987. 
19 This information was provided by Dr Reaz Addaoody, Registrar of the Judicial Tribunal 
of OAPEC (February 1992). 
20 OAPEC Judicial Tribunal Reports 1985, 1986, 1987. 
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On 28 October 1989, the lawyers representing both parties informed the 
President of the Judicial Tribunal of OAPEC that both parties had agreed to 
settle their dispute and applied to expunge their claim from the Tribunal's list. 
Accordingly the Judicial Tribunal decided on 5 R Thani 1410 AH (corresponding 
to 4 November 1989) to delete the case from its schedule and register the case 
as settled, according to Article 70 of the Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal. 
5. The Board of Lease Appeals of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enacted the first Mining Code under 
Royal Decree No. 40 dated 11 Ramadan 1382 AH, corresponding to 5 February 
1963, as amended under the Royal Decree No. 21 dated 20 Jumad AI Awal, 1392 
AH, corresponding to 1972. This provided, in Article 55 for the establishment 
of a Board of Lease Appeals, an independent board .to hear appeals in disputes 
arising from the application of the Mining Code. This Article read as follows: 
There shall be established pursuant to this Code an independent 
board for the appeal of disputes arising from the application of 
this Code, consisting of not less than three and not more than 
five members to be chosen, regardless of nationality, from 
eminent and highly reputable jurists and judges experienced in 
international law and in problems relating to leases. The 
members of the board shall not be called to account civilly or 
criminally except in accordance with rnles to be prescribed by a 
special law ... 
This Article applies exclusively to mining; moreover Article 2(a) excludes 
petroleum, natural gas, and derivatives thereof, and Article 2(b) excludes pearls, 
corals, and similar substances from the scope of its jurisdiction. 
Despite these exclusions, several oil concession agreements concluded by 
the Government of Saudi Arabia provide for the jurisdiction of the Board of 
Lease Appeals. For example, two concession agreements were concluded 
between the Government of Saudi Arabia, and General Petroleum and Mineral 
Organization "Petromin", a public organization under the laws of Saudi Arabia 
in 1387 A.H. corresponding to 1967. These were concluded for the purpose of 
discovering and producing hydrocarbons, including petroleum, natural gas, asphalt 
and any other petroleum products, by-products, and derivatives in the Red Sea 
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and Empty Quarter areas. Article 54 of both agreements probides that the 
Board of Lease Appeals is to constitute a forum for any dispute which might 
arise. It states: 
Article 54 
If any doubt, difference or dispute shall arise between the 
Government and PETROMIN concerning the interpretation or 
the performance of this Agreement or anything herein contained 
or in connection herewith, or the rights and liabilities of 
PETROMIN, and failing any agreement to settle it by any other 
method, the doubt, difference or dispute shall be submitted to 
the Board of Concession Appeals provided for in Article 5021 of 
the Saudi Arabian Mining Code. 
If and when an international coun is created for the settlement 
of controversies arising from Middle Eastern Oil Concessions, 
PETROMIN and the Government shall examine together the 
possibilities of substituting that court for the above mentioned 
Board of Concession Appeals. 
Further the Concession Agreement between Saudi Arabia and the French 
Company Auxrab in 1384 AH corresponding to 1965, provided in Article 63 that 
the Board of Lease Appeals would provide a forum for any dispute which might 
artse: 
.. .If no agreement is reached by the Committee of Experts, the 
parties shall submit the doubt, difference or dispute to the Board 
of Concession Appeals provided for in Article (55) of the Saudi 
Arabian Mining Code ... 
This suggests that the jurisdiction of the Board extends to petroleum concession 
agreements with foreign companies, because there is no provision that prevents 
the parties to a concession agreement from agreeing to submit their disputes to 
the Board. 
21 See p.83. 
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6. Conclusion 
Oil exponing countries as a consequence of their membership of OPEC 
and OAPEC have proposed or established forums to submit disputes which may 
arise between member governments and foreign petroleum companies, and 
between member countries themselves. The OPEC High Coun has not yet been 
established, but OAPEC has established its Judicial Board and a number of cases 
have been brought before it. Saudi Arabia also has a Board of Lease Appeals. 
Although this Board was established to provide jurisdiction for mining disputes, 
there is no provision to prevent it exercising similar jurisdiction on disputes 
between the government and foreign oil companies which may be submitted to 
it. 
A consequence of the development of OPEC and OAPEC is that the 
interests of oil producing States can be protected from the threat of interference 
from more powerful states with interests in oil companies operating in their 
territory. This protection ensures that another country's law will not be used in 
disputes between the company and the member State. 
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CHAPTER4 
LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW AND CHOICE OF FORUM 
1. Introduction 
As we have seen, a basic principle of conflict of laws is the freedom of 
the parties to choose the law to govern their contract. Under both civil law and 
common law, the principle of party autonomy, with limitations in certain cases, 
is recognized. This principle is also generally reflected in international 
conventions dealing with this area. But there are several provisions in these 
conventions which allow exceptions to the rule of freedom of choice by allowing 
the application of mandatory rules. 
Further, in commercial contracts the parties may designate a forum as 
the exclusive forum to deal with any dispute which may arise between them. 
These clauses are very common in international contracts and may or may not 
be combined with a choice of law clause.1 There are also, however, certain 
limitations on the ability of parties to choose their forum, recognized by 
international conventions. 
In this chapter I will discuss the possible limitations on choice of law and 
forum, with special reference to the choice of law governing oil concessions, and 
various limitations on choice of forum as they apply to oil exporting countries. 
I C Noles, "Enforcement of forum selection agreements in contracts between unequal 
parties" Ga J Inti & Comp L 11 (1981) 693. 
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2. Limitations on Freedom of Choice of Law 
(1) Treaties Guaranteeing Choice of Law 
(a) Mandatory rules 
(i) Definition 
Mandatory rules have developed from the perceived need for State 
intervention for three reasons, first, to protect the weaker party to a contract in 
domestic law, second, to protect the social and economic interests of the State, 
and third, to impose internationally agreed standards in respect of particular 
contracts. In particular, the second of these processes has led to the need to 
define mandatory rules in international contracts and the role they should play.2 
Article 3(3) of the EEC Convention on the Law applicable to 
Contractual Obligations of 19 June 198cY defmes mandatory rules as "rules of law 
of a country which cannot be derogated from by contract". Article 3(3) provides 
that. .. 
The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law, whether or 
not accompanied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, 
where all the other elements relevant to the situation at the time 
of the choice are connected with one country only, prejudice the 
application of rules of the law of that country which cannot be 
derogated from by contract, hereinafter called "mandatory rules". 
Nonh states that: 
Article 3(3) allows the parties to choose the law of any country 
but, if all the elements of the contract are connected with one 
country, the choice of the law of a second country is not to 
prejudice the application of the mandatory rules of the first 
country. The objective is clear: the parties cannot evade the 
application of any of the mandatory rules of their domestic law 
by a choice of law clause. "Mandatory rules" has, and rightly 
2 C McLachlan, "The New Hague Sales Convention and the Limits of the Choice of Law 
Process" LQR 102 (1986) 620. See also AL Diamond, "Conflict of Laws in the EEC", 
Current Legal Problems 32 (1979) 155. 
3 Opened for signature, 19 June 1980: 23 OJ Eur Comm (No L 266) 1 (1980). 
has, a broad meaning extending to all domestic law which cannot 
be derogated from by contract. 4 
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Common examples of mandatory rules are laws concerned with contracts of 
employment and some consumer contracts. 5 The notion of mandatory rules is 
clearly designed to curtail the right of the parties to avoid state regulation by 
choosing some other law. However problems of implementation remain.6 
MacLachlan has suggested that mandatory rules problems could be solved by the 
adoption of international standards (such as for example the use of international 
human rights standards) to define "public policy", in contexts such as cultural 
property, in discussions of legislative jurisdiction in economic law and in 
exchange control under the Bretton Woods agreement.7 As the EEC Convention 
provides, the forum's ability to apply mandatory rules of its own would not be 
impeded by its power to apply the mandatory rules of another state, although 
other exclusionary rules of the conflicts of law place limits on this power. Also, 
if a contract has a close connection with a third country and if there are 
mandatory rules in that contract, they may be applied by the judge, regardless of 
the law of the contract. A foniori a consumer or employee should be protected 
by the laws of the country of sole connection. 8 
(ii) The Scope of Mandatory Rules. 
Article 3(3) of EEC Convention applies to the rules of the law of a 
country with which all relevant elements of the situation at the time of the choice 
of law are connected. Article 7 (1) & (2) further provide: 
(1) When applying under this Convention the law of a country, 
effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another 
country with which the situation has a close connection, if and 
in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must 
be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In 
considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, 
4 PM North, "The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980. 
Its History and Main Features" in PM North (ed), Contract Conflicts (1982) 18. 
5 D Jackson, "Mandatory rules and Rules of Ordre Public" id, 65. 
6 McLachlan, 626. 
7 Ibid. 
8 SeeM Wolff, "Some Observations on the Autonomy of Contracting Parties in the Conflict 
of Laws" Trans Grotius Society 35 (1949) 143, 147. 
regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the 
consequences of their application or non application. 
(2) Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of 
the rules of the law of the forum in a situation where they are 
mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the 
contract. 
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In this regard, Article 7 creates various ways to avoid the application of some 
rules of the Convention under certain circumstances: it has been said that "in so 
doing [Article 7] adds to the flexibility of the Convention".9 But these provisions 
are not acceptable to some writers, as will be seen. Article 7 also concerns the 
application of the mandatory rules of a law other than lex causae under certain 
circumstances, where the courts have a discretion. 
(iii) The Application of the Law of Closest Connection 
The laws of another country may under the EEC Convention supersede 
those chosen by the contracting parties, where that legal system has a close 
connection with the contract.10 The precise nature of this connection has been 
debated, yet under Article 7(1) of the EEC Convention "there must be something 
more than a relatively minimal connection between the country of the rule and 
the situation when compared with that of the governing law"." Further the 
forum must consider this rule within the context of the case to determine if it is 
more applicable than the most closely connected law. The object of Article 7 is 
to take into account the community interest, 12 which the parties have already 
indicated their connection with through the elements -of the transaction. Philip 
states that: 
9 
10 
11 
12 
The principal condition for applying a rule of another law under 
paragraph ( 1) is that there is a close connection between the 
situation and the country to the law of which that rule belongs. 
Where the contracting parties themselves have chosen the 
applicable law and where that law is different from that which 
would have been applicable, failing any choice by the parties, the 
A Philip, "Mandatory rules, public law (political rules) and choice of law in the EEC 
Convention" in North (1982) 81. 
For further details, see chapter 2. 
Jackson, 73. 
Ibid. ' 
latter law presents a close connection with the situation since the 
situation is most closely connected with that law. But even other 
laws may be given effect under paragraph (1), since a close 
connection may exist without the connection being the closest. . 
Thus, where the applicable law is that with which the situation 
is most closely connected there may still be situations where 
another law may be applied under paragraph ( 1 ) ... 13 
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However, there have been many criticisms of Article 7, particularly on 
the basis that it creates uncertainty in a contract and that it requires four 
hypothetical conditions to be met (viz, that it must be connected with another 
country, that this country must have mandatory rules, these rules must purport 
to exclude the application of every other law and that this is justified by the 
special nature and purpose of these laws). More importantly, it creates even 
more complexity for judges in deciding which legal system is the most valid. 14 
(iv) Application of Mandatory Rules of Another Country 
As we have seen Article 7 ( 1) provides for the application of the 
mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a 
close connection. The rules which may be applied under this provision of this 
Convention are rules pertaining to any legal system, with which there is a close 
connection irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under 
Article 7(2).15 But the application of mandatory rules of another country is not 
new to English law. For example, in Ralli Brothers v. Campania Naviera Sota y 
Aznar, a Spanish ship was to carry jute from Calcutta to Barcelona at a freight 
of 50 pounds per ton. The contract was in English and contained a clause 
specifying that disputes were to be settled by arbitration in England under 
English law. However after the contract was signed, the Spanish government 
prohibited payment of freight of more than 10 pounds per ton. When the 
charterers tried to claim the balance of payment when they delivered the jute in 
Spain, they were refused. The Court of Appeal in England recognized the 
Spanish law and dismissed the claim for the balance.16 
13 Philip, 103. 
14 L Collins, "Contractual Obligations. The EEC Preliminary Draft Convention on Private 
International Law" ICLQ 25 (1976) 50-1. 
15 Philip, 103. 
16 [1920]2 KB 287. 
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Similarly in Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia (1944) Ltd, a contract for the sale 
of jute bags between an Indian seller and a European buyer was governed by 
English law, both parties contemplating that the jute should be shipped from 
India to Genoa for resale in South Africa. The seller repudiated the contract 
because the buyer intended to resell the jute bags in South Africa, although the 
export of jute bags from India to South Africa was prohibited under India law. 
The buyer claimed damages under English law which was the proper law of the 
contract, but the House of Lords gave effect to the Indian prohibition and 
refused to allow the claim. 17 
(v) Evaluation of Article 7 of the EEC Convention 
It is evident that Article 7 is intended to prevent "forum shopping" as 
Courts are inclined to apply the directly applicable laws of their own country to 
cases within their jurisdiction. However as Lando notes, "Such rules have seldom 
been applied as 'immediately applicable' by the courts of foreign countries, and 
their application depends on where the action was brought" .18 Thus by 
attempting to state the immediately applicable foreign laws the Convention 
attempts to create a more equal and uniform situation. Drobnig similarly notes 
that: 
First, States should mutually pay regard for each others interests, 
and second, citizens should not be exposed to contradictory 
rules... and the third principle... comes into play with regard to 
mandatory rules which aim at the protection of the weaker, or 
the less experienced, contracting party.19 
On the other hand there have been some serious criticsms of the article -
- most notably by Mann,20 who fmds that its vague and imprecise nature 
contributes to uncertainty in the law and problems in practice. He states: 
17 [1958] AC 301. 
18 Ole Lando, "The Substantive Rules in the Conflict of Laws: Comparative Comments from 
the Law of Contracts" Texo.s International Law Jourrialll (1976) 521-2. 
19 FA Mann, "Contracts Effect of Mandatory Rules" in K. Lipstein (ed) Harmonization of 
Private International Law By the E.E.C. (1978) 35. 
20 Id, 35-6. 
It gives to the third country's law a far greater effect than to the 
proper law or the lex fori. For the third country's law to be 
operative "a significant link" is sufficient. For the proper law to 
apply there must be a real choice by the parties or a close and 
substantial connection. For the public policy of the forum to 
apply some elementary principle of justice or morality must be 
at stake. 
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In his view such a situation would "constitute the most serious obstacle to 
international trade. I doubt whether the Convention as a whole does anything 
to enhance the certainty of the law". He also points out that "there is no justice 
in the proposition that either party to a contract can demand the application of 
a law to which it has not submitted", and that defaulters would easily abuse the 
provision. The primary duty of the international legislature to prevent such 
consequences. 
All that should be pointed out in connection with Article 7 is 
that, first, it treats this enormously complex and practical 
problem with less than the attention it deserves, and, second it 
enlarges the problem in the following way; the normal conflict 
is between the ordinary rules of private international law of 
State X, the State of the forum, which leads to the application 
of the law of State Y, on the one hand, and the public law of 
State X, which insists on the application of the internal law of 
State X. Article 7 enlarges this problem (perhaps in order to 
avoid charges of encouragement of forum shopping) by allowing 
the possible application not only of the public law of the forum 
but also of any of the public law of any State with which the 
contract is "connected". :n 
Fletcher argues that the lack of precision of the terms "close connection" 
and "situation", and the extent to which they prove to be uncertain, will 
encourage greater judicial subjectivity in the choice of law. Parties can no longer 
feel confident about which law will be applied to their case, nor will they be able 
property to evaluate all the consequences of a legal agreement. There is also the 
problem of how to identify and classify mandatory rules. 22 
It seems therefore that Article 7(1) has (probably unintentionally) 
created a sense of insecurity as to which law is to be used in deciding on a case, 
21 Collins 51, and see FA Mann, "Statutes and the Conflict of Laws" BYIL 46 (1972-73) 117. 
22 Ian F Fletcher, Conflict of Laws and European Community Law (1982) 170. 
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and would if applied give rise to that which it intended to prevent, a less equal 
and uniform environment in which contracts could be made. 
(b) Limitations on Freedom of Choice of Law 
The various international instruments dealing with this issue provide for 
a number of limitations on the freedom of the parties to choose the proper law 
of their agreement. 
(i) The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations of 1980 
Article 1(1) of the EEC Convention of 1980 provides that: 
This Convention shall apply to contractual obligations in any 
situation involving a choice between the laws of different 
countries. 
That means that it applies whether the situation is international or of an internal 
nature. Article 3(1) of the Convention recognizes the freedom of choice of law 
by the parties to govern their contract: 
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. 
The choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable 
certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the 
case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable 
to the whole or a part only of the contract. 
There is no general limitation on the parties' choice in the Convention. 
Whatever limitations there are must be taken from expressed provisions of the 
Convention.23 However, the freedom of the parties to choose the proper law to 
govern their contract is subject to several limitations under the Convention. 
These are as follows: 
23 Philip, 94. 
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(1) According to Article 1(3) the Convention does not apply to contracts of 
insurance which cover risks situated in the territories of the member 
states of EEC Convention. In order to determine whether a risk is 
situated in these territories the court must apply its internal law. 
(2) Article 3(3) provides that the choice of a law by the parties as the proper 
law of their contract is not to prejudice the application of mandatory 
rules of the law of the country to which the situation is closely 
connected, unless the situation has an international element. 
The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law, 
whether or not accompanied by the choice of a foreign 
Tribunal shall not where all the other elements relevant to 
the situation at the time of the choice are connected with 
one country only, prejudice the application of rules of the 
law of that country which cannot be derogated from by 
contract, hereinafter called "mandatory rules. 
(3) Article 5(2) makes a further exception for consumer contracts: 
... a choice of law made by the parties shall not have the 
result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded 
to him by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in 
which he has his habitual residence. 
(4) Article 6(1) provides that "in a contract of employment a choice of law 
made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the employee 
of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law 
which would be applicable to the contract in the absence of choice of 
law". 
(5) Article 7(1) provides that "when applying under this Convention, the law 
of a country effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of 
another country with which the situation has a close connection, if and 
in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be 
applied whatever the law applicable to the contract ... ". 
( 6) Anicle 9( 6) makes funher limited reference to mandatory rules: 
A contract, the subject matter of which is a right in 
immovable property or a right to use immovable property 
shall be subject to the mandatory requirements of form of 
the law of the country where the property is situated if by 
that law those requirements are imposed irrespective of the 
country where the contract is concluded and irrespective of 
the law governing the contract. 
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(7) Anicle 16 provides that "the application of a rule of the law of any 
country specified by this Convention may be refused only if such 
application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre 
public) of the forum". That means that public policy (ordre public) is 
outside the scope of the Convention. 
From the foregoing survey, it seems that the general recognition of party 
autonomy and the other provisions in various countries regarding choice of law 
seems to have influenced States not to make any stipulations on choice of law 
or to prohibit particular choices of law in international treaties. As a practical 
matter, any such treaty stipulations restraining choice of law would destroy the 
flexibility and ease of carrying on trade and commercial co-operation between 
developed and developing countries with divergent legal systems, because 
commercial men should, otherwise than in exceptional cases, need to take advice 
only on one system of law before making their decision to enter into the 
transaction. Prior limitations on choice of law are not the place to solve difficult 
problems which m!ly arise relative to a dispute. 24 Thus limitations on the choice 
of law decided on by the parties to a contract of international trade are probably 
unwarranted. Such stipulations could dilute the generally accepted principles of 
choice of law recognized under most legal systems, and would be prejudicial to 
the smooth conduct of international commercial transactions. On this ground 
Anicle 7(1) is unnecessary and detrimental to international contracts. As 
Vickers has stated, the principle of party autonomy can be supported for a 
number of reasons. 
24 Collins, 50. 
First, trade between nations is unlike a domestic 
transaction: in keeping with its international character, the 
regulation of trade and trade-related disputes should not 
be tied to one specific legal system. The legal system 
chosen should be the one best suited for each particular 
contract. Second, national courts often show a preference 
for their domestic law and could be biased in favour of 
nationals, discriminating against foreign parties... Third, a 
lack of trust by developed countries in the legal systems 
of developing countries, particularly where the systems are 
new leads to selection of the law of a developed nation. 25 
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(ii) The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods 1985 
It has been noted that in some respects the new Hague Sales Convention 
allows greater party autonomy than previously.26 However, there remain 
limitations on this autonomy, as follows: 
(1) Article 1 (b) covers those instances where the only reason for applying a 
foreign law is the stipulation by the parties in a contract. It states that 
the Convention shall not determine the law applicable to contracts . of 
sale of goods where the need for a choice of law "arises solely from a 
stipulation by the parties as to the applicable law, even if accompanied 
by a choice of court or arbitration". Further the Convention limits the 
choice of law to the legal system of nations and does not accept the 
choice of non-national systems. 
(2) Article 17 provides that the laws of the forum must be applied regardless 
of the laws that would otherwise govern the contract. It provides that. .. 
The Convention does not prevent the application of those 
provisions of the law of the forum that must be applied 
irrespective of the law that otherwise governs the contract. 
25 AM Vickers, "The choice of law clause in contracts between Parties of Developing and 
Developed Nations" Ga J Inti & Comp L 11 (1981) 620-1. 
26 McLachlan, 603-604. 
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(3) Article 18 provides that application of the Convention can be refused 
when it would be against public policy:27 
The application of a law determined by the Convention 
may be refused only where such application would be 
manifestly incompatible with public policy (ordre public). 
( 4) Article 9 deals with specific areas, such as sales by auction or on a 
commodity, and accepts that the parties' choice of law is valid only in so 
far as the law of the place where it is located does not prohibit such a 
choice. 
(5) Article 8(1) states that sales contracts are to be governed by the law of 
the person who delivers the goods, that is the seller rather than the 
buyer,28 unless "negotiations were conducted and the contract concluded 
by and in the presence of the parties in that buyer' State", "the contract 
provides expressly that the seller must perform his obligation to deliver 
the goods in that [the buyer's] State", or "the contract was concluded on 
terms determined mainly by the buyer, and in response to an invitation 
directed by the buyer to persons invited to bid". 29 
(2) Prohibitions in Legislation and their Recognition by Courts and Arbitrations 
. The trend towards allowing parties unlimited choice of the governing law 
of their contract is, as I have noted, subject to cenain limitations. A related 
problem involves national rules which prohibit two parties from entering into a 
contract at all, and thus raise the question of the legality of such a contract, if 
made. I will discuss such prohibitions and their recognition under the following 
headings: 
(1) Where the contract is contrary to public policy; 
(2) Where the contract is illegal by the law of the place of performance; 
(3) Where the contract is illegal by foreign legislation. 
27 ld, 604. 
28 ld, 605. 
29 Article 8 (2)(a), (b) & (c). See id, 606-7. See also EI Sykes & MC Pryles, Australian 
Private International Law (1991) 610-1. 
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It will be assumed that a contract cannot be made under a law that would 
declare it invalid (as distinct from merely unenforceable). 
(a) Contracts Contrary to Public Policy 
The legislation of most states embodies the notion of public policy. 30 
This has been stated by Lord Diplock in the following terms: 
English law accords to the parties to a contract a wide liberty to 
choose both the proper law and the curial law which is to be 
applicable to it ... The English Courts will give effect to their 
choice unless it would be contrary to public policy to do so. 31 
Similarly, according to Dicey and Morris: 
It is a general principle of the conflict of laws that the courts of a 
country will not apply any foreign law if and in so far as its application 
would lead to results contrary to the fundamental principles of public 
policy of the lex fori... The English courts have given effect to this 
principle in the law of contract, e.g. by refusing to enforce contracts 
which are opposed to the general policy of English law.32 
Thus "No action lies in England upon a contract that infringes the 
distinctive public policy of English law, as the law of the forum".33 It has been 
noted that conflict with English public policy is the essential criterion. 34 Thus 
English courts have refused to enforce contracts in restraint of trade,35 contracts 
entered into under duress or coercion, 36 and contracts involving trading with an 
enemy, whatever their proper law.37 They "will also regard as void any contract 
30 J Prebble, "Choice of Law to Determine the Validity and Effect of Conttacts. A 
Comparison of English and American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws" Cornel/LR 58 
(1973) 509. See also MG Paulsen & MI Sovern, "Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws" 
Col.Law Review 56 (1956) 969, 1003-4; E Rabel, The Conflict of Laws. A Comparative 
Study (1960) 551; JG Collier, Conflict of Laws (1987) 331. 
31 Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime SA [1971] 
AC 572,603. 
32 Dicey & Morris, Conflict of Laws (11th edn, 1987) 1226. See PS Smedresman, "Conflict 
of laws in international Commercial Arbitration: A Survey of Recent Developments", 
California Western International Law Journa/7 (1977) 341. 
33 Cheshire, North & Fawcett, Private International Law (1987) 483. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Rousillon v. Rousillon [1880]14 Ch D 351. 
36 Kaufman v Gerson [1904]1 KB 591. 
37 Robson v. Premier Oil & Pipeline Co. [1915]2 Ch 124, 136. 
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the recognition of which might constitute a hostile act against a foreign friendly 
government,38 or those which conflict with currency regulations. 39 In the United 
States, the Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws (1971) section 187(2)(b) states 
that the law chosen by the parties will not apply if it is against the public policy 
of the state with the greater material interest in the case. It goes on to state that 
"an express choice of law may be struck down by the forum as contrary to the 
public policy not merely of the forum, but possibly of some other State".40 
It does however appear unlikely that the public policy of other states 
would be given the same weight as the forum state. In England it has been 
stated that "no court applies the public policy of any country but its own".41 Yet, 
English courts do recognize other country's jurisdiction if to not do so would 
hamper good relations with foreign powers, or prejudice the interests of the 
United Kingdom. This can be seen in Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia (1944) Ltd.42 
Though English law was chosen to govern the transaction, it was noted that in 
referring to a friendly foreign country a basic principle of comity should be 
applied, and the contract declared illegal, as to enforce it would have violated 
a foreign law on foreign soil. 43 Public policy was also applied in Golden Acres 
Ltd v. Queensland Estates Pry Ltd.44 Here the contractual choice of Hong Kong 
law was overruled by Hoare J, who saw it as contravening the terms of a 
Queensland Act (the Auctioneers, Real Estate Agents, Debt Collectors and 
Motor Dealers Act 1922 (Qld)). He held that the choice of law was an attempt 
to override the local law and was not "a bona fide selection".45 
(b) Contracts Dlegal by the Proper Law. 
For most purposes in English law, legality is governed by the proper law, 
so that for a contract to be enforced in England it must be legal according to the 
38 De Wutz v. Hendricks [1824]2 Bing 314. See Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia 1944 Ltd [1958], 
AC 30 I a case about Indian legislation which prevented the shipping of goods from India 
to South Africa, a case of the application of the mandatory rules of another country. 
39 Kahler v. Midland Bank Ltd [1950] AC 24, 36. 
40 Prebble, 512. 
41 Dicey & Morris, 955. See also Prebble, 514. 
42 [1958] AC 301. 
43 Prebble, 514. 
44 [1%9] Qd R 378. 
45 [1969] Qd R 378, 385. 
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proper law, whether or not it is legal by (domestic) English law. A contract 
illegal under the proper law will not be enforced even though it is legal in the 
place where it is made.46 In Kahler v. Midland Bank Ltd, Lord Simonds 
remarked: 
... the courts of this country will not compel the performance of 
a contract if by its proper law performance is illegal. 47 · 
In Re Helbert Wagg and Co. Ltd,48 the proper law of the contract was 
German, and a German law (made after the contract was entered into) stipulated 
that payments under a contract be made to a German public fund. This was 
upheld in England even though the contract stipulated the payment was to be in 
London. The argument that the German law in effect expropriated the debt was 
rejected. 
In a Federal Court decision in Hamburg on the 22 June 1972 the 
German Court decided to uphold a Nigerian law prohibiting the sale of cultural 
objects. The court held the contract unenforceable "in the interest of maintaining 
proper standards for the international trade in cultural objects". 49 The case, 
between the German company seeking damages for the loss of six bronze statues 
and a Nigerian company, was seen by the court to contravene the UNESCO 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer 
of Ownership of Cultural Property.50 This was not strictly speaking a case of the 
direct application of the Nigerian law as such. Instead the Nigerian law became 
relevant because the German Civil Code referred to public policy, and the 
UNESCO Convention was taken as a reflection of public policy. 
46 RH Graveson, The Conflict of Laws (1974) 433-4. 
47 [1950] AC 24, 27. 
48 [1956] Ch 323. 
49 Federal CowlDecision, Hamburg, 22 June 1972:BGHZ, 59, 83; cited by McLachlan, 623-
4. 
50 Ibid. 
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(c) Contracts Dlegal Under Interstate or Foreign Legislation 
The Door to Door Sales Act 1971 (SA) attempts to protect the 
purchasers from door to door salesmen by limiting the kind of contracts such 
vendors can use. Specifically, it restricts the law of such contracts to South 
Australian law, and that the forum for the court must be in South Australia. 
Professor Kelly notes that: 
... the South Australian provision is ineffective, at least in 
isolation, in ensuring the non-enforceability of an affected 
contract in an interstate forum. 51 
A contract concluded between Benteler, and the Belgian Steel Company 
ABC and the Belgian State concerning the industrial and financial restructuring 
by Benteler of the Company ABC, led to dispute between them. When Benteler 
took the Belgian State to arbitration as provided in the contract, the Belgian 
State used Article 1676 para (2) of the Belgium Judicial Code, which prohibits 
the state from concluding any agreement which authorised it to have recourse to 
arbitration. This article provides: 
Except for legal persons of a public law character, anyone who 
has the capacity or competence to compromise may conclude an 
arbitration agreement. The State may conclude such agreement 
if a treaty authorises it to have recourse to arbitration. 
In response Benteler quoted the European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration of 1961 to which Belgium had adhered. It stated: 
1. In the cases referred to in art. 1 para 1 of this Convention, 
legal persons considered by the law which is applicable to them 
as 'legal persons of public law' have the right to conclude valid 
arbitration agreements. 
2. On signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention any State 
shall be entitled to declare that it limits the above faculty to 
such conditions as may be stated in its declaration. 
51 D. St. L Kelly, "Reference, Choice, Restriction and Prohibition" ICLQ 26 (1977) 880. 
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In this case, the tribunal declared that Belgium was bound by the arbitration 
agreement. It did not agree that the issue was a commercial matter under 
Belgium domestic law nor was it international. Though Belgium had the capacity 
to enter into private law contracts containing arbitration clauses, it was under 
Belgian State jurisdiction able to conclude such an agreement. The validity of 
such national judicial codes in international forums is thus controversial.52 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK) seeks to control the use of 
exemption clauses in many kinds of contract and to prevent the use of a proper 
law when the primary reason for the choice appears to be to avoid the provisions 
of the act. Section 27 (2) states that: 
This Act has effect notwithstanding any contract term which 
applies or purports to apply the law of some country outside the 
United Kingdom, where (either or both): 
(a) the term appears to the court, or arbitrator or arbiter to 
have been imposed wholly or mainly for the purpose of 
enabling the party imposing it to evade the operation of 
this act; or 
(b) in the making of the contract one of the parties dealt as 
consumer, and he was then habitually resident in the 
United Kingdom, and the essential steps necessary for the 
making of the contract were taken there, whether by him 
or by others on his behalf. 
The intention is to prevent the parties to a contract, which is most closely 
connected with the United Kingdom, from contracting out of the controls of the 
1977 Act by a choice of the law of a country other than the United Kingdom. 53 
The controls of the 1977 Act do not apply where the proper law which has been 
chosen by the parties is the law of the United Kingdom54 or to an "international 
supply contract".55 The 1977 Act does not seek to prevent the choice of a foreign 
law, but it could be used to invalidate its choice. 56 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
(1985) 10 Year Book of Commercial Arbitration 37. 
Cheshire, North & Fawcett, 469. 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK) ss27(1). 
s26. 
Cheshire, North & Fawcett, 469. 
• 
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3. Limitations on Choice of Forum 
(1) Various International Aspects 
The parties to a commercial contract may stipulate that the forum of a 
specified foreign country shall be the exclusive forum for litigation arising under 
their contract, i.e. that they will litigate such dispute only in that forum. 57 
However, there are various international limitations on such a choice of forum. 
(a) International Conventions 
(i) The Hague Convention on the Choice of Court of 1964 
The Hague Convention on the Choice of Court was approved by the 
Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1964.58 
It has had a strong influence in achieving the acceptance of the idea that the 
choice of forum is valid unless there are reasonable grounds to deny its validity. 
The Hague Convention accepts that choice of forum provisions are valid both in 
prerogative and derogative senses. 59 It stipulates that it applies only in civil and 
commercial matters and not to areas traditionally subject to local jurisdiction, 
such as family law maintenance obligations, succession, bankruptcy and disputes 
over immovable property. Article (2) provides: 
This Convention shall apply to agreements on the choice of 
court concluded in civil or commercial matters in situations 
having an international character. 
It shall not apply to agreements on the choice of court concluded 
in the following matters: 
(1) The status or capacity of persons or questions of family 
law including the personal or financial rights or 
obligations between parents and children or between 
spouses. 
57 M Gruson, "Forum-selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial 
Agreements" University of Illinois Law Review 1 (1982) 134. Forum selection clauses are 
sometimes called choice of forum or prorogation agreements. See J McKnight, "Freedom 
of contract-forum selection clause" Arkansas Law Review 27 (1973) 539; A Lenhoff, "The 
Parties' Choice of a Forum: Prorogation Agreements" Rutgers L Review 15 (1961) 414. 
58 11M 4 [1965]348-9. 
59 JT Gilbert, "Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts" Kentucky 
Law Journa/65 (1976) 29. 
(2) Maintenance obligations not included in the first 
sub-paragraph. 
(3) Questions of succession. 
( 4) Questions of bankruptcy, compositions or analogous 
proceedings, including decisions which may result 
therefrom and which relate to the validity of the acts of 
the debtor. 
(5) Rights in immovable property. 
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Article 4 provides that the forum agreement is void or voidable in case the choice 
of court is in the circumstances not fair and reasonable: 
... the agreement on the choice of court shall be void or voidable 
if it has been obtained by an abuse of economic power or other 
unfair means. 
As Professor Reese states, this provision would act as an "essential safety valve", 
as it would be impossible to predict the different kinds of situations which could 
arise. 60 Article 6 also provides: 
Every court other than the chosen court or courts shall decline 
jurisdiction except: 
(1) Where the choice of court made by the parties is not 
exclusive, 
(2) Where under the internal law of the State of the excluded 
court, the parties were unable, because of the 
subject-matter, to agree to exclude the jurisdiction of the 
courts of that State, 
(3) Where the agreement on the choice of court is void or 
voidable in the sense of Article 4, 
(4) For the purpose of provisional or protective measures. 
This is significant as it indicates a growing acceptance that choice of forum 
clauses are valid and will be enforced, in the absence of overriding arguments to 
the contrary.61 
Articles 12-15 outline the reservations a State may impose on freedom 
of the choice of forum. · Article 12 provides: 
60 WM Reese, "A Proposed Unifonn Choice of Forum Act" Columbia Journal of 
International Law 5 (1966) 193, 204. 
61 Gilbert, 30. 
Any contracting State may reserve the right not to recognise 
agreements on the choice of court concluded between persons 
who, at the time of the conclusion of such agreements, were its 
nationals and had their habitual residence in its territory. 
Article 13 provides: 
Any contracting State may make a reservation according to the 
terms of which it will treat as an internal matter the juridical 
relations established in its territory between, on the one hand, 
physical or juridical persons who are there and, on the other 
hand, establishments registered on local registers, even if such 
establishments are branches, agencies or other representative of 
foreign firms in the territory in question. 
Article 14 provides: 
Any contracting State may make a reservation according to the 
terms of which it may extend its exclusive jurisdiction to the 
juridical relations established in its territory between, on the one 
hand, physical or juridical persons who are there and on the 
other hand establishments registered on local registers, even if 
such establishments are branches, agencies or other 
representatives of foreign fmns in the territory in question. 
And Article 15 provides: 
Any contracting State may reserve the right not to recognise 
agreements on the choice of court if the dispute has no 
connection with the chosen court, or if, in the circumstances, it 
would be seriously inconvenient for the matter to be dealt with 
by the chosen court. 62 
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This Convention is intended to give effect to three principles. First, it validates 
the agreement of the parties on the choice of a court within the scope of the 
Convention. The second main principle concerns the effects of the agreement 
of the parties and is embodied in Articles 5, 6, and 15. The third is to ensure 
the recognition and enforcement abroad of judgments of the chosen court. 
62 See further RH Graveson, "The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference of Private 
International Law" /CLQ 14 (1965) 541. 
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(ii} The EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Civil and 
Commercial Judgments, 1968 
On 27 September 1968 the EEC signed a Convention on Jurisdiction and 
the Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments. It does not entirely 
exclude the various national laws of the member countries. Under Article 16, if 
a state's laws claim sole jurisdiction then this right cannot be removed by 
contract. Further, an agreement is null and void if it contravenes Article 12 and 
15.63 
(iii) The American Convention on Private International Law (Bustamante Code) 
1928 
In 1928 the American Convention on Private International Law was 
ratified by some Latin American countries. This is known as the Bustamante 
Code and provides for choice of forum providing " ... that one of them at least is 
a national of the contracting state to which the judge belongs ... unless local law 
is to the contrary". 64 Pryles comments that "This could be taken to require suit 
in the chosen forum to the exclusion of other courts". He adds "Some support 
for this view is found in Article 321 which defmes an express submission as 'the 
submission made by the interested parties by clearly and conclusively renouncing 
their own court •... "65 
(b) The Model Choice of Forum Act 1968 (USA) 
The Model Choice of Forum Act was approved in 1968 by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the United States.66 
This Act, though influenced by the Hague Convention, allows judges more 
discretion in deciding whether to uphold the choice of forum clause. 
63 Ibid. See further M Pryles & FA Trindade, "The Common Marlcet Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments" ALJ 48 (1974) 185. 
64 M Pryles, "Comparative Aspects of Prorogation and Arbitration Agreements" ICLQ 25 
(1976) 573. 
65 Ibid. See also MA Schwind, "Derogation clauses in Latin-American Law" AJCL 13 (1964) 
172. 
66 WM Reese, "The model choice of forum Act" AJCL 17 (1969) 292. Also WM Reese, "The 
Contractual Forum situation in the United States" AJCL 13 (1964) 187, 192. 
Section 2 (Action in this state by agreement) provides: 
(a) If the parties have agreed in writing that an action on a 
controversy may be brought in this State and the agreement 
provides the only basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, a court of 
this State will entertain the action if: 
(1) The court has power under the law of this State to 
entertain the action; 
(2) This State is a reasonably convenient place for the trial 
of the action; 
(3) The agreement as to the place of the action was not 
obtained by misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of 
economic power, or other unconscionable means; and 
( 4) The defendant, if within the State, was served as required 
by law of this State in the case of persons within the State 
or, if without the State, was served either personally or by 
registered (or certified) mail directed to his last known 
address. 
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Sub-section (b) exempts certain clauses, including especially arbitration clauses, 
as well as the appointment of an agent for the service of process pursuant to 
statute or court order. 
Although effect should be given to a choice of forum subject to the 
various exceptions set out, the model Act leaves a non-selected court in which 
proceedings have been commenced free, within broad limits, to determine 
whether to dismiss or stay the action. Section 3 provides: 
If the parties have agreed in writing that an action shall on a 
controversy be brought only in another State and it is brought 
in a court of this State, the court will dismiss or stay the action, 
as appropriate, unless 
(1) The court is reqnired by statute to entertain the action; 
(2) The plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the other 
State, for reasons other than delay in bringing the action; 
(3) The other State would be a substantially less convenient 
place for the trial of the action than this State; 
(4) The agreement as to the place of the action was obtained 
by misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic 
power, or other unconscionable means; or 
(5) It would for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable 
(0 enforce the agreement. 
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The decision of the Supreme Court in Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co.61 
should be seen against the background of the Model Choice of Forum Act, 
whose standards it substantially applied. A contract between an American 
corporation and a German ocean-tug company, to tow an oil rig from the United 
States to Ravenna, Italy, stated that "any disputes arising must be treated before 
the London Court of Justice". Neither party to the towage contract had any 
connection to England The United States Supreme Court declared that the 
forum selection clause was binding and Zapata's attempt to have the case heard 
in the United States failed. The Court held that the forum selection clause must 
be applied "unless Zapata could meet the heavy burden of showing that a trial 
in the United States district court in Tampa, Florida, would be much more 
convenient and that a trial in London would deprive Zapata of a meaningful day 
in court". 68 It stressed that the chosen forum was neutral, that the choice of 
forum clause had been freely negotiated between experienced businessman and 
was not an instance of using overweening bargaining power, and that there was 
no evidence of undue influence or fraud.69 The Supreme Court was clearly 
motivated by a desire to create contract security for businesses engaged in 
international trade.70 
67 407 US 1 [1972]. See further L Collins, "Forum Selection and an Anglo-American 
Conflict" ICLQ 20 (1971) 550; Reese in his comment on this case, International Lawyer 
7 (1973) 530; GR Delaume, "Choice of Forum Clauses and the American Forum" JMLC 
4 (1973) 295; K Nadelmann, "Choice of Court Clauses in the United States" AJCL 21 
(1973) 124. 
68 Gruson, 148. See also IM Farquharson, "Choice of Forum Clauses. A Brief Survey of 
Anglo-American Law" International Lawyer 8 (1974) 97. This case was brought in 
admiralty but the Supreme Court implied that the decision should not be limited to 
admiralty. The Court strongly affmned that choice of forum clauses should be given effect 
in all situations by positively stating that the case should be read in conjunction with 
National Equipment Rental Ltd v. Szukhent 375 US 311 [1964]. 
69 Gilbert, 27. 
70 A case in which a choice of forum agreement was not given effect because it was "clearly 
and probably unreasonable" is Calzavara v. Biehl & Co. 181 SO 2d 809 (La App 1966). 
In that case, "the Court ignored a contract provision purporting to give an Italian Court 
exclusive jurisdiction over an action by Louisiana resident against a Louisiana 
Corporation": WM Reese & M Rosenberg, Coriflict of Laws (1971) 213. 
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(c) The Restatement (Second), Corrjlict of Laws, section 80 (1971)71 
The Restatement directs the coun to give effect to a choice of forum 
clause if the choice is fair and reasonable. 72 However it provides: 
The parties agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust 
a State of judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be 
given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable. 
This rule demands that a party breaching the choice of forum clause show why 
it should not be enforced. This proof would be either that the choice of forum 
clause was not part of the contract or that it was "unfair or unreasonable".73 
4. Conclusion 
It appears that the freedom of the parties to choose the proper law to 
govern their contract has been widely recognized, but with certain limitations on 
their choice under international conventions. Further, the parties have the 
freedom to choose a forum to be the exclusive forum for any litigation 
subsequently arising between them, so that they will litigate such disputes only in 
that forum. Again certain limitations on the parties' autonomy are recogttized 
by international conventions, such as the EEC Convention applicable to 
Contractual Obligations, 1980. This, as we have seen, allowed for effect to be 
given to the mandatory rules of countries which have a close connection with the 
case. But the view has been expressed that these provisions may create a less 
secnre environment for international trade. 
71 Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) 617. Comment (a) states: "the parties to a contract 
may provide that all actions for breach of the contract shall be brought only in a certain 
court, and the courts of other States will usually give effect to such a provision; but the 
requirement can be imposed only by consent of the parties and as a term of a contract. 
If the parties agree, it is not like the case of one State prescribing by its statute what the 
courts of another State may do." But the Restatement of Contracts (1932) 558 is much 
more restrictive: "A bargain to forego a privilege, that otherwise would exist, to litigate 
in a federal court rather than in a State court, or in a State court rather than in a federal 
court, or otherwise to limit unreasonably the tribunal to which resort may be had for the 
enforcement of a possible future right of action ... is illegal" See Gruson, 145. 
72 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) ss80. 
73 JM Reilly, "Enforceability of "Choice of Forum" Clauses" California Western Law Review 
8 (1972) 333. 
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The new Hague Sales Convention of 1985 is said to give greater 
autonomy in choice of law than previous conventions, though important 
limitations remain, in particular a reiteration of the public policy limitation 
(Article 18). Further, Article 1(6) states that the stipulation of the parties cannot 
be the sole reason for the choice of law, and it recognizes certain overriding 
powers to the law of the forum (Article 17). It also makes provision for 
consumer contracts designed to protect the buyer: Article 9 limits such contracts 
to those which do not conflict with the law of the place where the article is 
located. 
There are also legislative restrictions on the parties to certain kinds of 
contracts to apply any law they choose. These include: (1) where the contract is 
contrary to public policy; (2) where the contract is illegal by the law of the place 
of performance; (3) in certain cases, where the contract is illegal by foreign or 
interstate legislation. Both courts and arbitral tribunals have recognized such 
prohibitions in legislation. 
So far as limitations on choice of forum are concerned, again the general 
position is one of freedom of contract, but subject to various overriding 
limitations. This position is reflected in the Hague Convention on the Choice of 
Court in 1964, in the United States Model Choice of Forum Act, approved in 
1968 by the National Conference of Cornmissioners,74 and in the Restatement 
Second, Conflict of Laws (1971). 
74 Reese, (1969) 295. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE LAW GOVERNING OIL CONCESSION AGREEMENTS 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we have seen . that the parties of the contract are free as a 
rule to choose the law or legal principles to govern their contract In Chapter 4 
we saw that this freedom is not absolute but there are limitations on their choice. 
Apart from the case of an express choice of law by the parties, various laws and 
legal principles have been suggested as being applicable to govern the. relation 
of the parties but there is no consensus on this matter. 
In a contract between a State and a private party private companies 
believe that a contract might be against its interests if it were to be subject to 
State law. However, indicating this too explicitly could force the state to demand 
its own law. Conversely, governments particularly of Third World nations have 
been anxious that these contracts (affecting the development of their State) 
proceed smoothly, and for this reason have been reluctant to demand the State's 
law as the law of the contract. For this reason, there is a tendency to use an 
"oblique and indirect" approach to the choice of law in such contracts in most 
cases, except in cases where the lender is in a notably more powerful position.' 
However, a great body of opinion respects the right of parties to a 
contract to select for themselves the law appropriate to their contract as both 
parties have a motive of self-interest, and it is unlikely they would exercise this 
choice in a capricious way. Further, even where the chosen system is quite 
unconnected to the contracting parties it is reasonable to see this as the 
combined desire to use a neutral and experienced forum "such as the system 
referred to in the standard form contracts of the particular trade" _2 
1 JF Lalive, "Contracts Between a State or a State Agency and a Foreign Company" ICLQ 
13 (1964) 992. 
2 A.E. Anton, Private International Law (2nd edn 1990) 264. 
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Furthermore, the choice of non-national law may be adopted where there 
IS no express choice of law by the parties, and when the court or arbitratal 
tribunal rule that the proper law can be inferred from the circumstances 
surrounding the contract, or may be adopted by the contracting state or when the 
national law is subject to exclusion. 
In this chapter I will analyse what has been suggested with respect to the 
applicable law, in its application to state contracts or concession agreements. 
Then I will discuss other laws applicable to govern oil concession agreements, and 
in particular the choice of non-national law as the proper law to govern oil 
concession agreements. I will discuss these issues with respect to oil concession 
agreements under four aspects -- juristic opinions, the provisions of concession 
agreements, state laws and the decisions of arbitration tribunals. 
2. The Law Applicable to Oil Concession Agreements 
As a result of increasing contact among states and because of expanded 
trade, economic transactions and exploration of natural resources, agreements 
concluded between a state and foreign oil companies have aroused a great deal 
of interest and controversy. Much debate has emerged about the applicable law 
which should govern the agreement, and the ways to resolve any dispute which 
may arise. 
Various laws and legal principles have been suggested as applicable to 
oil concession agreements in the absence of a choice of proper law by the parties. 
These include the lex contractus, national law, the general principles of law, and 
international law itself. I will discuss each of these, before suggesting a solution. 
(1) The Lex Conlractus 
It has been suggested that the terms and conditions of international 
contracts such as oil concession agreements, create the law of their relationship 
between the parties, and that the binding effect of these terms and conditions 
should accordingly be recognized by every legal system. In certain legislation it 
has even been declared that a contract is to be the law between the parties. The 
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"Majallah", the Ottoman Civil Code, recognized this principle, and was embodied 
in all the civil codes of Arab countries. 3 
Islamic Shari'ah provides that "the contract is the law of the contracting 
parties" on condition it does not contravene the rules of the Islam. Similarly, the 
principle enunciated by Article 1134 of the French Civil Code is that "les 
conventions legalement formees tiennent lieu de loi a ceux qui les ont faites. "4 
In Carlston's view, a typical oil concession agreement in the Middle East 
"becomes the fundamental or constitutive law of the joint enterprise of the 
government and the concessionaire. "5 Similarly, in the arbitration between the 
Government of Saudi Arabia and Aramco, the arbitration tribunal held that "The 
concession agreement is thus the fundamental law of the parties ... "6 
In the view of Verdross and Bourquin, the economic development 
agreement creates as the lex contractus "an independent legal order regulating the 
relationship between the parties." They refer to the economic development 
agreement as a "quasi-international agreement. "7 Verdross stated: 
... the lex contractus, created by a quasi-international agreement 
is an independent legal order, regulating the relation between 
the parties exhaustively. Naturally, the lex contractus may refer, 
for its interpretation or the filling up of eventual gaps, to the 
legal order of the contracting State, or of the other. party, or to 
international law. But these legal orders can only be applied 
inasmuch as they are delegated by the lex contractus, because it 
is the latter which, in a sovereign way, stipulates the mutual 
rights and duties of the parties. 8 · 
Whether a contract can be governed simply by its own lex contractus is,· 
however, a matter of controversy. The primary difficulty appears to exist in the 
operation of the agreement rather than its creation,9 which has led a number of 
3 H Cattan, The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa (1967), 33. 
4 Ibid. 
5 KS Carlston, "International Role of Concession Agreements" Northwestern University Law 
Review 52 (1957) 636. 
6 ILR 27 (1963) 168. 
7 Lalive, 997 .. 
8 A. Verdross, Quasi-International Agreem9nt, Year Book of World Affairs 22 (1964), 230. 
9 Cattan, 37. 
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writers to conclude that it is impossible for a contract to exist independently of 
a legal system. As Lord McNair said: 
It is often said that the parties to a contract make their own law, 
and it is, of course, true that, subject to the rules of public policy 
and ordre public, the parties are free to agree upon such terms 
as they may choose. Nevertheless, agreements that are intended 
to have a legal operation (as opposed to a merely social 
operation) create legal rights and duties, and legal rights and 
duties cannot exist in a vacuum but must have a place within a 
legal system which is available for dealing with such questions 
as the validity, application and interpretation of contracts and, 
generally, for supplementing their express provisions. Often such 
contracts may give some indication of the legal system within 
which thfl, or some part of their provisions, are intended to 
operate ... 
Mann has argued trenchantly that it is untenable to have any legal 
relationship outside a legal system, and that it is impossible for a contract to 
exhaustively regulate the relationship of the parties in a contract. He said 
"contracts are written against the background of a system of law, its jus cogens, 
its rules of construction and so forth. "11 The same view is taken by Lalive: 
This theory, however, is not satisfactory, it appears artificial and 
begs the question. A contract must be inserted in a pre-existing 
legal order and cannot remain in a vacuum. This order should 
be clearly defmed or, at least, ascertainable by way of legal or 
judicial interpretation.12 
The Aramco Arbitration Tribunal in 1958 stated: 
It is obvious that no contract exists in vacuo i.e. without being 
based on a legal system. The conclusion of a contract is not left 
to the unfettered discretion of the parties. It is necessarily 
related to some positive law which gives legal effects to the 
reciprocal and concordant manifestations of intent made by the 
10 Lord McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, BYIL 33 
(1957) 7. 
11 FA Mann, The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons, BYIL, 35 
(1959), 49,50 and see, his "The Proper Law in the Conflict of Laws"/CLQ 36 (1987), 437. 
12 Lalive, 998. 
parties. The contract cannot even be conceived without a system 
of law under which it is created. 13 
(2) National Law 
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Some have argued that the national law or municipal law of the 
contracting state is necessarily or at least presumptively applicable to an oil 
concession agreement concluded between the State and foreign oil company. 
Host-states prefer to apply their own law to resolve any dispute which arises 
between one of them and a private foreign company. They believe this for the 
following reasons. 
(1) Since the State is a party to the agreement as grantor of the concession 
it should apply its law under principles of lex loci contractus, "the law of 
the place of the contract". 
(2) Since oil resources are within the territory of the State and under its 
proprietary rights, the national law under the principle of "lex loci rei 
sitae", the law of the place where the thing is situated, should apply. 
(3) Since the "lex loci solutionis", the place of performance, is within the 
territory of the State, the national law should apply.14 
This principle was confmned by the General Assembly of United Nations 
Resolution 2158 (XXI) of 25 November 1966 which provides: 
That the exploitation of natural resources in each country shall 
always be conducted in accordance with its national laws and 
regulations.15 
But the same view has been expressed for much longer than that: it goes back 
at least to the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
13 Arbitration between Saudi Arabia Government and Aramco (1958) (special publication), 
5 quoted by Lalive, 998. 
14 McNair, 5. 
15 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2158 {XXI). 
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Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases. 16 This point was conceded in the Aramco 
Arbitration (1958), where it was stated that: 
The law in force in Saudi Arabia should also be applied to the 
content of the concession because this State is a party to the 
agreement, as grantor, and because it is generally admitted, in 
private international law, that a sovereign State is presumed, 
unless the contrary is proved, to have subjected its undertakings 
to its own legal system. This principle was mentioned by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in its judgments of July 
12, 1929 concerning the Serbian and Brazilian loans .. P 
In spite of these views, which would appear axiomatic, there are several 
writers and jurists who hold contrary opinions. The British House of Lords and 
the French Court of Cassation have rejected the idea that there is a particular 
presumption which may apply to contracts concluded between a State and a 
foreign party. 
In R v.lnternational Trustee for the Protection of Bond Holders AG, a case 
which arose upon a gold loan issued by the British government in New York in 
1917, the House of Lords rejected English law as the proper law of the contract 
and stated: 
It appears therefore that in every case whether a government be 
a party or not the general principle which determines the proper 
law of the contract is the same: it depends upon the intention 
of the parties either expressed in the contract or to be inferred 
from the terms of the contract and the surrounding 
circumstances ... that a government as a party is entitled to great 
weight in drawing the appropriate inference, but it is not 
conclusive and is only one factor in the problem.18 
The French Court of Cassation has also reached the same conclusion: 
The law applicable to contracts, whether with regard to their 
formation or whether with regard to their effects and conditions, 
is that which is adopted by the parties. This principle applies to 
16 P.CJ J. Series A No 20 (1929), 42. 
17 ILR 27 (1963) 167. 
18 [1937] AC 500-531. See also FA Mann, Studies in International Law (1973), 221; Lalive, 
993,994. 
contracts concluded between a State and a foreign national when 
such contracts, both by their nature and the form in which they 
were made, fall within the category of agreements of private law 
which can be assimilated to those concluded between 
individuals. 19 
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From the foregoing discussion it would appear that a contract concluded between 
a State and foreign element is not always submitted to a State's own national 
law. 
(3) The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations 
According to Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations constitute 
one of the sources of international law as applied by it.20 In part by derivation 
from this sub-clause, reference is often made to "transnational law" ,21 a "common 
law of nations",22 "a modern law of nature",23 "general principles of law" or 
principles of natural law and equity"24 or of "mutual good will and good faith".25 
Canan prefers "to retain the designation made of these principles in international 
conventions and State contract as 'the general principles of law recognised by 
civilized nations' or, more simply 'the general principles of law' ."26 
19 Translation from Cassation, Ch. Civile, 31 May 1932, D 1933, I 169-S-1933.1.17, quoted 
by Cattan, 41. See also Lalive, 993. 
20 RB Schlesinger, Research on the Geoeral Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized 
Nations, AJIL, 51 (1957), 734; Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied l7y 
International Courts & Tribunals (1987); JN Hazard, The Geoeral Principles of Law, 
AJIL, 52 (1958), 91; G Herczegh, General Principles of Law and the International Legal 
Order(i969), 39;0 Suratgar, Considerations Affecting Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts 
Between Governments and Foreign Nations, Indian Journal of International Law 2 (1962), 
273. 
21 PC Jessup, Transnational Law (1956). 
22 Described as the "droit common des nations" by P Fouchard, L' Arbitrage Commercial 
International, vol. II, 445, quoted by Cattan, 62. 
23 ICLQ I (1952), 247. 
24 Schlesinger, 742. 
25 These principles as used in international oil concession agreements mean "general 
principles of law recognised by civilized nations". This would appear from such 
international arbilral precedents as the Lena Goldfields Arbitration, Abu Dhabi case, and 
the Qatar case. See further RK Ramazani, Choice of Law, Problems and International 
Oil Contracts, A Case Study, ICLQ, 11 (1962), 511. 
26 Cattan, 62. 
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There are many opinions to the effect that this designation is 
antiquated. 27 Since 1945 the Permanent Court has been replaced by the 
International Court of Justice, and many new States have gained their 
independence. Now more than 163 States are members of the United Nations. 
The question is: do not all of these States have legal systems applicable or which 
qualify them for application under Article 38(1)(c)? 
Harris criticizes the expression "civilized nations" and prefers the 
expression "the general principles recognized in the legal system of independent 
States".Z8 I share this opinion. The phrase "civilized nations" evolved in the 
colonial era of the 19th century to refer to those nations, especially European, 
which were colonizing powers. It is in this century antiquated and contrary to 
the notion of sovereign equality. Further, it has connotations that link it 
primarily or even exclusively to expanding capitalistic societies, and which do not 
embrace the socialist and developing nations of the 20th century. The expression 
"the general principles recognized by the legal systems of independent States" 
more adequately describes the reality of nations forming sovereign States 
irrespective of their political systems and the stage of their economic 
development. 29 
Differences of opinion arise over whether general principles of law exist 
independently of any other legal system or whether they are merely a source of 
international law as is indicated by Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute. Traditionally, 
they have been perceived as deriving from the municipal law of States and filling 
in the gaps of international law.30 In practice there is often an assumption in 
international agreements and arbitration cases that the general principles of law 
are a source of international law, but not more. Some have taken it for granted 
that "general principles of law belong to international law and are to be 
equiparated to general principles of international law" .31 
Referring to the Oil Concession Agreement between Iran and Pan 
American International Oil Company of 1958, Rarnazani stated: 
27 DJ Harris, Cases and Material on International Law (4th edn 1991) 48-50. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Herczegh, 39. 
30 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th edn, 1990) 15, 17; G. 
Schwarzenberger, ED Brown, A Manual of International Law (6th edn, 1976) 27. 
31 Lalive, 1000. 
Thus, it may be submitted, Iran and Pan American International 
Oil Company by making express reference to the "principles of 
good will and good faith" have intended to apply "the general 
principles of law recognized in civilized nations" to their contract. 
Article 38 paragraph l(c) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (Article 38, paragraph 3 of the old Statute) has 
made these principles a source of public international law. 
Hence, Iran and Pan-American International Oil Company 
would seem to have intended to apply public international law 
in that sense as well. 32 
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However, there is now a question as to whether the general principles 
of law are to be seen as the sources of international law exclusively or whether 
they are common to all legal systems including municipal law. 
The current consensus of opinion is that general principles of law are 
common to all systems of law including international law and municipal law.33 
These principles may be applied in the case of the absence of the choice of the 
parties even without intention of the contract parties. They will be gathered 
from provisions of the contract or the circumstances surrounding the contract by 
the court or arbitration tribunal in case of dispute. Many of the recent oil 
concession agreements and petroleum laws provided expressly or implied the 
application of these principles, as we will see. 
(a) The Definition of These Principles in Accordance with Jurists' Opinions 
There is no accepted definition of the general principles of law, but only 
a variety of opinions. I..,ord McNair asked the following question: what are the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations? 
question: "I do not propose to prepare a list of the rules 
He replied to his 
of law likely to be 
recognized as general principles" ?4 He referred to two examples, the principle 
of "unjust enrichment" which was referred to in the Lena Goldfields Arbitration, 
and the principle of "respect for acquired rights", which "has frequently been 
applied by international tribunals to the rights acquired under concessions." Lord 
McNair's view of this issue with reference to the economic question is that the 
32 Ramazani, 512. 
33 Cheng, 390. 
34 McNair, 15. 
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general principles of law are applicable to govern those contracts between 
"corporations belonging to countries which have capital and skill to spare, and 
the governments of cenain countries which have natural resources awaiting 
development but not enough capital or skill available for that purpose. "35 
Schlesinger in his research on the general principles of law recognized 
by ci viii zed nations stated that: 
In countless cases, international courts have referred to this 
source of international law, and have invoked the general 
principles as a basis for their decisions. But if we read the 
opinions, we look in vain for an answer to the question: How 
did the court know that the particular rule or principle it relied 
on was in fact a general principle of law recognized by civilized 
nations? In case after case, the judge writing the opinion simply 
expressed a hunch, a hunch probably based upon the legal 
system or systems with which he happened to be familiar. As Dr 
Schwarzenberger emphasizes in his foreword to Dr Cheng's 
useful monograph on Article 38, it is not the fault of the judges 
that they have to resort to such an unscientific method. Nor is 
it the fault of those teaching and practicing international law. 
It is the comparatists, Dr. Schwarzenberger points out, who thus 
so far have failed to give any concrete answers, based on 
comparative research, to the question. What are the general 
principles of law which are recognized by civilized nations? As 
long as concrete answers to this question are lacking, there is 
necessarily a gap in the structure of public international law, a 
gap which can be filled only by those who have leamini and 
experience in what is commonly called comparative law. 
Similarly, Mann wrote: 
It is impossible, or would at any rate be inexact, to speak of the 
application of the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations. The general principles are not a law or a legal 
system that can be applied or referred to ... Lord McNair, who 
has recently given attention to the problem of 
internationalization, somewhat surprisingly considers the general 
principles as affording, in cenain cases, 'the choice of a legal 
system', and indeed, describes them as a 'system of law'. Yet it 
is hardly open to doubt that, unless they are equiparated to 
public international law the general principles are not a legal 
system at all, and Lord McNair clearly refuses so to equiparate 
35 McNair, 1. 
36 Schlesinger, 734,735. 
them. For he submits that the contracts he has in mind are not 
'governed by public international law stricto sensu', but 'should 
be governed by the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations. 37 
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From the foregoing illustration, the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations according to Jenks's opinion "are not a legal system in the 
traditional sense or of the accepted type, but whether they can serve as a proper 
law depends, it is submitted not on any preconceived notion of what constitutes 
a legal system but on whether they can fulfil satisfactorily in practice the function 
of a proper law and are in fact used for that purpose".38 
But according to Cheng the functions served by general principles of 
law are as follows: (1) they constitute the source of various rules of law, which 
are merely the expression of these principles; (2) they form the guiding principles 
of the judicial order according to which the interpretation and application of the 
rules of law are orientated; (3) they apply directly to the facts of the case 
wherever there is no formulated rule governing the matter. Whether these 
principles are general principles of international law or of municipal law, in his 
view: 
"These principles belong to no particular system of law, but are 
common to them all. nJ!T" 
(b) Early Arbitral Decisions 
In a number of awards in the immediate post-war period, some version 
of "general principles of law" was applied. For example in the arbitration 
between Lena Goldfields Company Ltd and the former Soviet Government 
(1930), Article 89 of the Concession Agreement provided: 
The parties base their relations with regard to this agreement on 
the principle of goodwill and good faith as well as on reasonable 
interpretation and the terms of the agreement. 
37 Mann, (1959) 44, 45. 
38 W Jenks, The Proper Law of International Organizations (1962), 152. 
39 Cheng, 390. 
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The tribunal decided that on all domestic matters in the U.S.S.R. Soviet 
law should apply except in so far as they were excluded by the contract, and 
accordingly ·that in regard to performance of the concession contract by both 
parties inside the U.S.S.R. Russian law was the proper law of the contract, but 
held that "for other purposes the general principles of law such as those 
recognized by Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice at the Hague should be regarded as the proper law of the contract. "40 
The arbitrator, Lord Asquith of Bishopstone, in the arbitration between 
Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. and Abu Dhabi (1951) stated: 
What is the "proper law" applicable in construing this contract? 
This is a contract made in Abu Dhabi, and wholly to be 
performed in that country. If any municipal system of law were 
applicable, it would prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi, but no 
such law can reasonably be said to exist.. The Sheikh 
administers a purely discretionary justice with the assistance of 
the Kor'an; and it would be fanciful to suggest that in this very 
primitive region there is any settled body of legal principles 
applicable to the construction of modern commercial 
instruments. Nor can I see any basis on which the municipal law 
of English could apply. On the contrary, Clause 17 of the 
Agreement.. repels the notion that the municipal law of any 
country, as such, could be appropriate. The terms of that clause 
invite, indeed prescribe the application of principles rooted in 
the good sense and common practice of the fenerality of 
civilized nations, a sort of "modern law of nature." 1 
In fact Article 17 of the Concession Agreement did not mention or stipulate any 
law which should govern this agreement. 42 
In the arbitration between The Ruler of Qatar and International Marine 
Oil Company Ltd in 1953, the arbitrator Sir Alfred Bucknill came to the same 
conclusion. He stated: 
40 ADIL (1929-30) Cases 1 and 258. See also A Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between the 
Lena Goldfields and the Soviet Government, Cornell Law Quarterly 36 (1950), 31. 
41 ICLQ, 1 (1952), 247, 261. 
42 Id., 240. 
... There is no settled body of legal principles in Qatar applicable 
to the construction of modem commercial instruments ... I need 
not set out the evidence before me about the origin, history and 
development of Islamic law as applied in Qatar or as to the legal 
procedure in that country. I have no reason to suppose that 
Islamic law is not administered there strictly, but I am satisfied 
that the law does not contain any principles which would be 
sufficient to interpret this particular contract ... both experts 
agreed that certain parts of the contract, if Islamic law was 
applicable, would be open to the grave criticism of being invalid. 
According to Professor Milliot, the principal agreement was full 
of irregularities from end to end according to Islamic law, as 
applied in Qatar. This is a cogent reason for saying that such 
law does not contain a body of legal principles applicable to a 
modem commercial contract of this kind. 43 
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Again in the arbitration between the Government of Saudi Arabia and 
the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) in 1958, the Arbitration Tribunal 
held that: 
In so far as doubts may remain on the content on the meaning 
of the agreements of the parties, it is necessary to resort to the 
general principles of law and to apply them in order to interpret, 
and even to supplement, the respective rights and obligations of 
the parties. 44 
The Tribunal added: 
Matters pertaining to private law are, in principle, governed by 
the law of Saudi Arabia but with one important reservation. 
That law must, in case of need, be interpreted or supplemented 
by the general principles of law, by the custom and practice in 
the oil business and by notions of pure Jurisprudence, in 
particular whenever certain private rights - which must inevitably 
be recognized to the concessionaire if the concession is not to 
be deprived of its substance - would not be secured in an 
unquestionable manner by the law in force in Saudi Arabia. 45 
In the arbitration between Sapphire International Petroleum and the 
National Iran Oil Company (NIOC) in 1963 the arbitrator applied to the dispute 
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. He observed: 
43 JLR, 20 (1953), 544, 545. 
44 ILR, 27 (1963), 168. 
45 !d., 169. 
All the connecting factors cited above point to the fact that the 
parties therefore intended to submit the interpretation and 
performance of their contract to principles of law generally 
recognized by civilized nations.46 
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The arbitrators in the Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Saudi Arabian cases did 
not fully understand the rules of Islamic Shari' ah. This lack of understanding 
led them to reject Shari' ah as inadequate for the purposes of an international 
arbitration. However, the applicability oflslamic Shari' ah to modern commercial 
contracts of this kind has been recognized in the opinion of some western jurists. 
For example, Coulson has shown that Islamic Shari 'ah is a legal system capable 
of supporting in a flexible way, modern legal structures. He states: 
The Qur' anic precepts are in the nature of ethical norms, broad 
enough to support modern legal structures and capable of 
varying interpretations to meet the particular needs of time and 
I 47 pace ... 
Similarly Schacht saw it as a comprehensive system dealing with the 
relationship between the individual and the State, and with the sanctity of 
contracts. He states: 
Islamic law, in all its schools, gives clear-cut decisions on a 
number of problems concerned with the relationship of 
individual and State, problems which, if I am not mistaken, have 
become a subject of much interest to western legal thought. The 
solutions provided by Islamic law go decisively and consistently 
in favor of the rights of the individual, of the sanctity of 
contracts, and of private property, and they put severe limits to 
the action of the State in these matters. 48 
Although it was noted above that there are four Islamic schools of 
thought, there are in fact no grounds for assuming that the rules of these schools 
in any significant way conflict.49 The differences between them are really 
differences of emphasis. 
46 ICLQ 13 (1964) 1015. 
47 NJ Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (1971) (1964) 225. See also Coulson, "The State 
and the Individual in Islamic Law" ,JCLQ 6 (1957) 49; JND Anderson & NJ Coulson, The 
Moslem Ruler and Contractual Obligations, NYULR 33 (1958) 917. 
48 J Schacht, Islamic Law in Contemporary States, AJCL 8 (1959) 138. 
49 M Khadduri and lU Liebesny, Law in the Middle East 1 (1955) 341-342. 
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(c) More Recent Arbitral Decisions. 
By contrast more recent tribunals have reached diverse and contradictory 
conclusions on this point. A good example is the Arbitration between Kuwait and 
the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) in 1982.50 In 1977 the Kuwait 
government nationalized the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) which 
had been operating under a concession agreement from the government since 
1948. The final revisions to the original Concession Agreement had been made 
in 1973. Aminoil protested against the government action, and invoked the 
arbitration provisions of the 1948 Agreement. On 23 July 1979, the parties 
signed an Arbitration Agreement providing for ad hoc arbitration in Paris. 
Article 111(2) of the Arbitration Agreement provided as follows: 
The law governing the substantive issues between the parties 
shall be determined by the tribunal, having regard to the quality 
of the parties, the transnational character of their relations and 
the principles of law and practice prevailing in the modern 
world. 51 
The parties did not agree what system of law was applicable. This 
problem was accordingly left to the tribunal to determine. The Award considered 
the applicable law to be a blend of Kuwaiti law and international law. It stressed 
that conflict between the two was not likely, as the Government itself in 
argument had stressed that: 
Public international law is necessarily a part of the law of 
Kuwait. 52 
So instead of relying on a third legal system, the award relies on 
combining the traditional "different sources of the law thus to be applied" and on 
"taking advantage of their resources". The general principles of law being part 
of international law, they are one of "the different legal elements involved". 53 
The award made most reference to general principles of international law, 
50 Aminoil Arbitration, ILM, 21 (1982), 976. 
51 Jd., 1000. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Id., 1001. See also PY Tschanz, The Contributions of the Aminoil Award to the Law of 
State Contracts, International Lawyer 18 (1984), 261. 
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including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 54 Thus the tribunal 
looked for a solution in the laws of the state, of which international law formed 
part. In doing so, it looked towards the general principles of law as helping to 
bring out "the wealth and fertility of the set of legal rules that the tribunal is 
called upon to apply.''55 
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has also offered the opportunity 
to analyze the choice of applicable law in international commercial arbitration, 
and to observe to what extent general principles of law or principles of 
international law are applicable in this context. While in most cases the judges 
respected the decision of the choice of law in the original contract, where this 
did not exist they needed to identify and apply general principles of law and in 
claims such as those to do with matters of expropriation and expulsion to apply 
international law. The only guideline provided was in Article V of the Claims 
Settlement Declaration "The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of 
respect for law ... taking into account relevant usages of the trade, contract 
provisions and changed circumstances".56 This allowed the tribunal a fairly free 
hand in selecting what it considered to be the most appropriate law. 
Naturally given the number of claims and the change of personnel in the 
arbitration tribunal there were inconsistencies in the decisions made. However 
there were certain themes, such as the consistent failure of the tribunal to refer 
to national legal systems, a tendency to apply general principles of law or public 
international law, but a lack of rules or guidelines as to why either was chosen. 
There was a tendency to use general principles of law in cases where it 
was perceived that (a) the principle of unjust enrichment (b) the principle of 
force majeure (c) principle related to contracts (d) the conflict of laws and (e) 
certain other principles (such as "changed circumstances") were involved. Some 
examples of each of these can be given: 
54 Amirwil Arbitration, 1005. 
55 !d., 1001. 
56 Department of States Bulletin 2047,4, quoted by JR Crook, Applicable Law in International 
Arbitration. The Iran U.S. Claims Tribunal Experience, AJIL, 83 (1989), 281. ' 
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(I) Unjust Enrichment 
In Isaiah v. Bank Mel/at Award (30 March 1983) Isaiah claimed that the 
bank had been unjustly enriched by receiving his funds in exchange for a 
dishonoured cheque. The tribunal relied on "general principles of law" and held 
that "it would be inequitable for such a bank to escape liability to the beneficial 
owner of the funds represented by such a dishonoured cheque and retain the 
funds to which it had no claim". 57 The claimant was awarded the amount due on 
the dishonoured cheque. 
In T.C.S.B. v. Iran the tribunal concluded that the authority claiming that 
a valid and enforceable contract must be respected was too great to be 
superseded by a claim of unjust enrichment. 58 
(II) Force Majeure 
The tribunal has recognized force majeure to authorize full, partial and 
even total suspension of a contract. In Gould Marketing Inc. v. Ministry of 
Defense (27 July 1983)59 the Tribunal looking at the upheaval caused by the 
revolution declared that force majeure had caused the frustration and 
impossibility of performance of the contract from 1979. This was despite claims 
of both parties to the contrary. It noted that this general principle could be 
found in the laws of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.60 
In International Schools Services Inc. v. National Iranian Copper Industries 
Co., the Tribunal found that the force majeure conditions operating resulted in 
the termination of the contract and that each party was responsible for its own 
losses after termination. 61 
57 Award No. 35-219-2 (Mar.30, 1983) reprinted in Iranian Asset Litigation Report 6, 428 
(April 15, 1983), quoted by DP Stewart & LB Sherman, Developments at the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal, 1981-1983,VirginiaJourna/ofinternationa/Law 24-1(1983), 30-31. 
58 5 Iran- U.S.C.T R. I60,17I-2 (1984 !). See also Lockheed Corp. v. Iran,A.W D. 367-829-2 
I AL.R. June 24, 1988 at 15,887, quoted by Crook, 293. 
59 3 Iran- U.S.C.T R. 147(1983 II); 6 Iran-U.S.C.T R. 272 (1984 11), quoted by Crook, 294. 
60 6 Iran - U.S.C.T.R. 274, quoted by Crook, 294. 
61 9 Iran- U.S.C.T R. 187 (1985 II), quoted by Crook, 294. 
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(III) Principles relating to Contracts 
General principles of law were applied by the Tribunal to contracts. 
These principles require that parties perform their contracts satisfactorily and 
with due diligence, as was expressed in General Dynamics Corp. v. Iran (1984).62 
It also maintained that a contract exists when one party performs at the 
instigation or with the acquiescence of the other party,63 as was evident in 
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Bank Markazi Iran. There the Tribunal stated that "a 
party may not deny the validity of a contract entered into on its behalf by 
another if by its conduct, it later consents to the contract. "64 When denying effect 
to a contract provision in Harnisclifeger Corp. v. Ministry of Roads and 
Transportation, the Chamber applied general principles to hold that where a party 
had either known or should have known about an error, it was generally accepted 
that a party may not be relieved from liability.65 
(IV) Principles of Conflict of Laws 
Principles of conflict of laws were applied in Economy Forms Corp. v. 
I ran, on the basis that there were general choice of law principles that stated that 
the jurisdiction with the most significant connection with the transaction must be 
taken into account. 66 This principle was restated in Harnischfeger Corp. v. 
Ministry of Roads and Transportation: 
The agreement ... makes no reference to governing law, however, 
under general choice of law principles, the law of the United 
States, the jurisdiction with the most significant connection with 
the transaction and the parties, must be taken to govern in this 
specific case... The United States law applicable to this 
commercial transaction is the Uniform Commercial Code.67 
62 5 Iran - U.S.C.T .R. 386.398 (1984 I), quoted by Crook, 295. 
63 2 Iran - U.S.C.T .R. 334. 339 (1983 I), quoted by Crook, 295. 
64 R.N. Pomeroy v. Iran, 2 Iran- U.S.C.T.R. 372-380(1983 I), quoted by Crook, 295-6. 
65 8 Iran- U.S.C.T .R. I 19, 133 (1985 1), quoted by Crook, 296. 
66 3 Iran- U.S.C.T .R. 4248 (1983 II), quoted by Crook, 297. 
67 7 Iran - U.S.C.T .R. 90-99 (1984 III), quoted by Crook, 297. 
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In some cases other general principles of law were identified and applied 
and in one case "clausula rebus sic stantibus" was invoked to justify contract 
termination, where the situation involved sensitive governmental contracts: 
Questech Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense Iran (1985).68 
(4) The Application of International Law to Concessions 
(a) The Classical View 
International law has traditionally been seen to govern the relationships 
between States ot other international entities: it does not recognize private 
individuals as part of this system, because they do not act independently in 
international relations. As a result private individuals are not the direct 
addressees of international law. In other words they are not subjects of 
international law. Most oil concession agreements in the world especially in the 
Middle East are concluded between States and private individuals or 
corporations rather than between States. They are therefore not governed by 
international law.69 
This view was axiomatic under traditional notions of international law. 
For example Lord McNair rejected the idea that international law is applicable 
to govern a contract or agreement between a State and a private individual or 
corporation. He said: 
It is impottant that the parties to such contracts should be in 
agreement as to the system of law which should govern them and 
within which they should operate ... that system cannot be public 
international law stricto sensu; as at present understood, because 
the contracts are not interstate contracts and do not deal with 
interstate relations.70 
Similarly, Friedman stated that: 
68 9 Iran - U.S.C.T .R. 107 (1985 II), quoted by Crook, 298. 
69 Serbian and Brazilian Loans Case P.CJ J., Series A. No.20 (1929), 42. 
70 McNair, 18-9. 
However, it appears to be more correct and to conform more 
closely with the opinions of the majority of writers that contracts 
cannot be the subject of international disputes since international 
law contains no rules respecting their form and legal effect.71 
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It is consistent with this position, as Article 34(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice provides, that only States may be parties in cases 
before the Court. 
Most arbitral awards suppon this view, even in the absence of express 
agreement to choice of proper law. For example the arbitration between the 
Government of Saudi Arabia and Aramco (1958) held that: 
As the agreement of 1933 has not been concluded between two 
States, but between a State and a private American corporation, 
it is not governed by public international law ... 72 
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, the International Court did not 
agree that a contract between the Iranian government and a foreign oil company 
had the status of an international treaty: it stated that the contract "could not 
possibly be considered to lay down the law between the two States. "73 
Subsequently the Security Council failed to take any action on a British 
complaint in respect of Iran. Ford stated in his comment on this matter: 
The Security Council failed to act because the ambiguous and 
elusive concepts of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction had 
created doubts in the minds of some of the delegates. 74 
(b) Contrary Opinions 
But some modern writers argue that there is no reason why international 
law cannot apply to a contract between a State and an individual or a 
corporation. For example Mann said: 
71 S Friedman, Expropriation in International Law (1953), 156. Other jurists support this 
view. See e.g. M. Wolff, Private International Law (2nd edn 1962) 416-7. 
72 ILR 27 (1963) 165. 
73 I.C.J. Reports (1952), 112, 113. 
74 AW Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of I951-1952(1954) 152. 
A contract could be "internationalized" in the sense that it would 
be subject to public international law "stricto sensu", that, 
therefore, its existence and fate would be immune from any 
encroachment by a system of municipal law in exactly the same 
manner as in the case of a treaty between two international 
persons; but that, on the other hand, it would be caught by such 
rules of ''jus cogens" as are embodied in public international 
law ... States are frequently not prepared to submit to foreign law, 
while private persons either refuse to submit to the law of the 
contracting State or would be willing to do so, but are 
confronted with the absence of any such law.75 
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Even those writers who reject international law as the legal system for 
the agreements between a state and a private company emphasise that while 
international law does not govern the contract the standards of international law 
may govern the situation. For example Jimenez de Arechaga stated that: 
We do not believe that there is an international law of contract, 
but even if it were so, international law contains the fundamental 
and overriding principle of the permanent sovereignty of the 
State over all its wealth and natural resources ... It is not the 
contract as such, but the situation as a whole which is governed 
by international law, whether or not the parties have so 
stipulated. 76 
(c) International Conventions 
It appears however that in recent international conventions there has 
been a trend towards the application of international law to State contracts with 
private parties. The International Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Dispute 1965 (ICSID) provides in Article 42(1): 
The tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules 
of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such 
agreement, the tribunal shall apply the law of the contracting 
State party of the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of 
75 Mann, (1959) 43-6. See also FA Mann, The Law Governing State Contracts, BYIL 21 
(1944) 20; PC Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1949). 
76 International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 Hague Recueil (1978/1) 1, 308, 
quoted by EJ ~virta, Participation of States in International Contracts and the Arbitral 
Settlement of Disputes, (Cambridge Ph.D Thesis 1988) 127. 
the laws) and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable. 77 
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If this provision is regarded as being in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, it indicates an extension of the use of 
international law to govern relations between a state and private parties. 
(d) Arbitration Agreements 
In Deutsche Schachtbau-Und Tiejbohrgesellschaft MbH v. Ras AL 
Khaimah National Oil Co. (1987) the agreement to arbitrate in Article XXI(l) of 
the contract was in the following terms: 
All disputes arising in connection with the interpretation or 
application of this agreement shall be fmally settled under the 
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce b( three arbitrators appointed in 
accordance with the Rules.7 
The problem of ascertaining the applicable law governing a state contract 
in general and a concession agreement in particular, led to the theory of the 
freedom of parties to a contract to choose the proper law of the contract. On 
this view there is nothing to prevent two parties choosing international law as the 
law applicable to govern their contract. 79 
Thus, in recent years contracts between states and private individuals 
have been either expressly or implicitly internationalized, especially in the case 
of oil concession agreements. 80 
77 See for further discussion, G Schwarzenberger, Foreign investments and International Law 
(1969), 143. 
78 [1987] 2 All ER 774. 
79 Lalive, 999. 
80 Ibid. 
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PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 
1. Introduction 
Sovereignty over natural resources, apart from being a legal concept, has 
widespread economic and political implications. This is particularly so in the 
context of the availability of foreign capital to the less developed nations. 
Economic development requires capital, whether domestic or foreign. Since most 
underdeveloped countries cannot supply their capital needs from domestic sources 
they seek to obtain sufficient foreign capital from abroad. Foreign capital is used 
for many purposes, including the development of the oil industry and other 
mineral resources, agriculture and forestry, or the acquisition of skills and 
technology. 
However, when underdeveloped countries reson to foreign capital, their 
economic and political evolution can be profoundly affected. Conditions imposed 
by nations giving aid can cause imponant changes in the freedom and social 
conditions of the underdeveloped country. The conflict between underdeveloped 
countries and foreign investment, as it relates both to permanent sovereignty and 
freedom of contractual relations, was described by Judge Levi Carneiro in the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case in the following terms: 
When there are so many countries in need of foreign capital for 
the development of their economy, it would not only be unjust, 
it would be a great mistake to expose such capital, without 
restriction or guarantee, to the hazards of the legislation of 
countries in which such capital has been invested.1 
1 ICJ Rep 1952,93,162 quoted by M Domke, "Foreign Nationalizations. Some Aspects of 
Contemporary International Law",AJIL 55 (1961) 585. 
134 
This is one basic argument used against the concept of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources. 
The concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was first 
specifically referred to during the debates on human rights in the United Nations 
in the early 1950s. In the course of formulating principles of self-determination 
as a basis for the draft Covenant on Human Rights, the concept of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources emerged as an expression of the principle of 
economic self-determination. The principal reason was the link which many 
perceived between the concept of permanent sovereignty and their own colonial 
history and years of dependence. Thus permanent sovereignty became a major 
demand of the newly independent states, articulated in the form of a claim for 
economic self-determination. The former Soviet Union and a number of other 
countries supported these demands, in the United Nations and elsewhere. 
Having obtained their political independence, in many cases the former 
colonies remained frustrated because their natural resources were still exploited 
by foreign investors in ways which they perceived as not in their interests but in 
the interests of the developed world. In almost all cases the newly independent 
countries insisted on control over and active participation in the development of 
their natural resources, on the grounds that political independence was bound to 
remain meaningless as long as foreign investors controlled their natural 
resources. 
It was in this setting that demands for economic self-determination, in 
the form of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, arose. Having learnt 
that "trade follows the flag" during their colonial past, these countries felt it was 
important that their control over their natural resources be permanently assured. 
Otherwise a country could remain in effect bound by the economic constraints 
previously imposed under colonialism. 2 
The emergence · of the new Asian and African states as members of the 
international community, and the increased influence that international political 
2 SK Banerjee, "The Concept of Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources - An 
Analysis" ,Indian Journal of International Law 8 (1968) 516. 
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institutions, especially the United Nations, played after 1945, brought about a 
great change in views about permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The 
legal validity and effect of the numerous resolutions adopted by these institutions, 
particularly the General Assembly of the United Nations, soon became a hotly 
debated issue. General Assembly Resolution 1803(XVII) of 14 December 1962 
on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources became the cornerstone of 
this debate, reflecting very fundamental doctrinal divergences among the different 
countries. 
The concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources markedly 
affected the direction in which the oil producing countries gained influence and 
then control of their oil resources. For example it became clear that the oil 
producing States of the Middle East and other parts of the world should review 
the concession agreements then in effect. At the end of 1951 a 50/50 formula 
for the division of profit between producing States and concessionaire companies 
(whether involving equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) became 
established. An OPEC Declaration of June 1968 included a statement of 
petroleum policy in member countries, emphasising the equity and feasibility of 
participation. The Declaration also emphasised "the inalienable right of all 
countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources in the 
interest of their national development ... "3 In this regard OPEC was conspicuously 
successful. Full ownership of petroleum enterprises became an established trend 
in developing countries, helping to create a new economic order. 
The principle of permanent sovereignty first developed in the early 
fifties, in accordance with a number of resolutions of the UJ;lited Nations General 
Assembly, beginning with Resolution 523(VI) of 12 January 1952.4 These 
3 OPEC, General Information and Chronology (1986) 36-7. 
4 Later resolutions included: Resolution 626(VII) of21 December 1952;Resolution 837(IX) 
of 14December 1954;Resolution 1314(XIII) of 12December 1958;Resolution 1515(XV) 
of 15 December 1960; Resolution 1803(XVII) of 14 December 1962, the Declaration on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Narural Resources; Resolution 2158(XXI) of 25 November 
1966; Resolution 2386(XXIII) of 19 November 1968; Resolution 2692(XXV) of 11 
December 1970; (UNCTAD) Resolution 88(XII) of 19 October 1972; Resolution 
3016(XXVII) of 18 December 1972; Resolution 3037(XXVII) of 19 December 1972; 
Resolution 3082(XXVIII) of6December 1973;Resolution 3171(XXVIII) of 17December 
1973; Resolution 320l(S-VI) of 1 May 1974, the Declaration on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order; Resolution 3202(S-VI) of 1 May 1974, the 
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order; and 
(continued. .. ) 
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resolutions have been the subject of great controversy between developing and 
developed countries. In this chapter I discuss the development of the right of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. First, I discuss the development 
of the concept in the United Nations from 1952 through Resolution 1803 in 1962 
to the present. I then discuss the aims and purposes of Resolution 1803 and the 
criticisms of it, and compare it with Resolution 3281, the Chaner of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (CERDS). This leads to the question how these key 
resolutions relate to existing legal norms, thence to the meaning and effect of the 
concept of permanent sovereignty, and its consequences and status in 
international law having regard to the practice supporting the concept of 
permanent sovereignty in international law. 
Finally, I discuss permanent sovereignty under Islamic Shari' ah. This 
includes the notion of pledge, the principle pacta sunt servanda, and the legal 
status of natural resources under Islamic Shari' ah. 
2. The Development of the Concept of Permanent Sovereignty in the United 
Nations 
The history of the concept of permanent sovereignty is concurrent with 
the history of the struggle between the capital exporting countries and the capital 
imponing countries, and the economic development of the latter. As Zakariya 
said: 
The battle for economic self-determination and permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources was fought simultaneously in 
the post-World War II era on two fronts, viz the concrete 
political and economic action by some of the developing nations, 
individually or collectively, and the theoretical refinement of 
the underlying legal concepts and principles within the United 
Nations System. Any progress and success achieved on one front 
was bound to influence, if not determine the outcome of the 
other.5 
4( ... continued) 
Resolution 328i(XXIX) of 12December 1974,the Charter ofEconomic Rights and Duties 
of States (CERDS). 
5 HS Zakariya, "Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Search for a New International 
Order", inK Hossain (ed), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order,(i980) 
208. 
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The concept of sovereignty conceived by the capital importing States was 
in the nature of Austin's defmition of sovereignty, "absolute and unqualified by 
any limitations of international responsibility".6 But capital exporting states held 
that "while territorial sovereignty was a legal attribute of every State, it was 
limited by the duties and obligations imposed on States by international law and 
by the economic and political necessities of the growing interdependence of the 
world community."7 Furtber they believed that the concept of permanent 
sovereignty over resources claimed by the less developed nations "was derived 
from the unwarranted and mistaken extension of the sovereign rights of State to 
mean the rights of ownership".8 
Wortley, who supported the cause of the Western capital exporting 
states, argued that: 
Much confusion has arisen from the nineteenth century 
exaggerations of the powers of the territorial sovereign over 
persons and tbings in its territory... It has been rightly said that 
everything actually in the territory of the State, considered in 
itself and independently of the persons to whom it belongs, must 
be deemed subject to the right of the imperium of the territorial 
sovereign. Yet imperium, sovereignty and eminent domain are 
not ownership; territorial sovereignty exists in the framework of 
international law; it is not superior to it... Because a sovereign 
State may control and expropriate property in its territory, this 
does not mean that it can, at will, disregard the claims made, by 
virtue of public international law, to restitution or to just 
compensation or that it may always insist on its own conception 
·Of private property.9 . 
Against the background of these basic arguments, it is necessary to trace the 
development of the principle of permanent sovereignty through legal and 
diplomatic forums and through a series of United Nations resolutions. 
6 Banetjee, 516. 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid. , 
9 BA Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law (1959) 12. 
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(1) The Human Rights Commission and Resolution 626(Vll) of 21 December 
1952 
The concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was first 
addressed in 1952 in the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, 
initiated through a Chilean proposal to the following effect: 
The right of the peoples to self-determination should also 
include permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources and that in no case might a people be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence on the grounds of any rights that 
might come ftom any other States. 10 
The General Assembly at its 6th session in 1952 stressed the right of the Third 
World to determine freely the use of their natural resources so as to further the 
realisation of their plans of economic development. 11 In particular United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 626(VII) of 21 December 1952 was 
adopted. It recognised that: 
All member states, in the exercise of their right freely to use and 
exploit their natural wealth and resources wherever deemed 
desirable by them for their own progress and economic 
development, to have due regard, consistently with their 
sovereignty, to the need for maintaining the flow of capital in 
condition of security, mutual confidence and economic 
co-operation among nations. 
Further it recommended that: 
All member states to refrain from any act, direct, or indirect, 
designed to impede the exercise of the sovereignty of any state 
over its natural resources.12 
The industrialised countries voted against this resolution on the grounds 
that it did not contain any provision restricting the power of states to expropriate 
private property or for the recognition of the rights of foreign investors under 
10 See Baneljee, 518. 
11 Ibid. 
12 General Assembly Resolution 626 (VII) of 21 December 1952. 
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international law, including treaties and other international agreements. The 
United States representative explained that the resolution would be interpreted 
by investors as a danger signal that they had better think twice before . they 
placed their capital in the less developed countries. 13 
Six months after the adoption of this resolution, these predictions proved 
to be correct. The Government of Guatemala used this resolution as a 
supporting argument when it exercised its sovereignty by taking over the property 
of the United Fruit Company in Guatemala.14 In 1954 the Civil Tribunal of 
Rome in supporting the Iranian Oil Nationalisation law, regarded the adoption 
of the Resolution within a month after the passage of the Iranian law, as 
recognition of the international legitimacy of that law .15 
The Human Rights Commission in 1955 stressed the "need" for a 
practical survey of the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and 
resources, and the principles of economic self-determination. Article I paragraph 
2 of the draft Covenant on Human Rights read as follows: 
The peoples may for their own ends freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources, without prejudice to any 
obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, 
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international 
law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence.16 
During the debate before the United Nations General Assembly, Saudi 
Arabian representative Ambassador Jamil AI Baroody said: 
It is indeed to prevent what had been a frequent occurrence in 
the nineteenth century, namely, that a weak and penniless 
government should seriously compromise a country's future by 
granting concessions in the economic sphere.17 
13 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, 7th session (A/411, 1952) 497. 
14 JN Hyde, Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources, AJ/L 50(1956) 854. 
15 Ibid. 
16 United Nations Doc A/C/3/L, 489. 
17 United Nations General Assembly lOth session, 3rd Committee, 672nd meeting, 240. 
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(2) Resolution 1314 (Xlll) of 12 December 1958 
Three years later the debate over the concept of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources and economic self-determination was resumed, in the 
context of a debate as to "whether a country's permanent sovereignty over its 
natural resources was to be qualified by the rights and obligation of States arising 
out of international law". The capital investing States still held that "it was 
illogical to use the term 'sovereignty' in conjunction with 'peoples' which did not 
yet represent sovereign States".18 
However, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1314 (Xill) of 12 
December 1958, entitled "Recommendation Concerning International Respect for 
the Right of People and Nations to Self-determination". The resolution drew 
upon the affirmation of the right as expressed in the draft Human Rights 
Covenants. It set up a Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources and "instructed it to conduct a full survey of the status of permanent 
sovereignty over natural wealth and resources as a basic constituent of the right 
of self determination, with recommendations, where necessary, for its 
strengthening". It also stated that in the "conduct of the full survey of the status 
of the permanent sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth 
and resources, due regard should be paid to the rights and duties of States under 
international law and to the importance of encouraging international 
co-operation in the economic development of under-developed countries".19 
The aim of the Commission "consisted essentially in determining the 
nature of the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources; the manner 
in which that right should be exercised and what measure should be taken into 
account according to international law" .zo At the request of the Commission the 
Secretariat prepared a study on the status of permanent sovereignty of peoples 
and nations over natural wealth and resources, national measures affecting 
ownership or use of natural resources by aliens, State control over natural 
18 Banerjee, 525. 
19 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1314 (XIII) of 12 December 1958. 
20 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. 
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resources and their exploitation of resources, acquired rights, concession 
agreements and other issues.Z1 
(3) Resolution 1515(XV) of 15 December 1960 
While the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty continued its work, the 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 1515(XV) of 15 December 1960, calling 
for concened action for the economic development of economically less 
developed countries. Paragraph 5 recommended that "the sovereign right of 
every State to dispose of its wealth and its natural resources should be respected 
in conformity with the rights and duties of States under international law".22 
(4) Resolution 1803(XVll) of 14 December 1962. 
On 14 December 1962 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 
1803(XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. This resolution 
emphasised the inalienable right of all States to freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources. It was adopted by a majority of 87 votes in favour, 2 
against, and 12 abstentions. The resolution declared that: 
1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty 
over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the 
interests of their national development and of the well-being of 
the people of the State concerned; 
2. The exploration, development and disposition of such 
resources, as well as the impon of the foreign capital required 
for these purposes, should be in conformity with the rules and 
conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be 
necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, 
restriction or prohibition of such activities; 
3. In cases where authorization is granted, the capital imponed 
and the earnings on that capital shall be governed by the terms 
thereof, by the national legislation in force, and by international 
law. The profits derived must be shared in the proponions 
freely agreed upon, in each case, between the investors and the 
recipient State, due care being taken to ensure that there is no 
21 A Akinsanya, The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third World (1980) 51. 
22 United Nations General Assembly Resolution, lSlS(XV) of 15 December 1960. 
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impairment, for any reason, of that State's sovereignty over its 
natural wealth and resources; 
4. Nationalisation, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based 
on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national 
interest which are recognised as overriding purely individual or 
private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the 
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance 
with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the 
exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international 
law. In any case, where the question of compensation gives rise 
to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking 
such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by 
sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the 
dispute should be made through arbitration or international 
adjudication; 
5. The free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples 
and nations over their natural resources must be furthered by 
the mutual respect of States based on their sovereign equality; 
6. International co-operation for the economic development of 
developing countries, whether in the form of public or private 
capital investments, exchange of goods and services, technical 
assistance, or exchange of scientific information, shall be such as 
to further their independent national development and shall be 
based upon respect for their sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources; 
7. Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty 
over their natural wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and hinders 
the development of international co-operation and the 
maintenance of peace; 
8. Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by, or 
between, sovereign States shall be observed in good faith; States 
and international organisations shall strictly and conscientiously 
respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural 
wealth and resources in accordance with the Charter and the 
principles set forth in the present resolution.23 
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Resolution 1803 had been drafted by the Permanent Sovereignty 
Commission pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1314 (Xlli) of 12 
December 1958, which provided that "the right of peoples and nations to 
self-determination as affirmed in the two draft covenants... includes permanent 
23 General Assembly Resolution 1803, 17 GAOR, Supp (No 17) 15; United Nations 
Documents N5217 (1962). 
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sovereignty over natural wealth and resources". These are the basic operative 
provisions reproduced in the paragraph 1 of Resolution 1803. The Chilean 
delegation noted24 at the Assembly's 17th session that the Commission's task. .. 
had consisted essentially in determining the nature of the right 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the manner in 
which that right should be exercised and what measures should 
be taken into account according to international law. The draft 
resolution referred, on the latter point, to General Assembly 
Resolution 1515(XV). 
Although the main legal premise of the resolution was not challenged 
directly by members of the former Soviet bloc, the former Soviet Union did 
stress protection against violations of sovereignty which meant the inalienable 
right of States to take property and to set their own terms and standards of 
compensation, and rejecting the concepts of the protection of foreign capital and 
acquired rights and of the arbitration or international adjudications of related 
disputes. 25 
On the other hand some delegations from the developing world held that 
the Permanent Sovereignty Commission's terms of reference had been "to protect 
the interest of the developing countries". They felt that the draft resolution 
should be considered from that point of view and that its principal aim was 
simply the economic development of underdeveloped countries or the 
encouragement of the flow of capital to such countries. 26 
A major criticism of Resolution 1803 is that it affords more protection 
to multi-nationals than to the host country. Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1803 
provides that: 
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on 
grounds or reasons of public utility security or the national 
interest... in such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate 
compensation... in any case where the question of compensation 
gives rise to a controversy... settlement of the dispute should be 
made through arbitration or international adjudication. 
24 GA (XVII) NC.2/SR.834.19. 
25 KN Gess, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, JCLQ 13 (1964) 407. 
26 ld, 407-408. 
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Thus the right of a host state to expropriate foreign property is limited by the 
requirement that the expropriation be not arbitrary or discriminatory but should 
occur for reasons of public utility, and that in the case of the expropriation, 
appropriate compensation be paid. "This is a concession to the recipient States 
but is certainly a victory to the investor States. "27 So also was the reference to 
the need for settlement of disputes through arbitration or international 
adjudication in cases where all local remedies had been exhausted. Critics feel 
that these arbitration provisions favour multi-nationals and that international 
arbitrators are most likely inclined to suppon the western multi-national investors 
abroad.28 
The fact remains that despite criticisms, Resolution 1803 is based on the 
principle of the "inalienable right of States to natural wealth and resources which 
must be exercised in the interest of national development and the well-being of 
the people of the State concerned". Resolution 1803 paved the way for a number 
of later resolutions of the General Assembly, from Resolution 2158(XXI) of 25 
November 1966 to Resolution 3201 S-VI and 3202 S-VI of 1 May 1974 by which 
was established the "New International Economic Order", and Resolution 3281 
(XXIX) of 12 December 1974, the Charter of Economics Rights and Duties of 
States. These resolutions reiterated the fundamental principles of Resolution 
1803 thereby re-emphasising its imponance. 
Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1803 provides that: 
Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by, or 
between, sovereign States shall be observed in good faith. 
Thus the right of a State to expropriate foreign property is restricted by this 
provision, implying that a breach of the agreement by the nationalisation is 
deemed a violation of international law. 
27 Akinsanya, 54. 
28 Ibid. 
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(5) Resolution 2158(XXI) of 25 November 1966 
General Assembly Resolution 2158(XXI) of 25 November 1966 affirmed 
"that foreign capital, whether public or private, forthcoming at the request of the 
developing countries, can play an important role inasmuch as it supplements the 
efforts undertaken by them in the exploitation and development of their natural 
resources" and asserted that foreign investment must take place under the control 
of the States and in accordance with their national development, their interests 
and their laws. Again this resolution affirmed "the inalienable right of all 
countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources". 
Developing countries "must increase their share in the administration of 
enterprises which are fully or partly operated by foreign capital".29 
(6) Resolutions 3201 and 3202: The New International Economic Order (NIEO), 
1 May 1974 
On 1 May 1974 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3201, the 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. The 
Declaration was stated to be "based on equity, sovereign equality, 
interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all states, irrespective 
of their economic and social systems which shall correct inequalities and redress 
existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the 
developed and developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic 
and social development and peace and justice for present and future 
generations ... "30 In particular paragraph 4(e) provides for: 
Full pennanent sovereignty of every State over its natural 
resources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard 
these resources, each State is entitled to exercise effective 
control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to 
its own situation, including the right to nationalisation or transfer 
of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of 
the full pennanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be 
29 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2158 (XXI) of 25 November 1966. This 
resolution was adopted by 104 votes in favour to none against with 6 abstentions. See 
also Akinsanya, 55. 
30 General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-Vl) of 1 May (1974). This resolution was adopted 
without a vote. 
subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to 
prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable right 31 
Paragraph 4(f) asserts: 
The right of all States, territories and peoples under foreign 
occupation, alien and colonial domination or apartheid to 
restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and 
depletion of, and damages to, the natural resources and all other 
resources of those States, territories or peoples.32 
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Paragraph 7 provides that the Declaration "shall be one of the most important 
bases of economic relations between all peoples and all nations".33 
Simultaneously, Resolution 3202, the Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, provided: "the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) shall constitute an effective 
instrument iowards the establishment of a new system of international economic 
relations based on equity, sovereign equality and interdependence of the interests 
of developed and developing countries".34 
(7) Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974: the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) 
On 19 April 1972 the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development met in Santiago. On the initiative of the President of Mexico, the 
Conference adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, in an 
attempt to protect the economic rights particularly of developing countries. The 
final draft of the Charter was submitted to the Second Committee of the General 
Assembly.35 
31 Ibid, paragmph 4 (e). 
32 Ibid, paragraph 4 (f). 
33 Ibid, paragmph 7. 
34 General Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May (1974). 
35 Akinsanya, 63. 
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On 12 December 1974 the General Assembly approved the Charter as 
Resolution 3281.36 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
contains 15 principles concerning the economic, political and other relations 
among States, including the following: 
1. Sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
States. 
2. Sovereign equality of all States. 
3. Non-intervention. 
4. Mutual and equitable benefit. 
5. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 
6. Peaceful settlement of disputes. 
7. Fulfilment in good faith of international obligations. 
8. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
9. No attempt to seek hegemony and spheres of influence. 
10. International cooperation for development. 
Of the Charter's 34 articles, the most important for present purposes are: 
Article 2 
(1) Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent 
sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its 
wealth, natural resources and economic activities. 
(2) Each state has the right: 
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment 
within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and 
regulations and in conformity with its national objectives and 
priorities. No State shall be compelled to grant preferential 
treatment to foreign investment. 
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities of 
transnational corporations within its national jurisdiction 
and take measures to ensure that such activities comply 
with its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its 
economic and social policies. Transnational corporations 
shall not intervene in the internal affairs of a host State. 
Every State should, with full regard for its sovereign 
rights, Co-operate with other States in the exercise of the 
right set forth in this subparagraph. 
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership 
of foreign property in which case appropriate 
compensation should be paid by the State adopting such 
36 General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) 12 December 1974. 
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and 
regulations and all circumstances that the State considers 
pertinent. In any case where the question of 
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be 
settled under the domestic law of the nationalising State 
and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed 
by all States concerned that other peaceful means be 
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and 
in accordance with the principle of free choice of means. 
Article 5 
(1) All States have the right to associate in organisations of 
primary commodity producers in order to develop their national 
economies, to achieve stable financing for their development 
and, in pursuance of their aims, to assist in the promotion of 
sustained growth of the world economy, in particular accelerating 
the development of developing countries. Correspondingly all 
States have the duty to respect that right by refraining from 
applying economic and political measures that would limit it. 
Article 12 
( 1) States have the right in agreement with the parties 
concerned, to participate in subregional, regional and 
interregional co-operation in the pursuit of their economic and 
social development. All States engaged in such co-operation 
have the duty to ensure that the policies of those groupings to 
which they belong correspond to the provisions of the present 
charter and are outward-looking ... 
148 
The vote on the Charter was 120-6 with 10 abstentions. Opposed were certain 
industrialised countries (United States, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany, United Kingdom, and Luxemburg). The countries which abstained 
were Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain and 
the Netherlands.37 Senator Charles Percy explained why the United States did 
not support the proposed Charter of Economic Right and Duties of States: 
[T]o command general support - and to be implemented - the 
proposed rights and duties must be defined equitably and take 
into account the concerns of industrialised as well as developing 
countries. In extensive negotiations in Mexico City, Geneva and 
here in New York, the United States worked hard and sincerely 
with other countries in trying to formulate a Charter that would 
achieve such a balance... Indeed, agreement was reached on 
many important articles, and our support for those was shown in 
the vote we have just taken. On others, agreement has not yet 
37 Ibid. 
been reached. Our views on these provisions are apparent in the 
amendments proposed by the United States and certain other 
countries, but these regrettably have been rejected by the 
majority here. Many of the unagreed provisions, in the view of 
my government, are fundamental and are unacceptable in their 
present form. To cite a few; the treatment of foreign investment 
in terms which do not fully take into account respect for 
agreements and international obligations, and the endorsement 
of concepts of producer cartels and indexation of prices ... 
Moreover, the provisions of the Charter would discourage rather 
than encourage the capital flow which is vital for development 
38 
(8) Comparison Between Resolutions 1803 and 3281 
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Article 2 of Resolution 3281 of 1974, the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States, made fundamental changes in Resolution 1803 of 1962.39 
I will analyse the changes as follows: 
(a) Permanent Sovereignty 
Article 2(1) of the Charter provides that a State shall exercise full 
permanent sovereignty over and possession of "all its wealth, natural resources, 
and economic activities ... ", while Resolution 1803 of 1962 provides that 
permanent sovereignty extends to all the natural wealth and resources of the 
State in question. It seems that the Charter is an expansion of the concept of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, compared with Resolution 1803 of 
1962. Moreover, it provides for sovereignty over economic activities, which may 
be independent of the natural wealth and resources of the State. 
(b) Protection of Foreign Investment 
Under Resolution 1803 of 1962, it is contemplated that imported capital 
and the earnings on that capital are to be governed by national legislation in 
force and by international law. By contrast under Aiticle 2(2)(a) of the 
Resolution 3281 of 1974, imported capital is to be regulated within State national 
38 Akinsanya, 61-62. 
39 ld, 62-66. 
150 
jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with its 
national objectives and priorities, without any preferential treatment for foreign 
investment 
(c) Transnational Corporations 
Resolution 1803 of 1962 is silent on this point while Article 2(2)(b) of 
the Charter provides that a State has full authority "to regulate and supervise the 
activities of transnational corporations within its national jurisdiction and take 
measures to ensure that such activities comply with its laws, rules and regulations 
and conform with its economic and social policies". Transnational corporations, 
on the other hand, are excluded from intervening in the internal affairs of a host 
State. 
(d) Limits on Nationalisation or Expropriation 
Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1803 of 1962 provides that "nationalisation, 
expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public 
utility security or the national interest". In marked contrast Article 2(2)(c) does 
not provide any restriction on rights of the State to expropriate foreign 
investment 
Capital exporting countries argue that the standards outlined in 
traditional international law must be maintained otherwise nationalization could 
not be justified in international law and would become instead an exercise of 
arbitrary power. However developing countries maintain that the standards are 
meaningless as it is the role of the State to define and interpret them and 
thereby provide justification for its acts of nationalization. 40 Further discussion 
on this point is in Chapter 9. 
40 SR Chowdhury. Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, in K Hossain and SR 
Chowdhury (eds) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International Law 
(1984) 10. ' 
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(e) The Principle of Compensation 
Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1803 of 1962 further provides that "the owner 
shall be paid appropriate compensation in accordance with the rules in force in 
the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in 
accordance with international law ... " Article 2(2)(c) on the other hand provides 
merely for "appropriate compensation [to] be paid by the State adopting such 
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all 
circumstances that the State considers pertinent". That means the compensation 
will be paid according to the expropriating State's own law, taking into account 
all circumstances which are considered relevant in accordance with that law. The 
Charter avoids all reference to international law, such as contained in Resolution 
1803 of 1962. However the doctrine of compensation in accordance with the 
Charter is not a matter of dispute because "the mere use of the expression 
"should" in lieu of "shall" does not necessarily exclude the obligation to pay 
compensation". What is significant is that it is the expropriating State that is to 
determine what "circumstances" are "pertinent". 41 I discuss the compensation 
issue further in Chapter 10. 
(f) Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1803 of 1962 provides: 
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a 
controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such 
measures shall be exhausted However, upon agreement by 
sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the 
dispute should be made through arbitration or international 
adjudication. 
Thus it would appear that any dispute about compensation which may arise 
should be referred to arbitration or international adjudication. On the other 
hand Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter rejects any reference to international means 
such as arbitration and international adjudication, providing as follows: 
41 FV Garcia-Amador, "The Proposed New International Economic Order: the new approach 
to the law covering Nationalization and Compensation", Lawyer of the Americas 12(1980) 
28,40. 
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a 
controversy, it is to be settled under the domestic law of the 
nationalising State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and 
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful 
means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States 
and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means. 
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Thus the settlement of compensation disputes is a matter for the domestic 
tribunals of the expropriating State acting in accordance with its national laws, 
unless by mutual agreement some other peaceful means is sought. In this regard, 
there is a fundamental difference between this article and the Latin American 
Calvo doctrine concerning dispute settlement. Article 2 of the Charter does not 
deny the possibility of the settlement of disputes by mumal agreement, whereas 
the Calvo Doctrine denies the validity of any contractual clause which provides 
for international arbitration or any other extranational procedures "instead of or 
in addition" to the national legal system.42 
However, most industrialised countries rejected Article 2 of the Charter, 
and endeavoured to amend it by a proposal which would have "(a) allowed 
appeals on investment disputes to international tribunals after the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies in the host country; (b) stipulated that the standard of 
compensation should be just compensation in the light of all relevant 
circumstances. "43 That proposal was defeated by a large majority of the 
developing countries, on the ground that international controversies arising from 
investment disputes should not be regarded as different from other international 
disputes and should be governed by the same rules of international law. Thus 
the question is, what are the rules of international law which must govern the 
relations between the State and private foreign investment? I discuss this issue 
in the next section. 
42 Chowdhury, 22. 
43 ld, 18. 
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3. The Meaning and Effect of the Concept of "PermanentSovereignty" 
(1) The Distinction between "Sovereignty''and "PermanentSovereignty" 
The term sovereignty in international law has been defined by jurists and 
political scientists from different perspectives, but always with a common core of 
"supreme authority". According to Morgenthau: 
Sovereignty is the supreme legal authority of the nation to give 
and enforce the law within a certain territory and in 
consequence, independent from the authority of any other nation 
and equality with it under international law.44 
This may be compared with Schwarzenberger's view: 
The principle of legal sovereignty is an abstraction from a 
number of relevant rules: 
(1) Without its consent, a subject of international law is 
bound by applicable rules of universal or general international 
customary law and general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations. 
(2) Additional international obligations may be imposed on 
any subject of international law only with its consent. 
(3) Unless the territorial jurisdiction of a State is excluded or 
limited by rules of international law, its exercise is exclusively 
the concern of the State in question. 
(4) Subjects of international law may claim potential 
jurisdiction over persons or things outside the territorial 
jurisdiction. 1n the absence of permissive rules to the contrary, 
however, they may actually exercise such jurisdiction in concrete 
instances only within their territories. 
(5) Unless authorised by permissive rules to the contrary, 
intervention by subjects of international law in one another's 
sphere of exclusive domestic jurisdiction constitutes a breach of 
international law. 45 
44 lU Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (1964) 318. 
45 G Schwarzenberger, Manual of International Law (1967) 65. 
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However, "sovereignty" does not give full freedom to do whatsoever the wishes 
or actual equality of rights or competences not in accordance with the principles 
of international law accepted among the nations. As James Crawford states: 
Sovereignty does not mean actual equality of rights or 
competences: the actual competence of a State may be 
restricted by its constitution, or by treaty or custom. The term 
"sovereignty" accurately refers not to the totality of powers which 
all States have, but to the totality of powers which States may, 
under international law, have. The danger of drawing 
implications from the term is thus evident. 46 
Whatever the difficulties, it is undisputed that State sovereignty over 
natural wealth and resources has become a most important subject for both 
developing and developed countries in international law. Investment by foreign 
companies has political, social, and economic implications for developing 
countries. These implications can involve a loss of control by the State over its 
own political, social and economic development. This loss of control is not 
acceptable to them and may be contrary to the concept of permanent sovereignty 
in international law. Even traditional international law recognized the right of 
States to control their natural wealth and resources. The Governments of 
France, the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, recognized the 
general right of a State to nationalize or take over its natural resources in a 
tripartite statement on 12 August 1956 concerning the nationalization of the Suez 
Canal Company, where they declared: 
They do not question the right of Egypt to enjoy and exercise all 
powers of a fully sovereign and independent nation, including the 
generally recognised right, under appropriate conditions, to 
nationalise assets, not impressed with an international interest, 
which are subject to its political authority.47 
But certain issues, such as standards of compensation and stabilization clauses, 
have been the subject of controversy. 
46 J Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (1979) 27. 
47 8 Whiteman, Digest of International Law (1967) 1106. 
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According to western industrialized countries the right of states to control their 
natural wealth and resources in accordance with the minimum international 
standard entails two rules of customary law:48 
1. Expropriation must be for a public purpose. 
2. Even when expropriation is for a public purpose, it must 
be accompanied by payment of compensation for the full 
value of the property, by which is meant "prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation. 
On the other hand Resolutions 1803 and 3281 require at most that the owner of 
expropriated property be paid "appropriate compensation": 
that full compensation need not be paid in every case. 
this clearly implies 
It depends on the 
circumstances of each case what amounts to "appropriate compensation". 
Thus it can be argued that permanent sovereignty is a concept over and 
above that of sovereignty in the normal sense, and that it emanates from the 
right to self-determination rather than from older territorial conceptions of 
sovereignty. Self-determination itself is deemed a fundamental principle of 
international law, and as we have seen the concept of permanent sovereignty 
means that the State has the right to control its natural wealth and resources for 
the benefit of its people and construction of its economy. The concept of 
permanent sovereignty is thus an expression of the value of economic 
self-determination, which helps to resolve such basic questions as whether the 
State loses any right of sovereignty when it engages itself by a treaty or a 
contract, or whether the right of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and 
resources is inalienable. 49 
Undoubtedly the State loses its sovereignty when it is under the 
protection of another State, which controls its internal or external affairs, 
whether by choice or by treaty, and which is placed under the legal authority of 
another State. But when the State enters into an obligation arising out of a 
contract for some economic purpose, such as the exploitation or production of its 
48 M Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law (6th edn 1987) 92-3. 
49 Hossain, in Hossain &'Chowdhury (eds), viii. 
156 
natural resources (eg oil concession agreements) these do not formally affect the 
sovereignty of the State: there is no question in such a case of the State divesting 
itself permanently or alienating its sovereignty to the private party. On the other 
hand, although formal sovereignty may be retained, such arrangements may 
prove inimical to the interests of the people of the State, especially if they are 
stated to last for many years. It is this problem of real disadvantage and 
subordination that the doctrine of permanent sovereignty is intended to address. 
According to MT Elghunairni, there is a distinction ... 
between the State's right to grant a concession and a 
concessionaire's entitlement to exercise his concessionary rights. 
The State's right to grant or withhold a concession is inviolable, 
as is its right to annul such a concession. But once the 
concession is granted it is absurd to claim that the operation of 
such a concession is inimicable to State sovereignty. Once 
granted a concession becomes a contractual relation, governed 
by the principles of contractual relations, without reference to 
the fact that one party may enjoy sovereign rights and another 
not. so 
In a sense the notion of permanent sovereignty is an exploration of this 
distinction. Indeed according to some it is much more. Thus Jimenez de 
Arechaga argued that: 
The territorial State can never lose its legal capacity to change 
the destination or the method of exploitation of those resources, 
whatever arrangements have been made for their exploitation 
and administration. Moreover, the State can exercise thts right, 
even if a predecessor State or a previous government engaged 
itself, by treaty or by a contract, not to so do. 51 
Brownlie considers that this "particular innovation" of Arechaga can be 
justified in accordance with Article 64 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the 
Law of Treaties "if and when the principle of permanent sovereignty emerges as 
50 MEES, 27 October (1961) 7, quoted by Mohammed Madani, The Relationship Between 
Saudi Arabia Domestic Law and International Law. A Study of the Oil Agreements with 
Foreign Companies, SJ.D Thesis, George Washington University (1970) 56. 
51 Jimenez de Arechaga, Recueil des Cours (1978!1) 297, quoted by Chowdhury, 7-8. See 
also, Jimenez de Arechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned 
Property, NYUJSLP, 11 (1978) 179. 
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a new peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)". Brownlie had 
earlier treated the principle of permanent sovereignty as one of the "candidate 
rules" which may have the special stams of jus cogens .... However he concedes, 
albeit "loosely speaking", that "permanent sovereignty is the assertion of the 
acquired rights of the host State which are not defeasible by a contract or 
perhaps even by an international agreement. "52 
On the other hand the main question is whether the right which is 
inherent in sovereignty is inalienable or not. According to one view ... 
Sovereignty is inalienable and indivisible. It only belongs to the 
State and cannot be ceded. As regards sovereignty over natural 
resources, this is no different from of sovereignty, but is 
comprised within the latter's general elements, within supremacy 
and independence. 53 
The 1982 Montreal Conference of the International Law Association resolved 
that the ftrst principle in this area was that the right of permanent sovereignty 
"emanating as it does from the jus cogens principle of self-determination, is a 
fundamental principle of contemporary international law, and an important 
instrument for the establishment of a new international economic order. "54 
The contrary view is that "when a state makes commitments as reflected 
in stabilization clauses, it does so, not in derogation of, but in the exercise of the 
same sovereignty which inheres in it." Thus the Arbitral Award between the 
Saudi Arabian Government and Aramco of 23 August 1958 provided: 
Nothing can prevent a State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, 
from binding itself irrevocably by the provisions of a concession 
and from granting to the concessionaire irretractable rights. 
Such rights have the character of acquired rights. 55 
52 Ibid. Article 64 of the Vienna Convention provides: "If a new peremptory norm of general 
international law emerges, any existing treaty. which is in conflict with that norm becomes 
void and terminates." 
53 G Elian, The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1979) 10-11, 
quoted by Chowdhury, 8. 
54 International Law Association, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, Montreal (1982) 197. 
55 Arbitration between Saudi Arabia & Aramco ILR 27 (1963) 168. 
Similarly in the Libya-Texaco Arbitration the Arbitrator held ... 
that a State cannot invoke its sovereignty to disregard 
commitments freely undertaken through the exercise of this same 
sovereignty and cannot, through measures belonging to its 
internal order, make null and void the rights of the contracting 
party which has performed its various obligations under the 
contract. 56 
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The conflict between the two views appears complete, but in seeking to resolve 
it, it is necessary to get beyond definitions and to look at the special 
consequences of the principle of permanent sovereignty. These are what serves 
to distinguish it from the more general principle of State sovereignty itself. 
(2) The Consequences of Permanent Sovereignty 
A series of United Nations Resolutions between 1952 and 1974 provide 
the key elements and basic discussion of the principle of permanent sovereignty. 
The consequence of this conception means that as a new international economic 
order emerges the high degree of dominance and control of foreign enterprises 
in developing States should be changed. Host countries should exercise control 
over their natural wealth and resources for the benefit of their people. This 
right of control is in accordance with the concept of permanent sovereignty. 
In fact for the last 37 years the concept of permanent sovereignty over 
natural wealth and resources has been expanding by virtue of United Nations 
resolutions regarding the right of permanent sovereignty, by the creation of 
organizations such as OPEC and OAPEC as instruments of international and 
national cooperation, and by increasing the host countries control over their 
natural wealth and resources. 
In the discussion of the resolutions concerning permanent sovereignty, 
the participation issue was one of the most important questions and the main 
distinguishing feature. It has changed the nature of traditional oil concession 
agreements, producing consequences in the area of the revision and amendment 
56 Arbitration between Libyan Government & Texaco ILR 53 (1979) 475. 
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of old concession agreements; the duration of concession agreements; 
relinquishment; State participation; the law and practice of nationalization; the 
widespread establishment of national oil companies; the settlement of disputes; 
compensation for expropriation; the emergence of new petroleum laws and of 
new types of agreements. I will deal with each of these in tum. 
(1) Revision and Amendment of Old Concession Agreements 
Older concession agreements were characterized by a high degree of 
economic control by the foreign oil companies over the natural wealth and 
resources of the host States. However, the producing countries called for 
renegotiation to revise and amend these types of concession agreements 
according to the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and 
resources. The demands of producing countries reflect their right of control over 
their resources. 
(2) Duration of Concession Agreements 
The old concession agreements were of excessively long duration, for 
example over 75 years,57 which seemed completely unreasonable. Rival 
concessionaires received ·protection over a long period especially if there was no 
provision in the agreements to change or amend those agreements. But since the 
concept of permanent sovereignty has emerged, most concession agreements 
granted after 1952 provide for a shorter term, typically between 25 and 40 
years. 58 
(3) Relinquishment 
The old concession agreements signed before 1950 sometimes covered 
the whole territory of the country. This was the case with all concession 
agreements in the Middle East. Moreover (except for the Saudi Arabia 
57 All Middle East concession agreements were granted for this average duration before 
1950. 
58 This period has typically been provided for in concession agreements in different countries 
since 1950. 
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concession agreement with Aramco of 1933) these concession agreements 
contained no relinquishment provision. The size of the exclusive area covered 
by the original concession agreements of 1933 and 1939 in the eastern province 
was about 440,000 square miles, or about the size of Texas and California 
combined.59 The D'Arcy agreement (Anglo-Persian Oil Company 1901) covered 
the whole of Iran except the nonhero provinces of Asterabad, Khorasan, 
Azerbaijan, Gilan and Mazanderan. This concession agreement did not contain 
any provision for relinquishment.60 These grants, it seems, were the largest 
individual grants in the world. 
Again, all this has changed. A consequence of permanent sovereignty is 
that the producing countries have requested foreign oil companies to define their 
area of operation and to agree to the relinquishment of land which needed more 
time to be d.eveloped or would never be developed. Some of the States 
producers entered into negotiations with foreign oil companies for 
relinquishment, and other States resoned to unilateral action. 
The Saudi Arabian government entered into negotiations with Aramco 
for this purpose. According to their Concession Agreement of 1933, Anicle 9: 
... the company shall relinquish to the government such portions 
of the exclusive area as the company at that time may decide not 
to explore funher ... 
Thereafter, as a result of long negotiations Aramco relinquished by agreement in 
1948 and 1963 a large pan of its concession to the Saudi Arabian government. 61 
The new type of concession agreement after 1952 provides for the 
definition of the area of operation to be much more limited and more precise 
than in the old concession agreements, and includes both relinquishment and 
joint-venture clauses. 
59 Aramco Handbook (1960) 136. 
60 AW Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952(1954) 15. 
61 Aramco Handbook, 137. 
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(4) State Participation 
. The traditional oil concession agreement stipulated for no changes to be 
made in its provision. This enabled foreign oil companies to resist any 
modification or amendment of their concession agreements according to the 
doctrine of the sanctity of contract. As a result of this attitude, the producing 
States were not able to share with the foreign oil companies decisions about the 
volume of production, the administration of enterprises, oil prices, or 
international oil policy, so as to protect the interests of their people and to 
ensure the development of their countries and their resources. For these reasons 
the old concession agreements were a detrimental imposition on the host 
countries. 
However, the foreign oil companies accepted and recognized in principle 
the rights of people to participation when most of the producing countries 
demanded renegotiation of existing oil agreements, relying on principle of "rebus 
sic stantibus" as an established principle of international law. This principle is 
discussed at length in the following chapter. 
The period between 1950 and 1960 saw the beginning of State 
participation in the oil enterprise with the foreign oil companies, including 
participation in profits, management international oil policy, oil prices and 
joint-ventures entered into between foreign oil companies and national oil 
companies. Participation in the negotiations, then, meant assuring effective 
participa~on in control and management. Thus major modifications in the 
structure of the contractual relations between producing States and foreign oil 
companies were made. The stage was eventually succeeded when the producing 
countries assumed full control.62 
62 F Rauhani, Concession Agreements Survey and Future Trends, Seminar on International 
Oil and the Energy Policies of the Producing and Consuming Countries (OPEC 1969). 
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(5) Nationalization 
The second and most imponant issue that arose as a result of permanent 
sovereignty and changed circumstances was the issue of nationalization of foreign 
oil companies. The producer States encouraged the foreign oil companies to 
agree to the renegotiation of concession agreements so as to provide for control 
and complete ownership over their natural resources. The producer States 
argued that the concept of permanent sovereignty involved the inherent and 
overriding right of States to control their natural resources. 
The Anglo-Iranian oil company was the first foreign oil company 
nationalized by the Mossadegh government in 1951. The collapse of the 
Mossadegh government on 13 August 1953 did not stop the producers from 
continuing their endeavour to control their natural resources. Later the foreign 
oil companies did agree to renegotiate, and through a series of negotiations were 
forced to accept and recognize the right of people to control their natural 
resources, provided that adequate compensation was pai<i 63 
Coinciding with this development was the widespread growth of national 
oil companies, established to represent the State in all joint ventures. Such a 
public enterprise could exercise greater control over the natural resources and 
involvement as well as being an operator in the petroleum processing and 
marketing field, the building of national petrochemical industries and the 
production and refining of oil itself, although ultimate control over operations 
usually remains with foreign oil companies. 64 
(6) Compensation 
The compensation issue is a complex one, and there is as yet no 
consensus among the international community concerning the terms · and the 
standard of compensation. The right to compensation depends upon the 
circumstances surrounding the nationalization. The principle of permanent 
63 J Blair, The Control of Oil (1976) 78; S Toriguian, Legal Aspect of Oil Concessions in the 
Middle East (1972) 168. 
64 J Stevens, Joint Ventures in Middle East Oil (1975) 26. 
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sovereignty over natural resources is however consistent with the recognition by 
the nationalizing States of the right of foreign oil companies to some measure of 
compensation for property which has been taken. This issue will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 10. 
(7) Settlement of Disputes 
Some of the newer petroleum laws and concession agreements provide 
that any disputes which may arise between the State and a foreign oil company 
shall be governed by and dealt with in accordance with the law of the State and 
within its jurisdiction. But by mutual agreement between the parties some other 
peaceful means may be sought when state jurisdiction has been exhausted, for 
example through recourse to arbitration or international adjudication. This 
principle was confirmed by the United Nations resolutions referred to above. 
Thus the Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955 was amended as mentioned 
previously, on 20 November 1965, to provide for settlement of disputes as 
follows: 
The Concession shall be governed by and interpreted in 
accordance with the principles of the law of Libya common to 
the principles of international law and in the absence of such 
common principles then by and in accordance with the general 
principles of law, including such of those principles as may have 
been applied by international tribunals. 65 
Article 39 of the Kuwait-Arabian Oil Company Agreement 1958 provides: 
... this agreement shall be given effect and must be interpreted 
and applied in conformity with the principles of law common to 
Kuwait and Japan, and in the absence of such common 
principles, then in conformity with the principles of law normally 
recognized by civilized nations in general, including those which 
have been applied by international tribunals. 
65 Clause 28(7) Second Schedule, the Libyan Petroleum Law No 25 of 1955, Middle East 
Law Review, vol 1 No 6, September 1958,286. See ILR 53 (1979) 297. 
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The oil concession agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and 
American Company Tennessee Sierra Leone Incorporated (1962) provides: 
This agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in 
accordance with the laws of Sierra Leone and such principles 
and rules of international law as may be relevant and the 
arbitrators and umpire shall base the award upon these laws, 
principles and rules. 
It appears that these provisions contrast with the Calvo doctrine which provides 
that: "the sovereign equality of States requires that a State be free from foreign 
State interference of any son. "66 Thus there is a difference between United 
Nations Resolution 1803 (1962) and the Calvo doctrine regarding the jurisdiction 
in case of dispute settlement mechanisms. The resolution reversed the situation 
and provides for international mechanisms. 
By contrast Article 4 of the Venezuelan Law of Hydrocarbons of 13 
October 1955 provides: 
Any doubts and controversies of whatever nature that may ensue 
because of this concession and which cannot be amicably settled, 
shall be decided upon by the competent couns of Venezuela, 
and in accordance with its laws, and for no reason nor for any 
cause shall they give rise to foreign claims. 
Article 49 (c) of the Saudi Arabia Japan Petroleum Trading Company 
Agreement (1377) AH 1957 provides: 
It is understood that no right under this agreement is or shall be 
in any manner acquired, either directly or indirectly, by a foreign 
government or State or foreign governments or States, or by a 
corporation or any other entity dependent on them, nor may said 
governments entities or corporations be admitted or accepted as 
panners or shareholders. 
66 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1948) 635. 
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(3) Who has the Right of Permanent Sovereignty: Peoples or States? 
As we have seen, successive United Nations resolutions have given some 
definition to the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. But it 
has often been asked who has that right, the "people" or the "State"? On this 
question the resolutions are divided. 
There is no doubt that the principle of permanent sovereignty has its 
origins in the principle of self-determination, which is clearly a right of peoples, 
not of states. This was evident from the earliest formulations of 
self-determination, for example in the Chilean proposal before the Human Rights 
Commission in 1952 for "the right of peoples to self-determination". This right 
was approved in Resolution 626 (VII) of 21 December 1952, and Resolution 
1314 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, which provided for the right of peoples and 
nations to self-determination. Moreover Resolution 1803(XVII) of 14 December 
1962 reaffirms the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over 
their natural wealth and resources. 
Furthermore, in the same terms, both the United Nations Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966,67 and the Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant, 16 December 1966, Article 1 (2) provided as follows. 68 
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations 
arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon 
the principle of mutual benefit and international law. In no case 
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) 
provides: 
( 1) All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural 
resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest 
of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it. 
67 993 UNTS 3. 
68 999 UNTS 171. 
(2) In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the 
right to lawful recovery of its propeny as well as to an adequate 
compensation. 
(3) The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be 
exercised without prejudice to the obligation of promoting 
international economic co-operation based on mutual respect, 
equitable exchange and the principles of International 1aw.69 
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From the foregoing it would appear that the peoples and nations are the direct 
holders of the right of permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources. 
On the other hand other resolutions refer to the right of States to 
exercise full permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. For example 
Resolution 1515 (XV) of 15 December 1960, provides, as we have seen, for "the 
sovereign right of every State to dispose of its wealth and its natural resources." 
Resolution 3281(XXIX) (CERDS) of 12 December 1974 provides in Article 2(1) 
that "Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty .... " 
These resolutions define the State as the sovereign power with the right to 
exercise permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources.70 This 
interpretation leaves the position of colonial territories out of consideration, for 
even the statist view of the concept of permanent sovereignty of peoples and 
nations would, in practice, preclude the exercise of State power by colonial 
authorities while the territory's status remained unchanged, with that power 
reviving upon the territory achieving independence.71 
According to Crawford, the notion that the "permanent sovereignty" is a 
sovereignty of "peoples" adds another dimension as follows. 
If those "peoples" constitute a pan only of the population of the 
State, then the notion of permanent sovereignty presumably 
limits the power of the national government freely to dispose of 
the natural resources of the region without the consent (or 
against the wishes or contrary to the interests) of the "people" in 
question. Alternatively, if the "people" is the whole population 
of the State, the principle apparently establishes that transactions· 
69 ILM 21 (1982) 59-68. 
70 Gess, 415. 
71 Ibid. See also Hyde 856. 
entered into by or on behalf of the State and involving the 
disposal of natural resources are subject to subsequent scrutiny, 
and to invalidation or avoidance, if these turn out not to have 
been in the interests of the population ... 72 
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In my opinion, permanent sovereignty over natural resources is the right 
of the people as a whole. But in normal circumstances, as it is impractical for 
the people to exercise this right, it is exercised on their behalf by the government 
of the State concerned. Thus Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1803(XVII) of 14 
December 1962 provides for "the free and beneficial exercise of the right of 
permanent sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural resources." 
The wording of "peoples and nations" implies that people who have not 
yet acquired the status of a State may entertain the right of permanent 
sovereignty. This leads to the very difficult question of when such peoples may 
be in such a position, and becomes a political problem of self determination as 
a human right 
( 4) The Status of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International 
Law 
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has been 
recognized by General Assembly resolutions, by international law conferences, by 
treaties and in practice. However, the status of this principle has given rise to 
a range of controversies. It conflicts directly with the interests of capital 
exporting countries, and highlights the opposing interests of Third World 
countries over such issues as nationalization, the standard for compensation and 
settlement of disputes. A further controversy arises as capital exporting countries 
attempt to impose references to investment agreements in international law, so 
as to incorporate the law as applicable to private companies. Third World 
countries naturally oppose such a reference, maintaining that such agreements 
apply to sovereign States only, and. that international law cannot govern a 
relation between foreign company and a State. 
72 J Crawford, The Rights of Peoples; Peoples or Governments, in J Crawford (ed), The 
Rights of Peoples (1988) 64. 
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In this section I will discuss the legal effect of General Assembly 
resolutions, both in general and specifically in the context of resolutions on the 
principle of permanent sovereignty. Then I will look at the support for 
permanent sovereignty in international law and finally I will discuss the binding 
force of investment agreements and concessions. 
(1) The Legal Effect of General Assembly Resolutions 
General Assembly resolutions in general have no binding effect on 
member states. But these resolutions may reflect impOrtant principles among the 
international community. Lauterpacht made it clear that even if they were not 
legally binding on members of the States as treaties (except in certain 
organisational matters) they could be admissible as evidence in the absence of 
evidence before international arbitral tribunals and before the International 
Court of Justice. He said: 
It would be wholly inconsistent with the sound principles of 
interpretation as well as with high international interests, which 
can never be legally irrelevant, to reduce the value of the 
Resolutions of the General Assembly -- one of the principal 
instrumentalities of the formation of the collective will and 
judgement of the community of nations represented by the 
United Nations -- and to treat them ... as nominal, insignificant 
and as having no claim to influence the conduct of the Members. 
International interest demands that no judicial support, however 
indirect, be given to any such conception of the resolutions of 
the General Assembly as being of no consequence.73 
Brownlie goes even further: 
The fact that in principle resolutions as a class are not binding 
has led to no little confusion and it is sometimes said that the 
General Assembly resolutions "have no legislative effect". In one 
sense this is correct: as such the resolutions do not make new 
law. However, if it is inferred that such resolutions can have no 
effect on the shaping of international law this is a capital error. 
The circumstances in which a particular resolution is adopted, 
the statements of delegations in the debate, the voting, the 
explanation of votes and the content of the resolution itself, are 
all indicators of the evidential significance of the individual 
73 Southwest Africa Voting Procedure Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep (19!i5) 67, 122. 
resolution. The key to the problem is the fact that the 
proceedings of the General Assembly, as of any international 
conference, are a vehicle for the formulation and expression of 
the practice of States in matters pertaining to international law. 
Thus the proceedings and the resolution themselves, constitute 
evidence of the formation of rules of customary (or general) 
international law.74 
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Thus although the resolutions of the United Nations are not legally binding, this 
statement is by no means the equivalent of a negative answer to the question 
whether a resolution of the General Assembly has legal force.75 
In the Charter there is no express undertaking to accept the 
recommendations of the General Assembly, but it cannot be said that the 
Charter specifically negates such an obligation. For example Lauterpacht has 
argued "that the Charter imposes a legal obligation upon the members to respect 
human rights though there is no express provision by which the members so 
agree'' .76 Sloan concludes that the non-obligatory status of recommendations "is 
far from being as definitely established as has been assumed by most writers. The 
most that can be said is that there is a presumption against these 
recommendations possessing binding legal force. "77 Sloan further suggests three 
circumstances when recommendations of the General Assembly may be legally 
binding. The first is where the parties have agreed to accept a recommendation 
as binding. 
States can ... agree in advance to be bound by Assembly 
recommendations; and with respect to States parties to such an 
agreement, such recommendations will be so effective as if they 
were laws enacted by an international legislature with powers 
similar to a national legislative body.78 
The second is where recommendations may achieve legal effect through the 
growth of a customary rule of international law.79 While the General Assembly 
74 I Brownlie, Recueil des Cours, 1 (1979) 260. 
75 B Sloan. The Binding Force of A 'Recommendation' of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, BYIL 25 (1948) 1. 
76 H Lauteipacht, Report of the Human Rights Committee to the Brussels Conference of the 
International Law Association (1948) 13, quoted by Sloan, 14. 
77 Sloan, 16. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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cannot as such enact new law, it has often adopted resolutions declaring what it 
regards as existing rules of international law.80 An important example is its 
declaration "that genocide is an international crime". Here "it might even be 
argued that such a statement was an expression of a general principle of law 
recognized by civilized nations".81 
The third concerns the authority inherent in the position of the General 
Assembly as a representative organ of the world community. Here Sloan 
contends that there is an inherent power in the General Assembly, and perceives 
it as having "a dual role", first as "an organ of an entity having a separate legal 
personality" and secondly, as a congress of the member nations none of which 
"lose the legal capacity which they possess at other times".82 
This analysis is consistent with, and was further reinforced · by, the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case (1986). 
Nicaragua claimed that the United States had violated three major obligations 
under customary international law, including the obligations not to use force in 
international relations except in certain narrowly defined cases, and not to 
intervene in the internal affairs of Nicaragua. The Court derived customary 
international law (in the absence of jurisdiction to apply the United Nations 
Charter) from General Assembly resolutions, including especially Resolution 
2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, the Declaration on the Principles of 
International law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, 
and Resolution 2131 (XX) of 21 February 1965, the Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty.83 Thus the Court concluded 
that Nicaragua claims were supported by General Assembly Resolutions which 
were for these purposes declaratory of customary international law. 
General Assembly resolutions have a wide range of effects, in a variety 
of areas, among which is their impact on oil concession agreement disputes. 
80 Id, 24. 
81 ld, 25. 
82 ld, 22. 
83 Nicaragua v Umted States, JCJ Reports 17, 19, 45, 53, 151, 107. 
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International tribunals have referred to General Assembly resolutions in recent 
cases, in the Texaco Case (1977),84 the Liamco Case (1977),85 and the Aminoil 
Case (1982). 86 
For example, in the Texaco case with Libya, sole arbitrator Dupuy 
analyzed the effect of the nationalization provisions of the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974 (CERDS) 
(Article 2) and in the Resolutions on the New International Economic Order 
(3201 and 3202), 1 May 1974 (Article 4, paragraph (e).87 He said: 
The general question of the legal validity of the resolutions of 
the United Nations has been widely discussed by the writers. 
This tribunal will recall first that, under Article 10 of the UN 
Charter, the General Assembly only issues "recommendations" 
which have long appeared to be texts having no binding force 
and carrying no obligations for the member States... Refusal to 
recognise any legal validity of United Nations resolutions must, 
however, be qualified according to the various texts enacted by 
the United Nations. These are very different and have varying 
legal value, but it is impossible to deny that the United Nations' 
activities have had a significant influence on the content of 
contemporary international law. In appraising the legal validity 
of the above-mentioned resolutions, this tribunal will take 
account of the criteria usually taken into consideration , ie. the 
examination of voting conditions and the analysis of the 
provisions concerned. 88 
The arbitrator concluded that the lack of agreement in the vote on the 
two resolutions indicated a lack of binding obligation. He pointed out: 
The conditions under which resolution 3281 (XXIX) proclaiming 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, was 
adopted also show unambiguously that there was no general 
consensus of the States with respect to the most important 
provisions and in particular those concerning nationalization ... 89 
84 Arbitral award Libya & Texaco 19 January 1977,/LM 17 (1978) 27-31. 
85 Arbitral award, Libya &Liamco 12 April, 1977,/LM 20 (1981) 51-3. 
86 Arbitral award, Kuwait & Aminoil 24 March (1982) ILM 21 (1982) 1032-3. 
87 See RP Brown JR, "Changing the Rules: International Law and the Developing Countries", 
International Lawyer, 12, No.1 (1978) 270. 
88 Texaco Case, Finding No. 83. 
89 Id, Finding No. 85. 
And further: 
While it is now possible to recognize that resolutions of the 
United Nations have a certain legal value, this legal value differs 
considerably, depending on the type of resolution and the 
conditions attached to its adoption and its provisions, Even 
under the assumption that they are resolutions of a declaratory 
nature, which is the case of the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States, the legal value is variable. Ambassador 
Castaneda, who was chairman of the working group entrusted 
with the task of preparing this charter, admitted that 'it is 
extremely difficult to determine with certainty the legal force of 
declaratory resolutions' that it is 'impossible to lay down a 
general rule in this respect', and that 'the legal value of the 
declaratoJ(' resolutions therefore includes an immense gamut of 
nuances. 
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In reference to the legal effect of resolutions, Jimenez de Arechaga 
stated: 
The determination of [the legal effect of resolutions]is a matter 
requiring careful analysis in each case and with respect to each 
provision and paragraph of a given resolution, taking into 
account inter alia, the drafting of the text: the voting strength it 
obtained, the statements made by members during the process 
of deliberation and the subsequent conduct of States [and of the 
United Nations itself] in respect of each resolution,91 
The first issue to consider in determining its effect is its authority as the 
most representative body of the international community of States. The 
important factor here is its status and capacity and the validity of the resolution 
itself. The second factor is the nature and content of a resolution, whether it 
relies on traditional sources of international law and whether there is a 
reasonable relationship with existing circumstances.92 Other factors include the 
time and circumstances in which the resolution was made, how it was prepared 
and how the resolution is drafted. Also the intent of the Assembly needs to be 
considered, and the strength of support a resolution obtains.93 As Sir Kenneth 
90 Id, Finding No. 86. 
91 Jimenez de Arechaga, Hague Recueil, 159 (1978 1) 31, quoted by B Sloan, General 
Assembly Resolutions Revisited, BYJL 58 (1987) 125. 
92 Sloan (1987) 126. 
93 Id, 129. 
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Bailey stated: "If a resolution is accepted by unanimity and is generally followed 
by practice, it may quickly acquire obligatory character."94 And also whether it 
is accepted by the external practice accompanied by opinion of jurists alone 
which creates the law and "that the resolution is only the stimulus" .95 
The weight of these factors will vary according to the circumstances 
surrounding each resolution, though resolutions can be divided into three 
categories: decisions, recommendations and declarations.96 The former can be 
seen to have the most binding effect to the extent "from a practical point of view 
agreement or acceptance may be material even with respect to legally binding 
decisions. "97 Recommendations carry obligations of co-operation and good faith: 
this applies, it has been said. .. 
to all validly adopted recommendations, . without special regard 
to the size of the vote. The hortatory effect of recommendations 
will be strengthened by unanimity or near unanimity. 
Recommendations will also have value as precedents and may 
gain binding force through acceptance or estoppel.98 
The status of a declaration depends on many factors: 99 
If the declaration is adopted by a majority vote it's evidentiary 
value is to be weighed in the light of all relevant factors. It 
would in any event be part of the material sources of customary 
law and would constitute an expression of opinio juris, or a lack 
of opinio juris for conflicting norms, of those States voting for 
the resolution.100 
94 K Bailey, "Making International Law in the United Nations", ASIL Proceedings6! (1967) 
235, quoted by Sloan (1987) 133. 
95 M Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law BYIL 47 (1974-5) 52. 
96 Sloan (1987) 139. 
97 Id, 140. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Id, 125. 
100 Id, 140. On the legal Sratus of General Assembly resolutions, in addition to the works 
already cited, see also K Skubiszewski, International Legislation, Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, vol.S, p.97; R Monaco, Source of International Law, id., vol.7, p.425, 
' and works there cited 
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(2) Legal Effect of General Assembly Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty 
As to Resolution 1803(XVII) of 14 December 1962, the opinion of most 
United Nations Members at the time, whether expressed in the Permanent 
Sovereignty Commission or in the General Assembly, was that the resolution 
intended to express existing law, without it being necessary to claim that the 
General Assembly could establish "new law" or had any authority to enact 
"international legislation" .101 For example Chile's view was that Resolution 1803 
"proposed no modification of the existing principles of law and, in fact, called in 
two places for the observance of those principles" .102 The United States noted 
that Resolution 1803 proposed "to state with lasting import the conviction of the 
General Assembly on fundamental issues".103 The instrument was one which 
"sets forth the rights and duties of States, which affirms their sovereignty and the 
modalities of the exercise of that sovereignty".104 For Argentina, Resolution 1803 
was a simple resolution in accordance with international law, although it had no 
binding legal force. IDS For the Philippines, apart from laying down minimum 
standards there was no question of establishing a new legal obligation for states 
or of legislating on the conduct of states: "Resolution 1803 was a means of 
crystallising prevailing views".106 For Syria, the Resolution 1803 created a "new 
legal basis" for the relationship between developed and underdeveloped 
countries. However it was noted that the two of the most important concepts on 
which the draft resolution was based -- State responsibility and State succession 
-- were still under consideration by the International Law Commission.107 
Hungary also agreed with the view that Resolution 1803 was a binding 
instrument and constituted "new law". Hu!lgary stated that the 'smuggling' of 
the principle of adequate compensation into international law by way of a United 
Nations resolution "would impose an obligation upon the developing countries" .IDs 
101 Gess, 409. 
102 United Nations Document NC 2/SR. 842, 12. 
103 Nl'V. 1193, 37. 
104 A/PV 1193, 32. 
105 United Nations Document NC 2/SR.859, 14-15. 
106 United Nations Document NC 2/SR 848, 20. 
107 United Nations Document NC 2/SR 855 13-14 quoted by Gess, 410. 
I 08 Quoted by Gess, 410. 
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By contrast, France and Japan felt that Resolution 1803 did not express 
existing international law. According to France, the principle of permanent 
sovereignty, although based on international law, was connected to the question 
of State responsibility, which was still under review by the International Law 
Comrnission. 109 In some particular aspects, the resolution would modify basic 
principles of private international law. 110 According to Japan, "the concept of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources had no legal validity, based as it 
was on the concept of self-determination which was not yet internationally 
established or accepted and which the Charter of the United Nations recognised 
as a principle and not as a right".111 Likewise the United States representative 
thought it "unlikely" that the Resolution 1803 was intended to make a substantial 
change in international law: such a step would, in any case, be unwise.112 
However, most Members did agree that Resolution 1803 was ... 
intended to set forth, within the solemn vehicle of a declaration, 
the basic principles and modalities of the exercise of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, subject to the overriding 
requirement that both principles and modalities of exercise be 
in conformity with the rights and duties of States under existing 
international law, and further, that the principles set forth reflect 
minimum standards.113 
According to Gess, the General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVll) is a 
positive reaffmnation of certain basic principles of international law: 
1. That compensation must be paid in the event of a lawful 
taking of rights and property. 
2. That such compensation must be paid in accordance with 
international law. 
3. That investment agreements between States and private 
parties have a binding effect.114 
109 United Nations Document NC 2/SR 859, 13-14. 
110 NC 2/SR 857, 3. 
111 United Nations General Assembly, 32nd session, !!78th meeting, 172. 
112 ld, 176. 
113 Gess, 411. 
114 ld, 448. 
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These principles define the concept of permanent sovereignty: it is evident that 
the General Assembly Resolution 1803 did not reflect the small voting strength 
of the world's capital exporting countries, but rather reflected "the position of a 
majority of the capital importing and underdeveloped countries acting in 
enlightened self-interest".115 
(3) Other Material supporting Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
in International Law 
General Assembly resolutions are by no means the only basis for arguing 
that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is recognized 
in international law. For example the 1982 Montreal Conference of the 
International Law Association attempted to give a definition of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources as follows: 
I. The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
emanating as it does from the Jus Cogens principle of 
self-determination, is a fundamental principle of contemporary 
international law, and an important instrument for the 
establishment of a new international economic order. 
II. The legal status of some of the corollary rights which stem 
from this principle, however, need to be clarified by further 
study. 
III. In inter-state relations permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources is one of the legal expressions of the economic aspect 
of political sovereignty of States which is a cornerstone of the 
present organization of the international community. It 
underlines the domestic jurisdiction of States with regard to the 
natural resources within their national boundaries, without, 
however, exempting it from the application of other rules or 
principles of international law. 
IV. The exercise of the right to nationalize or expropriate, as 
recognized, inter alia, by Article 2 (2) (c) of the Charter, is an 
exercise of sovereignty and such exercise of itself does not 
constitute an unlawful act so as to engage the State responsibility 
of the State concerned. 
115 Ibid. 
V. The exercise of the right to nationalize, recognized, inter alia, 
by Article 2 (2) (c), should be accompanied by the duty to pay 
appropriate compensation. 
VI. The need to consider all pertinent circumstances limits the 
discretion of the host State in the determination of the quantum 
of compensation. The discretion of the host State is 
'circumscribed by objective international guidelines. 
VII. The legal foundation of the concept of appropriate 
compensation is to be found in the equitable principle of good 
faith. The elaboration of the specific contours of these 
principles, and their legal implications, requires further study. 
VIII. Current State practice indicates that a variety of flexible 
formulae is applicable to the determination of the quantum of 
compensation upon nationalization or expropriation. 
IX. The Charter does not exclude the existence of international 
dispute settlement in the event of a dispute arising as to the 
appropriateness of compensation. Both UN General Assembly 
resolution 1803 and Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter allow for 
international settlement of disputes on the basis of sovereign 
equality of States· and in accordance with the principle of free 
choice of means. 
X. The principle of good faith applies to all economic relations, 
covered, inter alia, by the Charter, including situations relevant 
to Article 2(2)(c).U6 
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This is not the place for a full discussion of what constitutes general 
international law, or of the standard that has to be met to establish a rule of 
international law.117 It is sufficient for present purposes to say that the level of 
international support that now exists for the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over national resources as a principle of international law is quite sufficient and 
that international lawyers from many traditions and parts of the world recognize 
this, as we have seen. 
116 International Law Association, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, Montreal (1982) 197. 
117 See Monaco, 432-4; R Bernhardt, Customary International Law, Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, vol. 7, p.61. See also EV Petiesmann, Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States, id., voi.S, 71, 74-5 and works there cited. 
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(4) The Binding Force of Investment Agreements and Concessions 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides 
that: 
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must 
be performed by them in good faith. 
Likewise paragraph 8 of Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December (1962) 
affirms that foreign investment agreements "freely entered into by, or between 
sovereign States shall be observed in good faith." On the other hand Article 2 
of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States did not contain any such 
provision.118 Proposals by the developed countries to incorporate an express 
reference to investment agreements in the Charter were rejected by developing 
countries on the grounds that: 
The international law governing the relationship between only 
two states does not recognize the private companies as a part of 
this relationship, because they are not States. 
In other words they insisted that foreign private companies were not directly 
bound by international law and are not subjects of international law. But this 
view is by no means confined to Third World. Lord McNair has rejected the 
idea the international law is applicable to govern a contract or agreement 
between a State and a private individual or corporation.119 
Similarly in the arbitration between the Saudi Arabia and the Arabian 
American Oil Company (Aramco), the Tribunal rejected the company's claim 
that the oil concession agreement should be assimilated to an international treaty 
governed by the law of nations, holding simply that: 
As the agreement of 1933 has not been concluded between two 
States, but between a State and a private American corporation, 
it is not governed by public international law .120 
118 Chowdhury, 19-20. 
119 McNair, General Principles of Law recognized by Civilized Nations, BYIL 33 (1957) 19. 
120 Aramco Arbitration ILR 27 (1963) 165. 
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In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, the International Court did not accept 
that the contract concluded between the Iranian Government and a foreign oil 
company should be considered to be assimilated to an international treaty, and 
asserted that "it could not possibly be considered to lay down the law between 
two States" .121 
However, when the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties did not 
expressly refer to the principle of good faith it was never intended to mean that 
a breach of a contract has no legal consequences. The Charter provides in 
Article 2(2)(c) that a State may "nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership 
of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid." 
Thus the matter would be subject to the obligation to fulfil in good faith the 
arbitration agreement and to pay compensation in an amount to be determined 
by the appropriate tribunal, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations 
and other relevant circumstances.122 As Jimenez de Arechaga said: 
This is not an obligation resulting from an international treaty: 
it derives from the contract itself and constitutes an obligation 
based on the general principles of law, particularly the one 
requiring a State to observe all its obligations in good faith.123 
Also relevant here is the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank) Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 1965. The Convention 
established an International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
which seeks to facilitate by negotiation and of necessary by arbitration disputes 
that might arise between a State and foreign investors. Article 27 of the 
Convention provides that: 
No Contracting State shall... bring an international claim, in 
respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another 
Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have 
submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other 
Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with 
the award rendered in such dispute. 
121 ICJ Rep 1952, 112-113. 
122 Chowdhury, 20. 
123 de Arechaga, Hague Recueil I (1978) 306, quoted by Chowdhury, 20. 
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The effect is to enable the investor to defend its own interests, instead of 
exacerbating inter-state relations by turning private invesnnent disputes into 
inter-state disputes. In this respect, the machinery of the convention could 
perhaps be extended to other types of claim concerning treannent of aliens --
although it is doubtful whether individual claimants could afford the very high 
costs of international arbitration.124 
5. Permanent Sovereignty under Islamic Shari'ah Law 
Before discussing the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources under Islamic Shari'ah, some general comments should be made about 
the status and basic principles of that law, especially in relation to contracts and 
agreements. This may be particularly helpful to readers of this thesis who are 
not trained in or familiar with Islamic Shari 'ah. 
(1) The Principles of Islamic Shari'ah Law 
Islamic Shari'ah is of real significance for more than one billion people 
over the world, especially in the Middle East, Pakistan, Bangladesh, South East 
Asia and parts of Africa. The Shari'ah clearly embodies the universal maxim of 
the protection of acquired rights, and respect for contractual arrangements. 125 It 
is flexible and not rigid, and is thus capable through interpretation and 
application to meet any problems which may arise at any time and place. It 
provides a solution to a number of problems concerned with the relationship of 
aliens and the state or its citizens, which are at the core of the conflict about 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Muslim jurists have also 
established new solutions for the problems that are occurring in modern Islamic 
societies. They do not stand handcuffed towards new problems, but have sought 
to derive the right solutions from within the canonical law of Islam. The issue 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is one of these problems. 
Consent to treaties and conventions is only given by virtue of sovereignty, 
which allows a State to limit its sovereign rights and to be bound by international 
124 See further, Executive Direc!Or's Report (1965) para 23. 
125 Domke, 585. 
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legal obligations. In Islam "sovereignty is nominally vested in God and Man acts 
only as his vicegerent."126 In an Islamic State "the sovereign body is not 
considered to be absolutely supreme because it cannot legislate to do away with 
the Qur'an and Sunnah." 127 The law "never conceded to any human being any 
greater right than that of enforcing his [God's] law and protecting and leading his 
people. ul28 
In practice this confers sovereignty on the persons or institutions in 
power. However, this sovereignty differs from sovereignty as it is understood in 
the West. Even the prophet himself as head of the first Muslim State was not 
allowed to monopolize power and decision-making. "The governance of the 
Ummah [the Muslim Community] thus depended upon the principle of 
Consultation (Shura) and no ruler was free of this obligation."129 The Qur'an 
itself refers to "Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish Regular Prayer; 
who (Conduct) their affairs by mutual Consultation .. .''130 Though the concept of 
sovereignty in Islam is limited, the State is able to engage in international 
relations based on reciprocity. Once this has been done not only the provisions 
of international law but also those of the Shari'ah enforce the principle that this 
contract is legally binding. 
One starts from the premise that Islamic Shari'ah demands that people 
keep the obligations arising under their contracts and covenants. Thus when they 
sign a contract or covenant with a foreigner they have to maintain their pledge. 
There are a number of verses to this effect from the primary source of Islam, the 
Holy Qur'an, and from the second source of Islam, the Sunnah, the practice and 
tradition of the prophet. Thus the Qur'an says: 
Ye who believe! Fulfil (all) obligations. 131 
126 AA Maududi, "Political Theory of Islam" in K Ahmad (ed), Islam -Its Meaning and 
Message (1976) 160-8,quoted by Hasan Moinuddin, The Charterofthe Islamic Conference 
and Legal Framework of Economic Co-operation Among its Member States (1987) 53. 
127 D Khalid, Theocracy and the Location of Sovereignty, lSI Stud 11 (1972) 187-209,quoted 
by Moinuddin, 235. 
128 CG Weeramantry & M Hidayatullah, Islamic Jurisprudence. An International Perspective, 
(1988) 82. 
129 Ibid., 83. 
130 The Holy Qur'an Sura XL.ll, verse 38. 
131 The Holy Qur'an, Sura v. verse 1. 
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This applies comprehensively to all Muslim obligations, contracts and covenants 
relating to conduct in individual, social and public life, to commercial and social 
contracts (including marriage). Muslims must faithfully fulfil their pledge in all 
their obligations. Tabari states: 
... this is a command from God that every lawful contract must 
be observed; and it is not permissible to limit its application 
without proof of such limitation.132 
The Qur'an also provides: 
Fulfil the covenant of God when ye have entered into it, and 
break not your oaths after ye have confirmed them. Indeed f.Je 
have made God your surety; for God knoweth all that ye do. 33 
Qurtubi states that "Be faithful in the covenant of God" is a "general term 
applicable to all covenants which are made by the tongue and which man takes 
upon himself', 134 for in all such the Muslim may be regarded as making God his 
witness. This verse, Qurtubi affirms, may be regarded as included in the wider 
verse, "Verily, God commands justice and good work". The reason is that "the 
law was given to provide relief from the oppressor, and to restore to the 
oppressed the rights which he had filched." 135 
Again the Qur' an says: 
(But the treaties) are not dissolved with those pagans with whom 
ye have entered into alliance and who have not subsequently 
failed you in aught, nor aided any one against you. So fulfil your 
engagements with them to the end of their term; for God loveth 
the righteous. 136 
132 Tabari, Tafsir, VI 33 (Bulaq !905-I912,Cairo), quoted by JND Anderson & NJ Coulson, 
The Moslem Ruler and Contractual Obligations, NYULR 33 (1958) 923. 
133 The Holy Qur'an, Sura XVI, verse 9!. 
134 AI Qurtubi AI Jami,li Ahkam AI Qur'an, VI 33 Cairo 1935, quoted by Anderson & 
Coulson, 923. 
135 Ibid. 
136 The Holy Qur'an, Sura IX verse 4. 
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The Qur'an enjoins all Muslims to keep their obligations with non Muslims until 
the terms of the obligations are completed "for God loveth the righteous". 
"Where therefore, the polytheists were faithful and did not betray their trust, the 
Muslims were commanded to fulfil their undertakings until the full period for 
which they were concluded should have elapsed, and this is regarded as being of 
general application".137 Further the Qur'an enjoins all Muslims to keep their 
engagements in good faith and to "fulftl every engagement, for every engagement 
will be inquired into on the day of reckoning."138 These words are to be 
interpreted in a comprehensive sense. Tabari for instance, gives an entirely 
general meaning to the words which he interprets as applying to all human 
contracts. 139 
In another passage the Qur'an says: 
The believers must (eventually) win through. 
Those who faithfully observe their trusts and their covenants.140 
Qunubi says that "pledges and covenant include all that is incumbent on a man 
in regard to his religious and secular life, both in word and deed. It comprises 
his dealings with his fellow men, his undertakings, and much besides, . and the 
injunction is that he should keep them and perform them. The term pledge is 
of wider significance than covenant, for every covenant is a pledge. "141 The 
Shari' ah, therefore, recognizes the principle of mutuality between the parties. 
The Sunnah contains the practice of the prophet and the body of 
traditions regarding his life, what he said and did. It is considered as a second 
source of Islamic Shari'ah, by the consensus of all its schools. Thus Prophet 
Muhammad says: 
Muslims are bound by their stipulations, except a stipulation 
which makes lawful what is unlawful, or makes unlawful what is 
lawful. 
137 Anderson & Coulson, 924. 
138 The Holy Qur'an, Sura XVII verse 34. 
139 Tabari, Tafsir XV 61, quoled by Anderson & Coulson, 924. 
140 The Holy Qur'an Sura XXIII, verses 1 and 8. 
141 Ahkam XII 107, quoled by Anderson & Coulson, 925. 
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This means that the Muslim does not violate contractual stipulations, but must 
respect and observe what he has accepted. This is a most important principle in 
the Muslim community; it remained valid in Islamic Shari'ah even in the Middle 
Ages.142 
Muslim leaders and jurists support the doctrine of pledge keeping and 
the keeping of contracts and covenants according to the injunction of Qur'an and 
the practice of the Prophet. A few examples must suffice. Umar, the second 
Caliph, says: 
A man's rights are determined by his stipulations. You are 
entitled, therefore, to what you stipulated. 
The Hanbali school jurist Ibn Taimiya says: 
God has commanded that contracts be fulfilled, and this is of 
general application. He has thus commanded us to fulfil the 
covenant of God and covenants in general, and has included in 
this the contracts a man takes upon himself. This is proved by 
the Qut'anic verse: 'They had previously covenanted with God 
that they would not turn their backs, and of the covenant of God 
enquiry will be made. This indicates that in the covenant of 
God is included the contracts a man takes upon himself, even 
though God has not expressly commanded this particular 
covenant before, as in the case of an oath or sale, but merely 
commanded that it be fulfilled. 143 
Shafi'i, the founder of Shafi'i School (767-820), says: 
A contract is never vitiated except by its own terms. It is not 
vitiated by anything which precedes it or which follows it, nor by 
fancy or by conjectute as to probabilities. Similarly we do not 
vitiate any transaction except on the basis of the relevant 
contract. We do not vitiate sales, for instance, by saying 'This 
may be a means to some end' or 'This comes of an evil 
purpose' .144 
142 J Schacht, Islamic Law in Contemporary States, AJCL 8 (1959) 139-140. Also Anderson 
& Coulson, 925. 
143 Majmu'at Fatawa, lli 329 (Cairo 1908-1911), quoted by Anderson & Coulson, 927,928. 
144 AI Umm VII 270 (Cairo 1903·1908), quoted by Anderson & Coulson 927,928. 
185 
Thus it may be concluded that according to the Holy Qur'an, the practice of the 
Prophet and the consensus of Islamic schools and Muslim jurists, Muslims are 
strictly bound by their obligations of whatever kind, including economic 
agreements. Moreover because in Islamic Shari 'ah all people are equal, this 
general principle should apply to all the Muslim community, whether individuals 
or rulers. 145 
This principle of the sanctity of contracts has emerged from "a deep 
moral and religious influence." Islamic Shari'ah has a great influence on the 
observance of contracts as between the parties and the principle of the sanctity 
of contracts in general. This principle derives from the primary source of Islam, 
the Hoi y Qur' an.146 
This attachment to the principle pacta sunt servanda has also been 
noticed by western jurists. For example, according to Wehberg: 
For the Islamic peoples, the principle, pacta sunt servanda, has 
also a religious basis: "Muslims must abide by their stipulations". 
This is clearly expressed by the Qur'an in many places, for 
example where it is said: "Be you true to the obligations which 
you have undertaken... your obligations which you have taken in 
the sight of Allah... for Allah is your witness." 147 
Similarly Schacht states: 
The rule pacta sunt servanda is one of the fundamental principles 
of Islamic law. It is already enounced in numerous passages in 
the Qur'an: "0 ye who believe, fulfil your undertakings"; "And 
keep the covenant, lo, the covenant will be called (as a witness)"; 
"And those who keep their pledges and their covenant.. these 
will dwell in Gardens, honored," etc. Its classical formulation 
in Islamic law is al-Muslimum 'ala shurutihim, "the Muslims are 
bound by their stipulations", or, shorter, al-shart amlak, "the 
stipulation prevails." This maxim had already been formulated 
at the beginning of the second century of the hegira (early in the 
8th century AD), and it has remained valid in Islamic law ever 
since.148 
145 Anderson & Coulson, 928. 
146 Tabari, Tafsir, VI 33, quoted by Anderson & Coulson, 923. 
147 H Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, AJIL 53 (1959) 775. 
148 Schacht, 139. 
Anderson and Coulson state: 
It is abundantly clear, then, that there is reiterated authority in 
the Qur'an, the Traditions, and the writings of the jurists, for the 
principle that Muslims are strictly bound by every lawful contract 
or covenant into which they may have entered. This is at times 
emphasized on grounds of ethics, religion and law as an entirely 
general proposition; at times it is coupled with the consideration 
that, provided the enemies of Islam keep their side of a contract, 
Moslims must keep theirs, right up to the expiry of the 
prescribed period, and at other times it is conjoined with the 
observation that the inevitable result of a contrary policy would 
be loss of confidence on the part of those with whom they may 
need to have similar relations in the future .... 149 
(2) Sovereignty over Natural Resources in Islamic Shari'ah Law 
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Regarding the ownership of natural resources, all four schools in Islam 
(Hanafi 696-767, Maliki 715-795, Shafi'i 767-820, and Hanbali 780-855) agree in 
basic principle, although there are differences of opinion in the details. Professor 
Milliot has observed that: 
The regime of mines under Islamic law varies with the different 
schools, some holding that mines are part of the State domain 
and others stating that they follow the ownership of surface of 
the soil.... According to "Droit Musleman of L Milliot" where 
the mine is part of the State domain its exploitation can be 
granted under a concession... regulated at the direction of the 
sovereign. 150 
The Hanbali school, like the other schools in Islamic Shari.'ah, is dominated by 
the principal sources, the Holy Qur'an as the word of God and the Sunnah as the 
practice and traditions of the last of God's messengers, Muhammad. 
Supplemented by other sources, in particular Ijma (consensus 
Qiyas (reasoning by analogy), these constitute the Shari'ah. 
Kudamah (1223 AD) summarized the position as follows: 
149 Anderson & Coulson, 928. 
of opinion), and 
The jurist Ibn 
150 Quoted by Cattan, The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa (1967) 
56. • 
Minerals are free, he who finds a mineral is entitled to take his 
need thereof by priority to others, after which he must go away 
to let others satisfy also their needs; he cannot appropriate the 
vein or mine or deposit except with and as a result of his 
appropriation of the grounds where such vein or mine or deposit 
is found; this appropriation may be through an Iqta or a grant 
from the Imam or through occupancy and reclaiming it if it is a 
mawat [dead land], which has no owner ... 
No one is permitted to collect or dig out a mineral contained in 
the property of someone else because the ownership of the land 
comprises the owner of its apparent and hidden parts and 
layers ... 
Liquid minerals in particular are according to the prevalent 
opinion, always free and not liable to be appropriated by 'Iqta' 
or occupancy or by whoever owns the ground where they are 
found if they happen to be found in an owned property ... 
According to the prevailing opinion in the Hanbali school, liquid 
minerals whether apparent or hidden are not liable to private 
appropriation either through discovery and occupancy or through 
an 'Iqta' or grant by the ruler ... 151 
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On the other hand, Sheikh Muhammad Abuzahra, Professor of Law at Cairo 
University, gave his opinion in the Saudi Arabia and Aramco Arbitration to the 
effect that the legality of an oil concession can be supported under the Shari'ah 
by the rules relating to "/ qta", or to first discovery. The Sheikh's contention was 
as follows: 
As to its legality [the concession], it is to be considered as 
coming within an Islamic legal institution known as 'lqta al 
Mowat' (literally, allotting of undeveloped land), or as a grant of 
the right to take possession of minerals. It is well established 
that an "/ qta" for minerals which are under the ground is 
recognized by the Shari'ah. In such an "lqta" the leader of the 
Muslim Community (Imam) grants permission to one or more 
persons to explore a specified area and to take out whatever 
minerals he may discover ... 
It is established and accepted that whoever first takes possession 
of a buried mineral has the best claim to it. It is his property. 
151 Ibn Kudamah, A1 Moghni, 5, 521-528, Aramco Arbitration, Transcript of albitration 
proceedings, 11, 761. 
He has the right to continue to take the mineral and no other 
person has a right to compete with him for it.152 
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Concerning the "lhai Elmowate" (reclaiming borrowed land), the jurist Ibn 
Kudamah (d.1223 AD) stated: 
To sum up, the apparent [surface] minerals which can be used 
without difficulty such as salt, sulphur, naphtha and the like, 
cannot be appropriated by occupation (lhia) by anybody, nor can 
they be granted (Iqta) to anybody by the Imam, for fear of 
monopoly or undue restriction for which the Muslim Community 
may suffer. As to inner (subsurface) minerals which could not 
be reached and extracted except by hard work and expense, such 
as gold, silver, iron, copper, lead and crystal, if they are 
apparent, they cannot be appropriated as aforementioned. If 
they are hidden and a man digs them out, they will not be his 
property, according to the Han bali school, the Imam is forbidden 
from granting the right to appropriate the subsurface mineral. 
However, the Imam may grant rights over liquid minerals such 
as tar, naphtha or water, which may or may not be the property 
of the owner of the grounds in which they are discovered. 
Although opinion is divided on this matter, the stronger point of 
view is against ownership of such minerals. 153 
A further opinion was given by Sheikh Abuzahra on the Saudi Arabia-Aramco 
Arbitration, to the effect that: 
It is well established that the I qta for minerals which are under 
the ground is recognized by the Shari'ah law. In such lqta the 
leader of the Muslim Community, the Imam, grants permission 
to one or more persons to explore a specific area and to take 
out whatever minerals he may discover. There is a tradition to 
the effect that the prophet Muhammed granted to Bilal bin AI 
Hareth by means of lqta an area of land known as AI Qiblaya, 
including the hills and valleys in the area but he did not grant 
him a right which belongs to another Muslim.154 
In this context it is important to note that the Qur'an says: 
!52 Tashih AI Furu, 3, 846, Arbitration between Aramco and the Government of Saudi Arabia, 
Aramco's first memorial, 351-352. 
!53 Ibn Kudamah, AI Moghni, 520 (text in Arabic). See Madani, 36. 
!54 Nail Alawtar 6, 54 (Cairo 1933) quoted by Aramco Arbitration, Transcript of arbitration 
proceedings, Aramco 's frrst memorial, 351. 
To God belongeth all that is in the heavens and on eanh.155 
Sayyid Qutb explained this verse as follows: 
It is the overall ownership as well as being the absolute 
ownership,... the ownership that is unconditional without a 
restriction nor exception nor a partnership.. it is a concept of the 
one God school of thought.. thus the one Allah is the only living 
one, vigilant one, the sole owner, it is negating the partnership 
in its form as perceived on the peoples minds and awareness .. 
as well as being of having a mark on the making of the meaning 
of ownership and its truth in the people's world. Once shown 
that the real ownership belongs to Allah, there will be no 
ownership for the people in the ftrst place, but they will have 
(temporarily) acquired from the only original owner who owns 
everything, then they have to abide during the period of their 
temporary possession by the conditions of the owner passing the 
possession of such ownership .. and he has shown them the 
conditions of the owner in his legislation .. they are not to deviate 
from it or else their possession established during the time of 
their temporary possession would be negated and their actions 
would become void and these actions would have to be reversed 
by the believers in Allah on earth .. and there we ftnd the marks 
of the Islamic legislation and the practical sense of life that lies 
upon it ... and when Allah says "To God belongeth all that is in 
the heavens and on eanh" he does not only decide an imagined 
believed reality but he also lays one of the foundations of the 
constitution for the life of the humans and the way in which it 
is tied up as well. 156 
The prophet says: 
"The people are partners in fuel". 
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I may conclude from the foregoing that, there is a consensus of opinion 
that natural resources in the public domain belong to the Islamic community in 
general. However Islamic Shari'ah gives the sovereign (Imam) full authority and 
discretion for granting concession on behalf of the Islamic community in dealing 
with natural resources exploitation and preserving the national benefit. Thus the 
Islamic Shari'ah serves the welfare of the whole Islamic community. 
155 The Holy Qur'an, Sura II, verse 284. 
!56 Sayyid Qutb, Fi thelal AI Qur'an, part 1-4, (11th edu, 1985) 287-288 (text in Arabic). 
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On the other hand, the Islamic principle of natural resources seems to 
be flexible and not rigid in its application. The Iman recognizes individual rights 
to such resources, but when natural resources are monopolized or if they are 
scarce, under such circumstances the Islamic Community will suffer. The 
sovereign (Imam) can then reserve the natural resources for the whole 
cornmunity.157 
The principles of Islamic Shari' ah of natural resources are followed in 
almost all Muslim countries. Problems which have arisen between Islamic 
schools with regard to natural resources have largely been solved by mineral and 
petroleum laws, or in their absence by concession agreements or by custom. 
Arab, Middle East and North African countries now recognize that petroleum 
and minerals form an intrinsic part of the State domain where the State has the 
right to exploit them either on its own or by its permission given in the form of 
a concession agreement. All terms and conditions of exploitation now are 
determined by such concession agreements or by statute or. both.158 It may be 
worth mentioning a few examples: 
Article 1 of the Saudi Arabia Mining Code of 1382 AH (1963) which was 
amended in form but not substance in 1392 AH (1972) provides: 
All natural deposits of minerals and quarry deposits in whatever 
form or composition, whether in the soil or subsoil, anywhere in 
the State's land and sea territories and all land and sea areas to 
which the State's jurisdiction extends, are considered the State's 
exclusive property ... 
As to minerals excluded from the scope of this Code, Article 2 provides: 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1, the following 
shall be excluded from the scope of this Code. 
(a) petroleum, natural gas, and derivatives thereof; 
(b) pearls, corals, and similar substances; 
Article 9 of the Iraqi Interim Constitution of 1965 provides that: 
157 See Madani, 37-8. 
158 Cattan, 58. 
Natural wealth together with its resources and energies shall be 
the property of the State which shall properly dispose of them. 
Article 21 of the Kuwaiti Constitution of 1962 provides that: 
All of the natural wealth and resources are the property of the 
State. The State shall preserve and properly exploit those 
resources needful of its own security and requisite to the 
national economy. 
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Article 11 of the Arab Republic of Egypt Constitution of 1964 provides that, a 
natural wealth, whether subterranean or within territorial waters, as well as all 
its resources and energy, are the property of the State. Finally, in accordance 
with the Indonesian Constitution of 197 4, the key features of the law (No 37 of 
1960 is as follows): 
All minerals found in, on, and under the earth's surface within 
Indonesian mining jurisdiction in the form of natural deposits are 
national wealth and controlled by the State.159 
6. Conclusion 
In this Chapter I have shown how the concept of permanent sovereignty 
has polarized the opinions of the developing and the capital exporting countries 
in international forums. Developing countries, through their increasing 
participation in the world community have brought about changing opinions with 
regard to the right of nations to nationalize. They have challenged the 
traditional notion of international law that reasons of public utility or national 
interest must be recognized before nationalization is considered valid by the 
international community. And they have extended the definition of permanent 
sovereignty to cover not only natural wealth, but also minerals, agriculture and 
forestry. As a consequence of the development of concept of permanent 
sovereignty, this concept has dramatically changed the former's concession 
agreements, modern forms are much more advantageous to national interest. 
159 Legal and Institutional Arrangements in Minerals Development, Mining Journal Book 
(1982) 208. 
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The influence of developing countries can be seen to be the foundation 
of the United Nations resolutions, particularly Resolution 1803(XVII) of 14 
December 1962. The test of the operative principles set forth in this resolution 
formed the core of the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
as did the New International Economic Order (NIEO) of 1 May 1974, and 
Resolution 3281 (XXIX), the Chaner of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
of 12 December 1974. 
These resolutions and other United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions have been important in the development of recognition of Third 
World opinion. Though the United Nations resolutions do not have binding 
effect as a treaty, they could be admissible before arbitration or international 
adjudication as a source of international law. In any case where the question of 
compensation is emerging as a controversy, it must be settled by the application 
of the domestic law and its tribunals, unless it is mutually agreed by all states in 
accordance with the principle of free choice of means. 
In Islamic Shari' ah a pledge applies to all contracts, obligations and 
covenants entered into by an individual. Muslim people must faithfully fulfil 
their pledge in all their obligations and fulfil their undertakings until the full 
period for which they were concluded has elapsed. Islamic Shari'ah therefore 
recognizes the principle of mutuality between contract parties. 
Regarding the legal status of natural resources an individual may not 
appropriate the natural. resources, for which the Imam is empowered to grant 
exploration rights and to take out whatever minerals were discovered, for the 
benefit of the people. 
CHAPTER7 
RENEGOTIATION OF OIL CONCESSION AGREEMENTS: 
FUNDAMENTALCHANGEOF CIRCUMSTANCESIN 
INTERNATIONALLAW 
1. Introduction 
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In this century, and especially in the period since 1945, important changes 
in political, economic and social conditions have taken place in many societies 
as a result of increasingly rapid technological and social growth. These changes 
have been invoked increasingly in support of claims for the revision, termination 
or replacement of one treaty or agreement by another, on the basis that such 
changes were unforeseen at the time the agreement was entered into.1 
This process extends beyond international treaties to agreements or 
concessions between States and foreign private parties. From the beginning of 
this century, oil producing countries around the world have called on foreign oil 
companies to revise old concession agreements concluded between them. In 
support of their claims for these agreements to be revised, the theory of 
fundamental change of circumstances, which was already established and 
recognized by international law, has been relied on as if by analogy. This theory 
is thus of central importance to the stabilization of oil agreements. 
My purpose in this chapter is to discuss the doctrine of fundamental 
change of circumstances, both in international law and in its application to oil 
concessions and similar agreements. I will discuss flrst the development of the 
doctrine in international law (with reference both to its history and its present 
status), secondly, the right of producing countries to renegotiate contracts 
according to international law, and thirdly the effect of stabilisation agreements. 
1 JW Gamer, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Tennination of Treaties, AJIL 
21 (1927) 509. 
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2. Fundamental Change of Circumstances and the Termination of Treaties 
in International Law 
(1) Summary of Argument 
The origins of the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances 
(otherwise known as rebus sic stantibus) can be traced to Roman law. The 
doctrine was funher developed in the nineteenth century by international law 
jurists. Under the doctrine, a vital change of circumstances, which is the 
foundation of the agreement, may justify a request by one party to be released 
from the obligation, or to revise or terminate the agreement on the grounds that 
it is no longer in the interest of the party concerned because of the changed 
conditions. 
The basis of this doctrine, according to the early writers, was the 
intention of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement, rather than 
an objective rule of law. It was thus referred to as the clausula rebus sic stantibus 
-- that is, as an implied term. However, in the same way as the English common 
law rule of frustration of contracts developed from an implied term into an 
independent rule of law, so the international law doctrine of fundamental change 
of circumstances developed from a clausula into an independent rule, a process 
completed with the adoption of Article 61 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties in 1969. 
(2) The Notion of Fundamental Change of Circumstances 
The term rebus sic stantibus means literally "things remaining as they are". 
Reference is often made to the clausula rebus sic stantibus, ie, to an express or 
implied clause in a treaty conditioning its validity upon the continuance of the 
circumstances existing at the time when it was made. 2 As Sir John Fischer 
Williams (1928) stated: 
The doctrine that we set out to consider is the doctrine that 
treaties, · for the duration of whose obligations no special period 
2 DH Harris,Cases and Materials on International Law (4th edn 1991) 800. 
is fixed, are not to be understood as binding on the contracting 
powers in the event of some material change in the conditions 
with reference to which they were concluded, the word 
"conditions" in this statement including not only material, but 
also moral facts. For the purpose of the discussion, the phrase 
rebus sic stantibus is a convenient catchword: treaty obligations, 
when the treaty itself is silent, are subject to the provision that, 
if the obligations are to remain, the essential "things", inanimate 
and animate, material, moral and mental, must remain in the 
condition in which they were when the treaty was concluded. 3 
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There is much controversy among international law jurists regarding the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. This doctrine has taken several forms over the 
centuries and has been interpreted, in each historical period, so as to serve 
specific purposes which have arisen during that period.4 
In many old treaties a clausula rebus sic stantibus was expressly inserted: 
under it the treaty might be construed as abrogated, when material circumstances 
on which it rested changed. To bring about this effect it was not necessary that 
the facts alleged to have changed should have been essential conditions. It was 
enough if they were strong inducements to the party seeking abrogation. But 
such an implication came to be read into treaties even without any express 
provision, on the basis of a necessary inference as to the intention of the parties: 
The maxim conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus is held 
to apply to all cases in which the reason for a treaty has failed, 
or there has been such a change of circumstances as to make its 
performance impracticable except as an unreasonable sacrifice. 5 
At the same time a . very broad interpretation was given to the notion of 
"fundamental conditions" assumed by a treaty. These were taken to extend to all 
3 F Williams, The Pennanence of Treaties. The doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus, and article 
19 of the Covenant of the League, AJIL 22 (1928) 89. To similar effect WE Hall stated: 
Neither party to a contract can make its binding effect dependent at his 
will upon conditions other than those contemplated at the moment when 
the contract was entered into, and on the other hand, a contract ceases 
to be binding as soon as anything which fanned an implied condition of 
its obligatory force at the time of its conclusion is essentially altered. 
WE Hall, International Law (8th edn, 1924) 407. 
4 A Vamvoukos, Termination of Treaties in International Law (1985) 3. 
5 22 Court of Claims ( !887) 408. 
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sons of "vital interests" of a State, in accordance with prevailing ideas of inherent 
rights to self-preservation and to security. For example Oppenheim (1905) stated: 
When the existence or the vital development of a State stands 
in unavoidable conflict with its treaty obligations, the latter must 
give way, for self-preservation and development, in accordance 
with the growth and the vital requirements of the nation, are the 
primary duties of every State. No State would consent to any 
such treaty as would hinder it in the fulfilment of these primary 
duties. The consent of a State to a treaty presupposes a 
conviction that it is not fraught with danger to its existence and 
vital development. For this reason every treaty implies a 
condition that, if by an unforeseen change of circumstances an 
obligation stipulated in the treaty should imperil the existence 
or vital development of one of the parties, it should have a right 
to demand to be released from the obligation concemed.6 
Similarly Woolsey (1926) defined vital changes as: 
changes which are regarded by authorities as fundamental or 
vital are those which: take away the very foundation of the 
engagement, that is, its raison d' etre; threaten or cause the 
sacrifice of a State's development or its vital requirements for 
political or economic existence to the execution of the treaty, 
that is, make performance impracticable except at an 
unreasonable sacrifice; are inconsistent with the right of 
self-preservation, or incompatible with the independence of the 
State; modify essentially the political relations which produced 
political treaties, as for example, treaties of alliance, make a 
treaty really inapplicable, or actually impossible of fulfilment.7 
The relationship between rebus sic stantibus and prevailing ideas of the "natural 
rights" of States is clear, for example, from Fiore, who stated that: 
All treaties are to be looked upon as null which are in any way 
opposed to the development of the free activity of a nation or 
which hinders the development of its industry or commerce, 
which prevents the exercise of any of its natural rights or which 
offends in any manner against the principles of absolute justice 
or the supreme law of right. 8 
6 Oppenheim, International Law I (41h edn, 1928) 748. 
7 LH Woolsey, The Unilateral Termination of Treaties, AJJL 20 (1926) 349. 
8 Quoted by Garner, 512-13. See Hall, 416; GW Keeton, The Revision Clause in Certain 
Chinese Treaties, BYJL 10 (1929) 112. 
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Indeed according to Fiore, a treaty in this case is not merely voidable but is 
looked upon as null. 
German writers in particular adopted the theory that rebus sic stantibus 
was based upon the fundamental rights of the State, and they were followed in 
this by some American and European writers.9 That view was itself open to 
different interpretations. For example, it could be argued that the doctrine 
would apply only in those exceptional cases in which a fundamental right of the 
State is endangered. This view restricted the fundamental rights of the state to 
self-preservation. 10 A second view, more consistent with the ideas underlying 
"fundamental rights of the State", opposed the idea that treaty obligations are 
permanently binding. This concept is related to the idea that a State can be seen 
as a person in the process of development.11 As a State, unlike an individual, 
endures for many generations, these future generation~ should not be bound in 
perpetuity by treaty obligations which could hinder the progress or development 
of the State. 12 
Whatever its basis, the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances 
was accepted by the early writers on international law, and has thus been 
regarded as part of international law for three centuries. 13 Initially, fundamental 
change of circumstances was based on the intentions of the parties, as Hill (1934) 
stated: 
the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is based juridically upon the 
intention of the parties. A change of circumstances becomes 
relevant to the obligatory force of a treaty only in so far as it is 
related to the wills of the parties to the treaty at the time of the 
conclusion of the treaty. It is not an objective rule of 
international law which is imposed upon the parties, but is a rule 
for carrying the intention of the parties into effect.14 
9 C Hill, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus in International Law, University of Missouri 
Studies, IX (1934) 10. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Id, II. 
13 Law of Treaties, Harvard Research in International Law, AJIL 29 (1935) 1098. For 
further discussion see: A Toth, The Doctrine of Rebus Stantibus in International Law, Jur 
Rev 56 (1974) 147,263. 
14 Hill, 8-10, quoted by OJ Lissitzyn, "Treaties and Changed Circumstances" (Rebus Sic 
Stantibus), AJJL 6! (1967) 898. 
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In the opinion of some writers, the doctrine may have originated at time when 
it was customary to insert into a treaty, a clausula rebus sic stantibus and that 
the terms of the old and abandoned clause mus~ now be implied. Others express 
the opinion that the doctrine originated in Roman law on the ground that every 
contract carried with it the implied condition of rebus sic stantibus.15 
Roman law, according to the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, did not 
understand this doctrine in the same way we understand it today. However, the 
Corpus Juris Civilis does discuss the particular rules "which give the party 
concerned the right of rescission of or withdrawal from the contract on account 
of supervening changes in the circumstances". The rules differ depending on "the 
type of transactions to which they apply, the underlying juridical considerations 
and their legal effects" .16 
Whatever its origins, the concept spread rapidly among many writers in 
the sixteenth century. Jason de Mayno stated the rule that a clausula rebus sic 
stantibus was to be implied in all statutes, wills, contracts, privileges, oaths and 
sworn declarations of renunciation of rights.17 At this stage, the idea of a 
"clausula" was regarded as being equally applicable to private and public law. 
But because the writers did not analyse the nature and legal effects of the 
doctrine, it must be seen as still in an early stage of its development 18 
It was the opinion of early writers on international law that a doctrine 
of rebus sic stantibus was accepted as part of the law of treaties. 19 Gentili' s 
opinion was that "the doctrine was a general men~ reservation implied in wills, 
contracts and in any disposition whatever, according to general view."20 Spinoza's 
theory was that "no one makes a contract for the future except on the hypothesis 
of certain preceding circumstances. But when these change, the reason 
underlying the whole position also changes; accordingly every contracting party 
15 CG Fenwick, International Law (4th edn 1965) 545. 
16 Vamvoukos, 7. 
17 Mayno,/n Primam DigVeterisPart,Comment (1582) Foll40, 8-IO,quoted byVamvoukos, 
10. 
18 Id, 10·11. 
19 Ibid, II. 
20 De jure belli Libri Tres (1612) 365, quoted by Vamvoukos, II. 
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retains the right to consult its own interests".21 Vattel, the greatest authority of 
the 18th century, has influenced many later writers. He states that the doctrine 
is based upon the intention of the parties at the time when the treaty was entered 
into, and thereby places the whole question of changed circumstances within the 
field of treaty interpretation: 
This question has been proposed and discussed whether promises 
include in themselves this tacit condition, that the things shall 
remain in the State where they are, or, if the change that has 
intervened in the State of things can form an exception to the 
promise, and even render it null? The principle drawn from the 
reason of a promise should resolve the question. 1f it is certain 
and manifest that the consideration of the present State of things 
has entered into the reason which caused the promise, that the 
promise was made in consideration, in consequence of this State 
of things, it depends on the conservation of the things in the 
same State. That is evident, since the promise was only made 
on this supposition. Thus, when the State of things essential to 
a promise, and without which it certainly would not have been 
made, changes the promise falls with its foundation... The sole 
State of things, by reason of which the promise was made, is 
essential to it; and the change of this State alone can legitimately 
prevent or suspend the effect of this promise. 22 
Further, it was in Spinoza's theories, that the idea of a separation of the private 
law and international law was first formulated. These theories became most 
influential in the construction of the doctrine. 
Later, Bluntschli ( 1872) stated that the doctrine is not attached in 
general to all treaties but is applicable only if "certain circumstances have been 
assumed as the foundation of the treaty" whether expressly or impliedly.23 He 
conceived the doctrine as based upon the intention of the parties and not as an 
21 Spinoza, Political Treatise III, 17, quoted by H Lauterpacht, Spinoza and International 
Law, BYIL 8 (1927) 94. 
22 Le droit des gens, 11, 12,296, quoted by Hill, 8·9. According to Hill, the following jurists 
support the idea that the doctrine is based upon the intention of the parties: Grotius 
(1625), Pufendorff (1672), Bynkershoek (1737), Vattel (1758), Kluber (1819), Wheaton 
(1836), Heffter (1844), Bluntschli (1868), Hall (1880), Wharton (1884), Davis (1903), L 
Oppenheim (1905), Westlake (1910), Despagnet (1910), Liszt (1911), Pitt Cobbett (1922), 
Fenwick (1924), LD Woolsey (1926), Garner (1927), Lauterpacht (1927), Brierly (1927), 
McNair (1928), Fischer Williams (1928), Anzilotti (1929), Stowell (1931), Hill (1934). 
23 Bluntschli, Das moderne volkerrecht der civilisiertenstaaten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt(2nd 
edn 1872) 256, quoted by Vamvoukos, 17. 
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objective rule of law operating independently. 24 An influential interpretation of 
this period was that of Jellinek, in whose system, the rule of rebus sic stantibus 
could not be dispensed with. In his system, "the doctrine becomes a specific and 
exclusive rule of international law."25 
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus gradually lost its importance in private 
law, but it became increasingly important in international law, where it was 
re-interpreted to fit the philosophical and political theories of the 19th century, 
and ultimately became a central aspect of these theories.26 
(3) Fundamental Change of Circumstances in Modern State Practice 
The First and Second World Wars profoundly changed the economic and 
legal relations between countries around the world. As a result of these changes, 
the emphasis behind the doctrine carne to be on the interests of the international 
community, rather than the interests of individual nations and States. Thus, the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus was no longer regarded as being derived from, or 
based on, the specific nature or fundamental rights of States, doctrines which 
themselves were generally rejected. Nonetheless, the doctrine itself was quite 
often relied on, as the following survey shows. 
(a) The Termination of the Neutralization of the Black Sea 1870-1 
One of the earliest modern examples of reliance on fundamental change 
of circumstances involved the Treaty of Paris of 1856. The seven parties to the 
Treaty of Paris had agreed that the Black Sea should be neutralized, and Russia 
and Turkey agreed on a limitation of their naval armaments in the Black Sea. 
In 1870, Russia denounced these stipulations and at a conference held in London 
in 1871 asked for a revision of the treaty by common consent, placing emphasis 
upon the argument of changed circumstances. Among the changes relied on 
were changes in the European balance of power and th<>ir effects on the political 
position of Russia, as well as the introduction of iron-clad vessels. Within the 
24 Ibid. 
25 Id, 17-18. 
26 ld, 15-16. 
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conciliatory tone of the conference, the delegates sanctioned the request made 
by Russia. 
During this dispute, none of the powers denied that a material change 
of circumstances might serve as a valid ground for demanding modification (or 
termination) of a treaty. But it was pointed out that the only competent 
international authority to decide on a question of substantive law of this kind was 
the community of the States which were party to the treaty concerned and that 
unilateral denunciation was inadmissible under international law.27 
(b) Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles 1919 
An outline of the modern practice must begin with Article 435 of the 
Treaty of Versailles 1919, which recognized that the stipulations of certain 
treaties of 1815 were no longer consistent with current conditions. Article 435 
of the Treaty of Versailles provided: 
The High Contracting Parties, while they recognize the 
guarantees stipulated by the treaties of 1815, and especially by 
the act of November 20, 1815, in favour of Switzerland, the said 
guarantees constituting international obligations for the 
maintenance of peace, declare nevertheless, that the provisions 
of these treatie .nventions, declarations and other 
supplementary acts <;uucerning the neutralized zone of Savoy, as 
laid down in paragraph 1 of Article 92 of the Final Act of the 
Congress of Vienna and in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the 
Treaty of Paris of November 20, 1915, are no longer consistent 
with present conditions. For this reason, the High Contracting 
Parties take note of the agreement reached between the French 
government and the Swiss government for the abrogation of the 
stipulations relating to this zone which are and remain 
abrogated. The High Contracting Parties also agree that the 
stipulations of the treaties of 1815 and of the other 
supplementary Acts concerning the Free Zones of Upper Savoy 
and the Gex district are no longer consistent with present 
conditions and that it is for France and Switzerland to come to 
an agreement together with a view to settling between 
themselves the status of these territories under such conditions 
as shall be considered suitable by both countries.28 
27 The Parties were Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey. 
See Hill, 47; Varnvoukos, 67. 
28 Williams, 96· 7. 
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Thus the modifications which had been made by France and Switzerland were 
accepted by the Signatory Powers. 29 
(c) Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
In the period after 1919 the doctrine "came to be inextricably connected 
with the most acute political problem of the era", that is, the problem of peaceful 
change.30 The legal basis for debate was provided by Article 19 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, which was considered by some writers on international 
law as an application of the doctrine?1 Article 19 provided that: 
The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration 
by members of the League of Treaties which have become 
inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions 
whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.32 
On a number of occasions member States invoked the article before the 
Assembly of the League of Nations. Bolivia and Peru in 1920 requested the 
Assembly to reconsider and revise the treaty of 1904 between Bolivia and Chile 
and the treaty of 1883 between Chil,. and Peru.33 In 1921, the General 
Committee of the Assembly submitted the request of Bolivia to a Committee of 
Jurists which made the following Report: 
... in its present form, the request of Bolivia is not in order, 
because the Assembly of the League of Nations cannot of itself 
modify any treaty, the modification of treaties lying solely within 
the competence of the contracting States. 
Thus article 19 did not give the Assembly of the League of Nations itself 
jurisdiction to modify treaties. The Report continued: 
29 Keeton, 115; Williams, 96-7. 
30 Vamvoukos, 22. 
31 !d. See also Hill, 80. 
32 That the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is a rule for the termination of treaties, and not 
for their revision was the concept of the doctrine held by almost all writers on 
international law prior to !919: Hill, 80. 
33 Hill, 81; Vamvoukos, 131. 
... such advice can only be given in cases where treaties have 
become inapplicable... when the state of affairs existing at the 
moment of their conclusion has subsequently undergone, either 
materially or morally, such radical chanfles that their application 
has ceased to be reasonably possible.3 
As this conclusion was reached, Bolivia withdrew the request. 
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In 1925 China proposed a resolution, adopted by the Assembly, which 
provided that: 
The Assembly, having heard with deep interest the Chinese 
delegate's suggestion regarding the possibility of considering, 
according to the spirit of the Covenant, the existing international 
conditions of China; having learned with satisfaction that a 
conference of the interested States is soon to take place in China 
to consider the questions involved; expresses the ho~e that a 
satisfactory solution may be reached at an early date. 5 
On 10 September 1929, China submitted a draft resolution "to consider and 
report on the methods to make effective" Article 19 of the Covenant. The 
Assembly adopted a resolution which expounded on Article 19 as follows: 
A member of the League may on its own responsibility, subject 
to the rules of procedure of the Assembly, place on the agenda 
of the Assembly the question whether the Assembly should give 
advice as contemplated by Article 19 regarding the 
reconsideration of any treaty or treaties which such member 
considers to have become inapplicable or the consideration of 
international conditions the continuance of which might, in its 
opinion, endanger the peace of the world ... For an application 
of this kind to be entertained by the Assembly, it must be drawn 
up in appropriate terms... which are in conformity with Article 
19 ... In the event of an application in such terms being placed 
upon the agenda of the Assembly, the Assembly shall in 
accordance with its ordinary procedure, discuss this application, 
and if it thinks proper, give the advice requested.36 
34 Ibid. 
35 League of Nations, Records of Plenary Meetings (1925) 2, quoted by Hill, 81. 
36 League ofNations, OfficiaiJournai,Special Supplement No. 76,99-lOO;League of Nations, 
Journal of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly (1929) 393-95, quoted by Hill, 82. 
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But most international lawyers recognized that the doctrine "was as a rule of law 
inappropriate to solve political problems". Their opinion was that important 
political solutions should be excluded from the doctrine.37 
It would appear then, that the Assembly of League of Nations had no 
right to modify a treaty by itself, but could only advise the Members of the 
League concerned, without enforcing any decision in cases where a treaty had 
become inapplicable, or where "the State of affairs existing at the moment of its 
conclusion has subsequently undergone, either materially or morally, such radical 
changes that their application has ceased to be reasonably possible". According 
to Hill, "this is to reduce the possibility of application of Article 19 to cases of 
force majeure". This is in contrast to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as 
generally understood.38 
(d) Former Soviet Doctrine after 1917 
The Russian revolution of 1917 established a new conception in the 
history of this doctrine. On 25 October 1917, a decree was published by the 
second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It declared the abrogation of secret 
diplomacy and proceeded to the publication of "the secret agreements confirmed 
or concluded by the Government of Landowners and capitalists from February 
to October 25, 1917".39 The provisions of those treaties "in so far as they tend to 
the augmentation of the profits and the privileges of Russian capitalists" or to 
annexations by the dominant nation were "declared instantly and irrevocably 
annulled".40 Similarly, on 28 January 1918, the former Soviet Government issued 
a decree annulling State debts, paragraph 3 of which provided: 
All foreign loans are hereby annulled, without reserve or 
exception of any kind whatsoever.41 
37 Vamvoukos, 23. 
38 Hill, 83. 
39 EA Korovin, Soviet Treaties and International Law, AJIL 22 (1928) 762. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Id, 763. 
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On 20 April 1922, the Soviet delegation at Geneva presented a memorial 
containing the reasoning and the motives for this action: 
The revolution of 1917 having completely destroyed all the old 
relationships, economic, social and political, and having replaced 
the old social order (class divisions) by the new social order, 
the sovereignty of an insurgent people, turning over the power 
of the Russian State to a new social class, did by this fact break 
the succession of those civil obligations which were component 
elements of the economic relations of the social order now 
extinct.42 
According to the opinion of Soviet writers, this statement was an invocation of 
the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. Korovin's opinion, was that "the Soviet 
doctrine appears to be an extension of the principle of rebus sic stantibus, while 
at the same time limiting its field of application by a single circumstance - the 
social revolution". 43 He added: 
Every international agreement is the expression of an established 
social order... So long as this social order endures... the principle 
pacta sunt servanda, must be scrupulously observed. But if in the 
storm of a social cataclysm one class replaces the other at the 
helm of the State, for the purpose of reorganizing not only 
economic ties but the governing principles of internal and 
external politics... Old agreements which reflected the 
pre-existing order of things, are destroyed by the revolution, 
becoming null and void.44 
A further statement of the former Soviet government published on 2 
April 1924, set out their attitude towards treaties concluded by· previous Russian 
governments. The statement said, that some of the treaties had lost their force 
during and after the war, "while others are regarded as requiring conftrmation 
unless terminated by agreement of the parties in accordance with the doctrine".45 
More recently, a revised form of the doctrine was readmitted to Soviet 
literature. The Soviets recognized it as being essential for economic and political 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Hill, 32. 
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progress, a necessary exception to the general rule of pacta sunr servanda, which 
was often used to conceal the maintenance of imperialist domination of 
colonies.46 
It justifies repudiation by dependent and colonial nations of 
"unequal" treaties, that is, treaties which are not based on the 
sovereign equality of both parties in compliance with "generally 
recognized democratic principles of present day international 
law. "47 
Thus it was seen as a "progressive" rule of international law. 48 
(e) The Termination of Slave Trade Treaties 1921-2 
In 1921-2, the British Government gave notice of denunciation of slave 
trade treaties concluded during the 19th century. It stated, that the general 
policy of the government was "to abolish obsolete treaty instruments since the 
circumstances under which these treaties were negotiated are now happily past". 
Although most of these treaties were of indefmite duration, the other States 
parties replied that they regarded the treaties as inoperative and announced that 
they would cease to have effect from the date of acceptance of denunciation. 
The treaty with the United States which contained a provision for termination 
upon one years' notice, terminated after one year according to its terms. 49 
(f) The Washington Treaty of 1922 
On 6 February 1922, the Washington Treaty, concerning the Limitation 
of Naval Armaments was signed. Article 21 contained an explicit reference to 
"changed circumstances", as follows: 
46 Shurshalov, Osnovaniia Deistivitel' Nosti Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov (1958) 128, quoted 
by Vamvoukos, 26 
47 Krylov, 70 HR 4334; Lisovskii, International Law (1953), 253; Ram!lndo, Peaceful 
Co-existence ... 56-7; Erickson, International Law ... 77-80, all quoted by Vamvoukos, 26-7. 
48 Triska & Shusser, The Theory ... 141; Triska Pas (1959) 299; McWhinney, Peaceful Co-
existence ... & Soviet· Western International Law (1964) 65-6, quoted by Vamvoukos, 27 & 
see JN Hazard, Cleansing Soviet International Law of Antimarxist Theories, AJIL 32 
(1938) 244. 
49 This notice was given to nine states: Brazil, Columbia, United States, Haiti, Chile, 
Ecuador, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden: 116 BFSP 91-92, 118-119, 160-161, 196-197; 10 
LNTS 408, 418; 11 LNTS 462. See Vamvoukos, 80; Hill, 63. 
If during the term of the present treaty the requirements of the 
national security of any Contracting Power in respect of naval 
defence are, in the opinion of that power, materially affected by 
any change of circumstances, the Contracting Powers will, at the 
request of such Power, meet in conference with a view to the 
reconsideration of the provisions of the treaty and its 
amendment by mutual agreement. .. 50 
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In fact the Treaty terminated, in accordance with the 
after notice to that effect had been proven by Japan. 
under Article 21.51 
provisions of Article 23, 
No steps were taken 
(g) The Termination of Capitulations in Turkey 1914-23 
Turkey explicitly referred to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus in 1914 
and again in 1923 when it unilaterally abrogated the treaties, which provided for 
capitulations. Although the States possessing treaty rights (the British Empire, 
France, Italy, Japan and the United States) emphatically denied the right of 
unilateral termination, they admitted that the regime of capitulations had become 
unsatisfactory and were willing to consent to termination, provided that 
agreement could be reached on adequate safeguards for the persons, property 
and interests of their nationals. 52 While these States clearly agreed to this 
revision for political reasons, rather than for reasons of legal obligation, their 
comments indicate an implicit acceptance of a change of circumstances. For 
example, the delegate of France believed that the capitulatory regime "was in 
consonance with archaic ideas" and that the task of the Conference was "to 
devise a system more suited to modem requirements but which would give 
adequate guarantees to foreigners". 53 
(h) The Termination of Extraterritoriality in China 1926-30 
As part of its attempt to revise the rights of extraterritoriality of foreign 
powers in China, China relied upon the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. China 
50 McNair, The Law of Treaties (1938) 377. 
51 Bevans, 2 Treaties and Other International Agreements 351. 
52 Hill, 29. 
53 Ibid. 
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negotiated revised treaties with each foreign power separately. During this 
process, Belgium admitted the rebus sic stantibus rule, whereas Japan denied that 
there was such a rule in international law. 
In fact, the treaties granting extraterritorial rights in China contained 
provisions for revision at the end of a certain period, and from 1914 it appears 
that the other States parties were willing to relinquish extraterritorial rights "but 
only if satisfied that the State of the Chinese laws and their administration 
warranted them in so doing".54 In demanding revision of the treaties, China 
relied in part upon the revision clauses of the treaties, although they did not give 
her the right of either revision or termination, and in part upon the argument of 
changed circumstances. China referred, to the "many momentous political, social 
and commercial changes" which had taken place both in China and in foreign 
countries since the conclusion of the treaties, and stated that as a consequence 
the old treaties had outlived their usefulness and "if allowed to continue to exist 
in their present form would give rise to difficulties and complications" .55 China's 
legal position was that "the general right of revision being admitted, the right of 
both parties to a treaty to terminate it by notice... is all the more to be 
recognized". 56 China felt, she had tried and failed to come to an amicable 
agreement with foreign States and had no choice but to terminate the treaties. 
In response, Belgium admitted rebus sic stantibus as a rule,57 but 
condemned the unilateral termination of the treaty as contrary to international 
law, pointing out that the State invoking the rule must obtain the consent of the 
other party or appeal to the League of Nations. Eventually, the treaty was 
abrogated by mutual consent. GW Keeton notes that in the discussions on the 
Belgian treaty of 1865, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus was mainly used as a 
lever by China to initiate negotiations for revision of the treaty and was in fact 
ignored after that early stage. 58 
54 Chinese Customs Treaties, I, 557. See Vamvoukos, 87-8. 
55 Note of 15 November 1928 to Norway, quoted by Vamvoukos, 88. 
56 11 Chinese Review 1-8 (1927) quoted by Vamvoukos, 89. 
57 Hill, 33. 
58 Keeton, 128. 
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These discussions may be contrasted with those between China and 
Japan. When, in July 1928, China informed Japan that the treaty of 1896 had 
terminated, Japan replied that the Chinese action was inadmissible and that she 
would continue negotiations for revision only on condition that China should 
withdraw the provisional regulations and recognize the validity of the existing 
treaties. On 27 April 1929, Japan attacked the "principle of altered 
circumstances". This appears to contradict the implied acceptance of changes of 
circumstances recognized in Article II of the Commercial Treaty of 1903 between 
Japan and China which contained promises to relinquish extraterritoriality when 
the State of Chinese law warranted it.59 Despite this Japan stated that the 
doctrine had no foundation in international law or usage as a rule for revision or 
lapse of a treaty, and considered that the admission of such a principle would 
"render almost all treaties liable to repudiation at the pleasure of either 
contracting party, thus shaking the very foundations of international law". 60 
In the case of the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of 1887, Portugal denied that 
the treaty had lapsed and stated that "the changes of political, economic or 
commercial conditions, claimed to have occurred in both countries, are not of a 
nature to entitle China to dissolve the treaty by unilateral withdrawal". 61 The 
dispute was settled by negotiation in 1928. 
Similarly Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and the United States 
agreed that extraterritoriality could be relinquished, but only after a reform in 
the laws and judicial institutions of China and after the laws were properly 
administered. They were willing to consider gradual revision of the treaties as 
these improvements were realized. 62 For instance, Great Britain agreed that 
from 1 January 1930, "the process of gradual abolition of extraterritoriality should 
be regarded as having commenced in principle".63 These agreements were in 
keeping with the British Commercial Treaty of 1902, where Britain gave China 
the assurance of every assistance in law reform, and willingness to relinquish 
59 Chinese Customs Treaties, 11,662, quoted by Keeton, 118. 
60 Hill, 35. 
61 Chinese Review, 12, (1928) 64-66; 13 (1929) 13-14, quoted by Hill, 36. 
62 The China Critic, September 19, 1929,758-760 quoted by Hill, 36. 
63 Great Britain, 31 Accounts and Papers, (1929-1930); Cmd 3480. 
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extraterritoriality when the State of China's law warranted it.64 A similar process 
was adopted by the other States. 
(i) The Suspension of the International Load Line Convention 1941 
In 1941, the United States resorted expressly to the doctrine in order to 
unilaterally suspend the International Load Line Convention which was 
concluded in 1930. Although the British Government did not accept the 
suggestion of a temporary suspension as between parties assenting thereto. It 
considered that because of the war, normal international procedures where no 
longer available, and thus that the procedure of prior notification and consent 
did not need to be followed.65 On 9 August 1941, the President of the United 
States proclaimed that the unilateral suspension was based on "changed 
conditions" which gave the United States "an unquestioned right and privilege 
under approved principles of international law" to declare the treaty 
inoperative.66 The President was advised by Attorney-General Francis Biddle 
that "it is a well established principle of international law rebus sic stantibus that 
a treaty ceases to be binding when the basic conditions upon which it was 
founded have essentially changed. Suspension of the convention in such 
circumstances is the unquestioned right of a State adversely affected by such 
essential change".67 
Initially, Britain rejected the notion that it be suspended. It subsequently 
accepted the action and eight American States parties also expressed assent to 
it. No· State ever seems to have protested against unilateral suspension. 68 
Though it was criticised from different points of view, notably by Briggs 
and Hyde, Briggs noted that when it had previously been cited it was because it 
had been "clearly based juridicially upon the intention of the parties at the time 
of the conclusion of the treaty", and noted that "the evidence presented by the 
64 Chinese Customs Treaties, 1, 557, quoted by Keeton, 118. 
65 Vamvoukos, 103-4. 
66 Department of State Bulletin, V, No 111, August 9 1941,114-115,quoted by HW Briggs, 
The Attorney General invokes Rebus Sic Stantibus AJIL 36 (1942) 89. 
67 Vol 40, No 24, July 28 1941, 119-123. The Attorney General cited Kluber, Phillimore, 
John Westlake and Fischer Williams. 
68 5 Department of State Bulletin (1941) 114, quot&! by Vamvoukos, 104-5. 
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Attorney General fails to establish that the parties to the Convention - the 
purpose of which was to establish minimum safety regulations - intended that the 
occurrence of war should release the parties from the obligations assumed." He 
also thought this was not a case of necessity.69 
Hyde doubted the existence of the doctrine in international law, but 
appears to agree with the decision of the United States. He stated: 
There was doubtless good reason for the United States to 
proclaim its freedom from the further operation of the 
international Load Line Convention, at least during the 
continuance of the war. That reason was in substance, the 
circumstance that it could not possibly have been the design of 
the contracting parties when they concluded the convention, that 
it should remain necessarily binding upon the corning into being 
of the conditions to which both the acting Attorney General and 
the president referred; and that when those conditions did come 
into being, a contracting party confronted with a situation such 
as that which prevailed in July 1941, might, by appropriate 
action, free itself, at least for the time being, from the burdens 
of the arrangement.70 
This created yet another precedent in favour of the existence of rebus sic 
stantibus. 
(4) Case Law 
For some considerable time the doctrine had relatively little recognition 
form international tribunals, although some national court decisions relied on it. 
In a decision in 1912, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague 
recognized that the obligations of a treaty may be affected, where fulfilment of 
the obligations would be self destructive to a party. The Russian Indemnity Case 
involved the question whether, by a treaty of 1879, Russia was entitled to interest 
because of delays in the repayment of indemnities. Turkey pleaded various 
defences including force majeure and argued, that from 1881 to 1902 it was in 
69 Briggs, 90-3, quoted by Lissitzyn, 910. 
70 CC Hyde, 2/ruernationa/ Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United Stales (2nd 
rev. edn 1945) 1527. 
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serious financial difficulties. Though the tribunal held that the defence of force 
majeure might be pleaded in public as well as in private international Jaw, it 
held that the repayment of such a small sum would not compromise Turkey's 
internal or external situation.71 This decision is a precedent on force majeure 
rather than on the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. 72 
The doctrine was more directly supported in a number of municipal 
decisions.73 For example in Hooper v United States in 1887, J Davis stated: 
Abrogation of a treaty may occur by change of circumstances, as 
when a state of things which was the basis of the treaty, and one 
of its tacit conditions, no longer exists.74 
The United States Court of Claims there held that "a treaty which contains no 
clause providing for its termination, may be annulled by one of the parties under 
certain circumstances" ,75 and declared that the United States had a right under 
international law to declare terminated in 1798 treaties concluded with France 
in 1778. 
Similarly, in 1882, Lucerne requested that Aargau be held bound to 
recognize the dissolution of the agreement of 1830, which gave Aargau the right 
to tax and exercise some powers over a part of Lucerne. The Swiss Federal 
Tribunal concluded that Lucerne was unjustified in its claim. It noted that "At 
most a treaty can be unilaterally voided ... when there has occurred a change of 
those circumstances which, according to the evident intent of the parties at the 
time of the agreement, formed the tacit requirement of the existence of the 
treaty".76 
71 Decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of 11 November 1912, Hague Court 
Reports (JB Scott, ed, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1916) 
297-328. 
72 Vamvoukos, 175. 
73 HS Zakariya, Changed Circumstances and the Continued Validity of Mineral Development 
Contracts in K Hossain (ed), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order 
(1980) 263. 
74 22 Court of Claims Reports (1887) 408. 
75 ld, 416. 
76 Decision of 17 February 1882,Arretsdu Tribunal Federal Suisse en l'annee 1882.Recueil 
officiel, 8, 43-58. The court cites as authorities Heffter and Jellinek. See Hill, 19-20. 
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In 1925 the German State of Bremen invoked the doctrine as a ground 
for terminating some of its obligations from treaties made with Prussia in 
1904-1905. It argued, that since the Treaty of Versailles, the relations which 
formed the basis of the treaty had altered. The German Supreme Court stated, 
that "the possibility of treaty annulment on account of changed circumstances, the 
authority of the clausu/a rebus sic stantibus, is recognized in part in a broad sense 
in international law",77 but held that circumstances had not changed so much as 
to cause the treaties to be annulled. 
But the leading international judicial decision on the doctrine is still the 
Free Zones Case between France and Switzerland. In 1932, France argued before 
the Permanent Court of International Justice that the 1915-1916 treaties, 
establishing the customs and economic regimes of the Free Zones of Upper 
Savoy and the District of Gex, should be regarded as terminated. The Court did 
not consider the case to be within the scope of the doctrine, as it considered that 
France had not shown that the Zones were in fact established in view of the 
existence of circumstances which ceased to exist when Swiss federal customs were 
instituted in 1849. However, it did not question that in principle a change of 
circumstances could affect the validity of treaties, nor that rebus sic stantibus was 
a recognized rule of international law. 78 The Court in this case, as Brownlie has 
pointed out, "assumed that the principle existed while reserving its position on its 
extent and the precise mode of its application. "79 
In the first phase of the case, France argued that a radical change of 
circumstances, most significantly the Swiss Federal Customs law of 1849, had 
served to completely change the objectives of the original treaties and that there 
was no longer any need for these wnes. Switzerland contended, that it would 
not examine the doctrine because whatever its meaning, it was inapplicable to 
treaties establishing territorial boundaries. Furthermore, it argued that it was too 
late to invoke them as France had not done so earlier. 
77 Gennan Staatsgerichtshof, Decision of June 29, 1925 quoted by Hill, 21; JM Sweeney, 
CT Oliver and NE Leech, The International Legal System. Cases and Materials(1981) 1014. 
78 PCIJ Ser AlB, 46 (1932) 156-8. 
79 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th edn 1990) 620. 
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In its interpretation of the doctrine, the Coun implied that the change 
must relate strictly to the circumstances in view of which, or because of which, 
the parties had concluded the treaty.80 As we have seen, there was throughout 
an acceptance of the doctrine in principle. 
In his dissenting judgment, Judge Dreyfus stated that Article 435(2) of 
the Treaty of Versailles partly abrogated and panly was intended to lead the 
abrogation of the free zones. He decided that the treaties had lapsed as a result 
of changed conditions. 81 
The issue was also raised in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case in the 
International Coun of Justice in 1974. In 1972 the Icelandic Parliament had 
declared that: 
Because of the vital interests of the nation and owing to changed 
circumstances the notes concerning fishery limits exchanged in 
1961 are no longer applicable and their provisions do not 
constitute an obligation for Iceland. 82 
The Government of Iceland sought to extend its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction 
from 12 to 50 miles and terminate the Exchange of Notes with the United 
Kingdom of 1961. It invoked the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as embodied in 
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, contending that as 
it satisfied the two requirements of the doctrine, it could terminate the treaty 
forthwith. 
In relation to the first requirement of this doctrine, that the change must 
be a fundamental one, Iceland referred to developments in fishing techniques, "to 
the increased exploitation of the fishery resources in the seas surrounding Iceland 
and to the danger of still further exploitation because of an increase in the 
catching capacity of fishing fleets. "83 But the Coun held that these did not 
amount to a fundamental change. 
80 Vamvoukos, 159-160. 
81 PCIJ Ser AB, No 46, (1932) 202-205. 
82 /CJ Pleadings,FisheriesJurisdiction, 11-89, I. Enclosure 2, 39, quoted by Vamvoukos, 169. 
83 ICJ Rep 1974, 3. 
' 
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As to the second requirement, that change must result in "a radical 
transformation of the extent of the obligation still to be performed,"84 and must 
have increased "the obligations to be executed to the extent of rendering the 
performance something essentially different from that originally undertaken",85 
the Court noted that this condition was not wholly satisfied and that the change 
of circumstances "alleged by Iceland cannot be said to have transformed radically 
the extent of the jurisdictional obligation which is imposed by the 1961 Exchange 
of Notes... The present dispute is exactly of the character anticipated in the 
compromissory clause of the exchange of notes. Not only has the jurisdictional 
obligation not been radically transformed in this extent; it has remained precisely 
what it was." 86 
Neither of the applicants (United Kingdom and Federal Republic of 
Germany) contested that a rule of rebus sic stantibus existed in international law. 
However they contended -- and the Court agreed -- that the changes were not 
of a vital or fundamental character. The United Kingdom Memorial further 
asserted that... 
the doctrine never operates so as to extinguish a treaty 
automatically or to allow an unchallengeable unilateral 
denunciation by a party; it only operates to confer a right to call 
for termination and, if that call is disputed, to submit the dispute 
to some organ or body with power to determine whether the 
conditions for the operation of the doctrine are present. 87 
In this respect, the Court referred to Articles 65 and 66 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties as forming "the procedural complement to 
the doctrine of changed circumstances. "88 But the Court also noted that "in the 
present case, the procedural complement to the doctrine of changed 
circumstance is already provided for in the 1961 Exchange of Notes, which 
specifically calls upon the parties to have recourse to the court in the event of a 
dispute relating to Iceland's extension of fisheries jurisdiction ... "89 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
ICJ Rep 1973,21. 
ICJ Rep 1974, 3. 
In the result, the Court found by ten votes to four that: 
The Government of Iceland is not entitled unilaterally to exclude 
United Kingdom fishing vessels from areas between the fishery 
limits agreed to in the Exchange of Notes of 11 March 1961 and 
the limits specified in the Icelandic regulations of 14 July 1972, 
or unilaterally to im~ose restrictions on the activities of those 
vessels in such areas. 0 
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The Court held, that both governments were "under mutual obligations to 
undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their 
differences concerning their respective fishery rights in the areas. "91 
Thus, for the first time the International Court expressly accepted the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as incorporated in Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention as a statement of customary law. The Court stated: 
International Jaw admits that a fundamental change in the 
circumstances which determined the parties to accept a treaty, 
if it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the 
obligations imposed by it, may, under certain conditions, afford 
the party affected a ground for invoking the termination or 
suspension of the treaty. This principle, and the conditions and 
exceptions to which it is subject, have been embodied in Article 
62 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, which may 
in many respects be considered as a codification of existing 
customary law on the subject of the termination of a treaty 
relationship on account of change of circumstances.92 
In 1985, an arbitration decision again invoked the doctrine. In the dispute 
between the American company Questech Inc. and the Ministry of National 
Defence Iran, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus was invoked as a principle 
involving contract termination. The US-Iran Claims Tribunal applied the doctrine 
because of Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which referred to it 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 ICJ Rep 1973, 18. 
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specifically, and noted that it was a principle justifying contract termination in 
limited situations involving sensitive governmental contracts.93 
(5) The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 contains several 
provisions regarding the doctrine of change of circumstances. These provisions 
are, as OJ Lissitzyn points out, "the most authoritative relevant formulations so 
far produced in the international community".94 Article 62 of the Vienna 
93 Questech Inc. v. MinistryofNat'IDefence, 9 Iran USCTR 107 (1985 II) and See JR Crook, 
Applicable Law in International Arbitration: the I ran-US Claims Tribunal Experience, 
AJIL 83 (1989) 298. 
94 The doctrine had previously been accepted in several influential statements of the law of 
treaties. The Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties was prepared by Harvard 
Research in International Law in 1935, 1096. Article 28, concerning rebus sic stantibus, 
provides tbat 
a. A treaty entered into with reference to the existence of a state of facts, 
the continued existence of which was envisaged by the parties as a 
determining factor moving them to undertake the obligations stipulated, 
may be declared by a competent international tribunal or authority to 
have ceased to be binding, in the sense of calling for further performance, 
when tbat state of facts has been essentially changed. 
b. Pending agreement by the parties upon and decision by a competent 
international tribunal or authority, the party which seeks such a 
declaration may provisionally suspend performance of its obligations 
under the treaty. 
c. A provisional suspension of performance by the party seeking such a 
declaration will not be justified definitively until a decision to this effect 
has been rendered by the competent international tribunal or authority. 
In 1962, the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
formulated the doctrine rebus sic stantibus under the topic of "special problems of 
interpretation" as follows: 
Section 153. Rule of rebus sic stantibus. Substantial change of circumstances. 
(I) An international agreement is subject to the implied condition that a 
substantial change of a temporary or permanent nature, in a state of facts 
existing at the time when the agreement became effective, suspends or 
terminate, as the case may be, the obligations of the parties under tbe 
agreement to the extent tbat the continuation of tbe state of facts was 
of such importance to the achievement of the objectives of the agreement 
tbat the parties would not have intended tbe obligations to be applicable 
under the changed circumstances. 
(2) A party may rely on an interpretation of the agreement as indicated in 
subsection (!) as a basis for suspending or terminating performance of 
the obligations in question only if it did not cause the change ill the state 
of facts by action inconsistent with the purpose of the agreement and has 
otherwise acted in good faith. 
(3) When the conditions specified in subsection (1) apply only to a separable 
portion of the agreement, suspension or termination. applies only to tbat 
portion. 
In 1986, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
provided in section 336 rule of fundamental change of circumstances. This section adopts 
Article 63(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 provides that: 
( 1) A fundamental change of circumstances which has 
occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the 
conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the 
parties, may not be invoked as a ground for tenninating 
or withdrawing from the treaty unless: 
(a) The existence of those circumstances 
constituted an essential basis of the consent 
of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the 
extent of obligations still to be performed under the 
treaty. 
Article 62 further provides that: 
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be 
invoked as a ground for tenninating or withdrawing from 
a treaty; 
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary, or 
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach 
by the party invoking it either of an obligation under 
the treaty or of any other international obligation 
owed to any other party to the treaty. 
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a 
fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for 
tenninating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also 
invoke the change as a ground for suspending the 
operation of the treaty. 
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Article 62 was the product of extensive discussion within the International Law 
Commission. Initially, the Special Rapporteur, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, identified 
three juridical basic theories underlying the doctrine: 
1. The "implied term" theory which deduces the rebus sic 
stantibus clause from the presumed intention of the 
parties; 
2. Rebus sic stantibus is an objective rule of law, not 
dependent on any presumed or implied term of the treaty 
but imposed ab extra; 
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3. The doctrine as an objective rule of law which imports forcibly 
into the treaty, regardless of the intention of the panies.95 
The second of these interpretations of the doctrine was preferred by the Special 
Rapporteur, on the basis that the principle is an objective rule of law and "a 
device by which the rules as to absolute contracts are reconciled with a special 
exception which justice demands".96 Thus the International Law Commission 
accepted the doctrine as an objective rule of law:97 
The theory of an implied term must be rejected and the doctrine 
formulated as an objective rule of law by which, on grounds of 
equity and justice, a fundamental change of circumstances may, 
under cenain conditions, be invoked by a pany as a ground for 
terminating the treaty.98 
But this conclusion was a qualified one, as Sir Humphrey Waldeck, a later 
Special Rapporteur, stated: 
Although the doctrine is properly to be regarded as an objective 
rule of law, its application in any given case cannot be divorced 
from the intentions of the panies at the time of entering into the 
treaty; for the rationale of the rule is that the change of 
circumstances makes the treaty obligations today something 
essentially different from the obligations originally undertaken. 
The problem is to defme the relation which the change of 
circumstances must have to the original intentions of the panies 
and the extent to which that change must have affected the 
fulfilment of those intentions. 99 
Although the Commission decided, in order to avoid any doctrinal 
implication, not to use the term rebus sic stantibus either in the text or even in 
the title of the anicle on fundamental change/00 it clearly took the view that its 
scope should not be narrowly limited to particular classes of treaties.101 The 
Commission's commentary stated: 
95 (1957) JLCY (II) 58-59. 
96 (1957) JLCY (II) 59; and see Vamvoukos, 143. 
97 Lissitzyn, 914. 
98 (1963) JLCY (II) 82-83. 
99 ld, 83-84. 
100 Lissitzyn, 913. 
101 Sweeney, Oliver and Leech, 1016. 
Almost all modern jurists, however reluctantly, admit the 
existence in international law of the principle with which this 
article is concerned and which is commonly spoken of as the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. Just as many systems of municipal 
law recognise that, quite apart from any actual impossibility of 
performance, contracts may become inapplicable through a 
fundamental change of circumstances, so also treaties may 
become inapplicable for the same reason... it shows a wide 
acceptance of the view that a fundamental change of 
circumstances may justify a demand for the termination or 
revision of a treaty, but also shows a strong disposition to 
question the right of a party to denounce a treaty unilaterally on 
this ground... The evidence of the acceptance of the doctrine in 
international law is so considerable that it seems to indicate a 
recognition of a need for this safety valve in the law of 
treaties. 102 
(6) Rebus Sic Stantibus as a General Principle of Law 
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As this passage suggests an important influence on the development of 
the doctrine was the concept of "general principles of law", recognized by Article 
38(l)(c) of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. This 
encouraged lawyers to investigate the question of rebus sic stantibus by looking 
again at private law notions. 103 Thus, H Lauterpacht concluded that the doctrine 
had validity in international as a general principle of law within the meaning of 
Article 38(1)(c), since it had emerged from the various private law systems of 
civilized nations.104 Other international lawyers identified the "general principles 
of law" as the principles of "good faith", "equity" and "justice", and so it can be 
said that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus came to be regarded as based on 
independent legal doctrine rather than on implied consent.105 As H Lauterpacht 
maintained: 
The rule that compacts must be kept is certainly one of the 
bases of the legal relations between the members of any 
community. But at the same time the notion that in certain 
102 (1966) ILCY (II) 257. Further, Article 14 of the Havana Convention on the Law of 
Treaties which was concluded in 1928 between six American States provided that a treaty 
ceases to be effective among them "when it becomes incapable of execution". See MO 
Hudson, International Legislation (4th ed, 1931) 2378. 
103 Hill, 15. 
104 H Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (1927) 167. 
105 Vamvoukos, 25, and see JW Gamer, 511. 
cases the law will refuse to continue to give effect to origil}ally 
valid contracts, is common to all systems of jurisprudence.106 
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He illustrated this argument by municipal law examples, such as article 323 of 
the German Civil Code, the French Code Civil, the various manifestations of the 
doctrine of frustration or supervening impossibility of performance in English 
law, and the express reference to changed conditions in the Austrian Civil Code, 
concluding that although ... 
the protection of the right to rely upon the contract is 
fundamental, there is nevertheless a relatively small segment of 
cases in which the law will recognize that the contract has, as the 
result of an unforeseen change of circumstances, failed to realize 
the true will of the parties and that it cannot be maintained 
wholly or in part.107 
In this examination of different legal systems, he found that despite 
inconsistencies in the rules applying in different systems, "their cumulative effect 
is to give expression to the fact that the law, in some form or other takes 
cognizance of the change of conditions subsequent to the creation of the 
obligation", 108 and that "the Court has the power of adjusting the contract to 
changed circumstances if good faith so requires".Hl9 
Thus, today, most writers consider the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus to 
be well established as a general principle of law, and that there are exceptional 
cases when either party has a moral, if not a legal, right to demand that a treaty 
be revised, replaced or terminated. This right is said to be based on 
considerations of equity and justice, such that if the obligation were the result of 
a private contract the courts would not hesitate to grant relief to the complaining 
party.no 
106 H Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (1933) 273. 
107 ld, 275. 
108 Id, 276. 
109 Vamvoukos, 43. 
110 Ibid. 
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As H Lauterpacht has shown, rebus sic stantibus or equivalent doctrines 
are also found in contracts between private persons.U 1 There is thus every 
ground for arguing, that it is a general principle of law, quite apart from its 
acceptance as part of positive international law in Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
(7) Conclusion: The Status of the Doctrine in Modern International Law 
So far I have discussed the history of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine, 
which was originally a private law concept existing in Roman law, then its 
acceptance by writers of the 16th and 17th centuries. Then, in the 19th century, 
it developed into a characteristic rule of the law of nations, while, in the 
aftermath of World War II, it was reinforced in international law in the form of 
a "general principle of law recognized by civilized nations". Despite differences 
of opinion about the defmition of change of circumstances, there are no 
differences among the majority of the writers on international law regarding the 
following points: 
1. The revision and termination of an agreement, when the 
circumstances have changed or if the agreement was based upon 
an inequality, is justifiable. 
2. Not every change of circumstances can terminate the binding 
force of an agreement. A change must relate to an essential or 
vital aspect of the agreement. 
3. The doctrine of change of circumstances applies only when the 
fundamental conditions or circumstances existing at the time of 
the conclusion of the treaty have changed. The dissatisfied party 
then has the right to demand the other treaty party to terminate 
or revise the treaty. This right must be exercised in good faith. 
4. The doctrine is not a result of the implied intention of the parties, 
but is an objective rule of law. 
5. Many writers have analysed the doctrine of fundamental change 
of circumstances under different systems of law to show that the 
111 For example, Article 610 of the Gennan Civil Code provides provision for remaking a loan 
if there has been a rapid deterioration in the fmancial position of the other party. Article 
2-615 of the United States Unifonn Commercial Code provides for non-delivery in part 
or whole by a seller; if something has occurred, which the parties to the treaty assumed 
would not occur when the treaty was signed, which has made perfonnance of the sale 
impracticable. Sweeney, Oliver and Leech, 1016. 
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doctrine is widely accepted as a general principle of Jaw to which 
contractual obligations are subject, even though this doctrine 
sometimes has a different name. 
Thus, the modern view is, that the doctrine is an objective rule of Jaw operating 
independently of the intention of the parties.112 This tendency culminated in the 
codifying work of the International Law Commission relating to the law of 
treaties, resulting in the Vienna Convention of 1969. The doctrine has now 
completed its development and is accepted by modern jurists of international law 
as an objective rule of law. 113 
(8) Application and procedural aspect of the doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus 
Despite this agreement, there are differences of opinion concerning the 
application of the doctrine. One question is whether a treaty can be cancelled 
or suspended without mutual consent of the treaty parties, or whether the 
dissatisfied party must approach the other and seek its consent to termination. 
In other words the question is whether the doctrine of fundamental change of 
circumstances gives rise to a unilateral right to terminate the treaty, or whether 
one of the parties merely has a right to demand to be released from its treaty 
obligations. "That is to say that the doctrine creates no exception to the 
overriding principle that no State should be the judge in its own case".114 
According to this view, the application of rebus sic stantibus to international 
agreements is limited to a large degree. It does not confer upon a party to a 
treaty any right to act unilaterally to terminate or suspend obligations where 
disputes occur involving the doctrine. Rather, international law requires that the 
parties co-operate in seeking an impartial resolution of their controversy. !lS 
112 
113 
114 
115 
According to Hill: 
Despite any theoretical objections to the contrary, it remains 
true that customary international law lays down the rule that a 
party who seeks release from a treaty on the ground of a change 
Brownlie, 18; and sey DP O'Connell, International Law (2nd edn 1970) 1, 278. 
Vamoukos, 27-28; Brownlie, 621. 
SH Amin, The Theory of Changed Circumstances in International Trade 4, Lloyd's 
Maritime & Commercial Law Quarterly (1982) 578. 
Ibid. 
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of circumstances has no right to terminate the treaty unilaterally, 
and that recognition that the doctrine is applicable must be 
obtained either from the parties to the treaty or from some 
competent international authority .116 
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On the other hand, Fischer Williams's opinion, was that a vital change of 
essential conditions automatically terminated the treaty from the date of the 
change and did not depend on the specific consent of the other party. He stated 
that, in case of a vital change of circumstances, "The treaty in this event is, in 
fact, not voidable, but dead or 'obsolete' if that word be preferred".117 He added 
"in the event of a change of essential conditions, it ceases to be binding as from 
the date of the change, or we may say that natura/iter, from the very nature of 
the case, a contract made with reference to certain conditions disappears when 
the conditions are gone"."8 Similarly, the opinion of most of the earlier writers 
(Heffter, Fiore, Treitschke, Jellinek) was that when the change of circumstances 
which is the foundation of the rule, has taken place, the treaty is henceforth to 
be regarded as obsolete and no longer binding upon the dissatisfied party, and 
such party may repudiate it or terminate it, by a unilateral act.119 
Other writers state that, if the other party or parties refuse to consider 
a request of the dissatisfied party for the revision, termination or replacement of 
. the treaty, the dissatisfied party may then unilaterally terminate the treaty. Thus 
Gamer states: 
To deny the right of a State to denounce and terminate such a 
treaty in these circumstances would be to deny it the right to rid 
itself of an incubus upon its independence and sovereignty to 
which it never consented and which the other party never meant 
to impose upon it. 120 
A similar view was held by Scelle, that the dissatisfied party ought ftrSt to 
endeavour to come to an agreement with the other parties "but if it cannot 
convince them that the principle of rebus sic stantibus requires a modification of 
116 Hill, 78. 
117 Williams, 91. 
118 Jd, 93. 
119 Gamer, 514. 
120 Id, 516. 
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the treaty, it is no longer bound to consider the treaty as binding upon it and it 
may therefore denounce it." 121 
Despite this, overall the balance of opinion prior to the Vienna 
Convention was that if the other parties disagrees with the demands of the 
dissatisfied party to the termination or revision of the treaty, the only permissible 
method of applying the doctrine is by submission to a competent international 
authority.122 This issue is not squarely resolved by the Vienna Convention, 
Article 65(3) of which merely provides that if an "objection has been raised by 
any other party, the parties shall seek a solution through the means indicated in 
Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations."123 
The practice of States with regard to the procedure to be followed when 
the doctrine is invoked, was first laid down in the Declaration of London in 
1871. 124 This Declaration can be interpreted to mean that where a treaty 
contains no provision for its termination, suspension or revision, it can, in the 
absence of any valid ground of termination or revision by operation of law, be 
brought to an end or modified only with the consent of the contracting parties. 
Where, however, there is a valid ground for a review of the contract, this notion 
of consent implies only that the parties recognize that the objective rule of law 
invoked applies to the case in hand. It follows that in the case of a multilateral 
treaty the "consent" of all the contracting parties is not required, and that a 
majority decision is sufficient. 
Before the Vienna Convention was concluded, it was thus arguable that 
customary international law laid down the following rules of procedure: 
121 Scelle, 20 Rev Centrale de Droit International Public 490 quoted by Garner, 516. See 
further Harvard Research in International Law of Treaties, 1102. 
122 Hill, 15. 
123 Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations provides as follows: 
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, frrst of all, seek a solution 
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own 
choice. 
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle 
their dispute by such means. 
124 The declaration of London of 17 January 1871 signed by representatives of Germany, 
Austria-Hungaria, Great Britain, France, Italy, Prussia, Russia and Turkey. 72PP (1871), 
127; 61 BFSP (1193) quoted by Vamvoukos 207. 
A State claiming a change of circumstances has no right to 
unilaterally terminate, suspend or modify a treaty. It must first 
exercise it legal right to seek recognition that its claim is 
legitimate. A corresponding obligation on the other State is to 
enter into negotiations in good faith. 125 
If a change of circumstances can be mutually established to have 
occurred, the treaty can be terminated by the doctrine of rebus 
sic stantibus an objective rule of law. If the other parties ignore 
the demands of the claimant party or do not object to it, or 
refuse to enter into it, the party relying on the doctrine can 
lawfully terminate the treaty or suspend its operation... If 
negotiations fail to reach agreement, the State invoking the 
doctrine must seek a solution, as indicated by article 33 of the 
United Nations Charter, and submit the case to arbitration or 
judicial settlement by an international authority. 
If the other party refuses to do so, the State invoking the 
doctrine will have a legitimate right to terminate or suspend the 
treaty.126 
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It was, however, emphasized in London in 1871 that "it is an essential principle 
of the law of nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of 
a treaty nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the 
contracting powers, by means of an amicable arrangement" .127 
Although, this specific issue is not clearly resolved by the Vienna 
Convention of 1969, Articles 65-68 of the Convention establish general 
procedures to be followed in cases of invalidity, termination, withdrawal from or 
suspension of the operation of a treaty (including under Article 62). Article 
65(1) makes provision for a party to notify other parties of its claim and to 
indicate the measures proposed to be taken. Article 65(2) provides that if no 
objections are raised after the expuy of a period of not less than three months 
the measures may be carried out. Article 65(3) provides that if objection is 
raised, a solution is to be found by the means specified in Article 33 of the 
United Nations Charter. These clauses do not affect the rights or obligations of 
the parties under any provision in force between them with regard to the 
settlement of disputes. 
125 1d, 210-1. 
126 ld, 212-3. 
127 See Woolsey, 349; Keeton 116. 
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(9) Limitations upon the doctrine 
A number of limitations upon the application of the doctrine have been 
proposed or stipulated. These should be briefly referred to. 
(a) Treaties "oflndefinite Duration" 
At one time, it was argued that the doctrine was applicable only to 
treaties whose duration is not fixed or implied but are of "indefinite or perpetual 
duration", and which do not contain provision for termination or revision. Thus 
in Hooper v United States the court held that. .. 
A treaty, which on its face is of indefinite duration and which 
contains no clause providing for its termination, rna~ be annulled 
by one of the parties under certain circumstances. 28 
But the International Law Commission did not accept this view, and the 
limitations of the doctrine to so-called "perpetual treaties" or those which do not 
contain provision for termination, has not been confmned by international 
treaties or by State practice. 129 
(b) Boundary Treaties 
However, certain more limited exceptions from the rule have been 
established. Article 62(2) of the Vienna Convention provides: 
A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as 
a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: 
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary ... 
The reason for that exclusion was not that provisions of those treaties were 
"executed provisions, but that treaties of that type were intended to create a 
stable position" _13° During the debate on Article 62(2), some representatives 
128 22 Court of Claims Reports (1887) 408. 
129 (1966) ILCY (II) 259. 
130 Lissitzyn, 917. 
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from the Third World argued for the deletion of subparagraph 2(a). Mr Tabibi 
(Afghanistan) argued that "this principle was incompatible with the principle of 
peaceful relations among States, since undue rigidity was a source of disputes" 
and "that a [boundary] treaty imposed... for colonial or military reasons should 
not be exempted from the rule" .131 However, this view was not accepted.132 
(c) Extent of Change Required 
As we have seen Article 62 of the Vienna Convention provides that a 
fundamental change of circumstances, which has occurred ... 
since the time the treaty was entered into, and which was 
unforeseen by the parties may be invoked if 
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an es~ential basis 
of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the scope of 
obligations still to be performed under the treaty. 
But other opinions extend the application of the change of circumstances. to cases 
where the change of circumstances, was not "unforeseen" in an absolute sense. 
The possibility of change may have been anticipated by the parties who 
nonetheless failed to provide for it expressly.133 It is also argued that the doctrine 
should also be extended to cases where there is a need for relief against onerous 
obligations generally. 
From the above it can be seen that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has 
a limited application in international law, as it does not confer a party with the 
right to unilaterally terminate a contract; rather it demands the parties seek 
impartial resolution of the conflict. Yet, if there has been a fundamental change 
of circumstances, the parties are under an obligation to renegotiate the contract 
in good faith, and if the other party refuses to enter into negotiations in these 
circumstances, then the contract may be terminated or suspended. 
131 
132 
133 
Official Records: First Session, 373. Quoted byRD Kearney and RE Dalton, The Treaty 
on Treaties, AJIL 64 (1970) 543. 
ld, 544. 
Lissitzyn, 912. ' 
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(d) Effect of Invocation of the Doctrine 
It is clear that the effect of a fundamental change of circumstances is 
suspension of or termination of only those portions of the treaty which remain 
to be fulfilled and does not effect those portions which have been executed.134 
3. Fundamental Change of Circumstances and Termination or Revision of 
Concessions 
The doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances or some analogous 
doctrine is found not only in international law, but in Islamic Shari'ah, as well as 
in the common law and the civil law. Consequently, the right to renegotiate an 
agreement in cenain circumstances is recognized in these different legal systems, 
as we have seen. The doctrine has also been recognized in transnational 
arbitrations involving multinational corporations. 
In this section I will mention the doctrine in the common and civil law 
systems and in the next chapter I will discuss the doctrine in Islamic Shari'ah. 
(1) The Common Law Doctrine of Frustration 
The doctrine of frustration of contract in English law is very close to the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus in international law. The determining feature in 
both cases is an unforeseen external event or series of events or !i gradual change 
of circumstances. 135 Concerning the theoretical basis of this doctrine, these are 
three different views: 
1. The theory of "implied term" according to which there is an 
implied term in every contract, that performance is to be made 
only if it remains reasonably possible in accordance with what the 
parties of the contract contemplated. 
2. The theory of "material change" according to which, since the 
contract is based on consent, a pany is not bound to perform if 
134 Hill, 14. 
135 Williams, 93. 
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conditions arise, other than which were consented to when the 
contract was signed. 
3. That the doctrine is a device by which the rules of the contract 
which are expressed in absolute terms can be reconciled by the 
court to bring it into line with what justice demand. It enables 
the court to intervene to supply a just and reasonable solution in 
situations which the initial contract could not have anticipated.136 
Despite earlier dicta of Lord Sumner in the Privy Council, 137 the third of these 
views is now generally accepted. 
In the United States, the 1979 Second Restatement of the Law of 
Contracts provided as follows: 
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is 
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an 
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on 
which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render 
performance are discharged, unless the language or the 
circumstances indicate the contrary _'38 
This rule is subject to the limitation that "it applies only when the frustration is 
without the fault of the party who seeks to take advantage of the rule, and it 
does not apply if the language or circumstances indicate the contrary". 
Frustration as a result of circumstances existing at the time of the making of the 
contract rather than as a result of supervening circumstances is governed by a 
similar rule stated in section 266(2). 139 
(2) The Civil Law Doctrine of Imprevision 
The doctrine of imprevision, which is found in French law, was developed 
by the French administrative courts during and after the 1914-1918 War. It is 
applicable to contracts between private persons and the government and has 
136 Amin, 579. 
137 HirjiMu/ji and othersv. Cheong Yue SS Co. Ltd [1926)AC 509. See Fischer Williams, 92. 
Harvard Research in International Law of Treaties, 1111. 
138 Restatement of the Law Second, Contracts (1979) vol 2, Section 265, 264-265. 
139 Id, 335. 
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been recognized by the Council of State, 140 but it has not been recognized by the 
Court of Cassation as applicable to private contracts between individuals. It 
gives a right to the modification of contract terms in case of an unforeseen 
change in circumstances. 
The Council of State stated in Gaz de Bordeaux in 1916 that "a party has 
the right to demand a revision of the terms of a contract of concession whenever 
the equilibrium between the profits which it earns and the cost of manufacture 
has been upset by an unforeseen change of conditions, such as an increase in the 
cost of coal or other commodities used in the manufacture of gas." 141 
On the other hand, the doctrine of imprevision provides only for the 
revision of the contract under the new conditions, while the doctrine of rebus sic 
stantibus provides both for revision and the termination of the obligation.142 The 
doctrine of imprevision has found its way into the private law codes of certain 
countries (for example, Article 269 of the Polish Civil Code of 1932, Article 1467 
of the Italian Civil Code of 1946 and Article 147 of the Egyptian Civil Code of 
1948).143 
The doctrines of imprevision and frustration are similar, but as Mitchell 
pointed out there is one major difference: 
while the English theory recognizes the termination of the 
contract and adjusts the position of the parties in view of this 
fact, the doctrine of imprevision on the contrary is founded upon 
the continuation of the contract. It was designed, in the ftrst 
place, as a means of surmounting temporary obstacles to the 
continuity of performance. The similarity of the two doctrines 
lies in the circumstances which give grants for their application. 
The French doctrine depends upon the existence of unforeseen 
circumstances which result in "bouleversement de I' economie du 
contrat", a phrase which is very close to Lord Wright's phrase -
the "frustration of the commercial purpose".144 
140 Harvard Research in International Law of Treaties, 1112. 
141 Siiey,Recueil, 1916,111-17quoted byHarvard Research in International LawofTreaties, 
1112. 
142 Ibid. See further Hill, 19. 
14 3 Zakariya, 272. 
144 JOB Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities. A Comparative Study (1954) 190. 
In a discussion of frustration of contract Friedmann notes that: 
A vital change of circumstances may lead sometimes to the 
complete discharge and sometimes to the judicial modification 
of the terms of contract. The major effect of the doctrine .. .is the 
substantial limitation of the sphere of breach of contract, and, 
with it, the diminution, of the value of contract as a measure of 
security against economic risks .... The doctrine of frustration, 
while mainly a judicial code has also been incorporated into the 
Greek Civil Code.145 
4. Effects of Stabilization Clauses on the Invocation of the Doctrine 
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The purpose of a stabilization clause, in a concession agreement is to 
prevent the State party from making any alteration in the contract without the 
agreement of the private party. Historically, it was intended to give added 
security to the private party's investment under the contract, and to act as a 
counterweight to the sovereign power of the State.146 Asante states that such 
clauses are in particular directed against: 
1. The raising of taxes beyond the rates operating at the time of the 
agreement or otherwise stipulated in the agreement; 
2. The imposing of any fiscal changes in the general industrial or 
commerCial sectors in excess of the fiscal charges provided in the 
agreement; 
3. The amendment of the laws such as corporate and tax laws, which 
were in force on the date of the agreement. .. 
4. Expropriation, nationalization and any other form of intervention 
in the enterprise.147 
Its effect, if successful, was to make the contractual provisions rigid and 
inflexible.148 The two legal bases for the validity of stabilization clauses in 
145 W Friedmann, Changing Functions of Contract in the Common Law, UniversityofToronto 
Law Journal IX (1951) 39. 
146 A Redfern, The Arbitration between the government of Kuwait and Aminoil, BYIL 55 
(1984) 98. 
147 SK.B Asante, The Concept of Stability of Contractual Relations in The Transnational 
Investment Process, in Hossain (ed.), 245. 
148 SR Chowdhury, Permanent Sovereignty and its Impact on Stabilization Clauses, Standard 
of Compensation and Patterns of Development Co-operation, in Hossain and Chowdhury 
(eds), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resouces in International Law (1984) 48. 
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contracts are the theories of "acquired rights" and pacta sunt servanda. 149 Verwey 
and Schrijver state that: 
... the right to nationalize as such is no longer the subject of 
controversy, but the exercise of the right will be invalid if the 
taking of foreign property is contrary ( 1) to a treaty or contract 
which provides for "stabilization clauses" or "unassailability 
clauses" and (2) not supported by a public purpose ... 150 
Thus there are differences of opinion as to whether the stabilization clause can 
be interpreted as a renunciation of the State's right to nationalize private 
property for public purpose. To examine the status and effects of stabilization 
clauses, I will look at three awards relating to the Libyan oil nationalization of 
1974 and the Aminoil-Kuwait arbitration award of 1986. 
(1) The ·Three Libyan Awards 
Three Libyan arbitral awards - involving BP!SI, Texaco,152 and Liamco153 
- are at the heart of the controversy over the effect of stabilization clauses on 
concessions. The cases involved a common clause, clause 16 of the respective 
concession agreements, which in its final form after amendment in 1965 provided 
that: 
1. The Government of Libya, the Commission and the appropriate 
provincial authorities shall take steps necessary to ensure 
company's enjoyment of all the rights conferred by this concession. 
The contractual rights expressly created by this concession shall 
not be altered except by mutual consent of the parties. 
2. This concession shall throughout the period of its validity be 
construed in accordance with the Petroleum Law and the 
regnlations in force on the date of the execution of the agreement 
of amendment by which this paragraph (2) was incorporated into 
this concession agreement. Any amendment to and repeal of such 
149 Ibid. 
150 WD Verwey & NJ Schrijver, The Taking of Foreign Property under International Law. 
A New Legal Perspective, Meeting at the Peace Palace, The Hague. September 1984,4. 
See also Chowdhury, 52-3. 
151 Arbitration between the Government of Libya & BP ILR 53 (1979) 297. 
152 Arbitration between the Government of Libya & TexJJco liM 17 (1978) 1. 
153 Arbitration between the Government of Libya & Liamco liM 20 (1981) 1. 
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regulations shall not affect the contractual rights of the company 
without its consent. 
However the interpretation of the stabilization clause in the three Libyan cases 
was inconsistent, leading to no clear conclusion. 
The purpose of clause 16 was to ensure that concession holders could 
maintain their rights unless they agreed otherwise, and the effect of the clause 
was to ensure a commitment to the contract by the State.154 Arbitrator 
Mahmassani in the Liamco Arbitration discussed this point as follows: 
To strengthen this contractual character in Liamco's and similar 
other concession agreements as a precaution against the fact that 
one of the parties is the State, it was deemed necessary to 
ensure a certain protection for the contractual rights of the 
concessionaire. Usually foreign investors before taking the risk 
of investing substantial amounts of money and labor for 
'working' their concessions, are anxious to seek sufficient 
assurance for the respect of the principle of the sanctity of 
contracts... any such alteration or abrogation of concession 
agreements should be made by mutual consent of the parties. 
To ensure such protection in Liamco's concessions, a specific 
provision has been inserted to that effect in clause 16 of its 
agreements.155 
While the right of nationalization was not questioned, it was not considered an 
unlimited power, but entailed under international law an obligation by the State 
to recognize the terms and conditions of the agreement with a contracting party. 
Further, under Islamic Shari'ah, a source of Libyan law, parties must 
fulfil their contractual obligations. As Arbitrator Dupuy stated: 
Thus under the Shari' ah, nobody, neither the sovereign nor any 
official, is exempted as a matter of privilege. If, in conformity 
with the Siyasa doctrine, the sovereign has large discretionary 
powers as regards the promotion of public interest, he must 
154 Clause 16, which was modified by a December 1961 Royal Decree, was characterized as 
"a fundamental provision emphasizing the sanctity of contract": Qasem, Libya's New Oil 
Policy, world Petrolewn, September 1962,49-90. 
155 Liamco Award ILM 20 (1981) 58. See RB von Mehren & PN Kourides, International 
Arbitrations between States and Foreign Private Parties. The Libyan Nationalization 
Cases, AJIL 75 (1981) 480. 
nonetheless abide by the commands of the supreme law, and 
then Ibn Quadarna (a Hanbali School jurist) states that "a 
breach of a commitment on the part of the Imam is more 
serious and more heinous than a breach committed by anybody 
else, because of its baneful consequences." Now, it is accepted 
that this rule covers also agreements entered into with 
non-Muslims.156 
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He also referred to the famous precept of Islamic Shari 'ah found in the Holy 
Qur'an: "0 ye believers, perform your contracts", and to Articles 147 and 148 of 
the Libyan Civil Code, which confirms that contracts must be performed in good 
faith in accordance with their terms. 157 Therefore, as we will see in Chapters 8-
9, unless the doctrine of Durura- the principle of necessity -can be invoked, the 
onus under Islamic Shari'ah is on the parties to abide by the contract. 
In the Liamco Arbitration, Arbitrator Mahmassani made these comments 
regarding Islamic Shari'ah and Libyan law: 
The principle of the respect for agreements is thus applicable to 
ordinary contracts and concession agreements. It is binding on 
individuals as well as governments. The same is admitted in 
Islamic law, as is evidenced by many historical precedents. For 
instance, no less than the Great Caliphs Umar Ibn Al-Khattab 
and Imam Ali accepted to abide by their agreements and to 
appear before the Cadis [Judges] as ordinary litigants without 
feeling that this conduct was against their sovereign dignity ... 158 
International law carne to the same principle: "The State as a sovereign entity 
possesses the power to grant rights and bind itself to agreed terms. To permit 
a State to use its sovereignty to disregard commitments that it freely undertook 
through the exercise of that very sovereignty would be anomalous. Such a result 
would undermine and destroy the legal framework of the international order."159 
Arbitrator Mahmassani noted that "international custom and case law had always 
sustained the proposition of 'pacta sunt servanda'". 160 Similarly, Arbitrator Dupuy 
noted that, while the effect of clause 16 was to stabilize the position of the 
156 Quoted by von Mehren & Kourides, 517. . 
157 ld, 514. 
158 Liamco Award, ILM 20 (1981) 110-1. See von Mehren & Kourides, 518. 
159 Quoted by von Mehren & Kourides, 518. 
160 Jd, 518-9. 
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contracting panies, it "does not in principle, impair the sovereignty of the Libyan 
State ... " 161 
In the Liamco Arbitration Arbitrator Mahmassani also confirmed the 
effect of clause 16: 
To ensure such protection in Liamco's concessions, a specific 
provision has been inserted to that effect in clause 16 of its 
agreements. That clause has been legally authorized by and 
modelled upon the same standard clause of schedule 11 annexed 
to the petroleum laws of 1955 and 1965 ... The above clause 16 
comes under what has been termed "stabilization" and 
"intangibility" clause, which have been considered as legally 
binding under international law .... 162 
Arbitrator Dupuy concluded that a State which has exercised its 
sovereignty to enter into a contract with a foreign private pany cannot disregard 
these commitments by invoking its sovereignty to terminate the contract, and that 
while the right of a State to nationalize is internationally recognized, it cannot 
disregard its commitments in the contract, especially if it has accepted the 
inclusion of a stabilization clause.163 
In the BP case, clause 16 was held to be ineffective to nullify the 
nationalization measures taken by Libya, even though they were taken for overtly 
political reasons. But the Arbitrator held that the nationalization was arbitrary, 
discriminatory and amounted to a confiscation of property, and that damages 
would need to be paid. In the Liamco case the nationalization was not seen as 
discriminatory or wrongful, but there was liability for compensation for 
premature termination, and equitable compensation would need to be paid. 
However, in the Texaco case, the nationalization was held to be a contravention 
of the contract, so that clause 16 had the effect of "stabilizing" the petroleum 
legislation at the date of the execution of the agreement. The effect of these 
decisions varied from an interpretation that invalidated Libya's right to 
161 Id, 519. 
162 Liamco Award ILM 20 (1981) 58-9. 
163 von Mehren & Kouri des, 519. 
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nationalize to one that resulted in an obligation by the State to pay equitable 
compensation for nationalized property. 164 
(2) The Aminoil Arbitration 
In 1977, the Kuwait Government acted unilaterally to terminate the 
American owned Arninoil Company's concession in Kuwait and to nationalize the 
company. This concession, which had been granted in 1948, was to run for a 
period of 60 years, and the price to be paid was a fixed royalty of US$2.50 for 
every ton of petroleum. There was no provision under which the Ruler would 
obtain a higher return if oil prices increased. It was expressly stated in the 
agreement that no changes were to be made in the terms of the agreement "by 
either the Sheikh or the Company" unless both agreed that such changes were 
"desirable in the interest of both parties" (Article 17).165 
However many changes were made to this agreement, following earlier 
Saudi Arabian practice. In 1961, Arninoil became subject to Kuwait's income tax 
decrees, and in 1973 the payments due from Arninoil were increased. Following 
the war in the Middle East, in October 1973, the price of oil increased 
dramatically and OPEC announced that the average government "take" from 
operating oil companies would be $10.12 per barrel from January 1975, and that 
the revenues left to operating oil companies would be only 22 cents per barrel. 
Arninoil, fearing it would be driven out of business, requested negotiations with 
the Government. 166 
The failure to reach agreement led to a Decree Law No 124 of 19 
September 1977, which enacted that Arninoil's concessions would be terminated, 
that Arninoil's assets in Kuwait should return to the State and that fair 
compensation should be paid to Arninoil.167 Arninoil' s refusal to take part in the 
compensation committee led to an arbitration agreement between the parties in 
Kuwait on 23 July 1979. The arbitration tribunal of three members met in Paris. 
164 Chowdhury, 50. 
165 Redfern, 65-9. 
166 Id, 72. 
167 Ibid. 
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In the arbitration, Kuwait argued that "during the thirty years which had 
passed since the concession had been granted, there had been major political, 
economic and social changes both within its own territory and in the world 
outside. These changes were reflected in developed public international law and 
in particular, in those resolutions of the United Nations which concerned State 
sovereignty over natural resources and the new international economic order" .168 
The company argued "that it had paid a fair price for its concession and that, 
under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the company should have been entitled 
to go on operating the oil-fields until its contract to do so ran out, in the year 
2008". 169 
The positions of both parties were quite clear. The Government 
suggested, that as its agreement with Arninoil was a State contract, the tribunal 
should follow the normal rule and apply the law of the State party to the 
contract. Aminoil contended that the contract should not be considered a state 
law and should be internationalized. It argued that "pacta sunt servanda" was a 
fundamental principle of law and that a State could not lawfully abrogate a 
contract with a foreign party where it had expressly agreed not to do so. It 
placed heavy reliance on the stabilization clauses in the concession agreement. 
The Government argued that the stabilization clauses themselves could not be 
expected to survive the dramatic changes which had taken place since 1948. 
These included the declared independence of Kuwait; the promulgation of a new 
Constitution for the State and major revisions to the concession agreement itself. 
In its final decision, the Tribunal seemed to attach most importance to 
the "metamorphosis in the whole character of the concession" as a result of 
changes brought about with at least the tacit acceptance of the company, which 
entered neither reservations nor objections in respect to them. It recognized that 
times had changed since the making of the original agreement, and that its 
provisions would be out of touch with these changes, if they construed the 
agreement or the stabilization clauses it contained as an absolute prohibition 
against nationalization. The Tribunal stated that: 
168 ld, 74. 
169 Ibid. 
this concession, in its origin a mining concession granted by a 
State whose institutions were still incomplete and directed to 
narrow patrimonial ends became one of the essential instruments 
in the economic and social ~rogress of a national community in 
full process of development. 70 
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As this transformation took place, so did the contract of concession change its 
character. 
The Kuwait Government had, firstly, argued that the Article 17 was a 
colonial type of stabilization clause. This argument was rejected as Kuwait had 
reconfirmed these agreements as late as 1973 after Kuwait's independence and 
the promulgation of a new constitution. The Award also rejected the 
Government's argument "that the constitution had annulled the clauses and that 
in any event they were invalidated by a rule of jus cogens in international law 
whereby a State is prohibited from restricting its sovereignty over its natural 
resources." The Award stated: 
This contention lacks all foundation. Even if Assembly 
Resolution 1803 (XVll) adopted in 1962, is to be regarded, by 
reason of the circumstance of its adoption, as reflecting the then 
State of international law, such is not the case with subsequent 
resolutions which have not had the same degree of authority. 
Even if some of their provisions can be regarded as codifying 
rules that reflect international practice, it would not be possible 
from this to deduce the existence of a rule of international law 
prohibiting a State from undertaking not to proceed to a 
nationalization during a limited period of time. It may indeed 
well be eminently useful that 'host' States should, if they so 
desire, be able to pledge themselves not to nationalize given 
foreign undenakings within a limited period; and no rule of 
public international law prevents them from doing so.171 
On the other hand Aminoil had claimed that: 
1. International law applies to the relations between the 
parties. 
170 ld, 103. 
171 G Marston, "The Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration", JWTL, 17 (1983) 180-1. 
2. Present international law forbids the State to nationalize 
when it has agreed to stabilize the legal situation of the foreign 
investor. 172 
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Funher Aminoil argued "that stabilization clauses did no more than embody 
general principles of law and therefore they did not change what would have 
been in any event the company's legal position.'' 173 The tribunal rejected these 
arguments, noting that the stabilization clauses had the effect of specifically 
protecting the concessionaire, and was "a well-known principle in the 
interpretation of contractual undenakings" P4 
The third argument of the Government was that while a State was 
entitled to limit its legislative freedom for a limited period it could not do so for 
the whole life of the agreement.175 Again, the tribunal stated there was no law 
which could prevent a State from pledging not to nationalize foreign propeny 
undenakings. They said: 
it would not be possible... to deduce the existence of a rule of 
international law prohibiting a State from undertaking not to 
proceed to a nationalisation during a limited period of time.176 
However, the Tribunal did not attempt to defme what was a limited period of 
time, and stated that they were not prepared to interpret the clause so as to 
prohibit nationalization. Thus the Tribunal concluded that "it refused to view the 
stabilization clauses as a renunciation by the State to its right to nationalize,"177 
and interpreted it to be specifically directed against "anything which, by reason 
of its confiscatory character, might cause serious financial prejudice to the 
interests of the company." 178 Therefore the stabilization clauses were interpreted 
as being a commitment to ensuring that nationalization did not have a 
confiscatory character and as reinforcing "the necessity for a proper 
172 FR Tes6n, "Stale Contracts and Oil Expropriations. The Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration", 
Virginia Journal of International Law, 24 (1984) 340. 
173 ld, 340-341. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Redfern, 102. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Tes6n, 344. 
178 Redfern, 104. 
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indemnification as a condition of it" .179 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice disagreed with 
this interpretation, noting that " ... although the nationalization of Aminoil' s 
undenaking may otherwise have been perfectly lawful, considered simply in its 
aspect of being an act of the State, it was nevenheless irreconcilable with the 
stabilisation clauses of a concession that was still in force at the moment of the 
takeover" .180 
Thus, the stabilization clauses had to be read in the light of 
developments which had taken place both in international law and in the 
relationship of the panies since the original grant of the concession. The 
majority of the arbitrators indicated that "such a pledge, to be valid, would have 
to be for a limited period only" .181 In the result, compensation was assessed as 
the sum due as fair compensation for a legitimate act of nationalization. 
The Kuwait ruling indicates that stabilization clauses do not prohibit 
nationalization, but rather serve as a factor to consider when deciding on proper 
indemnification. 
(3) The Views of Writers 
There are three main themes in the writing on stabilization clauses; the 
first two opposing each other and the third, an attempt to integrate these views 
and provide a practical solution to the status of the clause. 
Wei! claims; that as a State can restrict the use of its prerogatives 
through a treaty, so it can also do it by a contract. He concludes, that such 
"clauses" deprive the host State of the power to terminate a concession without 
a private pany' s consent. He bases his conclusion on the ground that a contract 
which contains a stabilization clause is governed by international law rather than 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Id, 102. Further, in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case before the International Court 
of Justice 1952, Judge Alvarez referred in his dissenting opinion to the doctrine of rebus 
sic stantibus as a "well-known rule in the law of nations". However, the doctrine was not 
invoked by the Government of Iran before the International Court of Justice. See ICJ 
Rep 1952, 93, 124, 126. • 
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the law of the contracting State.182 Writers taking this approach see the 
stabilization clause as providing added protection to the security of a contract. 
Verwey and Schrijver claim that while the right to nationalize is no 
longer a matter of controversy, the right will be invalid if it is contrary "to a 
treaty or contract which provides for a 'stabilization clause' or 'unassailability 
clauses', and not supported by a public purpose.... They claim that the violation 
of a contractual guarantee provided for in a treaty or concession amount to a 
violation of international law" .183 
Others claim, that such clauses are invalid as they limit the ability of 
states to control their future legislative freedom, such claims maintain that there 
is no international customary rule which would allow stabilization clauses to 
become a special case for the assessment of the legality of unilateral termination 
of a contract. 184 
A modern position of compromise is stated by Jimenez de Arechaga who 
sees the clause as a factor to be considered in determining the appropriate 
compensation. He notes: 
This does not mean that stabilization clauses have no legal 
effect. An anticipated cancellation in violation of such a 
contractual stipulation would give rise to a special right to 
compensation; the amount of the indemnity would have to be 
much higher than in normal cases because the existence of such 
a clause is a most pertinent condition which must be taken into 
account in determining the appropriate compensation. For 
instance, there would be a duty to compensate for the 
prospective gains (lucrum cessans) to be obtained by the private 
party during the period that the concession still has to run. 185 
182 P. Wei!, Les clauses de stabilisation ou d'intangibi/ite inserees dans les Accords de 
developpement Economique, in Melanges, Offerts a Chmles Rousseau (1974), quoted by 
J de Arechaga, State responsibility for the nationalization of foreign-owned property, 
NYUJILP, 11 (1978) 191. 
183 Verwey & Schrijver, 4. 
184 EJ Paasivirta, Participation of States in International Contracts and the Arbitral Settlement 
of Disputes (Cambridge PhD Thesis, 1988) 136. 
185 de An!chaga, 192. 
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Such a position supports a State's right to nationalize while safeguarding the 
economic investment of the parties' interest in the contract. 
In this context, it is also interesting to note the conclusions of a Report 
of a Committee of the Australian Branch of the International Law Association 
regarding "stabilization clauses". The Committee concluded that: 
(a) Economic development agreement (EDA's) by their very nature 
cannot realistically be seen to be immutable; 
(b) Practice through the use of renegotiation 
renegotiation clauses will tend to ensure 
henceforth be variable.186 
and reliance on 
that EDA's will 
After discussing the views of Wei! and Arechaga on the effect of stabilization 
clauses in municipal and international law, the Report observes: 
Perhaps the advantage of stabilization clause is therefore 
political or moral rather than legal. While the stabilization 
clauses will be of little effect in municipal law, at least in English 
and Australian municipal law, it is hard to see that it could have 
any greater effect in international law unless the contract itself 
can be said to be subject to a non-State legal system. Our 
evaluation of arguments in support of such delocalization of 
EDA's suggests that this is unlikely, or that even if it occurs, 
such agreements are not immutable.187 
(4) Conclusion 
In my opinion, with regard to the conflict between the right of the State 
to nationalize foreign property and the principle of stabilization clauses in 
concession agreements, international law has recognized the right of the State to 
nationalize foreign property. Thus the Aminoil award rightly recognized that the 
principle of stabilization may validly limit the right to nationalize, but did not 
expressly prohibit it.188 The right to nationalize has been recognized in many 
United Nations resolutions beginning from Resolution 1803 in 1962. This right 
186 Australian Branch Report Ch.4, 163, 180. See Chowdhury, 53, 4, 5. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Marston, 180. 
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is to be based on grounds of public utility, security or the national interest. 
However, the State cannot invoke its sovereignty to disregard its contract with 
private foreign companies, in its termination or amendment of any contract, 
without the agreement of the party where it had agreed not to do so. The State 
must keep to its commitment. 
International law recognizes the principle of pacta sunt servanda both in 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and as a 
fundamental principle of law by which contracting parties must keep their 
commitments. On the other hand international law also recognizes the principle 
of rebus sic stantibus or change of circumstances in Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention. Thus the revision or termination of an agreement is proper in cases 
where circumstances have changed or where the agreement was based upon an 
inequality. 
In my opinion a resolution to the conflict between rebus sic stantibus and 
pacta sunt servanda may be found in the fundamental principles of international 
law. In the case where a State breaches its contract with a private foreign 
company before the termination date by nationalization of the private foreign 
company, and where the contract was signed as a long term agreement and if, 
this nationalization causes the private foreign company damages, as a result of 
the takeover, the company has the right to claim compensation and the State is 
obliged to pay this compensation according to the standard of international law. 
In this way it may be possible to arrive at a reconciliation of the two principles. 
Thus rebus sic stantibus is not in conflict with pacta sunt servanda. It 
simply begins to operate once the conditions for pacta sunt servanda cease to 
operate. It will begin at the lower limit when parties to a contract agree at the 
time of signing that cenain conditions exist and may be terminated if those 
circumstances change. This may lead to the implication that such changes have 
made continuation incompatible with the original intention of the parties. 
Stabilization clauses - as noted in the Arninoil case - could not be expected to 
survive the dramatic changes that may have occurred. It was the implicit or, in 
the above case, explicit, recognition of these changes that led to the use of the 
rebus sic stantibus doctrine. 
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CHAPTERS 
RENEGOTIATIONOF OIL CONCESSION AGREEMENTS: 
FUNDAMENTALCHANGEOF CIRCUMSTANCESAND THE 
TERMINATION OF TREATIES IN ISLAMIC SHARI' AHLA W 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the theory of fundamental 
change of circumstances according to the opinion of Islamic jurists. This is 
relevant, both because those opinions must form part of the body of learning 
which goes to constitute "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" 
(as referred to in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice) but also, because a concession agreement involving natural resources in 
an Islamic country, whatever its proper law, must take account of the law of that 
country as the law of the place where the concession is to be performed. Some 
understanding of the Islamic Shari 'ah on the point is thus essential. 
Although this is not a work of Islamic history, it is necessary ftrst to 
mention some important elements in the Islamic religion as a background to the 
following discussion. Then I will discuss the basic rules of change of 
circumstances, i.e. the effect of the changes in circumstances on the parties' 
commitments as one of the excuses which justify the termination or the 
amendment of the contract. In particular I will consider the deftnition of the 
excuse, its scope, and the relationship between force majeure and change of 
circumstances. Particular cases which have had a signiftcant effect on the 
development of the doctrine in Islamic law will then be referred to: in particular 
the "waqj'' endowment problems which arose in the Ottoman Empire in 1303 AH 
( 1893 ), and the recent resolution of Council of Higher Scholars Committee in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 1402 AH (1982) concerning the possibility of 
increasing the rental charges stated in the old "waqj'' contracts in case of a change 
of circumstances. Finally, I will discuss the procedures which Islamic law dictates 
should be followed in the case of contractual and treaty amendment or 
termination on grounds of change of circumstances. 
2. Historical Background 
(1) Sources of Islamic Shari'ah Law 
There are basically four sources of Islamic Shari'ah. These are: 
1. The Holy Qur'an (the word of god). 
2. The S unnah (The practice and traditions of the last of 
God's Messengers, Muhammad). 
3. ljma (Consensus of opinion). 
4. Qiyas (Reasoning by analogy). 
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There are also several minor sources which developed later as products 
of search by Muslim jurists for solutions to contemporary matters. These are: 
1. Al-Istihsan, which is "the deviation, on a certain issue, 
from the rule of a precedent to another rule for a more 
relevant legal reason that requires such deviation". 
2. Al-Istislah, which is "the unprecedented 
motivated by public interest to which neither 
nor the Sunnah explicitly refer". 
3. Al-Urj, or local custom, and usage.1 
Judgment 
to Qur'an 
These sources are not of equal importance. In fact the first two sources 
(the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah) are basic sources of Islamic Shari'ah, and 
there is no controversy among Muslim jurists (Al-Fugaha) about this position. 
The second two sources, Ijma (consensus of opinion) and Qiyas (reasoning by 
analogy) follow. After these four great sources the other minor sources follow 
in turn. 
However, with the exception of Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah each of the 
other sources has been a matter of controversy among Muslim jurists: these 
controversies have related to the very existence, legality and. definition of the 
lesser sources. As is normal after the termination of revelation, these 
controversies have · raged ever since Muslim jurists started to build up their 
1 S Ramadan, Islamic Law, Its Scope and Equity (1961) 23. 
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individual opinions (Ra'y), after the prophet Muhammad's death and the 
completion of the principles of the Islamic religion. 
(2) Schools of Jurisprudence in Islamic Shari'ah 
There are four Schools of Jurisprudence in Islamic Shari 'ah. In this 
chapter I will discuss their attitude towards the theory of change of circumstances 
in Islamic Shari'ah. The basis for these divergencies is the statement of the 
Prophet Muhammad that "The disagreement of my people is a mercy from 
Allah. "2 The character of this controversy and discussion was, and in a sense 
remains, theological: different opinions have been established among the Muslim 
world in the form of A/-ljtihad (individual opinions) on the basis of the two great 
sources of Islam, the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 
During the second and third centuries of the Islamic era (the eighth and 
ninth of the Christian era), according to Iqbal "not less than nineteen schools of 
law and legal opinion appeared in Islam. This fact alone is sufficient to show 
how incessantly our early doctors of law worked in order to meet the necessities 
of a growing civilization".3 However, no particular school dominated among the 
Muslim communities. Eventually four great schools of jurisprudence in Islamic 
Shari'ah were established as orthodox in the fourth century of the Hijrah,4 the 
Islamic era. Each was named after its jurist founder and each now prevails in a 
different country.5 They are: 
1. The Hanafi School, founded by Imam Abu Hanifa (696-767 AD), 
is influential in Iran, Syria, lower Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, 
Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, the Balkan countries, · Cyprus, 
Rhodes, and China. 6 
2 See M Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (1960) (1955) 35; NJ Coulson, A 
History of Islamic Law, (1971) (1964) 182. 
3 Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (1951) 165, quoted by Ramadan, 
79. 
4 
5 
6 
Hijrah or anno Hegirae (AH), is the date when God ordered the prophet Muhammad to 
emigrate from Makkah to Medina in 622 AD, from which the Arabian and Islamic era 
started. 
See further information, see M Khadduri & HJ Liebesny (eds), Law in the Middle East, 
1 (1955) 57. 
The notion of judgment upon reasoning adopted by Abu Hanifah and is termed al-qiyas. • 
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2. The Maliki School, founded by Imam Malik, (715-795 AD), 
spread in North and West Africa, upper Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, 
Somaliland, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, West of French, 
Gambia and Nigeria. 
3. The Shafi'i School (767-820 AD), founded by Imam AI Shafi'i, 
spread in lower Egypt, AI-Yaman, part of Eritrea, and Somaliland, 
Tanganyika, Kenya, Indonesia, Malaya, Siam, and Philippines 
(Sulu). 
4. The Hanbali School (780-855 AD), founded by Ahmad Ibn 
Hanbal, was dominant in Saudi Arabia, the Arab states of the 
Gulf, Syria, Palestine and Iraq. 
Since each school shares a single doctrine of sources of law, there are no 
differences in fundamentals, but they differ in several points through 
interpretation. Therefore, every Muslim can change his preference from one 
school to another during his lifetime without any restriction or criticism from 
Muslim communities. On the other hand, there is no permission to jump from 
school to school to find an easy interpretation or solution to the problems which 
every Muslim faces. There must be some commitment to the school which has 
been chosen. 
Those schools do not have the same opinion regarding the theory of 
change of circumstances. While all of them accept it as a principle, there are 
differences in its interpretation and application, as I will analyse later. 
(3) Difficulties of language 
In the case of Islamic Shari' ah, translating from the Arabic is especially 
difficult because the Qur'an has an extremely complex language and a linguistic 
form totally different from western languages. There is thus both a problem of 
translation and of the different interpretation of legal expressions. As Justice 
Robert Jackson said: 
The barrier of language presents more than the usual difficulty 
of comparative law studies in the case of Islamic law. A 
competent scholar engaged in translating for English readers 
what Muslims hold to be the meaning of the words of the 
Qur'an despaired of the effort to convey its spirit and declared 
that the Qur' an cannot be translated so as to be made plain to 
one who disbelieves its inspiration and its message. I suspect 
that the same difficulty of communication carries over into the 
effort to expound Islamic law to American readers. The writers 
of this work, as those of all others I have seen, find it necessary 
to use many word which probably convey to the Muslim a whole 
complex of meaning, a cluster of ideas, but which do not have 
an English equivalent. In course of time it is the custom that 
legal expressions come to carry a whole bundle of ideas to the 
initiate as do our phrases "due process of law" "equity 
jurisprudence" "trial by jury" or "judicial review". It appears to 
be true of many Islamic legal terms that they wrap volumes of 
meaning into a single word, which may be expounded to us, but 
we not having the same concept in our law have no legal term 
to fit it.7 
3 The Basic Rules of Change of Circumstances 
(1) Al-Ijtihad, or "Individual reasoning" 
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The most important of the works of Islamic Jurists (Al-Fuqaha) is 
A/-Ijtihad or "individual reasoning". 
A/-Ijtihad is derived from an Arabic verb Ijtahad, which literally means 
"to exert oneself': over the centuries this term has come to denote a large body 
of legal definitions and conditions. It was originally used, with a legal reference 
during the life of the prophet Muhammad in an account traditionally assigned to 
Mu'adh Ibn Jabal. The latter was appointed as a Judge to the AI Yaman by the 
prophet. Before he left, the prophet asked him, "According to what shalt thou 
Judge?" He replied, "According to the Book of God". "And if thou fmdest 
nought therein?" "According to the Sunnah of the prophet of God" "And if thou 
findest nought therein?" "Then I will exert myself to form my own Judgment" 
And thereupon the prophet said: "praise be to God who has guided the 
messenger of his prophet to that which pleases his prophet".8 
This concept of "Al-ljtihad" as stated in the words of Mu'adh Ibn Jabal 
"then I will exert myself to form my own Judgment" allows a certain amount of 
flexibility in the application of Islamic Shari' ah. According to tradition 
7 Quoted by Khadduri & Liebesny, viii. 
8 Quoted by Ramadan, 64. 
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of Prophet Muhammad permitted the exercise of Al-Ijrihad as a source of 
Shari'ah,9 enabling jurists to deduce new principles on the basis of revelation and 
to apply them to new facts facing modem Islamic society. It is, as Iqbal has said 
"the principle of movement in the structure of Islam". 10 
Caliph 'Umar Ibn Al-Khattab applied the prophetic tradition "Sunnah" 
when he gave his instruction to Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, Gadi, (Judge) of Basra in 
Iraq, specifying three so\rrces to be used in decisions, namely, the Qur' an, the 
prevailing Sunnah, and reason.U 
Similarly Ibn al Qayyim al Jawzyya Jurist of the Hanbali School tried to 
establish three conditions for the course and validity of individual opinion: 
(1) that it may be resorted to only in the absence of an 
applicable text of the Shari'ah: 
(2) that in no way should it contravene the Shari' ah: and 
(3) that the course of reasoning should not become entangled 
in any kind of sophistry or complication of expression 
which might affect the people's direct attachment to the 
Shari' ah or distort the brilliant clarity thereof.12 
But as Coulson has stated: 
Appreciation of the terms of the Shari' ah is, of course, a process 
of human thought, whether this takes the form of the simple 
recognition of the manifest meaning of a Qur'anic rule or lies in 
the derivation of a novel rule by analogy. Both the nature and 
the effect of this whole process of appreciation of the divine law, 
which is properly termed Ijtihad ·(literally, the "effort" of one's 
own Judgment) are regulated by the legal theory. In the first 
place the course which ljtihad must follow is defined. The 
mujtahid (or person exercising Ijtihad) should first seek the 
solution of legal problems in the specific terms of the Qur'an 
and the Sunnah, applying thereto the accepted canons of 
interpretation and construction, including the doctrine of repeal 
or abrogation (naskh). Thus the classical theory adopts the 
doctrine of ash-Shaft: by integrating the Qur'an and the Sunnah 
9 Khadduri, 28. 
10 Ramadan, 73. 
11 Khadduri, 28. 
12 Quoted by Ramadan, 68. 
as material sources of divine revelation. But the dominant 
position of the Sunnah has an even greater emphasis in the 
classical theory: for as well as explaining the Qur'an the 
Sunnah may also repeal it. Where a problem is not specifically 
regulated by the Qur'an or Sunnah, the method of analogical 
reasoning must then be used to extend the principles inherent in 
the divine revelation to cover new cases. The second function 
of the legal theory is the evaluation of the results of such 
Ijtihad in terms of the authority which is to be attributed to 
them as expressions of the divine will. A moment's reflection 
will bring to light the fundamental nature of the whole problem 
of the authority of the law in Islam. It was not merely a case 
of the values which were to be attached to the various possible 
interpretations of the Qur'an and Sunnah and the results of 
Juristic reasoning in general: there was also the primary 
question of the authority of the recognized sources of the divine 
will themselves, what, in fact, guaranteed the validity of the 
whole scheme of usul? These questions find their answer in 
the concept of "ljma" or consensus"." 
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In fact, Muslim jurists agree that Al-ljtihad (individual reasoning) is a significant 
factor in assisting them to extract a solution for any serious issue which may 
arise in the modern Islamic society. 
(2) Alteration of the formal legal opinion "Fatwa" with change of 
circumstances. 
We have discussed already the basic Islamic principles of justice, 
equality, the fulfilment of promises and the execution of contracts, without 
distinguishing whether such contracts were between two Muslims or between 
Muslim and non-Muslim. The Islamic Shari'ah is based upon justice among 
people without distinction and without violations of the commitments established 
by contract or agreement, whether between Muslims themselves or between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Basic principles of the Islamic Shari'ah include 
respect for vested rights, the prohibition of unjust enrichment or theft, and justice 
and equality among people. Accordingly, the Islamic Shari'ah is considered as 
applicable universally, and as not limited to any particular place, condition or 
time. The formal legal Islamic opinion ''fatwa" is changeable as the places, times, 
conditions, persons and objectives change through independent judgment ("AI-
13 NJ Coulson, 76-77. 
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ljtihad") in the application of rules, but tbe basic rules themselves are not 
changeable. 
The level of flexibility that can exist is shown by the formal Islamic legal 
rule (F atwa) changing according to changes in place, time, condition or persons. 
For example, the postponing of punishment for a temporary reason is found in 
the Islamic Shari 'ah. There are the cases of pregnant women and foster mothers 
who, during extreme cold or hot weather or during sickness may be exempted 
from their duties under Islamic Shari'ah, e.g. from fasting during the month of 
Ramadan. 14 
(3) The Effect on Contracts of Changes in Circumstances 
The Muslim jurists have discussed the problem of unforeseen changes 
after a contract has been agreed, which might affect the parties' commitments. 
Under the Hanafi School, Abu Hanifah Al-Nua'man, one of the four famous 
Muslim jurists, defined an excuse as " the agreed party's disability to keep the 
contract without bearing extra harm not required in the contract".15 In fact a 
distinction was drawn in this context between force majeure and change in 
circumstances. 
(a) Force Majeure: 
The definition of force majeure is given in the Islamic "Fiqh". For 
example, Ibn Kudamah (d 1223 AD) of the Hanbali School said "the force 
majeure is any disaster which is made by none of mankind".16 From the Maliki 
School Khalil said "the force majeure is whatsoever which cannot be avoided"Y 
It is also stated in the Sunnah: 
14 A research prepared by the Permanent Committee for Scientific Researches and lfta in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia concerning the old quitrents issue depending upon what was 
decided by the Council of the Higher Scholars Committee in its seventeenth circle held 
in Riyadh in 1401 AH (1981) (unpublished) 5. 
15 Quoted by S Al-Thnayyan, Force Majeure and their provisions in the Islamic Figh. Imam 
Muhammad Ibn Saud University, College of Religion [Shari'ah), Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, 1407 AH (1987) 313 (text in Arabic). Here and elsewhere in this Chapter 
translations are by the author unless otherwise stated. 
16 Ibn Kudamah : AI-Moghni, 4, 119. Quoted by Al-Thnayyan, 36. 
17 Moktsr Ibn Khalil, 3, 185, quoted by AI-Thnayyan, 31. 
The prophet Muhammad stated the force majeure clearly to be 
legitimate by negating the seller's liability for the value of the 
thing sold from the buyer if such thing faced force majeure 
before it had been received by the buyer. The prophet 
Muhammad said in the Hadieth "If you bought dates from your 
brother and they met force majeure, it is forbidden for you to 
receive anything from him. Why do you take your brother's 
money without right?"18 
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The notion of force majeure linguistically has a wider meaning than the 
meaning in the Islamic "Fiqh". The linguists extend the meaning offorcemajeure 
to "destruction and loss of all money". 19 Accordingly the prophet Muhammad 
confirmed the illegitimacy of taking money without any right 
(b) Change of Circumstances 
If it is sought to rely on changed circumstances from those existing at the 
time of the contract or agreement, the circumstances must be unpredictable and 
unforeseeable, and the change must be fundamental. The change must affect the 
substance of the contract. For it to be an acceptable excuse for contract 
tennination according to the Islamic "Fiqh", the bad effects which may result 
from the continuity of the contract must be greater than the benefits as a result 
of the changes in circumstances. 20 
This is consistent with what has been recently found in international law 
concerning the principle of change of circumstances. The evidence for this view, 
as a matter of Islamic Shari'ah, includes the following: 
* 
* 
18 
19 
20 
21 
The prophet Muhammad said "No harm and no causing harm [to others] 
... Whoever hurts [others], God will hun him, and whoever makes it 
difficult [for others], God will make it difficult for him".21 
The principle or rule of legal decision (Fatwa) is changed according to 
the changes of times, places, circumstances and persons. This rule 
confirms that the provisions should be adapted to the people's benefits 
and needs which are changeable according to changes in circumstances. 
This is a Hadieth narrated in succession by various narrators. See AI-Thnayyan, 105. 
AI-Thnayyan, 2-26. 
Research prepared by the Permanent Committee for Scientific Researches and lfta, 72. 
AI-Mustadrak and its summary, 2, 57-8. AI' Bayhaqi Sunnan 6, 69, quoted by 
AI-Thnayyan, 342. 
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This will assist the independent opinion maker to settle problems and 
disputes among people at any time or place. 
* The rule of "the difficulty brings the need for faci!ity". 22 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The rule of "contract termination because the benefit cannot be 
obtained". 
"Custom is authoritative" 
"Public usage is conclusive and action may be taken in accordance 
therewith" 
"What is customary amongst merchants is deemed as if agreed upon 
between them" 
"A matter established by custom is like a matter established by law" 
There is agreement among Islamic schools concerning the reasons which 
prevent contractual provisions having full effect or which cause a lease contract 
to be terminated. 23 For example, in hiring a person to pull out a painful tooth, 
if the pain in the tooth stops the hiring contract should be terminated because 
the tooth cannot be pulled out at that time. Similarly if the matter related to a 
lease, and the benefit of the lease decreased for any reason, the lease value 
should be reduced by an equal amount to the decreased benefit. Ibn Taimiya 
from Hanbali School (d 1328 AD) said: 
If something of public benefit is hired, such as a hotel...and 
such known benefit is decreased because the circumstances 
change, the hiring charge should be reduced by an amount 
equal to the deducted part of the known benefit.24 
Even where the changes do not affect the lease holder alone but also 
concern third parties, the lease holder may be prevented from gaining the benefit 
agreed for, but the benefit itself may be retained. Such excuses allow the lease 
holder to terminate the lease contract, according to most jurists, although the 
Shafi'yyah's (followers of Al-Shafi'i) say that a contract of lease should not be 
22 Al-Sayuti, 76. Ibn Najeeim, 75, both quoted by Al-Thnayyan, 324. 
23 Jd, 56. 
24 Majmu'at Fatawa, 30, 311. 
255 
tenninated in this case, because there is no tennination while the leased object 
survives.25 
Concerning changes in circumstances affecting only the parties but not 
affecting third parties, jurists did not agree. The majority view was that the 
contract could lawfully be tenninated as between the parties. On the other hand, 
the Shafi'i School say that a lease contract cannot be terminated unless there is 
some really significant impact on the benefits agreed on. This suggests a very 
restrictive view as to change of circumstances, relying on the reading in the Holy 
Qur'an recitation: 
0 Ye who believe, fulfil (all) obligations.26 
But another view (adopted by the Hanafi School) relies on the argument that "if 
we oblige the excused party to keep the contract, we will oblige him to accept 
harm not required under the contract" .Z7 This opinion is adopted by some jurists 
of the Maliki and the Shafi 'i Schools. 
The concept of change of circumstances could apply where (1) the 
change of circumstances is beyond expectation; (2) the change is fundamental; 
(3) execution of the agreement, because of the change, will result in difficulties 
or damage to some party. In such cases the damage should be avoided for the 
benefit of both parties. This can be seen from the following survey of jurists' 
opinions: 
( 1) The Hanafi School jurists consider that if the excuses happened to one 
of two parties causing harm resulting from the change of circumstances, the 
injured party has the right to terminate the contract. Among the harms to the 
lease holder are the following: "if he faces bankruptcy and leaves the market, if 
he wants to travel, if he wants to change his work style from handcrafting into 
25 See Al-Mabsoot, 16, 2,4; AI Sunnan, 16, 191; Al-Bahjah Fi Sharh Al-Tuhfa, 2, 178-9; 
Al-Mughni, 5, 456; Majmu'at Fatawa 30!290 (the opinion of the majority of jurists). But 
see Raodah El-Talibin, 5, 239-240relating to Al-Shafi'i opinion. See Al-Thnayyan, 313-5. 
26 The Holy Qur'an, Sura V, verse 1. 
27 Badai'a Al-Sanai'a, 4, 197-8, quoted by Al-Thnayyan, 318. 
256 
fanning or vice versa" .28 Among the excuses which the lessor might rely on is 
"facing great debt which he cannot repay other than the leased value" .29 This 
implies a sort of limitation of liability. The underlying argument is that: 
if the one who faces an . excuse is obliged to keep the contract, 
he should face harms not obliged under the contract.30 
(2) The Hanafi School asserts that if the rental over leased property is raised 
as a result of changed circumstances, this increase should be proportionate to 
other similar rental charges. However, if the other party disputes the lessor in 
relation to the increase in the charge and succeeds, the increase becomes void.31 
(3) The Maliki School shares the Hanafi School's position in accepting some 
of these excuses. Thus AI-Tasawuli said: 
if the hotel lease holder's income is decreased or he does not 
find residents because of the chan¥es in the circumstances, he 
should not pay the rental charges. 3 
Similarly Muhammad Aulaish said: 
in the case of property rental charges increasing because of 
changed circumstances from those under which the lease was 
agreed, the contract should be terminated and the leased 
property should be rented by the present similar rental charge. 33 
(4) Ibn Al-Salah, from the Shafi'i School, states that 
if due to changed circumstances the agreed rental charge 
changes, the unexpected increase should be considered 
temporary in character and contingent on the continuance of the 
change of circumstances. Should the circumstances remain 
changed and the increase in rental charge remain, the contract 
28 Badai'a Al-Sanai'a, 4, 197; Al-Mabsoot, 16, 2,7, quoted by Al-Thnayyan, 52. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Al-Mabsoot, 16, 2,7, quoted by Al-Thnayyan, 318. 
31 Research prepared by the Permanent Committee for Scientific Researches and Ifta 
(unpublished) 60-72. 
32 Al-Bahjah Fi Sharh Al-Tuhfa, 2, 23, quoted by Al-Thnayyan, 53. 
33 Research prepared by the Permanent Committee for Scientific Researches and Ifta 
(unpublished} 72. 
should be tenninated and the leased property should be rented 
again at a fair rental. 34 
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(5) If a property is rented at a comparable price to similar properties, and 
then rentals generally increase as a result of changed situations, the position 
depends on whether or not the rented property is occupied at that time by the 
lessee. If not the incidental increase on that property should be paid by the 
lease holder. If he accepts such an increase, the contract remains valid. If he 
does not, the owner should have the right to tenninate the contract. On the 
other hand, if the rental property is occupied by the lease holder's things (e.g. if 
the leased property is a plot of land planted by the lease holder or land occupied 
by building constructed by the lease holder), whatever has been done by the 
lease holder should be taken into consideration in an agreed settlement: one 
important factor to be taken into account is whether such increase in rental 
values happened ~s a result of the improvements made by the lease holder?5 
There is no consensus among jurists concerning the proportionate 
amount of the increase in the rental value which would give the owner the right 
to tenninate the contract. But that a minor or insignificant increase is not 
sufficient for this purpose is agreed by all jurists. 36 
In the case of quitrent contracts, where two parties contract for long 
term benefits, the party which owns the property may demand certain benefits in 
kind on a regular basis in exchange for the other party's use of the property for 
a specified period of time. Should the situation change, such as a general 
increase in the rental charges for similar properties, the original owner may by 
invoking the "change of circumstances" doctrine, reclaim the property and sell it, 
or revise the conditions of the original quitrent. If the quitrent land is sold or 
inherited, the new owner also inherits the quitrent. No one has the right to 
remove the quitrent. Ibn Taimiya from the Han bali School said, "if the qnitrent 
34 ld, 61, 72. 
35 Abdulrahman Al-Jezeri, The Fiqh according to the Four Muslim Rites (Cairo, 1%9) 3, 120. 
36 Ibid. 
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land is sold or inherited, the quitrent should be imposed on the buyer and the 
inheritor".37 
(7) Problems can arise regarding the settlement of quitrents involving 
property which is under long term lease. In a case where the property was sold 
before completion of the rental contract period because of changed 
circumstances, a dispute arose in Unaizah, in Saudi Arabia, and the notary public 
(an officer of justice in the Saudi Arabian system) refused to approve the selling 
of lands on which there are quitrents unless the quitrent owners agreed to such 
sales. The matter was then raised before the Higher Jurisdiction Council, and 
the Permanent Committee in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia issued Resolution 
No. 57 of 15/2/1396 AH (corresponding to 1978).38 The resolution, after 
establishing the basis of settlement, emphasised the legitimate right to sell such 
property even before the rental contract period is completed, in case of a change 
of circumstances. 
(8) Similarly, a dispute arose concerning certain leased properties forming 
part of a religious "waqf' endowment, 39 when their rental increased because of 
changed circumstances. The decree promulgated in order to solve the waqf 
problems, issued by the Ottoman Empire in 1303 AH (1893), stated the following 
rules: 
37 A letter sent by Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim, the Mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia formerly, to the Head of the Islamic Shari' ah court in Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarah 
No. 726 dated 10/11/1375 AH, corresponding to 1955, quoted in the Research prepared 
by the Permanent Committee for Scientific Researches and Ifta (unpublished) 57. 
38 Higher Jurisdiction Council Resolution, Permanent Committee in Saudi Arabia. issued 
with No. 57 on 15/2/1396 AH, corresponding to 1976. 
39 A waqfis. .. 
analogous to the English trust system but was developed more than a 
thousand years ago before the birth of the doctrine of uses and trusts in 
England. "Waqf' (plural awqa/) which permits an owner to seule his 
property for the use of specified beneficiaries in perpetuity and the 
owner thereby ceases to be the owner of the property and the property 
and its income is then administered by a trustee. The definition of waqf 
according to the Hanafi School is "the detention of the corpus from the 
ownership of any person and the gift of its income or usufruct either 
presently or in the future, to some charitable purpose". The waqfbegan 
as a charitable trust but there are also family waqf or a combination of 
the two, but the same legal rules apply to their administration. The 
Trustee is responsible for following the wishes of the donor and for 
providing the beneficiaries with the income from the property, be they 
the donor's descendants or another specified person or a charitable 
institution which is named as the inheritor. 
See Khadduri & Liebesny, 203. 
No. 281: If the rental charge is increased because of a great 
increase in demand during the lease period, the lease holder is 
requested to accept such increase. If he accepts that, he has a 
priority right to re-lease for the second time the new rental 
charge and for the same limited period. 
No. 282: If the leaseholder does not accept the incidental 
increase in the rental charge during the lease period, provided 
that increase is substantial the contract should be terminated and 
the property rented to another party, unless the rented object is 
otherwise occupied by the leaseholder's plantings. If this is the 
case, there should be a delay until the crops are harvested and 
the increase should be imposed from that date until the harvest 
is finished, and then the contract should be terminated. 
No. 336: Quitrenting is not allowed unless the quitrent involves 
a similar rental charge, and the charge should increase or 
decrease according to the circumstances of place and time. 
No. 339: If the rentals value has increased because of the 
quitrent holder building or planting, such increase should not be 
imposed on him. On the other hand if it has increased greatly 
in itself the increase will be obligatory ... 
No. 340: The quitrent holder is entitled to rely on the statement 
that the rental charge which he is paying is the appropriate 
rental charge for such a property and the waqf keeper should 
prove the increase with evidence.40 
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(9) The Council of Higher Scholars Committee in Saudi Arabia issued the 
following decision No. 96 dated 16/11/1402 AH (1982). 
The Council of Higher Scholars Committee reviewed the subject 
of the waqfs quitrented at low rentals which do not match 
present property values.... The Council decided to refer the case 
to the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal 
Opinions "lfta" ... In 1402 AH (corresponding to 1982) the 
Council rediscussed the subject and reviewed those matters. 
Their final decision was: it is not possible to include all these 
matters in on verdict because of their time and place variations, 
waqf holders' words and objectives which make each matter 
need to be reviewed on its own merits. Accordingly the Council 
decided by a majority that the waqf matter, whether they are 
quitrented or not, is the Shari'ah court's responsibility ... 41 
40 Quoted by Research prepared by the Permanent Committee for Scientific Researches and 
Ifta (unpublished) 63. 
41 The resolution of Higher Scholars Committee Council No. 96 dated 16/11/1402 AH, 
corresponding to 1982 (text in Arabic). 
260 
The point is that the effect of changes of circumstances on the rental 
values of such propenies quitrented under long term contracts at low values was 
considered relevant in principle. This shows that Muslim jurists in Saudi Arabia, 
where the Hanbali School is predominant, do not reject the principle of change 
of circumstances, but that they require the panicular circumstances of each case 
to be taken into account. Thus the Muslim jurists allowed rental charges to be 
increased before the end of the contract period if the circumstances had changed 
from those existing at the time of the agreement: if the leaseholder refused to 
pay such increased charges, the owner should have the right to terminate the 
contract and rent the propeny to another pany. It is also clear that the owner 
who alleges that the circumstances have changed resulting in an increase in 
rental value cannot simply terminate the contract unilaterally: the matter should 
be negotiated with the leaseholder. If he accepts such increment in the rental 
charge, a new contract should be agreed with him, including that increment. 
Only if the leaseholder refuses, does the owner have the right to terminate the 
contract. It is also obvious that the request for contract termination is not to be 
applied without reason, but that there should be changes in the circumstances 
which justify the increment in the rental charge value. 
The Islamic Juristic Assembly Council of the Islamic World League 
Decision No. (7) in its fifth session held between 8-16 Rabie Awal 1402 AH 
(1982) in Makkah Al-Mukaramah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, due to the changing 
circumstances has stipulated the following:-
1. In contracts with delayed execution (such as supply, leases, custody and 
other contracts) if the contracting conditions have substantially changed so as to 
change situations, costs and prices due to incidental reasons which were 
unforeseen at the time of contracting, and the performance of the contractual 
obligation would cause the undenaking pans gross and unusual losses from prices 
fluctuation in trade routes, and that was not a result of negligence or default by 
that pany in executing his obligations, in this case the judge should have the right 
in disputes and according to a claim for altering the contractual rights and 
obligations in a way that distributes the exceeding amount of contracted loss 
between the contracting panies, and also he is allowed to terminate the contract 
in that pan unexecuted if he sees that the termination thereof is best and easier 
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in the case submitted to him, provided a fair compensation to the other party 
who has the right in execution, that restores him a reasonable part of the loss 
that befalls him as a result of contract termination, so that they both have 
fairness without any suppression of the part of the committed and in 
implementing all these considerations, he should consult the experts and the 
trustworthy. 
2. The judge has also the right to ignore the committed if he found out the 
incidental reason is vanishable in a short time and that the committed shall not 
be determined by such concession. 
The Juristic Assembly Council considers this solution derived fropm 
Shari'ah principles in realization to the required justice between both parties and 
to prevent the suppression to any of the contractees by a reason out of his reach 
and such solution shall be similar to the wise lawful jurisdiction and nearest to 
Shari'ah principles and to its general intents and to its justice. 
4. The Change of Circumstances Principle in the Laws of Islamic Countries 
These principles are widely accepted in the laws of countries influenced 
by Islamic Shari'ah. For example, the Egyptian Civil Code 1948 makes it clear 
that the concept of changed circumstances applies to contracts generally and is 
not limited to administrative contracts. Article 147(2) provides: 
However, if by reason of exceptional and unforeseeable 
circumstances of a general nature, the execution of a contractual 
obligation, though not impossible, becomes onerous to the 
debtor so as to threaten him with an exorbitant loss, the Judge 
may, in accordance with circumstances and after weighing 
between the interests of the parties, reduce the onerous 
obligation to a reasonable level. Any agreement to the contrary 
shall be void. 
The explanatory memorandum to the Egyptian Code prepared by the late Abdul 
Razzaq Sanhouri, Professor of Law at the University of Cairo, and by the 
Drafting Committee of the Egyptian Code makes it clear that the concept of 
changed circumstances, under the Egyptian Code applies to contracts generally, 
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but that the conditions for it are relatively strict. First, there must be an 
exceptional change of circumstances of a general and not a particular character; 
second, the circumstance in question must be unpredictable and unforeseeable; 
and finally, the circumstance must render the performance of the obligation so 
onerous that the debtor is threatened with exorbitant loss. If these three 
conditions are met, the debtor may ask a court to reduce the now excessive 
obligation to reasonable limits, according to the circumstances and after taking 
into consideration the interests of both parties. The court is thus empowered, if 
these further conditions are met, to reduce the obligation, but the court is not 
empowered to terminate the contract. Moreover, this concept does not permit 
the party invoking it to suspend performance or to terminate the contract 
unilateral! y. 42 
Other Arab Civil Codes were modelled on the Egyptian Civil Code of 
1948. For example, Article 147(2) of the Libyan Civil Code 1954 is identical to 
Article 147(2) of the Egyptian Civil Code.43 Article 147(2) of the Egyptian Civil 
Code was adopted as Article 148 of the Syrian Civil Code, and Article 146 of the 
Iraqi Civil Code.44 The Iranian Civil Code, Article 229, states that: "if an 
obligant cannot perform his obligation owing to circumstances beyond his 
control he shall not be liable to damages". Commentators however argue that 
this is more a reference to force majeure rather than the principle of "changed 
circumstances". Another recent example of an Islamic State which has expressly · 
adopted the principle of change of circumstances is Afghanistan. 45 
5. Treaty Termination and the Principle of Changed Circumstances in 
Islamic Shari'ah Law 
The Islamic Shari' ah requires the keeping of promises and the fulfilment 
of commitments, as previously explained, but if the circumstances have wholly 
42 2 Al-Qanun AI Madani; Majumat Al-Amal A/-Tahdiriya (The Civil Code; Collection of 
Property Works) 278-84 (1949); Sanhouri Al-Wasit, The Theory of Obligation (2nd edn, 
1964) 717-24 (text in Arabic). 
43 MO Ansell & IM AI-Arif, The Libyan Civil Code (1954) 30. 
44 JND Anderson & NJ Coulson, The Moslem Ruler and Contractual Obligations, NYULR 
33 (1958) 921. See also Henry Cattan, The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and 
North Africa (1967) 128. 
45 For details see SH Arnin, The Theory of Changed Circumstances in International Trade, 
L/oyds Maritime & Commercial Law Quarter/y4 (1982) 582. 
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changed, the appropriate Islamic leader (the Imam in this case) will have the 
right to give priority to Islam and Muslims' benefits by amendment of the treaty 
or its termination. However, to comply with Islamic Shari'ah, a formal 
denunciation is necessary. For example, in 1571 Sultan Selim II broke his peace 
treaty with Venice in order to invade Cyprus, after he obtained a favourable 
legal opinion from the Mufti, Abu Saud.46 The Muslim leader (Imam) can 
terminate the treaty by his individual will, which stands for the will of the 
government. 
Al-Shafi'i (died 820 AD), who established the Shafi'i School, said, in his 
book Al-Umm, that the theory of changed circumstances is not applicable to 
limited term treaties, but only to those with an unlimited period.47 On the other 
hand, El-Ghouneimi said, in his comment on this matter: 
I do not agree with Al-Shafi'i and the way of his followers 
concerning their belief that changed circumstances make it legal 
for the injured party to terminate the treaty by his own 
individual will. I also disagree with him concerning his belief 
which limits the application of this theory to treaties of unlimited 
duration. But I would like to clarify that the application of the 
circumstances changing does not contradict the strict Islamic 
opinions concerning the fulfilment of agreements.... We cannot 
say that the treaty which loses its reason for existence will stay 
such as a means of stability in the relationships because the basic 
purpose which caused it, to achieve the security and benefits, of 
the two parties, has totally changed in such a way that it has 
become difficult for the treaty to play such a role of peace, but 
even its existence, as obligatoR', might result in dispute and 
hatred between its two parties. 4 
Under this principle treaty. amendment or termination should not be limited to 
treaties of unlimited duration: the decisive factor is not the treaty period but the 
objective of the treaty and the new circumstances. 
To summarize, if the Imam concluded a treaty but through a change of 
circumstances of a fundamental kind it turned out that he could not fulfil the 
treaty it could be declated void (batil). Even if the treaty were regulat but the 
46 A Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (1964) 53-4. 
47 Mr El-Ghouneimi, Treaties Rulers in the Islamic Shari' ah (1977) 133 (text in Arabic). 
48 Ibid. 
264 
terms could bring harm to the Muslim people, the Imam had the right to declare 
the termination of such a treaty, providing adequate notice was given to the 
other party to the treaty informing them of the intention.49 
In the Islamic Shari'ah mutual consent is seen as the important 
underlying principle of termination of contract as it is in the signing of a treaty. 
Thus before the contract is terminated it must be declared terminated by mutual 
consent. In the words of one author: 
The Imam, however, should never agree to a treaty in which only 
one of the two parties was allowed to terminate the treaty, even 
if he were the one given the right. 50 
6. Conclusion: The Relevance of the Islamic Doctrine of Changed 
Circumstances to the Renegotiation of Oil Concession Agreements 
From the foregoing analysis it would appear that the Islamic "Fiqh" 
jurisprudence recognizes the principle of change of circumstances. The evidence 
of this principle is found in the two principal sources of Islamic Shari'ah, the 
Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah (the practice of the prophet), and in other sources 
such as the "Ijma" (consensus of opinion) and "Qiyas" (reasoning by analogy), as 
well as in other rules which have been adopted in Islamic "Fiqh". 
There are several verses in the Holy Qur'an which prohibit taking 
property from people for self interest. For example: 
0 ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves 
in vanities. But let there be amongst you traffic and trade by 
mutual good will...51 
The majority of Muslim jurists consider that if unforeseen changes have 
so affected one of the contract parties the injured party has the right to terminate 
the contract even before the time has expired. As the Hanafi School says: "if we 
49 See Shaybani, al Siyar al-Kabir IV, 66; Ill, 261; Ibn Kudamah, Vlll, 463. See also 
Khadduri, 220-1. 
50 Ibn Kudamah, 8, 461-2, quoted by Khadduri, 221. 
51 The Holy Qur'an, Sura IV. Verse 29. 
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oblige the excused pany to keep the contract, we will oblige him for harm not 
obliged under the contract". 
The amendment of a contract as a result of change of circumstances 
should be done first by negotiation between the contract parties. Only if the 
other pany refuses to accept the harmed pany's request to amend the contract, 
is there a right to terminate the contract by individual action. 
Furthermore, the Imam has the right to terminate a treaty with another 
pany before its time if it contains terms that cannot be fulfilled or if it could 
bring harm to the Muslim community and he gives formal notification of his 
intention to terminate to the other pany to the treaty. Likewise, the Islamic 
Shari'ah decided on the acceptance of the principle of change of circumstances 
as applicable to contracts of an economic and political nature. 
The relevance of the principle to the renegotiation of the oil concession 
agreements, is that as Islamic Shari'ah is the law of those Arabian countries 
which have the world's largest reserves of oil, the principle can be seen as 
implicit in the arguments of these countries. These countries argued that 
conditions had changed since the 30s when the original contracts were signed, 
and that they were now entitled to have control over their own natural resources. 
An example of such a successful renegotiation of an oil concession agreement 
was that conducted between the Government of Saudi Arabia and Aramco in the 
seventies, when the Saudi Arabian Government Council of Ministers approved 
the basic statute of the riew Saudi Arabian Oil Company, Aramco al Saudia 
(Saudi Aramco) in 1988. As a result of this renegotiation and by mutual consent 
Aramco has recognized the right of the Saudi Arabian Government to control its 
natural oil resources. 
' 
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CHAPTER9 
EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY 
1. Introduction 
Before the First World War cases of interference with private property 
by the State were few.1 The prevailing view was that expropriation was to occur 
only in exceptional cases of public utility and that full compensation should be 
paid. But since the First World War the concept of private property has changed. 
The impact of this change differs depending on the political and economic 
circumstances and ideology of particular countries. The Mexican Constitution of 
1917 and the establishment of a Communist regime in Russia of 1917 were based 
on the expropriation phenomenon, which swept away the foundations of private 
property. Underlying these developments was the view that expropriation entails 
a restoration of the property to the people, and that a State has an unlimited 
right to expropriate foreign property located on its territories? 
During and after the Second World War several Eastern European and 
Latin American countries and the newly-independent Third World States adopted 
laws nationalizing major portions of industry and restoring property in the natural 
resources of the country to the people. In most cases some level of compensation 
was provided for. 3 
Western countries hold that expropriation is lawful only if it is for a 
public purpose, is-non discriminatory and is accompanied by prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation. Third World States do not wish to be bound by this 
strict conception.4 According to their economic viewpoint "expropriation is in 
I JES Fawcett, Some Foreign Effects of Nationalization of Property, BYIL 27 (1950) 356. 
2 A Akinsanya, The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third World (1980) 29. 
See also NR Doman, Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, Columbia 
Law Review 48 (1948) 1125; KS Carlston, Concession Agreements and Nationalization, 
AJIL 52 (1958) 260. 
3 Doman, 1126. 
4 Developing countries took this position frequently during the preparation of the United 
Nations resolutions. See R Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of 
Alien Propeny, AJIL 15 (1981) 555, 558. 
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many corners considered to be the (symbolic or real) central issue in the struggle 
for a new international economic order. "5 It is their opinion that "the political 
aspect of sovereignty is a necessary precondition to economic development".6 
The Third World is here defined as those countries which share a 
comparatively low degree of economic development and of living standards of 
their populations. They are relatively non-industrial, technologically less 
developed and mainly producers of raw materials. They are also referred to as 
"less developed countries" .7 Many have only relatively recently become 
independent of colonizing powers. Since 1960 Third World nations have been 
successful in changing the concept of the preconditions for the validity of 
expropriation and the standard of compensation. Their success is reflected in the 
resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, as will be seen. 
In this chapter I will discuss expropriation under international law, and 
in particular whether the general rules relating to expropriation may be modified 
in the case where there are stabilization agreements or other long-term 
arrangements for the exploitation of natural resources of a State. Since there is 
much controversy surrounding these topics, I will refer to the opinions of jurists, 
State practice and international conventions, and since there is a difference 
· between international law and Islamic Shari'ah regarding the principle of 
expropriation I will also discuss expropriation under Islamic Shari'ah. 
2. General International Law and the Expropriation of Property 
In this section I will define expropriation, nationalization, confiscation, 
requisition and other related terms. I conclude that the terms "expropriation" and 
"nationalization" can be used interchangeably for the purposes of this thesis. I 
will look at the development of these terms, from the Roman times to the 
modern era and show the development of the acceptance that, providing certain 
conditions are met, a State has the legal right to expropriate property. I will look 
5 Ibid. 
6 Virally, La Chane des Droits et Devoirs economiflues des etats, 20 Annuaire Francais de 
Droit International (1974) 67, quoted by Dolzer, 556. 
7 Akinsanya, 8-12. 
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at how the concept of acquired rights to property has been successfully challenged 
by Third World writers who hold that State sovereignty is the overriding principle 
in determining matters of property ownership. 
I will then look at the ways in which a State's desire to nationalize has 
been dealt with and outline the General Assembly resolutions which have been 
a major force in changing the legal position of nationalization and the legality of 
expropriation under international law. 
(1) Definitions 
Before examining State practice in relation to expropriation and its 
legality or otherwise under international law, it is convenient to discuss the 
terminology which host States use when they take alien property within its 
territory. There are many terms usually used for this purpose, including 
expropriation, nationalization, confiscation, requisition, and liquidation. 
(a) Expropriation 
According to Rood: 
Expropriation is the original broad term meaning the taking of 
property by the government for its own use ... 8 
The term "expropriation", though, is "usually applied to measures taken in 
individual cases. "9 
(b) Nationalization 
Many different definitions have been given of the term "nationalization". 
According to Rood: 
8 LL Rood, Compensation for Takeover in Mrica, Journal of International Law and 
Economics 11 (1977) 526. 
9 M Domke, Foreign Nationalizations: Some Aspects of Contemporary International Law 
AJIL 55 (1961) 588. See also GAVan Heeke, Confiscation, Expropriation and the Conflict 
of Laws, International Law Quarterly 4 (1951) 345. 
Nationalization is the newer term meaning the taking by the 
government of a natural resource of a category of industry as a 
part of a social or economical reform. 10 
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Thus, nationalisation could be defined "as a measure of general change in the 
State's economic and social life." 11 But other definitions stress the generality of 
the term, or the range of motives that may be involved. The Institut de Droit 
International in 1952 adopted a tentative definition as follows: 
Nationalization is the transfer to the State, by a legislative act 
and in the public interest, of property or private rights of a 
designated character with a view to their exploitation or control 
by the State, or to their direction to a new objective by the 
State.12 
Katzarov stated a similar definition as follows: 
Nationalization is the transformation in the public interest of 
higher order, of a specific property or of a particular activity 
which is or may be a means of production or of exchange in the 
wider sense of the term, into property or activity of the 
collectivity -- State, community or cooperative --in view of their 
immediate or future utilization in the general, and no longer 
private, interest.13 
The Aminoil Tribunal defmed nationalization as a "transfer, in the public interest, 
of property from the private to the public sector, thus realizing a programme of 
economic development." 14 But Foighel' s definition is more restricted: 
Nationalization may be defined as the compulsory transfer to the 
State of private property dictated by economic motives and 
having as its purpose the continued and essentially unaltered 
exploitation of the particular property .15 
10 Rood, 526. 
11 Domke, 587-8. 
12 44 Annuaire de I'Inscitul de Droit lnternalional Session de Sienne (1952) 283. 
13 K Katzarov, The Theory of Nalionalizalion (1964) 226. 
14 Award, para 84, 87; ILM 21 (1982) 976, 1018·9 quoted by PY Tschanz, The Contributions 
of the Aminoil Award to the Law of State Contracts, Incernalional Lawyer 18 (1984) 272. 
15 lsi Foighe1, Nacionalizalion (1957) 9. 
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On the other hand, some international jurists claim that the motivation 
for nationalization may be more political than economic. Charles de Visscher 
referred to "an internal measure of the State dictated by reasons that are more 
political than economic. In principle, its legality is not to be determined by any 
international criterion." 16 
The position is surely, as Mikdashi concludes, that the reasons for 
nationalization may be economic or political or some complex relationship 
between the two: 
... whether political, ideological, or economic development, have 
not existed in isolation. Moreover, the division between the two 
classes of reasons is theoretical, depending on the country and 
th . 17 e ume ... 
For these reasons it seems that there is no clear distinction between 
expropriation and nationalization in international law. As Domke states: 
The doctrinal viewpoint of distinguishing "nationalization" from 
"expropriation" may indeed have little practical effect in the 
reality of international legal relations.18 
(c) Confiscation 
Confiscation is the taking of private property by the State without 
compensation, in whatever form it may be or under what name it may be carried 
out.19 International jurists tend to support this view.20 In 1938 Hull on behalf of 
the United States asserted the traditional view that "the taking of property 
without compensation is not expropriation, it is confiscation. "21 But even 
according to traditional views confiscation was not always unlawful. Confiscation 
also occurs in cases where the State has the right to seize property which is 
16 Theory and Reality in Public International Law (1957) 193, quoted by S Toriguian, Legal 
Aspects of Oil Concessions in the Middle East (1972) 170. 
17 Z Mikdashi, The International Politics of Natural Resources (1976) 148. 
18 Domke, 588. 
19 Van Heeke, 345. 
20 Fawcett, 368. 
21 Id, 369. 
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involved in a contravention of that State's law. As an example international 
tribunals recognize the right to confiscate ships engaged in activities prohibited 
by local laws such as customs regulations, or where they pose a military threat to 
the State.22 
(d) Requisition 
Requisition has been defined as ... 
the manifestation of the unilateral will of the authorities 
exercising their powers of employing the resources found within 
the country for purposes of national defence. It finds sufficient 
justification in the necessity created by the war.23 
This definition has been expanded so that requisition can be defined as the 
taking of property for the use by the State in its own defence, whether the 
belligerent parties have been formally recognized or not. 24 
In 1928 the Turco-Greek Mixed Arbitral Tribunal said: 
Requisition is the manifestation of the unilateral will of the 
authorities exercising their power to press into the service of the 
national defence all resources to be found in the country ... it is 
sufficiently justified by the necessity occasioned by the war. By 
attempting to place requisition in one of the categories of law 
created for a situation of an entirely different character, a 
juridical construction would be adopted which would violate the 
nature of the act in question... The requisition no doubt creates 
a right for the benefit of the person injuriousg affected by it, but 
this right is not in the nature of a contract. 
22 S Friedman, Expropriation in international Law, 1953,1. See ED Re, ForeignCo'!fiscation 
(1951). 
23 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Laws as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 
(1987) 40. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Photiadis vTurkish Government, Annual Digest 1929-30No 236,quoted by Fawcett, 366-7. 
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(e) Conclusion 
These are not the only terms used for State action which has the effect 
of a taking of property. Another example is the term "liquidation", which has 
been given many interpretations, but which for practical purposes may be taken 
to mean the dissolution or final extinction of a corporate entity, with its 
associated distribution of property to claimants (who may include the State 
itself).26 
For international Jaw purposes it is dangerous to derive too much from 
the term used in assessing the legality of particular action. Thus it might be 
preferable to use the more general term "taking of property". The Second 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965) stated: 
Generally, any conduct attributable to a foreign state which is 
intended to and does effectively deprive an alien of substantially 
all the benefit of his interest in property, constitutes a taking of 
that property. 27 
The Third Restatement ( 1986) takes "essentially the same substantive positions as 
the previous restatement" .28 
Thus, the distinction between expropriation and nationalization has little 
practical effect under international law. As Rood said, "the two terms are often 
used almost interchangeably in legislation and legal writing. "29 The two terms 
will be used interchangeably here. 
As we have seen, the term nationalization means the taking of property, 
whether owned by nationals or foreigners, by the State. But there are various 
other means by which the State can take property through the exercise of "public 
powers", for example: in the regulation of the morals, health or safety of the 
26 Fawcett, 356. 
27 Restatement (Second) of ForeignRelations Law of the United States (1965) 192. 
28 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1986) 712. 
29 Rood, 526. 
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community, in suppressing or controlling by licensing such enterprises as the 
liquor trade, lotteries or prostitution. It is well established, in the words of CP 
Anderson, that the exercise of the "police powers of the State in the regulation 
of the morals, health and safety of the community presents a fundamentally 
different question from confiscation of private property as a national policy ... "30 
The fundamental distinction between confiscatory legislation in the exercise of 
"eminent domain" and the exercise of "police power" is the motive which inspires 
or is thought to inspire the legislation.31 When exercising its police power to 
take private property no compensation is required,32 although it is evident that 
this could not legitimise a spurious act of police power with the real motive of 
enriching the State's finances. 33 
A funher difficulty in receiving compensation in disputed cases of 
nationalization may be procedural. In the 1962 Case of Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Company Ltd,34 the Belgian Government coun claimed reparation for 
damages allegedly sustained by Belgian nationals, shareholders in the Barcelona 
Traction Company,35 when the Spanish government claimed that as the company 
was bankrupt and that the structure of the group and the relationship between 
its members were used "to the detriment both of the interests of the creditors 
and of the economy and law of Spain, the country in which the undenaking was 
to carry on all its business. "36 
The Judgment stated that the Coun was not of the opinion that, "in the 
panicular circumstances of the present case, jus standi is conferred on the 
Belgian Government by considerations of equity."37 The company was 
incorporated in Canada and had registered offices there. It had been 
incorporated under Canadian law for 50 years and had a close and permanent 
connection with Canada. That connection, the Coun held, "was in no way 
30 CP Anderson in the AJ/L 21 (1927) 525, quoted by F William, International Law and the 
Property of Aliens, BYIL 9 (1928) 23. 
31 Williams, 26. 
32 A Akinsanya, 4. 
33 FA Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, AJJL 54 (1960) 584; A Akinsanya, 
4. 
34 (1970) ICJ Report 3. 
35 Id, 7. 
36 Id, 15. 
37 ld, 50. 
274 
weakened by the fact that the company engaged from the very outset in 
commercial activities outside Canada. "38 
This procedural problem was noted by a subsequent declaration made 
by Judge Lachs, who noted that the "Canadian government's right of protection 
in respect of the Barcelona Traction Company has remained unaffected by the 
proceedings now closed", and that this fact was an "essential premise in the 
Court's reasoning".39 
On the other hand, in recent years we have seen the phenomenon of 
"creeping expropriation" in the utilization of a State's police power against 
foreign investors or a particular foreign investment. 40 In this context harassment, 
discrimination, confiscatory taxes, fines, currency devaluation, regulation of prices 
or utility rates, refusal to renew residence permits, withdrawal of residence 
permits and licenses, limitations on profits or limitations on the right to transfer 
or remit profits, and limitations on imports and the use of foreign exchange 
earnings have all been used.41 
While creeping nationalization has been called "a disguised 
discriminatory taxation regime",42 it is extremely difficult to define when normal 
regulation ends and expropriation begins.43 For example, there is no legal basis 
38 ld, 42. 
39 ld, 52-53. 
40 G Gainer, Nationalization. The Dichotomy between Western and Third World 
Perspectives in International Law, Howard Law Journa/26 (I983) 1551. 
41 Akinsanya, 5; I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th edn, 1990) 523. F 
Francioni, Compensation for Nationalization of Foreign Property, ICLQ 24 (1975) 257, 
states that "creeping expropriation" excludes the problem of liability for war damage or 
acts of confiscation enacted in the exercise of police power, such as sanitary measures or 
penalties which are collateral to a criminal conviction. See also Mendes, The Canadian 
National Energy Program. An Example of Assertion of Economic Sovereignty of 
"Creeping Expropriation" in Imemational Law, 14 Vand JTransnat' IL (1981) 506-7: "The 
imposition of taxation policies should not be regarded as amounting to creeping 
expropriation in international law, unless such taxation measures are unprofitable in the 
short and long term. On the other hand, the use of incentive payment schemes or direct 
grants by government to lessen the impact of a non-discriminatory taxation regime on 
national corporations should not be regarded as a facet of creeping expropriation. If the 
government is using the incentive payment scheme or direct grants in bad faith to 
implement a disguised discriminatory taxation regime that would make only the foreign 
controlled corporations unprofitable. Such measures should be regarded as creeping 
expropriation", quoted by Gainer, 1552-3. 
42 Gainer, 1553. 
43 Akinsanya, 5. 
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in international law to object to a State exercising its rights to taxation providing 
it is non-discriminatory, and it is the responsibility of the party who feels 
discriminated against to prove that this is so. 
(2) The Meaning of "Property" 
If international law limits in some respects the "taking" of property, it is 
necessary to define the latter term as much as the former. According to Staker 
"'Property' or the 'ownership' of specific objects is the legal status which is 
created by the municipal law of each State".44 There are two kinds of property 
rights: those of tangible property with which we are concerned here and 
intangible property. 
Tangible property rights are determined in international law by 
the use of the Lex situs rule: the State of the present situs may 
decide who has property rights in any tangible on its territory, 
and those rights will be recognized elsewhere subject to 
international public policy.45 
Staker notes that: 
The fact that States do have conflicts rules which recognize 
property interests conferred by other States should therefore be 
seen as State practice evidencing an international law rule ... 46 
And further ... 
international law rules on compensation ... presuppose an 
international law definition of property which other States have 
a duty to recognize. 47 
Property which is the subject matter of expropriation may be defmed as: 
44 C Staker, Public International Law and the Lex Situs Rule in Property Conflicts and 
Foreign Expropriations. BYIL 58 (1987) 155. 
45 ld, 251. 
46 ld, 162. 
47 ld, 190. 
(I) Foreign property owned by natural or juridical persons who 
do not enjoy the nationality of the expropriating State. 
(2) National property where owned by natural or juridical 
persons who enjoy the nationality of expropriating State. This 
property is not subject to the international law rule as it is not 
concerned with the relation between two States.48 
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The expression property in investment terms means money, bonds, funds, land, 
machinery, securities, equipment, raw materials, spare parts, means of transport, 
products and such rights as patents and trademarks. 49 In the context of natural 
resources, it means oil or other mineral resources, or the development of an 
uncultivated area for the purposes of agriculture or forestry.50 But Herz notes 
that property also comprises rights, "above all contractual rights, such as rights 
arising from contracts of concession, purchases, loans" etc. 51 
Property (mal in Islamic Shari'ah) covers not just physical objects but 
also a wide range of ideas. It is 
That which can be hoarded or secured for use and enjoyment at 
a time of need or that to which a man's desires incline and 
which men are in the habit of giving away ... and of excluding 
others therefrom. 52 
However, certain things, notably air, light, fire, grass, sea water, rivers, public 
roads, and common pasturing grounds can not be exclusively appropriated or 
disposed of. 53 
48 Akinsanya, 8. 
49 Ibid. 
50 McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, BYIL 33 (1957), 
1. 
51 JH Hen, Expropriation of Foreign Property, AIIL 35 (1941) 245. See further Friedman, 
145. 
52 A Rahim, Muhammadan Jurisprudence(1982) 207, quoted by H Moinuddin, The Charter 
of the Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of Economic Co-operation Among Its 
Member States (1987) 55. , 
53 Ibid. 
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(3) The History of Expropriation 
The history of expropriation is important as it indicates that there is a 
generally accepted tradition whereby property is subject to expropnatton. 
Although throughout history much has been said about the inalienable right of 
a man to his own property, in practice "at all stages of history the individual 
owner was liable to have his property taken from him. "54 
The Roman theory of property which could be interpreted as "the 
limitless right of ownership" has been shown by Schulz not to differ greatly from 
modern laws.55 Both jurists and Article 544 of the Code Civil, the Declaration 
des Droits de l' Homme of 28 August 1789 and many other Constitutions recognize 
"that the right of property merely confers powers upon the owner."56 
Grotius was probably the first to State that it is by virtue of the State's 
sovereignty in constitutional law that it has the power to take private property.57 
In England, this right was regarded as self-evident. The feudal system was based 
on the idea that the lord owned the residual property in the land. In practice 
the feudal kings were ruthless in their seizure of land. 58 
In 1876 in Kohl v. United States, it was stated that the right of 
expropriation "is the offspring of political necessity and it is inseparable from 
sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law."59 Indeed legal history 
regarding property is more concerned with the limitation of State power. The 
sovereign right of the State in the first place has been taken for granted,60 In 
Greek classical laws expropriation without compensation "was regarded as 
inconsistent with the nature of the institution of property. "61 In Rome, 
expropriation occurred "only in the most exceptional circumstances. "62 English 
law has been extremely influential in its concern for protection of property: from 
54 FA Mann, Outlines of History of Expropriation, Law Quarterly Review 75 (1959) 189. 
55 Schulz, Principles of Roman Law (1936) 151, quoted by Mann, 189. 
56 Mann, 190. 
57 1d, 192. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Kohl v. United States (1876) 91 US 449,451, quoted by Mann, 193. 
60 Mann, 193. 
61 JW Jones, The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks (1955) 198, quoted by Mann, 193. 
62 Schulz, 161, quoted by Mann, 193. 
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the 13th century property could only be taken per legem terrae, by "parliamentary 
legislation, by the owner's consent vicariously given in parliament".63 In 1215 the 
Great Charter guaranteed that "no freeman shall be ... disseized of this freeholds 
or liberties or free customs... but... by the law of the land", and contained 
provisions imposing the duty of payment for royal requisitions.64 
In 1541 the English Parliament enacted the first case of compulsory 
acquisition of land, for water conduits in Gloucester. It carefully made provision 
for compensation in case of injury to private owners.65 In 1543 the first London 
Water Act gave London similar powers.66 The Port of Chichester Act of 1575 
contained more elaborate provisions and for the next 200 years, such laws 
invariably provided for the independent assessment of compensation.67 In 1766 
Lord Camden stated that "the Sovereign Authority ... cannot take away any man's 
private property without making him a compensation."68 
At about the same time, Blackstone said that even though some public 
work may be extremely beneficial "the law permits no man, or set of men, to do 
this without consent of the owner of the land. "69 For the first time in the history 
of English law, the theory was propounded that expropriation involves "a 
compulsory contract", an idea which continues to be influential in England?0 
In 1845 the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act provided a streamlined 
"Code for Compensation" .71 Of course, the British Parliament is not subject to 
any basic or fundamental law, and its statutes are not subject to judicial review. 
Thus "Parliament could provide for the taking of property without 
compensation".72 But according to Mann, English history "does not furnish an 
instance of this kind":73 persons are protected by what has been described as "the 
63 F Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, (1939) 185, 186, 192, quoted by Marut, 196. 
64 Marut, 194. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 ld, 195. 
68 Parliamentary History, XVI, 168, quoted by Marut, 195. 
69 Ibid. 
70 ld, 196. 
71 ld, 198. 
72 ld, 199. 
73 Vanhorn's Lessee v Dorrance (1795) 2 Dall 304 (Patterson J), quoted by Marut, 199. 
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English equivalent of a Bill of Rights".74 The English legacy in this area is 
evident in the constitutions of the Commonwealth countries. 
A funher legacy of the English law is its insistence upon independent 
assessment of payment for compensation. In 1845 the Land Clauses 
Consolidation Act introduced a jury system, while in more recent legislation 
compensation is assessed by a lands tribunal or by the couns. 75 
To summarize, since the 13th century it has been recognized that there 
are restrictions on the taking of property, and as a result of "the influence of 
Baldus, the payment of pretium came to be recognized as a further condition. "76 
Both Gierke and Ullmann concur that "only public policy permits interference 
with private rights which must be accompanied by the payment of 
compensation."77 Suppon for this has been found in the writing of Lucas de 
Penna in the 14th century. Writers such as Zasius and Vasquius in the 16th 
century agreed that the principle "that an individual can be deprived of his 
propeny only ex justa causa and against compensation."78 
It appears from instances in France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland and 
Italy that these principles were applied in practice.79 Naturally, in practice there 
were problems applying these principles, notably in France prior to the 
revolution. It was here "that expropriation came to be classified as a case of 
purchase and sale, of vente forcee of compulsory acquisition. "80 Blackstone took 
this doctrine and so it found its way into English and American law. In 
Gennany, because the individual could take the State to coun "it was useful to 
classify expropriation as a compulsory purchase; then the State could be sued for 
the payment of the price. "81 From the late 18th century the law of expropriation 
was put on the formal basis of legislation. 82 
74 Mann, 199. 
75 Established by the Land Tribunal Act 1949, quoted by Mann, 200. 
76 Mann, 201. 
77 Mann, 202. 
78 George Meyer, Das Recht der Expropriation (1868) 116, quoted by Mann, 202. 
79 Mann, 203, 204. 
80 ld, 204. 
81 ld, 206. 
82 Id, 207. 
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In the United States the Fifth Amendment provided that "no person 
shall... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." 
American courts "have admitted an exception to, or qualification of, the general 
rule when the measure challenged cru;t be considered to be an exercise of what 
is called the "police power"83 Blackstone in the 18th century gave the name of 
"public police and economy" to the "due regulation and domestic order of the 
kingdom." In 1872 the Supreme Court of the United States gave it the name of 
"the police power" which it stated to be "incapable of any very exact definition or 
limitation. "84 
In 1789, the French Constituent Assembly required that public necessity 
be "legalement constatee" with compensation being ''prealable. "85 From 1789 these 
achievements in France and America were spread to other countries in three 
ways.86 
First, there are now many written constitutions in different countries 
which state "that property cannot be taken except for public purposes and against 
payment of compensation." Secondly, the taking of property will be regulated by 
legislation. For example, in France the assessment of compensation is left to a 
"commission arbitrated' evaluation" from which appeals may be lodged with formal 
bodies. Thirdly, there is a clear distinction between expropriation, which is the 
taking of property for public purpose, and confiscation, which is seen as 
"punishment, and presupposes conviction of a criminal offence and is limited to 
the loss of the instrumenta or producta sceleris. ,f)l While the criminal law of the 
world has many provisions to allow property which is the subject matter of crime 
to be forfeited, "they are now contrary to established conception of human 
rights.''88 
83 Williams, 23. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Mann, 207. 
86 Id, 208. 
87 ld, 210-11. 
88 Id, 211, 212. 
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However, in some countries laws have been passed dealing with 
confiscation of property which is the subject of proceeds of criminal action. For 
example, in Australia the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989 has as its 
principal objects: 
(a) to deprive persons of the proceeds of, and benefits derived 
from, the commission of offences against certain laws of the 
State; and 
(b) to provide for the forfeiture of property used in or in 
connection with the commission of such offences; and 
(c) to enable law enforcement authorities effectively to trace 
such proceeds, benefits and property; and 
(d) to provide for the enforcement in the state of forfeiture 
orders, pecuniary penalty orders and restraining orders made in 
respect of offences against the laws of other States. 
In 1952 in the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, the 
issue of permanent sovereignty over natural resources arose. This happened as 
a result of the desire of the Third World to control its own natural resources, 
especially when many countries had gained their independence and demanded 
the sole right to exploit their natural resources. Since that time, the General 
Assembly has issued a series of resolutions confllliling the right of a State to 
expropriate its natural wealth and resources. These resolutions developed a new 
conception of the nature of expropriation, especially since 1970 when the 
relationships between oil producing countries and foreign companies were 
challenged and changed as oil producing countries asserted control over their 
natural resources. The most important development since 1952 was a result of 
the confrontation between the Third World and western countries over the 
concept of compensation which needed to be paid to foreign companies. This 
will be discussed in Chapter 10. 
On the other hand, the history of expropriation in Islamic Shari'ah dates 
from more than 1412 years ago, when the Holy Qur'an asserted respect for 
private property, and did not recognize the expropriation of private property as 
a rule. But expropriation is allowed if it is in the public interest within very 
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narrow limits and with full compensation.89 This issue will be discussed in detail 
later in this Chapter. 
(4) The Traditional Law: The Principle of Acquired Rights 
One of the major underpinnings of the traditional law relating to 
expropriation was the concept of acquired rights. That concept has been applied 
by international tribunals "with a view to condemning interference with the rights 
of foreigners by means of expropriation" .90 Traditional international law 
emphasized the sanctity of private property which was to a significant degree 
immune from expropriation in the exercise of State sovereignty. 
This view was reflected by the International Law Association, which in 
1958 at its 48th Conference adopted a resolution providing that: 
The principles of international law establishing the sanctity of a 
State's undertakings and respect for the "acquired rights" of 
aliens require... that the parties to a contract between a State 
and an alien are bound to perform their undertakings in good 
faith.91 
This view was also expressed in the Arbitration Award between Saudi Arabia and 
the Arabian American Oil Company (the Aramco Arbitration) where the Tribunal 
asserted that: 
The principle of re#'ect for "acquired rights" prevents the State 
from derogating ... " from the responsibilities it incurs when it 
enters into a contract with a concessionaire. 
Historically, the principle of acquired rights had its origins in the law of 
State succession, where it sought to ensure some measure of continuity of private 
property rights after a change of sovereignty. It was not specifically concerned 
with the question of expropriation. For example in 1923 the Permanent Court 
89 J Schacht, Islamic law in Contempoilll)' States, AJCL 8 (1959) 141-142. 
90 Friedman, 120. 
91 Report of the Forty-Eighth Conference, (1958) xi, quoted by Domke, 598. 
92 Award 61, NILR. 6 1959, 125, 87, 109, quoted by Domke, 598. 
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in its Advisory Opinion on German Settlers in Poland, a case involving questions 
of State succession, held that: 
private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a 
change of sovereignty. 93 
In this the Court was only echoing the words of Justice Marshall in the United 
States Supreme Court a century earlier, when he said that on a change of 
sovereignty ... 
The people change their allegiance; their relation to their 
ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other; 
and their rights of property, remain undisturbed.94 
In 1929, MJG Guerrero was appointed by the Council of the League of 
Nations, to determine the position of the Sopron-Koszeg local railway company, 
from the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy. By a unanimous decision the 
tribunal noted: 
In principle, the rights which a private company derives from a 
deed of concession cannot be nullified or affected by the mere 
fact of a change in the nationality of the territory on which the 
public service conceded is operated... most authorities and the 
international judgments which conform most nearly to modem 
views of international law take this view ... 95 
This principle has been supported in the past by jurists such as Anzilotti, 
Verdross, Anderson, Scelle, Doman, Hyde, Woolsey, Charles Rousseau, McNair, 
Mosler, and Bindschedler.96 
But modem international jurists have attacked the principle of acquired 
rights as a "relic of the past. "97 The evident reason for this is that with the 
93 l'CIJ Series B. No.6 (1923) 36, quoted by McNair, 18. McNair also stated that acquired 
rights is "one of the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations", id, 16. 
94 US v. Percheman 32 US (7 Pet) 51, 87 (1833) quoted by SC Jain, Legal "Dichotomy" of 
Concessions, Indian Journal of International Law 9 (1969) 518. 
95 AJIL 24 (1930) 164-74, quoted by McNair, 18. 
96 Jain, 520. 
97 Ibid. 
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emergence of the developing nations there came a demand to ensure their 
development. It was felt that the maintenance of acquired rights would result in 
the stagnation of the new societies, and that the "the application of traditional 
law after the emergence of new States will be out of context with the 
socio-economic system prevailing in the world. "98 At the same time scholars 
attacked the concept as vague and unrealistic. For example Foighel stated that: 
It must be reasonable to assume that the maxim of the 
protection of vested rights -- already as a consequence of the 
change in the conditions and circumstances underlying the 
existence of the maxim is of no irnponance in deciding what 
minimum standard in international law is to be observed 
unconditionally in their dealings with foreigners.99 
Similarly Friedman argued that: 
The concept of acquired rights is especially uncenain, both in 
definition and application, and its emotional appeal alone would 
seem to explain its persistence and the fact that it is continually 
invoked by statesmen.100 
The International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom 
v Norway) held that: 
It should be observed in this connection that international 
arbitration is now entering a new phase. It is not enough to 
stress the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; regard must also be had to the modifications which 
these principles may have undergone as a result of the great 
changes which have occurred in international life, and the 
principles must be adopted to the new conditions of international 
life.10 
Consistently with this observation the concept of acquired rights in international 
law has been discarded by Jimenez de Arechaga: 
98 Ibid. 
99 Foighe1, 54. 
100 Friedman, 122-123. 
101 ICJ Rep 1951 116. 
Traditional international law considered any interference by a 
State with foreign-owned property a violation of acquired rights 
which were internationally protected, and thus an unlawful act. 
Today, measures of nationalization or expropriation constitute 
the exercise of a sovereign right of the State and are 
consequently entirely lawful. This fundamental change of 
approach significantly affects the application of the rules of State 
responsibility, particularly in regard to the existence and scope 
of the duty to compensate aliens whose property has been 
nationalized or expropriated.102 
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Thus Third World writers, maintaining State sovereignty as an overriding 
principle reject the doctrine of acquired rights, and directly challenge traditional 
western opinions. 103 
(5) Proposals for the Protection of Private Property 
A major consideration of foreign investors when deciding where and how 
much to invest in a foreign State, is a guarantee of the security of his property 
and investment. The act of nationalization without fair and adequate 
compensation would make investors afraid to invest in developing countries.104 
Thus since the First World War, several suggestions have been made to negotiate 
a multilateral treaty aimed "at the protection Of private foreign investment. u!OS 
In 1957 the International Chamber of Commerce sought to lay down "in advance 
in an agreed and binding form under United Nations auspices the treatment to 
be applied to foreign capital in their territories ... "106 The advantage of such 
guidelines was seen to be to encourage and protect investments especially in 
developing countries. 
Similarly, the International Industrial Development Conference in 1957 
discussed means of stimulating the flow of private capital to the less developed 
102 Jimenez de Arechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned 
Propeny, NYUJ ILP, 11 (1978) 180. 
103 WD Verwey & NJ Schrijver, Taking of Foreign Propeny under International Law and 
New Legal Perspectives, Meeting at the Peace Palace, The Hague (1984) 18. See also 
KN Gess, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, ICLQ 13 (1964) 442, regarding 
the question of the position of acquired right in newly-independent states. 
104 EL Nwogugu, The Legal Problems of Foreign Investment (1965) 130. 
105 AS Miller, Protection of Private Foreign Investment by Multilateral Convention, AJIL 53 
(1959) 371. 
106 Resolution of the 16th Congress of the ICC, May, 1957,printed in its Brochure No. 193, 
quoted by Miller, 372. 
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areas of the world.107 In 1956 ECOSOC urged governments "to continue their 
efforts to develop international confidence conducive to private investment"108 
In a code drafted by the German Society,109 three main points were proposed: 
(1) The protection of the business activities of foreign 
investors; 
(2) The establishment of international tribunals to deal with 
disputes; 
(3) The use of sanctions to ensure enforcement.U0 
Articles IV - VIII provided for the protection of foreign investment, subject to 
limitations "only with respect to public utilities and like activities of vital 
importance to the State in question."111 One guarantee that went with these 
rights was that expropriation of foreign assets would be prevented for 30 years: 
if it took place, compensation would have to be adequate and prompt 112 
In a few cases international conventions which provide procedures for 
the protection of private property were specially concluded. The Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention of 1967 on the 
Protection of Foreign Property113 stated that, on the condition that it was in the 
public purpose, property or investments could be either expropriated or directly 
or indirect! y affected. But it provided that such measures must not be 
discriminatory and that just compensation must be paid.114 Less directly, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1965 promoted a 
Convention to deals with the settlement of investment disputes.115 The IBRD 
107 The Conference was held under the joint auspices of Time-Life, Inc. and the Stanford 
Research Institute, quoted by Miller, 372. 
108 Resolution 619 (XXII) entitled "Financing of Economic Development" UN Doc. E/2929 
ECOSOC 22nd Sess. Official Record Supp. No.I. Aug. 17, 1956, quoted by Miller, 372. 
109 The German Society, a group of German businessmen, published a draft Code called 
"International Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private Property Rights in Foreign 
Countries" in 1957. This society, dedicated to the protection of private foreign investment, 
was officially known as the Gesellschaft zur Forderung des Schutzes von 
Auslandsinvestitionen: Miller, 371. 
110 Id, 373. 
111 Article V. 
112 Article VI. 
113 See G Schwarzenberger, Foreign investment and International Law (1969) 154. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Id, 135,153. 
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Convention has been into force since 14 October 1966: it established the Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between the contracting parties and 
nationals of other States. Article 42 (1) provides that an ICSID arbitral tribunal 
is to apply "such rules of international law as may be applicable."u6 
However attempts to deal directly with the issue of expropriation by 
multilateral treaty have usually failed. For example Article III of the 
Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of 1959 on the protection of private property 
provided: 
No party shall take any measures against nationals of another 
party to deprive them directly or indirectly of their property 
except under due process of law and provided that such 
measures are not discriminatory or contrary to undertakings 
given by that party and are accompanied by the payment of just 
and effective compensation. Adequate provisions shall have 
been made at or prior to the time of deprivation for the prompt 
determination and payment of such compensation, which shall 
represent the genuine value of the property affected, and be 
made in transferable form and be paid without undue delay .117 
The Draft Convention never came into force: according to Francioni, this is 
because it failed to take into account the political implications for Third World 
nations in accepting foreign investment us 
(6) Expropriation under United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzow Factory 
Case119 held that nationalization would only be illegal if it contravened a treaty 
regulation. The usual and legal nationalization would have resulted in a demand 
that compensation be paid for direct losses while the illegal nationalization in the 
Chorzow Factory Case meant that full restitution was due. 
116 ld. 
117 9 JPL (1960) 116. 
118 Francioni, 265. 
119 Chorzow Factory Case (1928) PCIJ Ser. A No. 17,46-7. 
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Thus it can be accepted that if a State is subject to a treaty obligation 
concluded by that State with respect to the protection of private property, the 
treaty provision prevails. But the question is: what is the position, apart from 
any such treaty. In discussing this question it is necessary first to outline the 
General Assembly resolutions which have been a major force in changing the 
legal position. 
The issue of expropriation was discussed in December 1952 in the 
Second Committee of the General Assembly, under an item relating to the right 
of the undeveloped countries to exploit their natural wealth and resources. The 
Committee discussed a Uruguayan draft resolution concerning the right of any 
State to expropriate its natural resources.120 On 21 December 1952 the General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 626 which approved the right of underdeveloped 
countries to control and exploit freely their natural wealth and resources. This 
resolution established the principle of economic self-determination. It provides 
that: 
the right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural wealth 
and resources is inherent in their sovereignty and is in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations. 
Further, it recommended restraint from any "act, direct or indirect, designed to 
impede the exercise of the sovereignty of any State over its natural resources". 
In 1955 the Third Committee of the General Assembly adopted a draft 
Convention on Human Rights which gave more emphasis to the principle of 
economic self-determination by developing countries. This proposal was adopted 
by the General Assembly in 1955 at its twenty-ninth session. 
Since this time the General Assembly has issued a series of resolutions 
relating to permanent sovereignty over natural resources and giving the State the 
right to expropriate foreign property. Some of the more important resolutions 
are as follows: 
120 Yearbook of United Nations (1952) 387, 390. 
* On 14 December 1962, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources. It affirmed the right of the State to 
expropriate private property, both domestic and foreign, within 
its territory. The resolution affirmed also "the inalienable right 
of all States freely to dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources in accordance with their national interests." 
* Resolution 2158 (XXn of 25 November 1966 emphasized the 
"inalienable right of all countries to exercise permanent 
sovereignty over their natural resources." 
* The Charter of Economic Right and Duties of States of 1974 
expanded the concept of permanent sovereignty of a State over 
its natural wealth and resources to recognize that a State's right 
to possess, use and dispose of its natural resources is inherent 
in its economic and social development. Further, Article 2(c) 
provides that every State has the right "to nationalize, 
expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property ... " 
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Thus various United Nations General Assembly Resolutions on permanent 
sovereignty over natural wealth and resources have recognized the right of States 
to expropriate private property located in its territory whether its foreign or 
national. The question is: what impact have these resolutions and other 
developments had on general international law? 
(7) The Legality of Expropriation under General International Law 
Both traditional and modem international jurists emphasize the right of 
the State to expropriate foreign property located within its territory. Thus 
Friedman stated in 1953 that: · 
States subject to contrary provisions in treaties or other rules of 
positive international law, possess the right to expropriate in the 
manner and form they consider best. They are entitled to 
organise their system of property, whether movable or 
immovable, according to their particular national genius, to 
maintain a liberal economy or to replace it by a controlled or 
planned economy. They may preserve the private ownership of 
all or part of the national wealth or suppress it either wholly or 
in part, in order to introduce collectivist forms of ownership or 
' 
to establish State control in certain sectors of economic life, 
States enjoy complete freedom, in this field. 121 
Similarly Jimenez de Arechaga said in 1978 that: 
Contemporary international law recognizes the right of every 
State to nationalize foreign-owned property, even if a 
predecessor State or a previous government engaged itself by 
treaty or by contract, not to do so. This is a corollary of the 
principle of permanent sovereignty of the State over all its 
wealth, natural resources and economic activities, as proclaimed 
in successive General Assembly resolutions. 122 
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The right of a State to expropriate foreign property has been generally 
recognized as emerging from the legal concept of sovereign rights. The United 
States in a note of 7 September 1948 to Rumania protesting about the 
discriminatory character of the Rumanian nationalization of American property 
"recognized the right of a sovereign power to expropriate property subject to its 
jurisdiction and belonging to American nationals .,. ".123 The Governments of 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States jointly issued statements 
regarding the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt, at the Suez 
Canal Conference in London on 2 August 1956, conceding Egypt's right to 
nationalize the Company.124 
In regard to the expropriation of American property in the Mexico 1938, 
United States Secretary of State Hull stated in his note of 3 April 1940: 
The Government of the United States readily recognizes the 
· right of a sovereign State to expropriate property for public 
125 purposes ... 
The right of a State to expropriate foreign property located within its 
territory has also been recognized by international conventions. For example, the 
Geneva Convention of 1922, concluded between Germany and Poland, 
121 Friedman, 134. 
122 de Arechaga, 179. 
123 Deparunent of State Bulletin 19 (1948) 408. 
124 8 Whiteman, Digest of International Law (1967) 1106. 
125 See Akinsanya, 206. 
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established Poland's right to expropriate in Polish Upper Silesia certain property 
of German nationals.126 
But under traditional international law, there were distinct limits on a 
State's right to expropriate. For example the Harvard Draft Convention on the 
International Responsibility of States provided in article 10 that three types of 
taking of property were unlawful: 
(1) those which are uncompensated; (2) those effected other 
than for public purposes, even if compensation is paid; and (3) 
those effected in violation of treaty, even if compensation is 
paid. The remedies provided were, however, different. In the 
first instance, damages were to be the proper reparation for a 
taking made wrongful by the failure to pay compensation: in the 
other two cases restitution was the ordinary remedy .127 
Thus according to this view, which can be taken to represent the traditional 
international law position, an expropriation is lawful if and only if: 
(1) The expropriation is in the public interest or for a public 
purpose; 
(2) The expropriation must be taken without discrimination 
against aliens; 
(3) The expropriation must be accompanied by adequate 
compensation. 
These three conditions will be dealt with consecutively. 
(a) The Public Interest or Public Purpose Requirement 
The conception of public interest or public purpose or public utility is 
found in the constitutions of many countries. For example, section 29 of the 
Constitution of Thailand of 3 August 1952 provides that: 
... Expropriation of private property by the State is prohibited 
unless necessary for the purpose of public utility ... 128 
126 PCJJ Series A No 7 (1926) 22. 
127 AJIL 55 (1961) quoted by JG Castel, International Law (1976) 1118. 
128 Quoted by A Akinsanya, 19. 
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But this "public interest" requirement is also contained in many of the 
international authorities. The Permanent Court of Arbitration recognized the 
right of expropriation of any property for reasons for public utility in the 
Norwegian Claims Case 1922. The right was described by the Court as ... 
the power of a sovereign State to expropriate, take or authorise 
the taking of any property within its jurisdiction which rna~ be 
required for the "public good" or for the general welfare.12 
A similar view was expressed by the International Tribunal in the Walter F Smith 
Case in 1929.130 United Nations Resolution 1803 (XVll) of 14 December 1962 
provided that nationalization measures must be based on ground or reasons of 
public utility, security or the national interest. Article 9 ("Act of Expropriation") 
proposed in 1957 by FV Garcia Amador, the International Law Commission's 
Special Rapponeur on State Responsibility, would have provided that: 
The State is responsible for the injuries caused to an alien by the 
expropriation of his property, save in so far as the measure in 
question is justified on grounds of public interest and the alien 
receives adequate compensationP1 
Many writers suppon this opinion.132 For example, Bin Cheng assened that: 
The public welfare of the community is considered by 
international law to be of such overriding imponance that it is 
allowed to derogate from the principle of respect of private 
rights. Such derogation is, however, conditional upon the 
presence of a genuine public need, and is governed by the 
principle of good faith.13 
This suggests that the right of a State "to expropriate is not only founded on, but 
also strictly circumscribed by, the public interest."134 
129 Scott, 11 Hague Court Reports 66. 
130 AJ/L 24 (1930). 
131 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 11 (1957) 117. 
132 See Toriguian, 186. 
133 Cheng, 39, 40 .. 
134 Ibid, 38. 
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By contrast the Harvard Draft No 10 of 1 May 1959 could not limit .. 
Takings to those for a "public purpose", for in modem times 
there are very few limits to what a State may consider necessary 
for general benefit, if there are no other reasons, the State can 
always rely on the needs of the national economy or on 
requirements of social welfare. An international authority would 
hardly be competent to pass judgment on the adequacy of such 
a purpose... [I]t is extremely difficult to conceive of a situation 
where an international tribunal would undertake to review a 
State's determination of what is a dominating public purpose 
except in a situation so flagrant that the procedure involves a 
manifest denial of procedural justice.135 
In the arbitration between Kuwait and Aminoil in 1979, the Tribunal did 
not agree that the nationalization "took the form of a single measme not directed 
to any object of general interest." It found this interest to be the futw-e 
development, in successive stages, of the country's oil industry.136 The 
implication is that the future development of the oil industry being in the public 
interest was a factor in concluding that the nationalization was legitimate. 
Although the principle of public welfare in international law overrides 
the principle of respect of private rights,137 it does not follow that there is a 
substantive requirement in international law that an expropriation be a matter of 
"public utility". International law does not have its own definition of "public 
utility". A definition could perhaps be found in the practice of nations,138 for 
example, in the building of highways, and railroads, military barracks and public 
cemeteries, or the secularisation of religious property, or the mobilisation of 
commercial and industrial resources for the prosecution of a war.139 But the 
definition of "public utility" must be the responsibility of the State, as only the 
State can decide what is in its true interests for the welfare of its people. As 
there is no definition of "public utility" in international law any such requirement 
135 Preliminary Draft with Explanatory Note, 1 May 1959, 66, quoted by Domke, 590, 591. 
136 Award, para 85, quoted by A Redfern, The Arbitration between the Government of Kuwait 
and Aminoil, BYIL 55 (1984) 97. 
137 Cheng, 39,40. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
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would be very difficult to challenge, unless it "were wholly beyond any reasonable 
limit "140 
(b) The Non-Discrimination Requirement 
It is often asserted, as a principle of State responsibility, that the State 
is under an obligation to treat aliens who reside within its territory equally with 
its nationals. This principle relates to the protection of the life and property of 
aliens under local law, and requires some remedy under international law for 
injury to the property of aliens which results from measures in the application of 
which there is discrimination between aliens and nationals of the State without 
any justifiable reason. Therefore, according to this view of international law, if 
alien property has been nationalized by the State separately from the property 
of its nationals without reasonable excuse, the measure is discriminatory. But if 
national property has been nationalized at the same time, the measure is 
non-discriminatory and no compensation is payable. 
But it is often the case that property of the relevant kind (e.g. rights 
under concessions or mining leases) is owned only by foreigners. International 
law and General Assembly resolutions have recognized each State's sovereignty 
over its natural resources and its right to expropriate alien property within its 
territory, in the pursuit of public interests of an economic or social nature. The 
view that "a nationalization measure is discriminatory simply because it is 
directed against foreign nationals"141 is not acceptable. In regard to the 
justification of discriminatory expropriations where aliens only are affected, 
Brownlie states that: 
The test of discrimination is the intention of the government. 
The fact that only aliens are affected may be accidental, and, if 
the taking is based on economic and social policies, it is not 
directed against particular groups simply because they own the 
property involved.142 
140 Domke, 590. See also Herz, 253. 
141 Akinsanya, 21. 
142 Brownlie·: 538. 
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Applying the criteria of discrimination, Brownlie concludes that measures "are 
discriminatory [if they are] aimed at persons of particular racial groups or 
nationals of particular States, or concern property owned by a foreign State and 
dedicated to official State purposes." 143 
The writer accepts that discrimination can be claimed in expropriation 
cases where the discrimination is "aimed at persons of particular racial groups or 
nationals of particular States". This is in agreement, with scholars and with State 
practice and with State and international jurisprudence.144 For example the 
Government of Cuba's Nationalization Law No 851 of 6 July 1960 was directed 
exclusively against enterprises owned by nationals of the United States. Article 
1 provided for: 
the nationalization, through expropriation, of the properties or 
concerns belonging to natural or juridical persons nationals of 
the United States of America or the concerns in which said 
persons have a majority interest or partic~ation even though 
they be organized under the laws of Cuba. 45 
The United States protested against this law and described its discriminatory 
character as follows: 
This law is manifestly in violation of those principles of 
international law which have long been accepted by the free 
countries of the West. It is in its essence discriminatory, 
arbitrary and confiscatory. 146 
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino the Cuban nationalization was 
deemed illegal on the basis of its discriminatory character. The New York 
Supreme Court stated that: 
The act classifies United States nationals separately from all 
other nationals and provides no reasonable basis for such a 
classification. The decree does not justify the classification on 
the basis of the conduct of the owners in managing and 
143 Ibid. 
144 Akinsanya, 21. 
145 AJIL 55 (1961) 823. 
146 43 Dept. of State Bulletin 171 (1960), quoted by Domke, 602. 
exploiting their properties or on the basis of the importance to 
the security of the State where ownership of the property resides. 
The justification is simply reprisal against another government. 
Doubtless the measures which States may employ in their 
rivalries are of great variety but they do not include the taking 
of the property of the nationals of the rival govemment.147 
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Similarly, an Amsterdam appellate court considered the Indonesian 
nationalization of Dutch property "a manifestly discriminating measure which in 
a very sharp manner attacks the rights and interests exclusively of nationals of 
the State of the Netherlands, though a State of war does not exist between 
Indonesia and that Country." 148 
In these cases, the claim of discrimination was upheld. But the claim has 
not always been accepted as a general rule, and has depended on the facts of 
particular situations. For example in Aminoil v Kuwait (1979) Aminoil claimed 
that as a Japanese owned Arabian Oil Company (AOC) had not been 
simultaneously nationalized, discrimination could be claimed. However the claim 
was not accepted by the Tribunal, which held that at no time had the American 
nationality of the Aminoil company been a factor in the nationalization process.149 
Further, the Minister for Oil had given the following reasons for the non-
nationalization of AOC: 
AOC's high-cost off-shore production operations are such as to 
give it a special position which requires a high degree of 
expertise. At the same time, it is working within the framework 
of a concession granted by both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, so its 
position is completely different. Any modification of the 
concession must be agreed to by both countries. 150 
The Tribunal held that "there was nothing that would prima facie prevent 
recognition of the validity of the nationalization". !Sl In consequence the claim 
of discrimination could not be applied. 
147 12APP. Div 2d 506, 207,NYS, 2d 288 (2d). Dep. Nov. 14. 1960, quoted by Domke, 603. 
148 Quoted by M Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts, AJJL 
54 (1960) 316. 
149 Redfern, 97. 
!50 Ibid. 
151 ld, 98. 
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It may be concluded that expropriations of property will be unlawful if 
they are a measure of retaliation against a foreign State and not against the 
private property of its nationals, or if they are directed without independent 
justification against nationals of a particular State or against particular racial 
groups. An expropriation may be discriminatory even if undertaken for public 
purposes. For example the expropriation of BP by the Libyan Government was 
considered illegal by the arbitrators. 152 Both the United States Department of 
State and United Nations Resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 are very critical 
of Israeli expropriations in Arab and occupied territories. 
Akinsanya: 
According to 
Some expropriations carried out by the Israeli government on 
Israeli territory were discriminatory while all expropriations 
carried out in Arab-occupied territories were clearly illegal 
because Israeli authority is governed by the law of belligerent 
occupation, the fact that they are directed against particular 
racial groups constituting an additional element of illegality.153 
(c) The Requirement of Adequate Compensation 
International law and United Nations resolutions have recognized that 
when the State exercises its sovereign right to expropriate property whether of 
nationals or foreigner, it should be accompanied with the duty to pay adequate 
compensation. The expropriation of property without compensation is against 
the rule of international law and will be unlawful. 
However, there is much controversy about the terms and standard of 
compensation. Western countries hold that "appropriate compensation" can only 
mean "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation", or "full and fair" 
compensation" .154 In Chapter 10 I discuss in more detail the principle and the 
standard of compensation according to Western and Third World opinion. 
152 FR Tes6n, State Contracts and Oil Expropriations: the Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration, 
Virginia Journal of International Law 24 (1984) 337. 
153 Akinsanya, 23. 
154 Gess, 427. 
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(d) Conclusion 
As has been noted an expropriation is recognized as lawful, if it satisfies 
three conditions: (I) public interest or utility (2) non-discrimination (3) adequate 
compensation. H?wever, there are differing opinions regarding the requirements 
of public interest and non-discrimination. The problem with defining public 
interest is that "there is little authority in international law establishing any useful 
criteria by which a State's assertion of public purpose can be questioned ... 
[T]here appear to be few, if any cases in which a taking has been held unlawful 
under international law on the sole and specific ground that it was not for a 
public purpose" .155 
General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, submits the expropriation of 
foreign property to domestic law. Article 2 (a)(6) totally disregards both the 
principle of public purpose and also. the principle of non-discrimination. In effect 
the Charter uses the language of non-discrimination to widen the governmental 
power of Third World countries. Further Article 2 provides that no State shall 
be compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign investment These 
provisions can be seen to reflect the opinions of Third World and former colonial 
countries that "they are not bound by existing international law on expropriation 
because it was formulated for the benefit of western States" .156 
It is the opinion of this writer that the concept of public interest or utility 
does not have any satisfactory definition in international law. It is the 
responsibility of the expropriating State to consider what is necessary and useful 
for the benefit of its people. This argument has historical validity. Before the 
French Revolution, the King had to decide what was the public interest "and 
there was no court of law which would have the jurisdiction or power to review 
the reasons for and the justifiability of the royal deterrnination". 157 
155 BH Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation 
of Foreign-owned Wealth, AJIL 75 (1981) 440. 
156 Quoted by Gainer, 1565. See also Guha-Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for 
Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law, AJIL 55 (1961) 866. 
157 Mann, 204. 
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Nor can the concept of discrimination prevent a State from taking 
nationalization measures, even if these measures adversely affect foreigners. If 
the discrimination "is caused for developmental purposes it is assumed to be 
justified".158 Neither the principle of public interest nor discrimination are 
universally accepted in international law: both have been criticized by Third 
World countries, and both principles have been ignored in the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States. 
(8) The Territoriality of Expropriation 
As we have seen, a State has the right to expropriate foreign property 
located with its territory, a right which always proceeds from its sovereignty. The 
question is whether the right to expropriate has any effect outside the territory 
of .the State. Friedman argues that ... 
the general rule is that expropriation which is derived from the 
jurisdiction exercised by the State in virtue of its territory and its 
public services, can only affect property situated within such 
territory as defined by international law .159 
In the Lotus Case, the basic premise of territoriality was stated as follows: 
the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law 
upon a State is that ... it may not exercise its power in any form 
in the territory of another State. 160 
In practice "the courts of other states need not and generally do not give effect 
to nationalizations of assets located outside the jurisdiction of the nationalizing 
State, since a State has no jurisdiction and therefore no power to transfer title to 
property located outside of its territory".161 
158 FV Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New International Economic Order. A New Approach 
to the Law Governing Nationalization and Compensation, Lawyer of the Americas 12 
(1980) 27. See Gainer, 1564. 
159 Friedman, 161. 
160 PCIJ 1927 SerA, No 10, 18-19. 
161 R Delson, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Issues of Public and Private 
Imernational Law, Columbia Law Review 57 (1957) 778. 
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Laws of some countries emphasise that nationalization take effect inside 
their territory. For example the law nationalizing the oil industry of Iran in 1951 
provided that "the oil industry throughout all parts of the country, without 
exception, be nationalized" .162 This principle is also found in the laws of other 
countries such as Indonesia and Cuba.163 
By contrast the Egyptian decree on the nationalization of the Suez Canal 
Company of 26 July 1956 provided for the taking of the company's assets outside 
of Egypt: "all its assets, rights and obligation are transferred to the nation". But 
the extraterritorial effect of the Egyptian rationalization decree was not 
recognized. The Suez Canal Settlement Agreement provided that the 
government of Egypt "shall leave the assets outside Egypt" to the company. 164 
However, in computing the amount of the settlement sum, the value of the 
external assets of the company may have been taken into account 165 
Where extraterritorial effects have been accepted they appear as special 
solutions to problems of a political nature. For example two notable exceptions 
to the principle of territoriality are: 
(a) The Litvinov Agreement of 16 November 1933 by which 
the United States agreed to the application of 
nationalization measures of the Soviet Union to assets 
located within the United States; 166 
(b) In US v Pink, a special treaty was signed which compelled 
the courts to accept Russian confiscatory decrees in the 
Soviet Union. 167 
Writers with experience in socialist States hold the view that the external assets 
of foreign-owned companies should be included in nationalization measures 
because "the entire property of the nationalized subjects is affected as an 
universitas rerum"; or "such of the assets as are located outside the taking country 
162 AW Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952(1954) 268. 
163 Domke (1961), 598. 
164 United Nations Docs N3898, S/4089, of 23 September 1958, AJIL 54 (1960) 498, 502 
quoted by Domke (1961), 599. 
165 Rauschnig, Die Abwicklung des Suez Kana/ Konfliktes, 8 Jahrbuchfiir InternationalesRecht 
(1959) 267, quoted by Domke (1961), 599. 
166 Domke (1961), 599. 
167 AJIL 36 (1942) 309; 315 US 203, 220 (1942). 
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should share the fate of the entity in its country of origin".168 Katzarov states 
that "the jurisprudence relating to the territorial effect of nationalization... has 
only a very restricted theoretical creative value".169 
It appears that certain instances of acquiring property outside the taking 
State's territory can be recognized in international law, where such acquisition 
can be seen as a simple consequence of an effective acquisition, e.g. of shares, 
within the foreign State. Such an instance occurred in Williams and Hwnbert 
Ltd. v W&H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd in 1985Y0 In 1983 W & H, a Spanish 
company, was nationalized by the Spanish Government. This was accomplished 
by the passing of a special law, under which, "all the shares in, and control of, 
the Spanish Company and its subsidiaries were vested in the Spanish State.'' 171 
The plaintiff was an English company marketing for the company and owning the 
trademarks "Dry Sack". Following the acquisition by the Spanish Government 
the English company became in effect a "subsidiary" of the parent company. 
Action was brought over ownership and right to use certain trademarks. The 
House of Lords, citing Luther v Sagor and Princess Paley Olga v Weisz, held: 
These authorities illustrate the principle that an English court 
will recognize the compulsory acquisition law of a foreign State 
and will recognize the change of title to property which has 
come under the control of the foreign State and will recognize 
the consequences of that change of title. The English court will 
decline to consider the merits of compulsory acquisition.172 
Lord Templeman also noted that "English law and international law must 
recognize the Spanish law and accept its consequences.''173 
It should be noted that there was no evidence that the compulsory 
acquisition of shares in the company violated international law. There was no 
168 Knapp, International Law Association, Report of the Forty Eighth Conference (1958) 177, 
quoted by Domke (1961), 600. 
169 K Katzarov, "The Validity of the Act of Nationalization in International Law", MLR 22 
(1959) 646. 
170 (1986) AC 368. 
171 BYIL, 56 (1985) 317. 
172 BYIL, 57 (1986) 440. 
173 ld, 441. 
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international law obstacle to holding that the shares, and therefore control in the 
companies, vested in Spain. 174 
3. The Effect of Stabilization Clauses 
In order to encourage investments in developing countries, States have 
sometimes given assurances of security to foreign property owners, which at times 
came into conflict with their desire to nationalize. The main area of conflict, for 
the host countries, was that they feared that the price to be paid for economic 
investment was an unacceptable degree of interference in their economic and 
political sovereignty which would influence their cultural activities, and economic 
and financial institution. "Also the government feels that it will lose its 
sovereignty as a result of the operations of multinational firms which is closely 
associated with the issue of extraterritoriality."175 
However, the Third World desperately needs the foreign capital or 
foreign talent to assist in developing the country, and has entered into 
agreements which created contractual rights for the investor and obligations for 
the host countries. These agreements, which provided protection for the investor 
in accordance with international law against any prejudicial act, have sometimes 
generated conflict with the State's right to expropriate foreign property. For 
example, Article 3(2) of the Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments of 25 November 1959 between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Pakistan provides: 
Nationals or companies of either party shall not be subjected to 
expropriation of their investments in the territory of the other 
party except for the public benefit against compensation, which 
shall represent the equivalent of the investments affected.176 
Some Third World countries expressly state that expropriation of industry 
is not the policy of the government. For example, the policy statement of 
Guinea declares that: 
174 BYIL 56 (1985) 317. 
175 AI Litvak, Foreign investment (1970) 23, 25. 
176 Quoted by Akinsanya, 32. 
Those who are ready to invest in the Republic of Guinea and 
who accept to participate in the economic development of our 
country, must be able to count on flawless social stability and 
benefits from guarantees protecting their capital from all 
arbitrary acts and ensuring fair interests. 177 
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Furthermore, some agreements contain provisions preventing expropriation for 
a defined period of time. For example, in 1953 India made an agreement with 
three foreign oil companies to build refineries. This agreement stated that there 
would be no nationalization for 25 years: if the enterprise was expropriated after 
that time, reasonable compensation was to be paid.178 
In 1967 three Japanese companies signed a contract with the Ruler of 
Abu Dhabi which provided "The mutual consent of the Ruler and the Companies 
shall be required to annul, or modify, the provisions of this agreement."179 
The Concession Agreement of 1933 between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company stated that government legislation could not alter either the 
concession or the terms of the concession.180 
In 1973 the Sultan of Oman and the Sun Group signed an agreement 
which stated that the Sultan could not amend the agreement, but that with the 
written consent of the Sun Group the provisions of the agreement could be 
annulled, amended or modified, and also the Sultan could not pass laws which 
would discriminate against the operations of the Sun Group.181 
In June 1975 the government of Liberia and Liberia Iron and Steel 
Corporation signed an agreement which stated in Article 21: 
177 Ibid. 
178 Narayanan, India, in Wolfgang Friedmann (ed), Legal Aspects of Foreignlnvestment (1959) 
249,261. 
179 Selected Document of the International Petroleum Industry (1967) 137, quoted by EJ 
Paasivirta, Participation of States in International Contracts and the Arbitral Settlement of 
Disputes (Cambridge PhD Thesis 1988) 131. 
180 (1952) ICJ Reports, 86. 
181 GR Delaume, Transnational Contracts: Applicable Law and Settlement of Disputes. Law 
and Practice, Binder 1, Booklet 3.1.,25,1983; quoted by Paasivirta, 131. 
This Concession agreement shall be governed, construed and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the Republic of 
Liberia excluding, however, any enactment passed or brought 
into force in the Republic of Liberia before or after the date of 
this concession agreement which is inconsistent with or contrary 
to the terms hereof. 182 
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It has often been argued that international law recognizes that, according 
to the principle pacta sunt servanda, a contract concluded between two States or 
by a State with a national of another State, must be respected, and that in 
consequence expropriation of private property in situations where the property 
is specifically protected by an agreement is contrary to international law. For 
example in 1958 the following resolution was adopted by an International Bar 
Association Committee on Protection of Foreign Property in Time of Peace: 
International law recognises that the principle pacta sunt 
servanda applies to the specific engagement of States towards 
other States or the nationals of other States, and that in 
consequence a taking of private property in violation of a 
specific State contract is contrary to international law.183 
Similarly in the Losinger and Company Case Switzerland argued that: 
The principle of pacta sunt servanda must be applicable not only 
to agreements directly concluded between States, but also to 
those between a State and foreigners. 184 
But there has in modern times been a metamorphosis in the whole 
nature of pacta sunt servanda as it relates to expropriation. In the case of Kuwait 
v Aminoil in 1977, the principle pacta sunt servanda was interpreted so as not to 
interfere with changes in the contract "brought about by time, and the 
acquiescence and conduct of the parties. "185 Thus because of the principle pacta 
sunt servanda, the contract was still valid, but it became a different contract. 
Thus the principle which restricted the right of a State to nationalize property 
182 CICR!, I, 113. 
183 International Bar Association, Seventh Conference Report, Cologne {1958) 485. 
184 PC!J Series C No 78 (1936) 32. 
185 Award, Paragraph 101; !LM 21 (1984) 1023. See Tschanz, 277. 
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specifically protected by an agreement or contract was no longer considered 
valid. 
The right of a State to expropriate its natural resources is a corollary of 
the right of permanent sovereignty, a right which exists and may be exercised 
"even if the predecessor State or a previous government engaged itself by a treaty 
or a contract not to do so". 186 Thus stabilization agreements will not prevent the 
State from exercising its rights to expropriate its natural resources. 
Furthermore, the stabilization function cannot be achieved as there is no 
international law preventing nationalization, providing compensation is paid, and 
because "international law does not possess adequate rules governing contracts 
of this nature" .187 When it became necessary to adjust some long term 
agreements, such as the oil concession agreements of the 1930s, this was done 
using the more flexible institutions of municipal contractual law. If international 
law had demanded rigid adherence to stabilization agreements, it could have 
resulted in a total severance of any kind of contractual agreement. 188 
4. The Expropriation of Property in Islamic Shari'ah Law 
Islamic Shari'ah respects private property. Property is not only a right 
but also a responsibility. The Holy Qur'an, the basic source of Islamic Shari'ah 
prohibits unjust enrichment (akl al-amwal baynakum) (bil-batil). In the Qur'an 
there are several verses dealing with this issue. For example the Qur'an says: 
0 ye who believe. Eat not up your property among _yourselves 
in Vanities. But let there be amongst you traffic and trade by 
mutual good-will ... 189 
0 orphans restore their property (when they reach their age) nor 
substitute [your] worthless things for [their] good ones; and 
devour not their substance !by mixing it up] with your own. For 
this is indeed a great sin. 19 
186 de Arechaga, 179. 
187 Id, 193. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Holy Qur'an sura IV verse 29. 
190 Id, verse 2. 
Similarly Prophet Muhammad said: 
0 ye people; your blood and money are as sacred to you until 
you meet your God, as the sacredness of this day and month. 
He who is killed in defence of his property is a martyr. 
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The inviolability of private property is affirmed in the Holy Qur'an, which 
disapproved of usury191 and prohibited interest. 192 "The sanctity of property is an 
absolute rule for all schools of law, both between private persons and in their 
relationship with the State." 193 Moreover, this is the case without any 
discrimination between alien and citizen regarding their religion: all are equal 
before the law in respect of their right to protect their property. 
On the other hand, Muslim jurists have established many new solutions 
for the new problems that have occurred in modern Islamic societies. They did 
not stand handcuffed towards these new problems but managed to derive 
appropriate solutions from within the rules of Islam. In the economic domain in 
particular Muslim jurists have lately arrived at a solution to the question of an 
interest-based economy (which is rejected by the Islamic Shari'ah) by improvising 
the so-called Islamic Banks based on money management without interest. Such 
banks are spreading over the world.194 
In the second century of the Hijrah (8th century AD) Abu Yusuf, a 
famous jurist in a treatise written at the command of the Caliph Harun al Rashid 
(the Imam) on revenue and other matters of government said: 
It is neither lawful for the Imam [the head of the Muslim State], 
nor has he the power, to give as a concession to anyone that 
which belongs to a Muslim or to a protected person, or to 
deprive them of anything which they possess, except if he has a 
191 The Holy Qur'an, sura IV verse 161. 
192 The Holy Qur'an sura II verse 279. 
193 Schacht, 140. 
194 "Islamic banking turning popular", in Muslim World News, a weekly newspaper published 
by the Muslim World League, Makkah Al-Mukarramah No 969 14 April 1986, Sha'ban 
5, 1406H. 
legal claim against them; in this case he may exact from them 
that to which he has the right 195 
This bears out Schacht's statement that: 
Islamic law in all its schools gives clear-cut decisions on a 
number of problems concerned with the relationship of 
individual and State, problems which ... have become a subject of 
much interest to western legal thought. The solutions provided 
by Islamic law go decisively and consistently in favour of the 
rights of the individual, of the sanctity of contracts, and of 
private propeny, and the~ put severe limits to the action of the 
State in these matters ... 19 
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Therefore, Islamic Shari' ah does not recognize the nationalization of 
private propeny, whether foreign or national, as a rule, because in neither the 
basic source of Islamic Shari'ah, the Holy Qur'an, nor in the Sunnah, the practice 
of the prophet, is their provision for the nationalization of private propeny. 
Islamic Shari'ah has the great doctrine of Durura, necessity or force 
majeure, which is derived from the Holy Qur'an. This doctrine provides for the 
disregarding of a law, even of an economic or political nature, if the basis for so 
doing is the protection of the propeny of a State, or its very existence, or the 
protection of life. This doctrine applies to both religious and secular life.197 
195 Kitab al-Kharaj, Bulag, Cairo 1302, 34 quoted by Joseph Schacht, 140. 
196 Schacht, 138. 
197 Durura The Principle of Necessity in Islamic Shari'ah outlines five elements which it is 
vital to preserve for the spiritual and temporal well-being of the Muslim. These five 
elements are 
I. That one must keep the religion 
2. That one must preserve one's own life 
3. That one must preserve one's own mind 
4. That one must not prevent or harm fuwre generations 
5. That one must preserve one's personal possessions. 
Durura states that no activity can be engaged in which would interfere with a man 
preserving these elements, and further that extraordinary measures may be taken if 
necessity requires it, in order to ensure the preservation. Durura recognises the 
importance of these elements to man's spiritual and temporaJ affairs and claims that 
should such elements be lost, a man's spiritual and temporaJ world will also be lost El 
Ghouneimi, Treaties Rules in the Islamic Shari' ah. (1977) 127 (text in Arabic). See also 
Abd AI Hamed Mutwally, Islamic Shari' ah as the Basic Source of the Constitution, (1975) 
13()..1 (text in Arabic); M. Muslehuddin, Islamic Jurisprudence and the Rule of Necessity 
and Need, IS/ Stud 12 (1973). ' 
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However, Islamic Shari'ah allows expropriation of private property in the 
public interest only within very narrow limits. 198 In the case of the compulsory 
sale of land for public roads or cemeteries, full compensation must be paid by 
the public treasury. So also in the case of the compulsory sale of property to 
repay debts.199 
On the subject of the seizing of belongings in the public interest, the 
Islamic Juristic Assembly Council announced in its Fourth Conference at Jeddah 
in Saudi Arabia, in a session held from 18 to 23 Jumad Thani 1408 (AH) - 6 to 
22 February 1988 - under the reference number D4-80-88, and according to the 
Islamic Shari' ah the following: 
First; the individual ownership should be respected and 
protected against any assault, and its range should not be 
tightened or restricted. The proprietor is the master of his 
property with which he can do whatever he likes, and fully 
benefit of it. 
Second; it is allowed to expropriate an estate for public interest. 
This should be done under the following legal guideline: 
1 - In return for taking over an estate, an immediate and fair 
compensation should be paid. 
2 - The person who takes it should be the person in charge 
or his deputy. 
3 - The seizure should be for the purpose of serving a public 
interest required by a general necessity such as mosques, 
roads, bridges and arches. 
4 - The seized estate should not be used for public or private 
investments, and the taking over process should not be 
accelerated. 
Any infringement of these conditions makes the seizure of an 
estate an oppression that God and his Prophet have prohibited. 
Therefore, while private property is considered protected in Islamic 
Shari' ah, the demands of society have led to the clarifying of the doctrine of 
Durura as it applies to control of natural resources. Based on the principle of 
198 Schacht, 142. 
199 Ibid. 
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necessity, Islamic society sees its development as a modern State imperative. For 
this reason it condones the reclaiming of its own natural resources and considers 
this agreement terminated. Anicle 97 of the "Majallah", the Ottoman Civil Code, 
stated that: 
One is not allowed to take another's property without legal 
cause. 200 
Moinuddin stated that. .. 
Thus violation of contractual obligations which are committed 
by the State under the compulsion of necessity and within the 
public interest cannot be considered to be an expropriation of 
ownership of property, which is in any case vested in the State, 
but a breach of a private contract in the form of a premature 
termination of a concession~ contract that entails the 
obligation to pay compensation.2 1 
On the other side, the reading of the Islamic Shari'ah texts has shown 
that ownership - as much as it is complete, steady and permanent in terms of 
owning, possessing and running it under the Islamic Shari'ah - should not 
contradict the public interest of all Muslims by any absolute character that may 
be asserted for it. And if a contravention occurs, the public interest is to be 
given priority over the private interest, but the private right should be protected 
through a fair compensation. Thus Ibn a! Qayyim a! Jawzyya Jurist of the 
Hanbali School said: "For the sake of the probable interest, it is allowed to 
impound belongings from owners, after paying for their values." What is meant 
here by probable interest is the public interest. 202 
The compensation must be paid according to Islamic principles, as is 
explained in Chapter 10. 
200 ILM 20 (1981) 47. 
20 I Moinuddin, 62. 
202 Quoted by B Abuzied, AI Mulhamanh Fi AI Akar 1411 AH (1991) 35 (texl in Arabic). 
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5. Conclusions 
As I have shown, expropriation or nationalization are terms used for the 
transfer of property to the State for the benefit of the State and its citizens. 
These terms are not to be confused with confiscation, as nationalization or 
expropriation involves the payment of compensation, whereas confiscation is used 
to describe the taking of private property without compensation. 
I have shown that although traditional international Jaw by way of the 
principle of "acquired rights" demanded the protection of private property, and 
by way of the principle pacta sunt servanda considered unlawful any interference 
with contractual rights, these traditional principles have been challenged, 
especially since the 1917 Revolution in Russia. The sanctity of the right to hold 
private property has been diminished in cases where it is seen to conflict with the 
benefit of the people of a State. 
Since 1952 the expropriation of foreign property has been considered 
especially by Third World writers to be a matter concerned with the sovereignty 
of a State, and this new conception has been recognized by General Assembly 
resolutions and by international law. One conception is that expropriation is to 
be considered lawful in international law providing three criteria are met, viz: 
(I) The expropriation is in the public interest; 
(2) The expropriation must occur without discrimination; 
(3) The expropriation must be accompanied by adequate 
compensation. 
But there remains a considerable amount of controversy surrounding the 
definition and legal status of public interest and non-discrimination. 
In particular the concept of non-discrimination has been criticised by 
Third World writers, who consider it doubtful because it is not assumed to be the 
source of an international obligation, and because in the words of Francioni, in 
this respect "international law experience is far from being consistent. "203 
203 Francioni, 270. 
311 
Regarding the element of public interest, there is no agreed definition 
of the term in international law, and it is now considered to be the responsibility 
of the expropriating State to determine what is necessary and useful for the 
benefit of its people. Thus it is significant that the concepts of 
non-discrimination and public interest were ignored ~y the key General Assembly 
resolution, Resolution 3281(XXIX) of 12 December 1974. 
Finally, under Islamic Shari'ah, as provided in its sources, the great 
Islamic doctrine known in Arabic as "Durura" holds that necessity or force 
majeure permits the state to disregard the law, for both religious or secular 
reasons, and allows expropriation, always against compensation, in special cases 
of necessity. 
CHAPTERlO 
COMPENSATION FOR EXPROPRIATION 
1. Introduction 
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There is much controversy in international law regarding the issue of 
compensation for expropriated property. The traditional international law 
principle was that full compensation was payable in cases of the expropriation of 
foreign property, 1 and that this was particularly the case if the expropriation was 
in violation of a treaty, was discriminatory or was in breach of an express 
commitment not to expropriate.2 The compensation controversy emerged clearly 
after the First World War, as a consequence of the Russian Revolution of 1917, 
the expropriation of foreign property by the Mexican government in 1938, and 
the Chinese expropriation of 1940. 
According to the Western view, it is often stated that the expropriation 
of foreign property is a violation of international law unless the expropriating 
State pays just compensation. This requirement of compensation plays a 
dominating role in any discussion of the international rules relating to the 
expropriation of foreign property. The principle of compensation is founded in 
the general principle of law condemning unjustified enrichment.3 The principle 
of unjust enrichment has been recognized by jurists as embodied in most legal 
systems, whether civil law or common law. 4 This principle may be applied in 
international law, as a means of preventing the nationalizing State from 
benefiting unjustly from those whose property is expropriated, and to protect 
property owners from arbitrary expropriation.5 The principle is sometimes 
equated with the traditional doctrine of respect for acquired rights on the basis 
that the act of expropriation is a violation of the acquired rights of the owner of 
the foreign property. That means when a certain legal right has been acquired 
I W. Friedmann, Some Impacts of Social Organization on International Law ,AJIL 50 (1956) 
475-504. 
2 JH Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property, AJIL 35 (1941) 249. 
3 A A Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign investors (1962) 271. 
4 W Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964) 206. 
5 JH Herz, 249. 
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under the national law of a State, that legal right must be respected as a matter 
of international obligation. 6 
Thus there is an international duty to provide compensation over and 
above any provisions of municipal law.7 But there is as yet no unanimous opinion 
among writers when dealing with the problem of compensation. There appear 
to be three major points of view, which often depend on whether the authors 
belong to the developed or developing world. Western writers and Western 
state practice maintain that the act of taking private property gives rise to an 
obligation on the part of the State to pay full damages in a "prompt, effective and 
adequate manner". Third World writers claim, that if a State is pursuing a broad 
scale economic and social reform, no compensation at all is legally due. A 
further opinion, also expressed by writers of developing States, is that there is an 
obligation to compensate, but that there is no obligation that it be "prompt, 
adequate and effective". 8 
The requirement of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" has 
been frequently affirmed by the United States,9 for example in notes to the 
Cuban government,10 and is also embodied in treaties made by the United 
States, ll and other States such as the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Pakistan. 12 
On the other hand, the use of nationalization measures by countries in 
the past World War I era has generally been a means to bring about sweeping 
economic and social changes. If a country was forced to pay full compensation, 
it would impose an obligation on the nationalizing State, which either could not 
be met at all, or which would cause the national budget considerable hardship. 
This obligation would interfere with the right of a State to undertake pressing 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
F Francioni, Compensation for Nationalization of Foreign Property, ICLQ 24 (1975) 259. 
T Huang, Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question, AJIL 51 
(1957) 306. 
Francioni, 255-6. 
M Domke, Foreign Nationalizations. Some Aspect of Contemporary International Law, 
AJ/L 55 (1961) 604. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. • 
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social reform. In such cases the demands of compensation directly conflict with 
the sovereignty of a State. 13 
The conflict between the developed and the Third World is evident. The 
developed world maintains that the standard of compensation be determined by 
the Hull rule of "prompt adequate and effective compensation". The Third World 
maintains that a nationalization decree demands that compensation be 
determined by the State's own legislation, which will naturally be adapted to the 
wishes of the nationalizing government.14 
Resolution 1803(XVII) of 14 December 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources, and Resolution 3281(XXIX) of 12 December 1974, the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and other General Assembly 
resolutions state that in the case of the expropriation of foreign property 
appropriate compensation should be paid. In these forums the traditional 
requirement of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" has been dropped. 
On the other hand it can be said that the payment of some compensation is 
recognized in the State practice of Western, Eastern and Third World nations 
alike: despite the fact that communist nations maintain there is no obligation to 
make reparation for expropriation, they have in practice generally agreed to pay 
compensation.15 
In this chapter, I analyze the Western concept of compensation as 
embodied in the Hull formula "prompt, adequate and effective compensation", 
and the Third World conception, which refers to "appropriate compensation" as 
a standard rule. I next discuss the measure of compensation, giving examples of 
decisions on compensation, and of modern State practice in the Third World, and 
referring also to the question of special treatment for expropriation as a result 
of social reconstruction. Against this background I discuss the question of 
compensation in the case where there are specific undertakings by the State (eg. 
stabilization agreements). 
13 R De1son, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, Colombia Law Review 51 (1957) 
760-766. 
14 Ibid. 
15 LL Rood, Nationalization and Indigenization in Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies 
14 (1976) 441. 
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2. The Traditional International Law Position 
(1) The Minimum Standard of the Treatment of Aliens 
In discussions of the standard of treatment of aliens in matters of 
compensation, a contrast is usually drawn between an international minimum 
standard set by international law and the principle of non-discrimination as a 
standard for the protection of foreign-owned propeny. Thus Piper states that 
the ... 
national treatment of aliens cannot fall below the mtmmum 
standard of justice prescribed for the treatment of aliens by 
international law, regardless of the standard treatment received 
by nationals. Aliens consequently may be entitled to preferential 
treatment if such preferential treatment is necessary to meet the 
minimum standard. 16 
Supponers of this view argue that there is no clear definition of the principle of 
non-discrimination and that it has limited suppon in practice.17 On the other 
hand the traditional western view of expropriation itself relies in pan on a 
non-discrimination test For example, in January 1972 President Nixon stated 
that the United States "had the right to expect that any taking of American 
propeny would be non-discriminatory."18 However, this was in the context of a 
taking which discriminated against United States nationals specifically, and 
controversy remains about this principle of non-discrimination as between aliens 
and nationals, when a State exercises its right to nationalize. This controversy 
highlights the different positions of western and developing countries. According 
to Francioni: 
From the point of view of international equity the assumption 
was that in the case of conflict between the pecuniary interests 
of a foreign individual or company and the need for the host 
countries to nationalize those interests in the pursuit of the 
16 Piper, New Directions in the Protection of American-Owned Property Abroad, IU, 4 
(1978-79) 317, quoted by G Gainer, Nationalization, The Dichotomy Between Western 
and Third World Perspectives in Imemational Law, Howard Law Journa/26 (1983) 1563. 
17 ld, 1563. 
18 ld, 1563-7. 
general economic and social progress of the nation, the latter 
had to be given priority. 19 
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Moreover the Western position on an international standard of justice 
"further presumes that this standard is its own enunciation of that law" ?0 It 
derives· from and relies heavily on its own traditions as the legal basis for the 
standard of treatment of aliens.21 
(2) The "Prompt,Adequate and Effective" Standard of Compensation. 
The rule of prompt, adequate and effective compensation initially 
emerged as the result of the Mexican agrarian and petroleum expropriations of 
1938. The dispute between the United States and Mexico was not concerned 
with the Mexican action of expropriating American property within its territory 
for public purpose, as the United States recognized Mexico's right to do this. 
The dispute on the Mexican government's refusal to pay compensation for the 
expropriation according to the concepts of western international law. 22 In 1938 
the Secretary of State Hull, wrote to the Mexican Ambassador in Washington: 
We cannot question the right of a foreign government to treat 
its own nationals in this fashion if it so desires. This is a matter 
of domestic concern. But we cannot admit a foreign government 
may take property of American nationals in disregard of the rule 
of compensation under international law.23 
On 3 April 1940 he wrote another note to the Ambassador saying: 
19 Francioni, 268. 
20 Gainer, 1565. 
21 Ibid. Further, Article II of the French Civil Code provides that "Aliens should enjoy in 
France the same civil rights which are or shall be accorded to Frenchmen by the treaties 
of the nation to which that alien belongs": see EM Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection 
of Citizens Abroad (1927) 36. Article 11(2) of the Treaty of the Benelux Economic Union 
(1958) states that the nationals of each High Contracting Party "shall enjoy the same 
treatment as nationals of that State as regards: (a) freedom of movement, sojourn and 
settlement; (b) freedom to carry on a trade or occupation, including the rendering of 
services; (c) capital transactions; (d) conditions of employment; (e) social security benefits; 
(f) taxes and changes of any kind; (g) exercise of civil rights as well as legal and judicial 
protection of their person, individual rights and interests." AH Robertson, European 
Institutions, Co-operation, Integration and Unification (1966), 405 quoted by Z Kronfol, 
Protection of Foreign Investment (1972) 15. 
22 Department of State Press Release, 3 August 1938. 
23 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 1942,656. 
The right to expropriate property is coupled with and 
conditioned on the obligation to make adequate, effective and 
prompt compensation. The legality of an expropriation is in fact 
dependent upon the observance of this requirement.24 
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By contrast the Mexican Foreign Minister in his replies of 3 August ~d 
1 September 1938 said: 
... there is in international law no rule universally accepted in 
theory nor carried out in practice which makes obligatory the 
payment of immediate compensation nor even of deferred 
compensation, for expropriations of a general and impersonal 
character ... 25 
In 1941 a Report was made jointly by experts appointed by the United 
States and Mexican governments, which evaluated the losses incurred by the 
United States in the process of nationalization and stated the terms by which 
such compensation was to be repaid. 26 Thereafter the rule of "prompt, adequate 
and effective" compensation for the taking of foreign property became the basic 
formula used by western developed countries in their compensation demands. 
This rule was again applied in 1960 by the United States government in 
challenging the legality of the Cuban expropriation of property belonging to 
American citizens, in 1963 by the United States in the Ceylonese nationalizations 
and by the United Kingdom in 1951 in the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute.27 But the 
rule was by no means entirely novel: it was supported by the Permanent Court's 
judgment in the Chorzow Factory case, which provided that an expropriation not 
accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation is 
invalid under international law, and by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
the Norwegian Shipowners case.28 The Hull formulation was supported also by 
jurists such as Shawcross, who saw the failure to pay full, adequate and effective 
compensation as making an act of expropriation invalid.29 
24 Ibid. See also CC Hyde, Compensation for Expropriation, AJIL 33 (1939) 108. 
25 Delson, 763. 
26 KS Carlston, Concession Agreements and Nationalization, AJIL 52 (1958) 273. 
27 Francioni, 263, 264. 
28 R Delzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, AJIL 75 
(1981) 558. 
29 Delson, 763. 
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Some writers distinguish between cases where full compensation should 
be paid and those which result from fundamental social and economic reforms 
where partial compensation would be adequate.30 
(3) Treaties and State Practice supporting the Hull Formula 
The traditional view of international law regarding the rule of "prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation" is found in State practice. The western 
countries have tried to create a legal basis for this rule by introducing 
(sometimes by imposing) it in their treaty practice with some Third World 
countries.31 Many treaties which have been concluded between different States 
make provision for the payment of compensation in cases where foreign property 
has been expropriated. In particular since the Second World War the United 
States has concluded many treaties of friendship, commerce . and navigation, 
which include provision for compensation claims based on the principle of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 
For example Anicle VI(3) of the Treaty with Japan of 2 April 1953, 
provides as follows: 
Property of nationals and companies of either party shall not be 
taken within the territories of the other party... without the 
prompt payment of just compensation. Such compensation shall 
be in an effectively realizable form and shall represent the full 
equivalent of the property taken; and adequate provision shall 
have been made at or prior to the time of taking for the 
determination and payment thereof.32 
Similarly Anicle 6(4) of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce of 12 
November 1959 between the United States and Pakistan provides that: "property 
... shall not be taken without the prompt payment of just compensation."33 This 
30 This view was held by P Guggenheim, H Lauterpacht, JN Hyde, Friedmann and lsi 
Foighel. See further, S Toriguian, Legal Aspects of Oil Concessions in the Middle East 
(1972) 218-9. 
31 Francioni, 264. 
32 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 4, Part 2, 1953,2068-9. Further, Article 
IV(2) of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations between U.S. and Iran of 1955provides 
that, "property... shall not be taken without the prompt payment of just compensation." 
Id. Vo1.8, Part I, 1957,903. 
33 A Akinsanya, The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third World (1980) 31. 
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formula has been consistently relied on by the State Department. For example, 
in a Note to the Government of Guatemala concerning the taking of certain real 
property of the United Fruit Company, it stated that: 
Just compensation may be defined as that compensation which, 
as indicated in the previous Aide-Memoire of the United States 
on the present subject, is "prompt", is "ade'\uate" and is 
"effective" - otherwise the payment is not "just" ... 4 
Similarly, regarding the expropriation of the American Oil Company in Ceylon 
in 1961, Stephen Schwebel said on behalf of the United States' government that: 
His government did not question the right of a sovereign nation 
to nationalize property belonging to United States' citizens or 
companies provided that adequate compensation was promptly 
paid in accordance with international law.35 
The United Kingdom has also concluded many treaties with different 
countries in this field. For example, in the Agreement of 29 July 1963 on 
Commercial and Economic Co-operation with the Republic of Cameroon, it 
appears that "the protection of investments under the treaty is based on the 
combined application of the standard of equitable treatment and the minimum 
standard. "36 Article 5(2) provides ... 
.. .in accordance with international law, [the parties shall] make 
provision for the payment of adequate and effective 
compensation. Such compensation shall be paid without undue 
delay to those entitled to it. Measures of expropriation, 
nationalization or confiscation shall not be discriminatory or 
contrary to a specific undertaking. 37 
Article 15 of the Treaty of Commerce of 11 March 1959 between the 
United Kingdom and Iran provided that nationals of each State party would in 
34 29 Department of State Bulletin, 14 September 1953, 359, 360, quoted by JN Hyde, 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources, AJIL 50 (1956) 864. 
35 KN Gess, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, ICLQ 13 (1964) 428. 
36 G Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law (1969) 35. 
37 Article 5(2), Cmnd 2133 (1963) 3 quoted by Schwarzenberger, 36. 
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case of restriction or expropriation affecting their property "receive prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation." 38 
In practice, the elements constituting just compensation are neither fixed 
nor precise, but it is the common view of developed countries that the 
compensation paid must be equivalent to the value of the property taken and 
that it must be paid from the time when the property is taken in an economically 
useful form. If compensation cannot be paid at that time, interest must be paid. 
It is further maintained that exceptional circumstances which could cause a 
deviation from this rule must be decided by international law. The use of other, 
apparently more flexible formulas on some occasions does not involve any 
withdrawal of the basic United States' position, as Domke points out: 
Fair compensation is similar to the terms "equitable", reasonable 
or "just" as being an equivalent to "adequate" compensation?9 
This definition is effectively the same as that which is defined by the Hull rule 
as prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 
3. The Legal Position of Third World Countries 
(1) The Minimum Standard of Treatment of Aliens 
As noted above, there is no universally accepted minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens. The Third World position lays most of its emphasis on the 
national treatment standard, and treats State responsibility for aliens in other 
respects as outside the scope of international law.40 
This position had its origins in the Calvo .doctrine, which rejected an 
international minimum standard, holding that aliens within the borders of a State 
should be governed by the same standards and laws that govern its own 
38 Akinsanya, 32. 
39 Domke, 608. 
40 FV Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New International Economic Order: A New Approach 
to the Law Governing Nationalization and Compensation, Lawyer of the Americas 12 
(1980) 27. See Gainer, 1564. 
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nationals. Calvo had stated "that aliens are not entitled to rights and privileges 
not accorded to nationals, and that therefore they may seek redress for 
grievances only before local authorities. "41 Thus the Third World view is that 
municipal law should apply to determine the issue of compensation, and they 
recognize only the obligation to treat aliens equally with nationals, on the basis 
that foreigners could not claim any superior justification for the public taking of 
their property, since they could not have a better claim than or different rights 
from nationals. 
For example in 1938, the Mexican government emphasized that its 
international obligation was confined to ensuring that aliens were treated equally 
with Mexican citizens. Replying to the United States' government on 3 August 
1938 it stated that: 
The jurisdiction of the States within the limits of the national 
territory is applicable to all inhabitants, nations and foreigners 
who are under the same protection of the national legislation 
and authorities the foreigners cannot claim rights different from 
or more extensive than national [sic]... as your government is 
not unaware that our government fmds itself unable to pay the 
indemnity to all affected by the Agrarian reform, by insisting on 
payment to American landholders, it demands in reality, a 
special ~rivileged treatment which no one is receiving in 
Mexico.4 
In 1953, Guatemala adopted a similar position after it nationalized American 
owned property. 
41 Shea, The Calvo Clause (1955) 19. This doctrine was frrst espoused in 1868 in an 
international law treatise of Carlos Calvo, Argentine diplomat and publicist. The result 
of this doctrine is that the alien is entitled to national treatment and no more, thus 
negating the concept that, whatever a State does to its nationals, it must treat aliens 
permitted to enter in accordance with the rules of international law, setting a minimum 
standard for such treatment 5 Hackworth, Digestof International Law (1943) 635. There 
is another similar doctrine, the Drago doctrine from Argentina (1902). It rejects 
specifically the threat of external force to collect public debts. This doctrine is postulated 
on the same derivation from concepts of sovereignty, independence and absolute equality 
of States as is the Calvo doctrine. JM Sweeney, Cf Oliver, NE Leech, The International 
Legal System Cases and Materials (1981) 1112. 
42 Deparunent of State press release, 3 August 1938, quoted by Francioni, 269. 
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The rule of equal treatment for nationals and aliens was also adopted by 
a League of Nations Report on the Responsibility of Governments43 and 
subsequently in 1957 in Article I of the International Law Commission Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility.44 
A second and related aspect of the Third World approach to this 
problem is the rejection of customary law processes which were created and used 
to the disadvantage of capital importing countries. Third World jurists argue 
that the use of customary international law cannot be valid when the original 
international community consisted of only a few nations outside Europe,45 
whereas since 1945 this community has extended to include many former colonies 
of European States which are now independent nations. For example, Syatauw 
noted that: 
There are indeed good reasons for Asian States to resent 
traditional international law. It has often been an obstacle 
rather than a help for their national aspirations. The position 
of a colony under international law was minimized and the 
transition of such a territory into an independent State met with 
great barriers of doctrines of international law.46 
Thus, it is argued, that the law of nationalization was formulated to benefit the 
western States, without considering the circumstances in which the property in 
question may have been acquired or the way in which it may have been used. 
They contend that all the past circumstances and the conduct of the foreigu 
investor "should be taken into consideration in determining compensation."47 
(2) The "Appropriate Compensation" Standard 
After the Second World War, and especially after 1952, the international 
climate changed: increasingly the argument was heard that the traditional 
4 3 Francioni, 270. 
44 The Second Report to the International Law Commission on the International 
Responsibility of States, United Nations Document NCN4 (1957) 106. 
45 Gainer, 1565. 
46 Syatauw, Some Newly Established Asian States and the Development of International Law 
(1961), quoted by Gainer, 1565. 
47 Girvan, Expropriating the Expropriators. Compensation Criteria from a Third World 
Viewpoint (1973) 155, 156 quoted by Gainer, 1566. 
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doctrine on the question of payment of "prompt, adequate and effective" 
compensation in the nationalization of foreign property had lost its relevance in 
view of the development of the right of States to permanent sovereignty over 
their natural resources. Instead, the preferred formula was one of "appropriate 
compensation", which allowed for a range of solutions depending on the special 
circumstances of each case. Factors such as political and economic necessity, 
balance of power and ability to pay have resulted in different kinds of 
compensation agreements, and in particular, lump-sum agreements.48 
As early as the 1952 Siena Session of the Institute of International Law 
there was a body of opinion to the effect that "a nationalizing State fulfils its 
obligations as to the payment of compensation by the payment of such 
compensation as is reasonable in the circumstances, taking into consideration the 
whole of its national economy. "49 
However, the principle of the permanent sovereignty of the State over 
its natural wealth and resources which has been articulated in United Nations 
General Assembly resolutions is the principal basis for this new trend. The 
United Nations provided a new forum for the creation of customary rules of 
international law upholding the right to expropriate foreign property, and a more 
flexible standard of compensation. This effectively began in 1952. General 
Assembly Resolution 626(VII) of 21 December 1952 provided that: 
The right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural 
wealth and resources is inherent in their sovereignty ... 50 
In 1962 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1803 (XVII) on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. The debate between the capital 
exporting and Third World countries (along with the former Communist bloc) 
48 Montreal Report 93, quoted by SR Chowdhury, Pennanent Sovereignty and Its Impact 
on Stabilization Clauses. Standard of Compensation and Patterns of Development 
Co-operation, inK Hossain & SR Chowdhury (eds), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources in International Law (1984) 57. 
49 44 Annuaire de I'Jnstitut de Droit International. Session de Sienne (1952/11) 251, 323, 
quoted by Huang, 306-7. 
50 General Assembly Resolution 626(VII) of 21 December 1952. 
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centred primarily on the issue of the standard of compensation. Paragraph 4 of 
Resolution 1803 provides: 
... in such cases [of nationalization] the owner shall be paid 
appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force 
in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its 
sovereignty and in accordance with international law ... 
The view of the capital exporting countries throughout the debate was that 
"appropriate compensation" was ambiguous since it was not clear what exactly 
"appropriate" meant.51 The United States submitted an amendment which held 
"appropriate compensation" to mean "prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation".52 The United States withdrew its amendment, but after the 
adoption of the draft resolution by the Second Committee, the United States 
noted that in its view the word "appropriate" was the equivalent of "prompt, 
adequate and effective" in the event of expropriation.53 
Some credence to this view was given by the rejection of the former 
Soviet Union's proposed amendment to paragraph 4 of the draft, which read: 
The question of compensation for the owners shall in such cases 
be decided in accordance with the national law of the country 
taking these measures in the exercise of its sovereignty. 54 
The former Soviet Union amendment was rejected by a vote of 39 to 28 with 21 
abstentions.55 Egypt and Afghanistan had also submitted an amendment which 
provided for the payment of "adequate compensation when and where 
appropriate".56 This amendment was withdrawn. 
By contrast General Assembly Resolution 3281(XXIX) of 12 December 
1974, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted a position 
51 SK Banerjee, The Concept of Pennanent Sovereignty over Nawral Resources - An 
Analysis, Indian Journal of International Law 8 (1968) 529. 
52 Ibid. 
53 United Nations Document NC 2/SR 850 7. 
54 United Nations Document NC 2/L 670. 
55 United Nations Document NC 2/SR 858 13. 
56 United Nations Document NAC 97/L2. United Nations Document NAC 97/SR.27.5,6. 
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which closely reflected this proposal. Article 2(2)(c) provides that in the case of 
expropriation "... appropriate compensation should be paid by the States 
adopting such measures taking into account its relevant laws and regulation and 
all circumstance that the State considers pertinent. .. " General Assembly 
Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973 adopted the expression "possible 
compensation" in case of expropriation. 
Thus, these resolutions provide that the owners of nationalized propeny 
are entitled to "appropriate compensation" or possible compensation instead of 
just or adequate compensation. Moreover, there are imponant differences 
between Resolution 1803 and Resolution 3281, as was seen in the previous 
Chapter. For present purposes the major difference is that, while Resolution 
1803 provides in paragraph 4 that compensation is to be determined in 
accordance with the law of the State in question and in accordance with 
international law, Article 2(2)(c) of the Chatter does not make any references to 
international Jaw, but merely provides that compensation is to be determined by 
the expropriating State in accordance with its municipal law and taking account 
of its panicular circumstances, thus rejecting by implication any obligation of 
compensation under international law. In the words of Jimenez de Arechaga: 
... the phrase "in accordance with international law" was 
eliminated because of Third World countries suspicions as to 
what western countries expect from international Jaw... [O]nce 
it is established that the alleged customary rule of "prompt, 
adequate and effective" compensation is no longer accepted by 
the vast majority of the international community, the reference 
to international law lost the meaning intended by the developed 
countries. 57 
Thus the notion of appropriate compensation is a flexible one, which 
allows those determining the scale of compensation to take account, for example, 
57 Jimenez de Arechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned 
Property, NYU JILP 11 (1978) 186. The ECOSOC "Group of Eminent Persons" Report 
on Multinational Corporations, issued in New York in 1974, recommended that 
nationalizing States " ... should ensure that the compensation is fair and adequate and 
determined according to due process of law of the country concerned ... " It is unclear 
whether this implies a minimum standard of treatment See JG Castel, International Law 
(1976) 1118. 
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of any unjust enrichment that may have been involved in the investment58 In 
accordance with this approach the following factors, it has been suggested, should 
be considered as peninent: (I) the ability of the host State to pay; (2) the extent 
to which the resources have been exploited by the pany nationalized; (3) its 
policies as to re-investment; (4) the extent of profits that will be lost by the pany 
that is nationalized despite any stabilization clause; (5) whether the initial 
investment has been recovered; (6) whether there has been undue enrichment as 
a result of a colonial situation; (7) whether the profits obtained have been 
excessive; (8) the contribution of the enterprise to the economic and social 
development of the country and its respect for labour law and its reinvestment 
policies.59 
4. The Principle of Compensation in Islam 
In Islamic Shari'ah, if a State terminates a private concession agreement, 
acting in the interests and social good of the community, it is obliged to pay 
compensation, except in cases where the propeny in question was wrongly 
acquired by individuals. 60 
While Islamic Shari' ah accepts the legal obligation to pay compensation, 
it has disputed western demands prescribing the amount to be paid. The amount 
of compensation should be linked to the value of the propeny taken, in order 
to be "just" and "due". Since "harm cannot be removed by the infliction of harm", 
the compensation payable for propeny taken cannot be less than what is fair and 
equitable. 61 
Anicle 2 of the main agreement between the Saudi Arabia Government 
and Aramco of 31 January 1977 relating to the takeover of Aramco made 
provision for the amount of compensation which the Saudi Arabian government 
must pay for assets. Funher the principle of Islamic Shari'ah agrees with the 
58 Falk, The New States and International Legal Order, 118 Recueil des Cours Academie 
de Droit International, 129 (1966), quoted by de Arechaga, 185. 
59 de Arechaga, 185. See also Chowdhury, 16-7. 
60 H Moinuddin, The Charter of The Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of Economic 
Co-operation Among Its Member States (1987) 61. 
61 Ibid., 63. 
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demands of Third World countries who claim that compensation for 
expropriation should be calculated on the basis of the net book value of the 
assets.62 
5. Compensation for Expropriation: An Analysis of State Practice and 
Decided Cases 
In deciding on the present extent of the obligation to compensate for 
expropriated property in international law, it is necessary to review the various 
disputes and decided cases, looking first at the earlier precedents, secondly, at 
the question of compensation for expropriation as result of social reconstruction, 
and thirdly, at recent Third World practice. 
(1) Earlier Compensation Cases 
Before the First World War there were very few cases of interference by 
a State with private property which had international repercussions. The 
following are examples of these cases which are often cited. I conclud that it is 
very difficult to find any precise formula for standards of compensation in these 
cases, though in all cases compensation was given. 
(a) The Delagoa Bay Railway Case (1900) 
This case was arbitrated between England, America and Portugal. The 
Portuguese government had annulled concession agreement granted for the 
construction of a railway from Lourenco Marques to the Transvaal frontier. The 
Portuguese government's right to expropriate was in no way challenged. After 
the negotiation the Portuguese government admitted its liability to pay 
compensation according to the international standard. 63 
62 FR Tes6n, State Contracts and Oil Expropriations: The Aminoi/-Kuwait Arbitration, 
Virginia Journal of International Law 24 (1984) 351. 
63 Moore, 11 Digest of International Arbitrations (1865-1898). See NR Doman, Postwar 
Nationalization of Foreign Propeny in Europe, Columbia Law Review 48 (1948) 1133. See 
also AP Fachiri, Expropriation and International Law, BYIL 6 (1925) 165-166. 
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(b) The Italian Life Insurance Monopoly Case (1911) 
Italy initially claimed that no compensation could be claimed by existing 
insurance companies for damage suffered in the creation of a National Institute, 
which was to take over complete control of Italian life insurance business. No 
compensation was to be paid for pecuniary damage suffered by existing life 
insurance businesses. Protests were made by the governments of all countries 
with interests in this area in Italy, and as a consequence amendments were made 
to the original bill, which allowed foreign insurance companies to continue 
business for ten years on certain conditions. As a consequence of the prohibition 
on continuing business, the foreign companies then had time to dispose of their 
property in what has been described as "fair conditions".64 
(c) The Chorzow Factory Case (1928) 
In the Chorzow Factory case the Permanent Court of International 
Justice held that the expropriation was unlawful, because of an express treaty 
obligation forbidding it, and required compensation to be paid for the value 
taken.65 
The expropriation of German property in Upper Silesia was regulated by 
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of 5 May 1922. It stated that: 
Except as provided in these clauses the property, rights and 
interests of German nationals may not be liquidated in Polish 
upper Silesia. 66 
When on July 14, 1920 the Polish law led to the expropriation of the Chorzow 
Factory, Germany claimed in the Permanent Court of International Justice that 
the attitude of the Polish Government was not in conformity with the Articles of 
the Geneva Convention and was therefore illegal. 
64 Fachiri, 166, 167. 
65 PCIJ Series A. No.I?. (1928) 46-7. 
66 Id, 21. 
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The case relied entirely on the interpretation of the Peace Treaties and 
the Geneva Convention, and the Court held that the Polish action was contrary 
to the Geneva Convention and therefore illegal. In its judgment the Court 
noted: 
The essential prinCiple contained in the actual notion of an 
illegal act - a principle which seems to be established by 
international practice and in particular by the decisions of 
arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as possible, 
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish 
the situation which would in all probability, have existed if that 
act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or if this is not 
possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a 
restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages 
for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in 
kind or payment in place of it - such are the principles which 
should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for 
an act contrary to International Law.67 
In its ruling the Court distinguished between legal and illegal 
expropriation. And as Herz points out, the case can be distinguished because of 
its reliance on a specific treaty obligation: 
According to this case, the breach of an express treaty obligation 
forbidding expropriation made the act a wrongful one for which 
restitution in kind (or if impossible, full payment of value plus 
losses sustained) was due. But the Court further stated that 
ordinary, lawful expropriation would have brought about merely 
the obligation to pay cash compensation for direct losses. 68 
(d) Ponuguese Religious Properties Case (1920) 
In 1920 Britain argued that Portugal, by taking possession of religious 
property legally acquired by British nationals, had acted contrary to the principles 
of international law.69 However, as Friedman notes: 
67 ld, 47. 
68 Herz, 253. 
69 PCA Award 16, 1 RIM 7, quoted by S Friedman, Expropriation in International Law 
(1953) 70. 
far from denying these principles... the Portuguese government ... 
accepted them without reserve... The Tribunal did not therefore 
really have to decide a point of law at all.70 
(e) Conclusion 
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It appears that it is difficult to find in these cases, precedents, which 
cannot be explained in terms of diplomatic pressure, or the facts of the original 
agreement, or resulting from specific treaty provisions imposing a given solution. 
The Delagoa Bay Railway Case and the Ponuguese Religious Case properties 
indicate that the question of the right of nationalisation had already been settled 
and that Portugal early admitted its duty to pay compensation. This could in 
principle be seen to have been concluded by the original agreement which had 
already settled the question of law. The Chorzow Factory Case is considered to 
have established the principle of respect for private property, in international 
law. However it can be seen as an example of a case decided by the application 
of a specific treaty provision. 
(2) Compensation for Expropriation as Result of Social Reconstruction 
The expropriation measures undertaken in Eastern Europe after the 
Second World War occurred as a consequence of the social and political 
repercussions of that war. The impetus for the expropriations was the 
replacement of a capitalist system with a centrally-controlled socialist State. But 
it was facilitated by the earlier Nazi expropriation of properties, which after the 
German defeat were left ownerless: by this time practical difficulties made the 
return of such property seemingly impractical. As the following survey shows, 
compensation was generally calculated by reference to economic and political 
considerations rather than the value of the expropriated property.71 
70 Friedman, 71. 
71 See Friedman, 29; Doman, 1140. 
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(a) Poland 
The Polish nationalizations occurred by means of a Polish Act of 
Nationalization of 3 January 1946. Two categories of nationalization occurred: 
(I) where propeny was transferred to the State without compensation (this 
concerned propeny which formerly belonged to the people of the German Reich 
or the former free City of Danzig or to people who fled Poland to join the 
enemy); (2) where propeny was transferred with compensation. This 
compensation was to be determined by a special tribunal: Anicle 7 of the Polish 
Act of nationalization provided that the Treasury would pay compensation one 
year from the determination of the amount. Compensation to foreigners was 
designed to facilitate normal political relationships and negotiations were made 
with individual nations affected. Americans were paid in respect of their dollar 
investments, either in dollars or a convertible currency.72 
(b) Czechoslovakia 
The Czech Nationalization law went into effect on 27 October 1945. 
The Czech State acquired ownership of all the nationalized enterprises, including 
all their propeny, assets and rights. The new national enterprises could petition 
for the abolition or correction of so-called "economically unjustifiable" 
obligations. 73 The basis of compensation was the official value of the propeny 
on 27 October 1945, and compensation was paid through the issue of 
interest-bearing securities. The State guaranteed the payment of interest and the 
redemption of securities. Where foreign capital was invested, negotiations were 
to be opened with the government of the owners.74 
(c) Yugoslavia 
On 5 December 1946 Yugoslavia declared a nationalization law which 
was to be the basis for the nationalization of private enterprises in 48 different 
72 Journal of Laws No.3, February 5 (1946) 17. See Doman, 1146. 
73 ld, 1143. 
74 16 State Department Bulletin, 367 (1947), quoted by Doman, 1143. 
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industries.75 A procedure for compensation was established, whereby the State 
paid the owners of nationalized enterprises on the basis of the net value of the 
property on the day of nationalization. Payment was made in Government bonds 
payable to the bearer.76 In principle the Government expressed a willingness to 
return foreign property to the legitimate owners under certain conditions, and 
conducted separate negotiations with the governments of countries with property, 
to arrive at compensation amounts. 77 
(d) Hungary 
Nationalization occurred under the Hungarian Act XXV of 1948, by 
which the State acquired ownership of the shares of all nationalized companies. 
However foreign citizens or foreign legal persons could retain ownership of 
shares in nationalized companies. Any contractual obligations existing in favour 
of Hungarian citizens were annulled. Compensation was to be decided upon by 
. a separate Act of Parliament Thus nationalization only affected the rights and 
interests of Hungarian nationals.78 The nationalization law was issued by 
reference to the Treary of Peace with Hungary which became effective on 15 
September 1947.79 
(e) Rumania 
The Constitution adopted by Rumania on 13 April 1948 provided the 
basis for nationalization, but the main Law affecting the Basic Industries was 
enacted on 11 June 1948.80 The Law accepted the principle of compensation 
except in the cases of persons enriched in an illegal manner. Commitments 
assumed by the old enterprise could be avoided if they did not benefit the 
75 Official Gazette of the Federal People" s Republic of Yugoslavia. No 98.6 December 1946, 
quoted by Doman, 1150. 
76 Ibid. 
77 ld, 1152. 
78 Ibid. 
79 United States Treaty Series No 1651 (1947), quoted by Doman, 1153. 
80 Published by the Ministry of Arts and Infonnation, Bucharest (1948), quoted by NR 
Doman, 1155. 
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enterprise itself.81 Compensation was to be established by commissions consisting 
of three magistrates appointed by the Ministry of Justice. 82 
(f) Bulgaria 
Article 7 and 11 of the Bulgarian Constitution of 4 December 1947 
provided for the nationalization of enterprises in certain branches of industry. 83 
The former owners of nationalized property were compensated for the capital 
invested in the property, but not the property itself.84 Compensation was to be 
in State bonds, paid over a long period. 85 The property of foreign individuals 
and associations was also nationalized. Compensation was denied those 
politically incriminated.86 The banking system was also nationalized, but not 
those banks which belonged to foreign States. 87 
(3) Modern Case Studies in the Third World Countries 
I examine here various expropriation measures carried out in different 
Third World countries. A number of these countries were strongly influenced by 
OPEC which was formed in September 1960 to protect the interests of oil 
producing States. In 1968 OPEC adopting a resolution stating that in the interest 
of national development all nations had the right of permanent sovereignty over 
their natural resources,88 and that the nationalization of the oil industry was the 
aim of its policy. It is thus appropriate to look at the Middle East, which was 
particularly affected by this approach, first. 
(a) The Middle East 
The Middle East has been very important for many centuries because of 
its strategic geographic position between Europe, Asia and Africa. It was 
81 Ibid. 
82 ld, ll56. 
83 Friedman, 46. 
84 Doman, ll57. 
85 Friedman, 47. 
86 Doman, II 57. 
87 Ibid. 
88 OPEC, General Information and Chronology (February 1986) 36. 
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important for religion, trading, navigation and shipping during the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. But by the beginning of the twentieth century the Middle 
East became more important that at any other time because the world's largest 
petroleum reserves lie in it. Oil is the most important single commodity in the 
economic life of the industrialized and industrializing countries. 89 
(i) Iran 
(A) Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Ltd (1933) 
In 1909 the first oil well was discovered by D' Arcy: as a result the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company was established. (In 1935 its name was changed to the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) when the name of the country was changed 
by Reza Shah from "Persia" to Iran.) In 1912 the first oil shipment was completed 
from the port of Abadan. A refinery was built at the same time.90 
In May 1951 the Mossadegh Government terminated the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company's concession agreement of 1933, and nationalized the oil industry 
in Iran. This nationalization was the first instance in the Middle East. However, 
the nationalization of the Iranian oil company was unsuccessful because the 
Mossadegh Government was faced with very difficult internal problems. On 13 
August 1953 the Government collapsed and was removed from power: the Shah 
of Iran was returned to the throne with the backing and support of the United 
States and the United Kingdom.91 Negotiations thereafter took place between 
the Iranian Government and NIOC on the one hand and a consortium of eight 
international oil companies including Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Limited 
(AIOC). These resulted in the conclusion of a new Concession Agreement of 19 
September 1954 with these companies for a minimum period of twenty-five years 
subject to extension. This Agreement revoked the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
concession of 1933. According to Article 1 of Pan II of the Agreement Iran 
89 RJ Barnet, Middle East Oil, The Beginning (1975) 5. 
90 "Oil was frrst discovered by M. de Morgan in the province of Kennanshah. The result of 
his explomtions were published in Paris in 1982." AW Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Dispute of 1951-1952 (1954) 15. 
91 B Shwadran, Middle East Oil (1977) 59. 
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agreed to pay 25 million pounds sterling to AIOC in compensation, to be paid 
in ten equal annual instalments beginning on 1 January 1957.92 
The new Concession Agreement appears to have been regarded in part 
as a re-affirmation and sharing of the rights and privileges of the earlier 
. . 
concession. On 29 October, 1954 it was announced that the seven other oil 
company parties had agreed to pay AIOC a sum which would amount to more 
than $600,000,000 for its share in the concession.93 
(B) INA Corporation and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(1985) 
In the INA Corporation and the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
I ran case, the Tribunal ruled that the compensation should be equal to the fair 
market value of its shares, rather than "prompt adequate and effective 
compensation",94 as INA had demanded. It noted that there had been a 
reappraisal of what constituted adequate compensation in the case of lawful 
large scale nationalizations, but this appeared to be balanced against the fact that 
the case involved "the investment of a rather small amount shortly before 
nationalization",95 and before the corporation had time to reap any benefits from 
its investment. It therefore concluded "the full equivalent of the propeny taken 
entitles the claimant to be granted compensation equal to the fair market value 
of its shares ... assessed as of the date of nationalization".96 
(C) Starrett Housing Corporation and the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran (1983 - 1987) 
In the Starrett Housing Corporation and the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Award, the Starrett Corporation were found to have been denied 
92 Ford, 180-9; Carlston, 273-4. 
93 New York Times, 30 October 1954,6 col 3. 
94 Award No 184-161- 1, 12 August (1985), reprinted in 8 Iran- U.S.C.T .R. 371 quoted by 
G Lagergren, Five important cases on Nationalization of foreign property, decided by the 
Iran - United States Claims Tribunal Repon No 5, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law, LUND (1988) 11. 
95 ld, 8. 
96 !d. 
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effective use and control of their property interests in Iran, but that they had 
exaggerated the length of time they had been subject to the loss. In assessing 
compensations they employed an expert who assessed the value of the Starrett 
project at $41 million. This assessment was based on the hypothetical projection 
of what Iranian businessmen fully aware of the relevant circumstances would 
have paid for the project on 31 January 1980. 
The Tribunal, while accepting the methods and procedure used by the 
expert, "made a number of modifications which decreased the value "97 of the 
compensation to $36.5 million. This decrease was to do with recognizing loans 
the Iranian government had made to the corporation. Further it rejected the 
corporations request for compound interest and awarded a simple rate of 8.5 
percent as reasonable in this case. 98 
(D) Foremost Tehran Inc. and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(19s6r 
The Tribunal in this case decided that the combined effect of certain 
acts and omissions by the Iranian partners was such that their impact deprived 
Foremost of its rights as 31% owner of the Pak Dairy Corporation. In reviewing 
the history of the case it stated "on balance that the interference with the 
substance of foremost's rights did not by 19 January 1981, and still less by 27 
May 1980, amount to an expropriation"/00 even though it conceded foreign 
personnel had been asked to leave Iran. It did however, state that the company 
should be compensated for the loss of enjoyment of the property in question, 
particularly the failure of Pak Dairy to pay declared dividends to Foremost. The 
compensation was to be the amount of cash dividends that should have been 
paid in 1979 and 1980 plus interest at 10%.101 
97 Award No 11L 32- 24- I (19th December 1983) reprinted in 4/ran- U.S.C.T R. 122, and 
Final Award No 314- 24-1, 14 August, 1987, quoted by Lagergren, 24 
98 ld, 25,26. 
99 Award No 220- 37/231-1, 11 April 1986, reprinted in 10 Iran- U.S.C.T R. 229, quoted 
by Lagergren, 29. 
)00 Id, 34. 
101 Id, 35. 
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(E) Sea - Land Service Inc, and the Islamic Republic of Iran (1984) 
In the arbitration between .Sea - Land Service Inc and the Government 
of Iran and its Port and Shipping Organization (PSO), the Tribunal ruled that the 
finding of expropriation would require at least that there was deliberate 
government interference with the conduct of Sea -Land's operation,102 and that 
this could not be proved. However $750,000.00 was awarded, as an 
approximation of the unjust enrichment which would have accrued to Iran, for 
the use and benefit of facilities Sea - Land had built, prior to the date when by 
contractual agreement they were to be handed back to the P .S .0. It noted that 
the theory of unjust enrichment "does not permit the tribunal to compensate Sea 
- Land for the loss of unpaid debts, freight charges and termination expenses, 
non of which resulted in the enrichment of P.S.O. or the Government"-103 
(ii) Iraq 
In March 1925 the Iraqi Government granted their first concession to the 
Anglo-French Turkish Petroleum Company. In October 1927 the large Kirkuk 
well was discovered. In 1929 the name of the company was later changed to the 
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). The Iraqi Government developed the 
industrialization of petroleum in the country by granting concessions to other 
foreign companies.104 In 1972 the Iraqi Government nationalized IPC. It agreed 
in principle (as stated in Law 69 of June 1972) to pay compensation for the book 
value of the company. However, it claimed that IPC had failed to develop the 
oil fields it had discovered and was t)lerefore not entitled to the compensation. 
So, although Iraq felt justified in withholding compensation it accepted the duty 
to pay compensation in principle.105 
102 Award No 135- 31- I, 20th June 1984, reprinted in 6Jran- U.S.C.T.R. 149, quoted by 
Lagergren, 38. 
103 ld, 44. 
104 See further, Aramco Handbook, Oil and the Middle East (1968) 93. 
105 Schwarzenberger, 96. 
338 
(iii) Kuwait 
On 23 December 1934 the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) was formed 
when the Gulf Kuwait Company joined with British Petroleum (Kuwait) Ltd. It 
discovered oil in Kuwait in April 1938.106 Later, other companies were granted 
concessions to drill oil in Kuwait, including the Neutral Zone between Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia. American Independent Oil (Aminoil) was one of those 
companies. In 1946 Kuwait oil production increased, until it was the largest 
producer of crude oil in the Middle East. 107 
On 19 September 1977 the Kuwait Government moved to terminate its 
concession agreement of 1948 with Aminoil. The Government explained that 
nationalization had become necessary because of Aminoil' s failure to comply 
with the Government's demands, which were that Aminoil comply with the Abu 
Dhabi formula of 1974, under which royalty levels on oil were 20% and tax levels 
were 85%. Aminoil rejected the takeover. In 1979 Kuwait and Aminoil agreed 
to submit the dispute between the parties to arbitration in Paris.108 
Aminoil asked that it be compensated for the loss of its assets as well as 
profits lost before the decree law. Kuwait claimed Arninoil should pay for 
damage caused to the Company and for failure to make certain capital 
expenditures. 109 The Arbitration Award (American Independent Oil Company v 
Kuwait) was conciliatory, recognizing the changes that had taken place in the 
Middle East since the General Assembly Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources which referred to a State's right to nationalize its 
property with "appropriate compensation". The Tribunal's ruling on the amount 
of compensation (including expectation of future profits) by the company to be 
nationalized and the claims of the oil producing countries to use the Abu Dhabi 
formula: in the result it calculated a reasonable rate of return to be $10 million 
a year, on the basis of an interest rate of 7.5% and an inflation rate of l0%.no 
In deciding on the appropriate amount of compensation to be paid the tribunal 
106 Aramco Handbook (1960) 123. 
107 Aramco Handbook (1968) 98. 
108 ILM 21 (1982) 997-8-9 
109 Tes6n, 326-7. 
110 ILM, 21 (1982) 997-1041. 
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looked at the balance sheet of the financial rights and obligations of the parties 
as at 19th September 1977, and decided $179,750,764 was to be awarded to 
Aminoil payable on 1 July 1982.111 
The decision has been praised as one "which could become the source 
of a consensus for solutions"112 for these kinds of contracts. Not only did both 
parties participate fully in the negotiations, but the Kuwait Government carried 
out the award without any reservations.113 
(iv) Saudi Arabia's Takeover of Aramco 
Negotiations between the Saudi Arabian Government and the Standard 
Oil Company of California (SOCAL) began in mid-February 1933 and a 
concession agreement was signed on 29 May 1933. Article 1 of this Agreement 
provided: 
The Government hereby grants to the company on the terms and 
conditions hereinafter mentioned and with respect to the area 
defined below, the exclusive right, for a period of sixty years 
from the effective date hereof, to explore, prospect, drill for, 
extract, treat, manufacture transport, deal with, carry away and 
export petroleum, asphalt, naphtha, natural greases, owkerite 
and other hydrocarbons and the derivatives of all such products 
It is understood, however, that such right does not include the 
exclusive right to sell crude or refined products within the area 
described below or within Saudi Arabia. 114 
Several months after the agreement was signed, the Standard Oil Company of 
California (SOCAL) established the California Arabian Standard Oil Company 
(CASOC). CASOC's name was changed in 1944 to the Arabian American Oil 
Company (Aramco). 
111 Ibid., 1042. 
112 P-Y Tschanz, The Contribution of the Aminoil Award to the law of State Contracts, 
International Lawyer 18 (1984) 245. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Agreements between the Saudi Arabian Government & the Arabian Oil Company 
(Aramco) (Government Press, 1384 AH (1964). 
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In March 1938 oil was discovered in the east of Saudi Arabia in large 
quantities and on 1 May 1939, King Abdal-Aziz AI Sa'ud turned the valve to 
begin the loading of the first tanker to transport a cargo of Saudi Arabian crude 
oil. Saudi Arabian oil reserves proved extremely large. Between 1946 and 1948 
there was a call for greater market outlets and this development needed 
. . 
enormous capital investment. The Texas Oil Company (now Texaco Inc), Socony 
Vacuum Oil Company (now Mobil Oil Company) and the Standard Oil Company 
(New Jersey)) combined with the California Arabian Standard Oil Company 
(CASOC) to become the owners of the Arabian American Oil Company 
(Aramco) in 1948.115 
The Saudi Arabian Government's intention to gradually take over 
Aramco has been evident since 1973. In that year it signed a participation 
agreement with Aramco by which it would own 25% of the company. This 
percentage was increased to 60% during the following year.116 In 1977 the Saudi 
Arabia Government completed negotiations with Aramco for the takeover, but 
the arrangements were not finalized. The preamble to the Main Agreement of 
31 January 1977 recites that "the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. .. 
desires to exercise full rights of ownership and effective control of the natural 
reserves covered by, the Aramco concession in Saudi Arabia"., and provides for 
the transfer of substantially all Aramco's assets, against compensation as 
determined by the Agreement. In 1980, the Saudi Arabian Government paid 
compensation for all the holdings of Aramco. 
By Decree No. 40 dated 29/3/1409 AH 8/11/1988, the Saudi Arabian 
Council of Ministers approved the basic statue of the new "Saudi Aramco Oil 
Company", "Aramco AI Saudia", which culminated in the Royal decree No. M/8 
dated 4/4/1409 AH (13/11/1988). See Appendix No 2, below, for the text of 
the decree. 
On this basis of mutual respect and good faith problems have been and 
will continue to be solved by co-operation and mutual consent. In particular 
115 Aramco Handbook (1968) 107. Petromin Bulletin 2, No 7 (1988) 10 (in Arabic). 
116 MEES (12/1/1974). Asharq Al-Awsat. International Daily Newspaper of the Arab. Vol. 
11. No. 3636 2/3/1409 (11/11/1988). In Arabic. 
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Aramco has recognized the right of Saudi Arabia to have sovereignty over its 
natural oil resources, without dispute. 
(b) Other Arab Countries 
(i) The Arab Republic of Egypt and the Nationalization of the Suez Canal 
The Suez Canal Company was nationalized according to Decree 185 of 
26 July 1956 by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt Article 1 of 
this Decree provided: 
The Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal (Egyptian 
Joint-Stock Company) is hereby nationalized all its assets, rights 
and obligations which are transferred to the nation ... 
Egypt claimed that the nationalization was for a public purpose and was 
accompanied by an offer to pay compensation. The governments of the United 
States, France and the United Kingdom, while agreeing in principle to the right 
of Egypt to nationalize, challenged what it saw as an arbitrary and unilateral 
manner of exercising that right. They also claimed the Suez Canal was subject 
to international, not domestic, law. 
The compensation claims were referred to arbitration. On the 13 July 
1958 the Compagnie Financiere de Suez was formed: the Agreement stated that 
Egypt undertook to pay in seven instalments 28 million Egyptian pounds to the 
Compagnie Financiere de Suez. 117 
The basis of compensation, was reached for pragmatic reasons rather 
than those of a completely equitable settlement. It was based on the principle 
of the territoriality of nationalization and the new recognition of any 
extra-territorial effects of the Egyptian Nationalization law. In Britain, it became 
evident after 1958 that it would be impossible for claimants to pursue their 
individual claims against the Egyptian government, and that a lump-sum 
117 Schwarzenberger, 84. For further information about the dispute see RO Matthews, 21 
International Organisation (1967) 80. 
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settlement payment by Egypt would be administered, assessed and paid by 
United Kingdom authorities in sterling. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr Amory) explained the agreement 
as follows: 
First, it provides for the return to the owners British property in 
Egypt which has been under sequestration. This and the 
resumption of normal trade are the chief advantages... secure 
under the agreement... where property has been taken over by 
the Egyptian authorities... Egyptianised or has suffered damage 
during sequestration, compensation will be paid from the lump 
sum of £27~ million sterling .... ns 
The value of the property to be returned to Egypt was valued by the owners at 
about 130 Million pounds, a difference that reflected the desire of the nations 
with differing interests in Egypt, to allow the nationalization, settle the armed 
conflict between Egypt, and the United Kingdom and France to America and 
Russia's satisfaction. 
(ii) Libya 
When Libya obtained its independence in 1951 there were almost no 
known natural resources. But oil was discovered in 1959 in commercial 
quantities and the ftrst petroleum export started in 1961. By 1969 petroleum 
production had moved forward rapidly. 
Libya was the frrst oil producing country to nationalize its oil resources 
after the collapse of the Mossadegh Government in Iran (1953). In 1971 Libya 
expropriated the assets of the BP Exploration Company, then in 1973 the Nelson 
Bunker Hunt Oil Company. Perhaps the major motivating factor in these 
nationalizations, was political, a protest against the Iranian occupation of three 
islands in the Arabian Gulf, which was seen by Libya as a collusion between 
118 8 Whiteman Digest of International Law (1967) 1110. 
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Britain and Iran, and a warning to the United States to end its aggressive policy 
towards the Arab nation due to America's support of Israel. 119 
Initially Libya demanded a 51% ownership share but the majority of 
companies which had concessions in Libya rejected the principle of participation. 
In response the Libyan Government expropriated all the assets of other oil 
companies.120 Libya asserted that compensation should be for the book value of 
the affected companies rather than the value of their assets as a going concern. 
Texaco, California Asiatic Oil and Atlantic Richfield refused to accept these 
conditions and demanded arbitration. 
When the subsequent ruling favoured the companies, Libya ignored it, 
claiming that the right to nationalize was not an arbitral issue, but compensated 
them on the assessed book value. 121 In May 1975 the Nelson Banker Hunt Oil 
Company entered into a settlement agreement with the Libyan Govermilent for 
compensation of approximately $19,000,000. 122 Hunt is now seeking to recover 
the proceeds realized by the companies which bought oil from the nationalized 
company prior to 1975, thus indicating his discontent with the Libyan assessed 
"net book value" .123 
(iii) Algeria . 
During the Second World War the French government searched directly 
for oil within France and territories regarded as part of or belonging to France. 
Later the French government searched in the Sahara area and proved the 
existence of the Algerian oil reserves. The commercial exploitation of oil 
coincided with the beginnings of the Algerian War of Independence in 1955. In 
1962 the Algerian War was concluded by the Evian Agreements. Since Algeria 
obtained independence, agreements have been made for the full development of 
119 R Weisberg, The Politics of Crude Oil Pricing in the Middle East {1977) 82. For further 
details see L Turner, The Oil Company in the International System (1978) 133; J Fawcett 
and A Perry, Law· and the international Resource Conflicts (1981) liS. 
120 Ibid. See further R von Mehren & N Kourides, International Arbitrations between States 
and Foreign Private Parties. The Libyan Nationalization Cases, AJIL 75 (1981) 476. 
121 Texaco Arbitration,ILM 17 (1978) 5-6,31-37. 
122 See further Sweeney, Oliver and Leech, 402. 
123 ld. 
344 
the production of gas and oil reserves for industries and the rebuilding of the 
country after the war. 
In the 1960's Algeria began to nationalize the oil industry in stages, and 
by 1969 the government controlled 25% of production. In 1971 it nationalized 
all gas deposits and land pipes, agreeing to supply France with oil at the world 
price. France was not satisfied with this attempt at compensation and withdrew 
all engineers and technicians from the wells. Algeria then agreed to pay 
compensation for the expropriated shares to the French subsidiary. 
The subsidiary company Total Algeria received an appropriate share of 
the oil produced, the company was required to invest certain amounts and 
received benefits if the amounts specified were exceeded. 
It is important to note that though initially Algeria refused compensation, 
it later accepted in principle the right of France to receive appropriate 
compensation for its nationalized property. 124 
(c) Other Third World Countries 
(i) Mexico 
The Mexican nationalization measures stem from the revolution of 1910 
which resulted in heightened nationalism and radical agrarian reform. On 23 
November 1936 Mexico enacted an expropriation law, and on 18 March 1938 the 
properties of seventeen foreign oil companies were expropriated by decree. A 
compensation settlement was not reached until 1941 after a difficult negotiation. 
This has been discussed previously. Mexico initially refused to pay compensation 
claiming that the demands of internal development superseded those of foreign 
countries for payment However, later this decision was reversed and Mexico 
agreed both in principle and in practice to pay compensation.125 
124 A Jones, Oil: The Missed Opportunity (1981) 142-4. See also L Turner, 133; Y A Sayigh, 
The Economics of the Arab World (1978) 551. 
125 Francioni, 266; PM Brown, Mexican Land Laws, AJIL 21 (1927) 294, AJIL 20 (1926) 
519; Carlston, 272. 
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(ii) Cuba 
The Cuban expropriations were directed mainly against enterprises 
owned by the United States, which was seen to have colluded with the previous 
Batista regime in committing crimes against the "national economy" or the "public 
treasury" and in keeping Cuba in an underdeveloped State. The expropriation 
in Cuba began on 4 March 1959 with the Cuban Telephone Company, but 
interference with the American property began on 6 August 1960 according to 
Nationalization Law No 851 of 6 July 1960. Resolution No 1 provided for the 
"compulsory expropriation... of all property and enterprises... and rights and 
interests" of 26 enterprises wholly or principally owned by "nationals of the 
United States of America".126 This was followed by United States action on 6 
July 1960 to amend the Sugar Act 1948 so as to pennit the President to reduce 
the Cuban sugar import quota. As a result the Cuban sugar quota was set at nil 
for 1961.127 Akinsanya argues that as "the basic reasons for Law No 851 was to 
retaliate against the reduction of the Cuban sugar quota, it could be argued that 
the expropriation of US-owned enterprises under Executive Resolution No 1 of 
6 August 1960 was necessary 'for the defense of the national sovereignty' and 
more importantly to force the aliens' home government to alter its policies in a 
way consistent with national interests" .128 However this may be, the Cuban 
government continued to expropriate property owned by United States nationals. 
The claims of many United States citizens for compensation remain unsettled. 
(iii) Peru 
Peruvian nationalization measures were prompted by nationalism, 
advocated by the President Velasco, whose coming to power was facilitated 
because of the unwillingness of the people to accept the concessions granted to 
the international petroleum company. The refineries were expropriated on 8 
October 1968, and this was followed by expropriation effecting banks, agrarian 
reform, sugar refineries, mining companies and the telecommunication industry. 
Compensation agreements proved difficult, but separate agreements were made 
126 ILM 3 (1964) 383. 
127 AJIL 56 (1962) 1104. 
128 Akinsanya, 125. 
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with United States nationals and United States-Peruvian relations were 
normalized. The Peruvian nationalization of private property was again 
compensated for both in principle and in practice, despite the huge internal 
development demands.129 
(iv) Chile 
The Chilean Copper expropriations of July 1971, although primarily 
affecting the interests of United States nationals, were not an anti-American 
political act but ratber part of a process of "economic nationalism" .130 The 
process of nationalization continued under the Allende Government, who was 
eventually brought down the American opposition. A compensation agreement 
for the Copper expropriations was reached in September 1973. Anaconda and 
Kennecott tbe Companies who had owned 80% of Chile's most important foreign 
exchange earner, Copper, were compensated for their assets tbat were 
expropriated in July 1971.131 Prior to this many claims of United States nationals 
had been settled.132 
(v) Tanzania 
From 1967 Tanzania began a process of nationalization of major 
industries, resources, banks and businesses. However, some foreign owned ftrms 
were allowed to continue and some joint ventures were set up between tbe 
government and foreign investors. In such cases tbe Government recognized its 
obligation to pay "full and fair compensation for tbe assets acquired" and 
promised to act "honestly and fairly" towards deprived foreign investment Thus 
provision was made for indemnification in the acquisition of Sisal Estates. 
Subsequently, provisions were made to compensate tbe owners of Sisal 
Estates, but it was decided that as tbe industry was in decline it would not accept 
the liabilities of those plantations. Compensation was paid for landed rental 
129 D.A Gantz, The United States-Peruvian Claims Agreement of 1974,/nternational Lawyer 
10, (1976) 390. 
130 Akinsanya, 133. 
131 ILM 13 (1974) 1189 
132 See Akinsanya, 140. 
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properties, Caltex assets, Bata Shoe Company, The Banks, Insurance Finns, and 
Coffee Plantations expropriated between 1967 and 1973. 
However, a dispute arose later with the United Kingdom over the 
Acquisition of Buildings Act 1971, as the British Government claimed its 
nationitls were being deprived of $4 million without compensation. Tanzania 
justified its action by claiming that by the terms of the Act no compensation was 
to be paid on buildings ten years old. This issue was unresolved, as has the 
nationitlizing of marketing properties belonging to Caltex and Singer Sewing 
Machine of Kenya, without compensation.133 Pressure was brought to bear on 
Tanzania through the failure of the International Development Association to 
provide loans. Again the motivation for these nationalizations was the desire to 
create a more equitable socialist State and to prevent capital leaving the 
country .134 
(vi) Zambia 
On 11 August 1969, the Zambian Government decided to nationitlize or 
acquire 51% of the assets of foreign owned Copper Mining Enterprises. In 
compensation the Roan Selection Trust, Ltd. (RST) received $150 million in 
compensation, together with a ten year sales and management contract. A 
similar arrangement was made with the other major Copper Enterprise, the 
Zambian Anglo-American Trust (Zarnanglo) with compensation at $175 million. 
It has been noted that the sales and management contracts, made as part of 
these settlement turned out to be disastrous for Zarnbia.135 However, as a 
consequence of the compensation agreements the Zambian Government has 
made a good investment climate for foreign investors, as was evident in the 1979 
agreement with a West German Company to prospect for uranium.136 
133 ILM 11 (1972) 106-8 and see Akinsanya, 149. 
134 Akinsanya, 150. 
135 Id, 152 
136 EA Umozurike, Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property and Economic Self 
Determination, East African Law Journal 6 (1970) 95-96, quoted by Akinsanya 154. 
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(vii) Indonesia 
In 1958 almost all foreign enterprises were expropriated by the 
Indonesian government. Indonesia did not implement the promise of payment 
contained in its nationalization laws and later decreed that where enterprises had 
been owned by the Dutch "they would not be compensated at all" .137 
With the end of the Sukarno era and the accession of Suharto, this policy 
was reversed and on 14 December 1966 President Suharto requested that all 
government departments take appropriate measures to return all foreign assets, 
previously nationalized during the last two years of Sukarno's rule.138 Further, 
Indonesia agreed to pay the Netherlands DFI.683 million by 2003.139 The 
expropriations in Indonesia were motivated by nationalistic and political forces. 
By providing for the payment of compensation, Suharto was perhaps motivated 
by the desire to encourage private foreign capital investment 140 
(viii) Sri Lanka 
In April, May and June 1962 Sri Lanka terminated the operations of 
foreign oil companies involved in the distribution of oil products, including the 
assets of Esso, Texaco, Caltex and Shell. In response the United States imposed 
foreign aid sanctions, and claimed that Sri Lanka's refusal to pay prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation violated international law. In spite of this 
the Sri Lankan Government continued its policy ofnationalizing foreign property 
in 1964 and 1970. 
In fact after three years the oil companies resolved their compensation 
disputes.141 That it took such a lengthy period had the effect of discouraging 
137 Domke, 604. 
138 Akinsanya, 170. 
139 GNJ Van Wees, Compensation for Dutch Property Nationalised in East European 
Countries, NYJL 3 (1972) 92. 
140 DN Smith & LT Wells, Conflict Avoidance in Concession Agreementa, Howard 
International Law Journa/17 (1976); 59. 
141 Akinsanya, 172. 
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foreign invesonent in the country. In 1972 attempts were made to give incentives 
to attract again foreign investors. 142 
(4) Conclusion: The Scope of the Duty to Compensate in International Law. 
It must be admitted that there continues to be some authority and some 
state practice in favour of a relatively strict standard of compensation in 
international law. Thus the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in American 
International Group v Islamic Republic of Iran declared that foreign nationals 
were entitled to "the value of the property taken" which was to be "the going 
concern or fair market value" of the propeny. 143 Similarly in Sedco Inc v Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1986), the Tribunal's award stated that Sedco was entitled to 
be compensated, as it had claimed, for the full value, if any, of its equity interest 
in Sediran. A subsequent award would determine the amount of compensation 
and the rate of interest. 144 In a separate opinion, Judge Brower stated that the 
tribunal had abundantly re-confmned that "customary international Jaw continues 
to mandate without qualification that full compensation by given for 
expropriation".145 Other cases between these parties have reached similar 
results, 146 although these can be explained, at least in pan, by the bilateral treaty 
guarantee of full compensation and by the intention of the Algiers Accord itself 
to provide a substantial measure of compensation. 
On the other hand even the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
the impossibility of defining a standard of just compensation that would suit all 
circumstances, and that no definite standards of fairness can be mandated that 
would always be appropriate.147 However, it has accepted that in normal practice 
" for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, just compensation is normally to be 
measured by the "market value of the property at the time of the taking 
contemporaneously paid in money". 148 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
!d. 
ILM 25 ( 1986) 646. 
10 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports (1987) 189. 
ILM 25 (1986) 636. 
E.g. Iran Chevron Oil Company v Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1986) 10 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports (1987) 357. 
Restatement Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1986) vo12, section 
712,206-8. 
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As a matter of international law, however, the evidence tends strongly 
against the traditional standard of prompt, adequate and effective compensation 
as a norm of international law. Thus Jimenez de Arechaga stated . that "the 
classical docoine does not represent the general consensus of States. 
Consequently, it cannot be considered as a rule of customary law".149 Similarly 
the Rapporteur of the Australian Branch of the International Law Association, 
concluded that, "in the light of practice, it is difficult to continue to argue that 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation is a norm of international law, if 
indeed it ever was ... there is no evidence that the Hull rule continues to exist as 
part of the customary international law in the post-World War II period".150 
Therefore the traditional principle of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation for nationalized foreign property is no longer relevant to the 
economic and political reality of Post World War 1.151 The recognition of a 
States right to nationalize, and the rapid economic development of capital 
importing counoies, has resulted in the lapse of any earlier international law 
principles for assessing compensation. But this does not mean that no 
international standards survive. It is generally held that the principle of "unjust 
enrichment" validly applies, so as to require the parties to reach equitable 
settlements. Thus Jimenez de Arechaga stated that: 
.. .if the nationalizing State were to grant no compensation when 
nationalizing alien property, it would enrich itself without 
justification at the expense of a foreign State... The nationalizing 
State would be depriving an alien community of the wealth 
represented by the investments it has made on foreign soil ... 152 
This principle makes it the duty of the nationalizing State to provide 
compensation, a duty which has in practice been adopted by nationalizing nations 
since 1945. 
149 de Arechaga, 184. 
150 Australian Branch Report, 180-1, 936, quoted by Chowdhury, 57, note 48. 
151 Castel, 1150. 
152 de Arechaga, 182. 
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6. The Measure of Compensation 
While the principle of the compensation is accepted by international law 
and United Nations resolutions there is much controversy surrounding the 
procedures for determining compensation. Three issues need to be referred to 
here. 
(1) The Amount of Compensation 
According to the sources already referred to, the amount of 
compensation must be assessed in accordance with the conditions in the 
expropriating State. 153 But this leads to controversy about the extent to which 
those conditions can effectively negative any obligation of compensation. 
Friedman has stated that: 
The assessment of the quantum of compensation has given rise 
to considerable difficulties and it has so far been impossible to 
bring it within the limits of a precise formula. 154 
The Draft Convention of the Organization of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (O.E.C.D.) proposed in 1967 that compensation should 
represent the genuine value of the property affected without undue delay.155 
Implied in the doctrine of acquired rights is that the expropriated alien should 
be compensated for all the elements of the loss sustained. Similarly the model 
Bilateral International Treaty (BID provides that: 
Compensation would be equivalent to the fair market value of 
the investment paid without delay... and effectively realizable.156 
On this basis the following items must be taken into account: (1) the 
value of both the material and immaterial assets of which the alien has been 
deprived; (2) the interest on capital where payment has been deferred; (3) 
153 Domke, 608. 
154 Friedman, 215. 
155 Schwarzenberger, 153 .. 
156 Barovick, Bilateral Treaunent Treaties Ensuring Fair Treaunent for U.S. Investors in 
the Third World, Bus, AM3, (Aug, 23 1982) 5, quoted by Gainer, 1569. 
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indirect damages such as when loss is sustained as a result of incidental 
termination of related contracts; (4) goodwill and future profits.157 But these 
principles tend to conflict with the demands of Third World Countries, who claim 
that compensation for expropriation of foreign property should be calculated on 
the basis of net book value of the assets, i.e. the value of the assets as registered 
on the company's books for tax purposes.158 
The right of the nationalizing State to demand that payment of 
compensation be in accordance with the laws, regulations and circumstances it 
considers pertinent appears to be an important trend within the international 
community. In practice there is a tendency to compromise, with many 
governments unilaterally determining an amount of compensation, which if 
considered unacceptable is then negotiated on the company's behalf by its 
government. 
In almost all cases the compensation paid represents an equitable 
compromise taking into account the economic and social circumstances of the 
developing countries. 
The amount of compensation is determined on the basis of 
equity during the negotiations on a bilateral compromise, taking 
into account the social function of property as a development in 
internal law which has obviously affected international law and 
which is in the final analysis justified bt the economic and social 
circumstances of developing countries. 59 
This practice is reflected in General Assembly resolutions. Resolution 1803 
which confirmed the inalienable right of States to control the disposition of their 
natural resources, but provided that the expropriating State should pay 
"appropriate compensation" in accordance with its own law and international law. 
However this resolution did not mention the amount of compensation to be paid. 
Resolution 88(Xll) adopted by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development Board (UNCTAD) of 19 October 1972 provided that: 
157 Francioni, 261-2. 
158 Tes6n, 351. 
159 0 de Rivero, New Economic Order and International Development Law (1980) 107. 
... Such measures of nationalization as States may adopt in order 
to recover their natural resources are the expression of a 
sovereign power in virtue of which it is for each State to fix the 
amount of compensation and the procedure for these measures 
and any dispute which may arise in the connection falls within 
the sole jurisdiction of its courts ... 160 
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Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973 on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources provided that: 
... each State is entitled to determine the amount of possible 
compensation and the mode of payment. .. 161 
The amount of compensation should be appropriate to the situation. By 
definition appropriateness requires taking all the circumstances of the case into 
considerations. The most important among these is the ability of the State to 
pay, without undue difficulty. The amount should also take the social and 
historical conditions of the country into account. There is not and possibly will 
never be a formula for determining the amount of compensation. The amount 
must be determined on the facts of each case. 
(2) Lump-Sum Agreements 
In practice many international claims arising out of nationalizations have 
been settled by lump-sum payments to the claimant State. However, these 
agreements under which less than full compensation "is accepted are based on 
political and economic reasons, prospects of further trade relations and other 
motives".162 Early examples are the Peace Treaties of 1947 providing for a rate 
of compensation for loss suffered as a result of World War II on the part of 
allied property in the amount of two thirds of the sum necessary to make good 
the loss suffered. The delegates of the Great Powers at the Peace Conference 
emphasised that: 
160 United Nations Document, TD/8423 (1973). 
161 United Nations Document, A/RES 3171 (XXVIII)(1974). 
162 Domke, 609. 
as a matter of legal principle, full compensation ought to be paid 
and... their departure from that principle was due to political 
and economic considerations only.163 
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Western countries have always maintained in practice that the conclusion 
of a lump-sum agreement did not imply a departure from or abdication of the 
traditional international law principle of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. This view has been taken, for example, in the practice of the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 164 In their view the principle of lump-
sum payments does not compromise the principle of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation, since the conclusion of such agreements is "not 
unconnected with political and economic reasons". 165 There were many examples 
of the use of lump-sum payments in the period 1945-1950, following large scale 
nationalization in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, England, 
Hungary and Rumani-a. But the practice has continued to the present time: 
according to Dolzer. .. 
The terms of the treaty between the United States and China, 
entered into 1979... indicate that the general thinking on lump-
sum payments ... has not changed considerably over the past three 
decades" .166 
Writers within the Western tradition of International law similarly insist 
that the practice of concluding lump-sum agreements does not modify the 
established compensation standard. Stevenson stated: 
The lump-sum settlements following post-war nationalization 
programs of the Eastern European countries were negotiated 
compromises and as such do not constitute a departure from the 
traditional international law principle.167 
Some support for this position can also be gained from the statement of 
the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case that: 
163 A Martin, Private Property, Rights and Interests in the Paris Peace Treaties, BYIL 24 
(1947) 284. 
164 Domke, 609. 
165 Akinsanya, 4 7. 
166 Dolzer, 559. 
167 American Society of International Law Proceedings 54 (1960) 112. 
Lump-sum agreements are merely specific agreements... reached 
to meet specific situations.168 
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But despite the debate as to whether these qualify as "evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law", 169 the practice they represent is now common. 
They should "be treated no differently than any other expression of international 
law 11 • 170 
For Third World countries the payment of a lump-sum is a preferred 
form of compensation payment, providing the terms of payment of the lump-sum 
are such that the country does not suffer undue hardship paying. Lump-sum 
payments are attractive in that they immediately resolve the issue, and tend to 
be arrived at on the basis of appropriate rather than full compensation. Lump-
sum agreements were also the usual made of settlement in the nationalizations 
which took place in the Middle Eastern oil producing countries in the early 
1970.171 
But the question remains what is their juridical significance. According 
to Akinsanya: 
It may well be that those States that reject the view that 
lump-sum settlements constitute strong evidence of State practice 
and indeed,an emerging principle of international law... do so 
merely to bolster and reaffirm their claims to nothing short of 
full compensation.172 
(3) The Form of Payment 
As a consequence of the trend to rely on the principle of unjust 
enrichment in compensation cases, the two notions of (a) prompt payment and 
(b) the currency of payment have been brought into dispute. 
168 AA Fatouros, International Claims. Their Settlement by Lump-Sum Agreements, AJIL 
71 (1977) 363. 
169 ld, 364. 
170 RB Lillich & BH Weston, International Claims: their Selllement by Lump-Sum Agreements 
(Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1975) II, quoted by Fatouros, 364. 
171 EJ Paasivirta, Participation of States in International Contracts and the Arbitral Selllement 
of Disputes (Cambridge, PhD Thesis, 1988), 199. 
172 Akinsanya, 48. 
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(a) Prompt Payment 
In the past, deferred payment was the exception rather than the rule.173 
The United States only accepted deferred payments with regard to the Mexican 
land expropriations on the understanding that this was not to constitute a 
precedent. 174 But the requirement of 'promptness' has not been followed in 
modern State practice. The principle of unjust enrichment demands that 
compensation be paid but does not impose time restrictions. Therefore, a 
deferred payment is the rule and prompt payment or payment without undue 
delay in cash is an exception. 175 This is shown by several compensation 
agreements signed by the various western powers in connection with post War 
Eastern European nationalizations and by the Egyptian, Indonesian and Cuban 
nationalizations, referred to already. 176 It has in practice become the usual 
means of meeting compensation payments. 
(b) Currency of Payment 
There is debate as to the desirable currency to use to cover 
compensation payments. Section 190 of the Restatement Second of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States stated that compensation "must be in the form 
of cash or property readily convertible to cash" and if not "must be convertible 
into such currency and withdrawable" where the currency was that of the 
expropriated State.177 
Section 712 of the Third Restatement of 1986 does not specify that 
compensation must be in cash. It indicates that compensation "must be paid 
173 Doman, 1139. 
174 Ibid. The United Nations International Law Commission stated tbat 
It is clear tbat the time limit for the payment of the agreed 
compensation necessarily depends on the circumstances in each case 
and in particular on the expropriating states' resources and actual 
capacity to pay. Even in the case of "partial" compensation very few 
states have in practice been in a sufficiently strong economic and 
financial position to be able to pay the agreed compensation 
immediately and in full. 
Fourth Report on International Responsibility (Rapporteur, FV Garcia Amador) (A/CN 
4/119) (1959) 59. 
175 Francioni, 282 
176 Ibid. 
177 See Akinsanya, 45. 
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equivalent to the value of the property taken and must be paid ... in an 
economically useful form". Further it noticed that "it should be in convertible 
currency but bonds may satisfy." 178 
This rule would in effect require agreement of the foreign investor, and 
would depend on the economic conditions of the expropriating State. However, 
Metzger contends that "there is no international law rule requiring that any other 
than the local currency of the local State, whether it is convertible into foreign 
exchange or not, be paid for taken property" .179 In practice many expropriating 
States maintain that compensation can be paid in public bonds of the 
expropriating State with interest paid annually. Recent State practice in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa reveals many cases where foreign companies were 
compensated through interest bearing public bonds redeemable in five to ten 
years.lso 
Negotiations in September 1954, between the Iranian government and 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company resulted in Iran agreeing to pay compensation 
to the company in ten annual instalments.181 Similarly the Cuban Agrarian 
Reform Law of 1959 provided in Article 3: 
The indemnity shall be paid in redeemable bonds... bonds shall 
be floated in such amount, and under such terms and conditions, 
as may be fixed in due time. The bonds shall be called 
'Agrarian Reform Bonds'... The issue or issues shall be floated 
for a period of twenty years, with annual interest not exceeding 
four and one-half per cent. 182 
However, these bonds have never been issued and no compensation has been 
paid. 183 
178 Third Restatement (1986) 198-9. 
179 SD Metzger. Propeny in International Law, Virginia Law Review 50 (1964) 594,603. 
180 AJdnsanya, 45. · 
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Others assen that the expropriating State may choose to pay in any 
reliable form and even in kind. 184 The Cuban Nationalization Law of 1960 
included a system of compensation linked to sugar expons to the United States. 
In the case of the nationalization of the Bolivian Gulf propenies in 1969, the 
compensation was through the sale of gas to foreign countries.185 Another 
illustration was Libya's offer of oil instead of money to compensate American oil 
companies.186 
Thus each case must be determined by the circumstances of the case: 
although developing countries are supponed by General Assembly Resolution 
3171 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973 which provides that "each State is entitled 
to determine the ... mode of payment", in practice the form of payment tends to 
be a compromise between the interested panies. 
7. Stabilization Clauses and the Quantum of Compensation 
There are many differing opinions about the consequence of a 
stabilization clause, in the case of expropriation when the concession agreement 
provides that the agreement will not be changed during its term without the 
consent of the panies. However there appears to be some agreement that the 
stabilization clause may create an obligation on the pan of the host country to 
pay a higher level of compensation for the termination of the agreement and 
expropriation of the propeny. Here the stabilization clause takes on a fmancial 
function. Jimenez de Arechaga stated that in such cases "the amount of the 
indemnity would have to be much higher than in nonnal cases since the existence 
of such a clause constitutes a most peninent circumstance which must be taken 
into account in determining the appropriate compensation."187 The special 
obligations imposed by the stabilization clauses may mean, for example, that the 
foreign pany has a right to claim compensation for future loss of profits, during 
the time the concession had to run.188 
184 Francioni, 282. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Do!zer, 560. 
187 International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 Hague Recueil (1978, I) I, 308 
quoted by Paasivirta, 137. 
188 de Anlchaga, 192. 
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However, Jimenez de Arechaga has argued that such clauses "are 
unnecessary because international law is always applicable to the cancellation of 
a contract or the nationalization of an enterprise without the payment of 
appropriate compensation" .189 In other respects it has been noted that the rigid 
obligations imposed by stabilization clauses in international law could lead "to a 
complete breakdown of the contractual link", 190 and that in cases of fundamental 
change of circumstances, contracts must be susceptible to review, a review which 
can in the nature of things only occur under municipal law. In practice, the huge 
investment of resources by corporations intending to invest in a foreign country 
has led some to conclude that there "is perhaps an implicit clausula rebus sic 
stantibus" in such economic development agreements.191 According to this view 
it appears the value of a stabilization clause to be political or moral rather than 
legal.192 
8. Conclusions 
As we have seen, until the First World War the traditional conception 
was that when property was expropriated, it must be accompanied by full 
compensation. But there were few cases in which a State interfered with private 
property in circumstances which had international repercussions or which were 
subject to international adjudication. One example is the famous principle of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzow Factory Case to the 
effect that the breach of an express treaty obligation forbidding expropriation 
made the act a wrongful one for which restitution in kind or if possible full 
payment of value plus losses sustained was due. 193 But even apart from treaty 
the standard of compensation held by western countries was stated in the Hull 
rule, which was formulated to explain the United States' position regarding the 
expropriation of its property in Mexico in 1938. This rule stated that the 
standard of compensation required was that it be "prompt, adequate and 
effective". This implies that the compensation which an investor deserves should 
189 Ibid. 
190 Id, 193. 
191 D Flint, Foreign Investment and the New International Economic Order in Hossain & 
Chowdhury (eds) 166. 
!92 Id, 163. 
193 PCJJ Series A No. 17 (1928) 46-7. 
360 
take into account not only the updated value of the physical assets but also the 
loss of expected earnings. 194 
Yet partly as a result of pressure caused by the changing international 
climate and in part as a result of the influence of the newly developing countries, 
there arose a modified rule, stated for example in Resolution 1803 (XVll) of 14 
December 1962 which called for "appropriate compensation" only, avoiding and 
mention of the precise amount to be paid. As a result of this and similar 
resolutions such as Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, the Chapter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and of extensive state practice 
providing for less than full compensation for expropriation (especially through 
lump-sum agreements), the standard of "appropriate compensation" has now 
become a customary rule of international law. Moreover Third World countries 
use the "net book value" or the value of the assets as registered in the companies 
books for tax purposes, as the measure of determining "appropriate 
compensation". 195 They further claim that a State should be entitled to decide 
on the way payment is made, considering all the circumstances. 
Thus the Hull rule is no longer the applical3le rule of customary 
international law. There is a trend to balance this new standard of" appropriate 
compensation " with the principle of unjust enrichment, with the latter, if not 
itself a customary rule of international law, at least providing the underpinning 
in principle for the new developments.196 
!94 Tes6n, 351. 
195 Ibid. 
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The problem of the law governing concession agreements and the 
permanent sovereignty of States over their natural resources is, by its very nature, 
not subject to a single comprehensive solution. But a general approach to the 
problem may, however, be found in the norms of modern international law. 
Until the Second World War, concession agreements were created as a 
legacy of the colonial world. Oil producing states were economically, politically 
and militarily tied to the interests of more powerful independent states, generally 
the superpowers. However, by 1952, these States had begun to assert their rights 
to control their own natural resources. From this time on, developing nations 
have taken an active and successful interest in the creation of new principles and 
rules of national and international law regulating these questions. 
This became evident, in the Sixth Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1952, when Resolution 545 was passed. This asserted the right of 
all peoples and nations to self-determination, a right which involved a number 
of economic and social aspects. In particular, it was accepted that political 
independence required economic independence, and that the acquiring of this 
right included a nation's sovereignty over its own natural wealth and resources. 
From this time the issue of permanent sovereignty was raised many times 
in the United Nations. On 14 December 1962 the operative principles which 
were to form the core of the doctrine on permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources were adopted by the General Assembly with a remarkable degree of 
consensus. Resolution 1803 (XVII) and subsequent similar resolutions, which 
were strongly supported by developing countries, are considered the cornerstone 
of the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. But these 
resolutions recognize that this right is qualified by corresponding obligations and 
duties arising out of international law. 1 
1 See Chapter 6. 
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In Chapter One we have seen that a concession agreement involves the 
granting of a franchise, license, patent, charter, monopoly or privilege to a 
national or foreign company by a state within an exclusive area of its territory for 
a period of time. This definition has been accepted by international jurists to 
include economic and political concessions, although only the former are dealt 
with in this thesis. 
In Chapter Two, I argued that there is an inherent conflict between oil 
importing and oil producing states, the former preferring international law, the 
latter municipal Jaw, as the basis for concession arrangements. This conflict is 
at present most successfully contained by the use of arbitration. Further, the 
validity of choice of forum clauses has been accepted by international law and 
most courts as a valid grant of jurisdiction. However, Third World countries are 
more likely to protect themselves by stipulating national forums for the 
settlement of disputes. This position of third world countries has been reflected 
in United Nations resolutions since 1952, and international conventions. I also 
demonstrated that Islamic Shari'ah covers both religious jurisprudence and the 
jurisprudence of the State and produces similar results to international . law. 
In Chapter Three, I showed how some oil producing states have 
established their own dispute settlement mechanisms. Two important bodies are 
OPEC, established in 1960, and OAPEC, established in 1968. OAPEC has a 
functioning judicial tribunal to settle disputes between member countries, and 
also between member countries and foreign oil companies. The establishment 
of these bodies ensures that the interests of oil producing States are considered 
and that their laws rather than the laws of other countries are used to settle 
disputes. 
Chapter Four examines limitations on the choice of law and choice of 
forum which are recognized by conventions, courts, and tribunals, despite the 
recognition of the freedom of parties to chose the applicable law and forum. In 
summary, the relevant conventions have allowed for effect to be given to the 
mandatory rules of countries which have a close connection with the case, while 
legislative restrictions include cases where the contract is contrary to public policy 
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cases, where it is illegal by the proper law and some cases where it is illegal 
under interstate or foreign law. 
Chapter Five argues that in principle the national law of the oil 
producing State should govern the substance of an oil concession agreement, but 
that if this principle is not submitted to, then other laws, including international 
law, can be chosen by the parties as the applicable law. Further, there has been 
a trend in recent years to the express or implicit internationalization of oil 
concession agreements. 
Chapter Six examines the development of the concept of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources. 
sovereignty is concurrent with the 
It argues that the history of permanent 
history of the struggle between capital 
exporting and importing countries, and the economic development of the latter. 
The consequence of the acceptance of this concept, as is evident in United 
Nations resolutions between 1952 and 1974, is that developing States should 
acquire a higher degree of control over foreign enterprises involved in their 
States. This should allow them to share the benefits of this control among the 
people of the State. This right was, however, qualified by corresponding 
obligations and duties arising out of international law. General Assembly 
resolutions in general have no binding effect on member States. However, these 
resolutions support the third world demand to control their own natural 
resources. Chapter Six also discusses: 
* 
* 
I argued: 
* 
the consequences of the acceptance of this principle in the 
new international economic order. 
in particular, its use in the renegotiation and revision of 
the older concession agreements. 
that one result is that concession agreements granted after 
1952 are of much shorter duration than the older 
agreements. 
* 
* 
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that the area covered by these agreements has become 
more limited, and includes relinquishment and joint-venture 
clauses. 
that the principle has allowed progressively greater State 
control over the control and management of foreign oil 
companies. 
The second major issue arising from the principle of permanent sovereignty was 
the right of States to nationalize foreign oil companies. Nationalization was 
regarded as one of the means of exercising that sovereignty. Here, I argued that: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Nationalization, the right of a people to control their 
natural resources, has now been recognized as a right, 
providing adequate compensation is paid. 
Disputes arising from the above issues should be dealt with 
in accordance with the law of the State unless by mutual 
agreement, recourse to arbitration or international 
adjudication is made. 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources is the right 
of a people as a whole. 
There are limits on the power of the State. In particular, 
the relations between States and foreign investors are 
governed by the principle of good faith. 
I argued that pre-independence and post-independence concessions 
should not be treated at the same level, and that as the former were not based 
on the sovereign equality of States, they conflicted with various United Nations 
resolutions and were against the spirit of decolonization. The concept of 
permanent sovereignty is now established in international law. Its acceptance has 
altered the nature of concession agreements, in ways which are much more 
favourable to the exporting State's interests. 
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The concept of permanent sovereignty is also evident in Islamic Shari'ah. 
Consent to treaties and conventions is only given by virtue of sovereignty whereby 
the State chooses to limit its sovereign rights and to be bound by international 
legal obligations. Although sovereignty is nominally vested in God, an Imam is 
empowered to grant exploration rights, and to take out whatever minerals are 
discovered, for the benefit of the people. In Islamic Shari'ah a pledge applies to 
all contracts, obligations and covenants entered into by an individual. 
In Chapter Seven, I looked at the theory of fundamental change of 
circumstances, which has been relied on by many oil producing countries around 
the world to claims to revision of existing oil concession agreements. I showed 
that the majority of writers on international law are in agreement that rebus sic 
stantibus is an objective rule of law operating independently of the intention of 
the parties. It allows that the revision and termination of an agreement, when 
the circumstances have changed or if the agreement was based upon inequality, 
is justifiable. However, it does not give one party the right to act unilaterally to 
terminate or suspend obligations where disputes occur involving the doctrine. It 
requires that parties co-operate in seeking an impartial resolution of their 
controversy. 
I went on to argue that in a conflict between the right of the State to 
nationalize foreign property and the principle of stabilization clauses in 
concession agreements, international law recognizes the right of the State to 
nationalize foreign property. However, a State cannot entirely disregard its 
contractual obligations with private foreign companies in terminating or amending 
a contract. Where a State terminates a contract with a private foreign company, 
compensation may be payable according to the standard of international law. I 
concluded that the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda begins to operate once the 
conditions for rebus sic stantibus cease to operate. 
In Chapter Eight, I discussed the theory of fundamental change of 
circumstances according to the opinion of Islamic jurists, and the procedures 
which should be followed under Islamic Shari' ah in the case of contractual and 
treaty amendment or termination on grounds of change of circumstances. I 
showed that the concept of change of circumstances could apply where the 
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change is fundamental, where it is unexpected, and where the execution of the 
agreement will result in substantial difficulty or damage to some party. This 
interpretation is found in both the principal sources of Islamic Shari'ah, the Holy 
Qur'an and the Sunnah (the practice and tradition of the last of God's 
messengers, Muhammad). 
As the domestic law of many oil producing States, Islamic Shari'ah 
supports the use of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus when seeking renegotiation 
or amendments to existing oil concession agreements, especially where these 
agreements spanned a considerable period of time and where circumstances have 
changed since the signing of the agreement. 
In Chapter Nine, I noted how, due to the influence of third world 
nations, the traditional view that expropriation should occur only in exceptional 
cases of public utility and should be accompanied by prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation, had changed. I showed the historical development of a 
State's legal right to expropriate property, based on the principle of permanent 
sovereignty. I showed that in modern times expropriation is to be considered 
lawful in international law, providing the expropriation is in the public interest, 
without discrimination, and is accompanied by adequate compensation. 
However, there is an implicit conflict of interest in the defmition of the 
terms non-discrimination and public interest. This interest reflects the conflicting 
economic concerns of oil producing States and foreign companies. The right of 
a State to expropriate its natural resources is a corollary of the right of 
permanent sovereignty. The stabilization clauses will not prevent the State from 
exercising its right to expropriate its natural resources. The stabilization clauses 
only means that the State is not legally allowed to expropriate private property 
without compensation.2 
In Islamic Shari'ah the doctrine of Durura allows for the disregarding of 
a law, even of an economic or political nature, if the basis for doing so is the 
protection of the property of a State, or its very existence, or the protection of 
2 FR Tes6n, State Contracts and Oil Expropriations; The Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration, 
Virginia Journal of International Law 24 (1984) 344. 
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life. The State has the right to intervene in the economic life of the people, as 
part of ... 
the changing conditions of modern economic life which is 
becoming more complex and interdependent.3 
Should contractual obligations be terminated by the State, under the doctrine of 
Durura, it is not considered an expropriation of private property, as this is not 
recognized in Islamic Shari'ah. 
In Chapter Ten, I examined the compensation controversy that emerged 
during the early twentieth century. Here the conflict between Third World 
opinion and that of the industrial western world clearly emerges. The western 
concept of compensation is embodied in the Hull formula of "prompt, adequate 
and effect" compensation; the Third World's view in the concept of "appropriate" 
compensation. Appropriate compensation considers the ability of the host State 
to pay, whether there has been undue enrichment as a result of the colonial 
situation, and the contribution of the enterprise to the economic and social 
development of the country and its respect for labour law and its reinvestment 
policies, among the factors to be considered . when determining the amount of 
compensation. 
In discussing a range of nationalization cases, I conclude that it is 
impossible to define a standard of just compensation that will suit all 
circumstances, and that no definite standards of fairness can be mandated that 
will be universally appropriate. It follows that there is no sufficient evidence that 
the Hull rule became a part of customary international law. No foreign oil 
company has received full or adequate compensation as defined by that rule. 
The standard of appropriate compensation has become a rule of customary 
international law, and is recognized among the States of third world as such. A 
further feature of this period is that lump sum agreements, providing for partial 
3 MN Siddiqi, Muslim Economic Thinking. A Survey of Contemporary Literature, in K 
Ahmad (ed), Studies in Islamic Economies (1980) 211, quoted by H Moinuddin, The 
Charter of the Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of Economic Co-operation Among 
Its Member States (1987) 56. 
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circumstances, have regularly been made. Thus, what can be said is that the 
principle of "unjust enrichment" validly applies and requires parties in a 
nationalization dispute to reach equitable settlements. Thus compensation must 
be paid and the amount must be assessed in accordance with the conditions in 
the expropriating State. 
In Islamic Shari'ah compensation for expropriation of property is 
considered an obligation. The amount to be paid depends principally on the 
value of the property taken, since Islamic Shari'ah adopts a fairly strict standard 
of compensation. 
To conclude, international law has changed substantially during this 
century, to reflect more clearly the interests of oil-exporting States in retaining, 
and in many cases regaining, control over their natural resources. Principles 
relating to the choice of law in concession contracts, the termination or 
modification of such contracts and of treaties protecting foreign investment, the 
law relating to expropriation of natural resources and the level of compensation 
payable - all these have changed, so that the present position reflects a more 
equitable balance between the interests of the various countries and parties 
involved. This more equitable situation also more clearly reflects and 
corresponds to the principles of Islamic Shari 'ah. But underlying all these 
changes there is also the constant principle of good faith, on both sides, again 
reflected in Islamic Shari'ah. 
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APPENDIX NO. 1 
The Jurisdiction of the Judicial Tribunal of OAPEC 
1. The OAPEC Agreement. 
Article 23, provides in the fust paragraph that the Judicial Tribunal has 
the following jurisdiction. 
(a) The disputes which are related to the interpretation and 
application of this agreement and the execution of obligations due. 
(b) Disputes which arise between two or more members of the 
organization in the field of oil activity. 
(c) The disputes, decided by the Council that are in the Tribunal's 
Jurisdiction. 
In the second paragraph this article provides that the Tribunal has the 
optional jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the parties as following: 
(a) The disputes between any member, and the petroleum companies 
which are working in that member's territory. 
(b) The disputes between a member and another member petroleum 
company. 
(c) The disputes between two or more members of the organization 
except that mentioned in paragraph (1) of this article. 
2. The Judicial Tribunal Protocol, Article 24. 
1 - The Tribunal has the right of jurisdiction in:-
(a) The disputes which are related to the interpretation and 
application of the agreement, and the execution of obligations due. 
All member countries, organizations and companies connected to 
the organizations are accepted as parties of the disputes. 
Between two or more of the member countries. 
370 
Between two or more of the companies that are connected 
to the organization. 
Between the member countries and those companies. 
Between the organizations of any member country or the 
above mentioned companies. 
(b) The disputes that exist between two or more members of the 
organization, relating to the field of petroleum activity, on the 
condition that it is not related in any way to the territorial 
sovereignty of the member countries, participating in the disputes. 
(c) The disputes that the OAPEC Council decides are the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal are outlined above in paragraph (B). 
2 - In accordance with the agreement between the parties of the disputes, 
the following disputes may be submitted to the Tribunal for judgement. 
(a) The disputes between any member, and the petroleum companies 
which are working in that member's territory. 
(b) The disputes between a member and another member petroleum 
company. 
(c) The disputes between two or more members of the organization 
except that mentioned in section ( l) of this article. 
Article 25: 
The Tribunal may give a consultation in legal problems referred to it by 
approval of the Minister's Council. The rules of procedure show the rules of 
applying and reviewing a request and giving the consultation. 
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Article 26: 
The Tribunal derives its authority to judge the disputes that are 
mentioned in article (24) in the first paragraph of this protocol, from the Islamic 
Shari'ah and the International law which is applicable in this matter. 
(a) The organization's agreement and the international convention 
which oblige the dispute's parties. 
(b) The customs internationally compulsive. 
(c) The general principles of law applied in the international society. 
(d) The general principles in the countries members' laws. 
(e) The court's judgements and the trend of the great jurists in the 
public law in all the countries members is to be drawn on as 
required. 
For those disputes which are included in article (24) the Tribunal is to 
judge them according to the most suitable law, to govern what it believes to be 
the dispute. 
Article 27: 
The judgements of the Tribunal is considered final, and parties to its 
disputes are obliged to abide by its decisions, and further it has executive power 
in member countries. 
Following judgement, the parties concerned should present the judgement 
to those local authorities with the power to enforce the decision. The local 
authority should ascertain that the presented document is authentic before 
enforcing the judgement. 
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APPENDIX NO. 2 
Saudi Arabia's Takeover of Aramco 
In January 1984 a senior Saudi employee of Ararnco Mr. Ali Al Naemy 
was nominated as the first Saudi president of the Aramco company. This 
position was renegotiated in April 1987 when it was assumed by the Saudi 
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Mr. Hisham Nazer, and Ali AI 
Naemy was nominated as executive president. 
By No 40, [Date 29/3/1409 AH] 8/11/1988, the Saudi Arabian Council 
of Ministers approved the basic statue of the new "Saudi Aramco Company", 
"Aramco Al Saudia". "Saudi Aramco" which culminated in the royal decree No. 
M/8 [date 4/4/1409 AH] 13/11 1988 as follows: 
"The Council approved the basic statute of the Saudi Arabian 
Oil Company. . .. This basic statute defines the organizational 
structure of the petroleum utilities earlier owned by the 
Kingdom. The system does not constitute any change in the 
situation or privileges of Saudi employees and contractors. The 
technical, administrative and marketing relations with petroleum 
companies will continue. 
Negotiations with some companies on joint projects have entered 
their final stage and some agreements will be concluded soon. 
The monarch issued directions to Mr. Hisham Nazer (Minister 
of Petroleum and Mineral Resources) to resume effons to 
enable the Kingdom to panicipate in the marketing process in 
a way that secures enough supplies for consumers. He noted 
that joint projects enhance relations and peace among nations." 
The main points in the speech by the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources, Mr. Hisham Nazer to the editors of Saudi Newspaper and Magazines 
on [26/3/1409 AH], 5/11/1988, are as follows: 
First: 1 The System of Saudi ARabia Oil Company. The 
purpose of issuing this system is to provide the 
foundations for a legal basis which will facilitate 
the administration previously owned by the 
Arabian American Oil Company, thereby rectifying 
the current situation. 
2 Special considerations in the company's formation.' 
To depart from the current situation of the 
company and to be rid of the restrictions of the 
American rules and regulations, which when it 
was an American company limited it.2 To have the 
freedom to market Saudi-marketing body which 
would work in the interest of the Kingdom. 
Second: Important points which should be considered when 
referring to the company. 
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1 This company has been established not to extricate from 
our previous partners, but to continue to co-operate with 
the foreign companies to progress, and to promote the 
company more widely in a variety of areas. 
2 We can't do without the advanced technical experience 
which these companies offer, and especially American 
technology in the fields of exploration and drilling. 
3 This subject should not be given more importance than it 
warrants, and that it not be formulated in terms of a 
radical national movement. 3 
The Saudi Arabia is to control 50% of Texaco Company. 
A joint venture was accordingly signed on 10 November 1988 with the Texaco Oil 
Company. In return for allowing Texaco to purchase 600,000 barrels of crude oil 
a day at regular market prices. Saudi Arabia will pay $US 812 million to control 
50% of its oil refineries and distribution network in twenty three states in 
America. 
Saudi Arabia's Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Mr 
Hisham Nazer said in London on 10 November following the signature of the 
Saudi-Texaco agreement: 
... when we started restructuring the oil industry in Saudi Arabia 
two years ago, we began by defining the functions of our various 
oil entities such as Aramco, Petroleum which is the organization 
1 Asharq AI Awsat, International Daily Newspaper of the Arab, Volll,No 36362/31/1409 
AH (11/11/1988) (in Arabic). 
2 Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia No 3236, 18/4/1409 AH (11/25/1988). 
Translation quoted by Riyadh Newspaper, Vol IV, No 144, 1/4/1409 AH (10/12/88). 
3 Information provided by Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Saudi ARabia 
1988 (translated by the author). 
responsible for industrializing the oil related products and 
refining and product distribution within the Kingdom, and other 
related industrial enterprises. With regard to Aramco the first 
step we took was to create a marketing subsidiary known as 
Saudi Petroleum International and then a refming subsidiary 
known as Saudi Refining International which has just signed its 
first major venture in the business. Each of these is owned by 
subsidiaries of Saudi Aramco. You have no doubt heard that a 
couple of days ago the Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers 
approved the Charter of the new Saudi Aramco which will be 
managing the assets which the Kingdom bought a few years ago. 
Now, the creation of this Saudi National Company will not have 
any impact on the current administrative and technical 
relationship between the new company and the ex-Aramco 
partners. On the contrary, as you have seen, we have already 
embarked with one of the partners - Texaco - on a very major 
step which is very important for the fulfilment of the objectives 
I have just outlined. 
What we will do from now on is to continue to get into the 
market, in order to secure for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia its 
proper share in the world market. We will continue, in the 
efficient management of the oil industry in Saudi Arabia. 
Probably, right now Saudi Arabia has the lowest cost of 
production, and we will continued to cut that cost even further 
as far as we can and we will continue the process of training 
Saudi nationals to assume more and greater responsibility - as 
is already happening in Saudi Aramco, Saudi Petroleum 
International and Saudi Refining International. 
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A summary of the speech of the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources to the editors of Saudi Newspaper and Magazines of [26/31/1409 AH] 
Sill/1988 regarding the participated transaction with Texaco, is as follows; 
The target of this transaction between Saudi Arabia and 
Texaco Company is to achieve an integration in the 
manufacturing of Saudi oil 
The most important features of this transaction are: 
(1) To guarantee marketing 600 barrels of Saudi raw oil and to enter 
other similar projects which will assist a full marketing guarantee 
for the Kingdom. 
(2) To compensate for a part of the national income, in case of a 
decrease in the price of raw oil, in comparison with that of the 
refined production market which is frequently more constant and 
stable. 
r-----------------------------------------------------------~--------~ 
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(3) The importance of the integration of the states in oil manufacture, 
starting from drilling and production up to its transportation and 
marketing until it reaches the consumer. It is important to 
achieve the greatest possible revenue so that historically this step 
will be an important one for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
( 4) The time and the situation in which this transaction is being made 
is a rate and good opportunity for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
(5) The American market is very important for the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia as America is its most developed market. This is because 
it is likely that an increase in the orders for products will come 
from that market. 
Therefore this transaction is considered to be a way of entering the 
market. The Minister also noted some important points in talking and writing 
about this transaction. 
1. It should be apparent that the Kingdom does not intend 
at all to create a petroleum market monopoly and there 
is no suggestion that the Kingdom has this intention and 
further to do so would result in many problems as there 
ate American rules against monopoly and flooding. 
2. The Kingdom does not seek beyond the participation, to 
control the oil price or the product. 
3. This transaction will promote the traditional relationship between 
the United States and the Kingdom, where the American market 
is the greatest consumer and the Kingdom reserves all necessary 
supplies for this market. ·Thus, this transaction will strengthen the 
exchange of common interests. 
4. This transaction will promote the fruitful historical relationship 
between American oil companies and the Kingdom.4 · 
The new Agreement between the Government · of Saudi Arabia and 
Aramco concluded on 1/31!1977 reflects the bond between these parties, the 
foundations of which were laid in their Agreement in 1933. 
4 Ibid. 
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